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There are, on average, over twenty-five accidental gas explosions every year in the 
UK, each requiring an investigation to determine the origin and cause, in order to 
satisfy regulatory requirements, or for the purposes of criminal or civil litigation. The 
most important conclusion to be drawn from the investigation is the identification of the 
source of the gas release. This is most often determined through interpretation of the 
severity of pressure and thermal damage to the building and its contents. 
Guidance in reference books states that gas explosions exhibit characteristic pressure 
and thermal damage dependent upon the concentration of the fuel/air mixture prior to 
ignition. It is believed that a number of investigations have resulted in the incorrect 
apportion of blame as a consequence of the misinterpretation of forensic evidence. 
The key objectives of the study were to answer three questions. Firstly, can ignition of 
a fuel lean or fuel rich mixture cause significant structural damage to a building? 
Secondly, is it possible to determine the gas concentration in a building, prior to 
ignition, from the severity of the thermal damage? Thirdly, do materials exposed to a 
transient flame front always exhibit thermal damage?  
The results of four experimental programmes, and over one hundred and fifty explosion 
tests, are reported in this thesis. Explosion tests were conducted in explosion 
chambers ranging from 1 m3 to 180 m3. Experiments were conducted in single and 
interconnected enclosures, with and without obstacles (including furniture) and with a 
number of ‘marker’ boards to assess the severity of thermal damage. A number of 
parameters were varied; including, fuel type, concentration, distribution of gas, 
congestion, ignition position and vent size and failure pressure.  
The results demonstrate that under the right conditions, fuel lean and fuel rich 
explosions can cause overpressures that have the potential to structurally damage 
buildings (> 200 mbar).  
A number of mechanisms have been proposed, detailing the manner in which gas 
explosions propagate from one room to another. This knowledge provides a valuable 
new insight into how complex a vented explosion in a typical building can be, and how 
the design and construction of a building can affect the magnitude of the explosion.  
Several causes of the development of high overpressures have been identified; the 
ignition of a flammable cloud outside the vent opening(s), the sudden increase in mass 
combustion as a turbulent mixture in a secondary compartment is ignited by a 
viii Abstract 
propagating flame front passing through an interconnecting doorway, and the highly 
turbulent ‘jetting’ expanding flame, driven by the venting process, propagating through 
a doorway and towards a vent opening in a secondary enclosure. 
Evidence is presented that shows it is possible to generate pressures capable of 
causing structural damage to buildings with volume blockages of as little as 0.57%, if 
vent openings do not allow sufficient outflow. However, the obstacle geometry, and its 
location to other obstacles and the enclosure, were found to be critical in the 
development, or otherwise, of damaging overpressures.  
The experiments have demonstrated that it is possible to use the severity and extent of 
thermal damage to wall coverings and wood surfaces, sustained during a gas 
explosion, to provide useful information on the gas concentration, its distribution 
throughout the building prior to ignition and the depth of any flammable layer. It is 
demonstrated that it is possible to assess the severity of the thermal damage to various 
materials in order to estimate the natural gas concentration prior to the explosion to the 
nearest 2%.  
The most suitable materials, in terms of forensic indicators, appear to be softwood 
covered with either gloss varnish or white oil based gloss paint. Such surfaces are 
common in buildings as door frames, window frames, etc. However, it is shown that 
quick drying paints are less susceptible to thermal damage and may cause the 
misinterpretation of evidence which could lead to an incorrect diagnosis of the origin 
and cause of an explosion.  
In tests where a flammable gas/air layer was present, thermal damage may be 
observed above the nominal layer boundary (for natural gas), down to the lowest level 
where the concentration was originally above 8% ± 1%. It is shown to be possible to 
estimate the layer depth from the damage to an accuracy of approximately 15 cm.  
The results of the experimental programmes presented in this thesis, provide new 
knowledge and understanding of the development of gas explosions in buildings and 
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PREFACE 
This research is related to the investigation of accidental gas explosions in dwellings. It 
is primarily concerned with the interpretation of forensic evidence found at the scene of 
an explosion such that the composition and distribution of a fuel/air mixture, prior to its 
ignition, may be estimated and used to correctly determine the origin and cause of the 
explosion. 
To correctly interpret the forensic evidence presented through pressure generation and 
thermal damage requires knowledge and understanding of a wide range of scientific 
and engineering principles, which include, the properties and characteristics of 
hydrocarbons, the installation of gas distribution and consumer pipework and 
appliances, the distribution and build-up of flammable mixtures following a release of 
gas, flame propagation following ignition of a flammable gas/air mixture, the generation 
of pressure through flame propagation and the response of structures to flame and 
pressure. Consequently, it was recognised that whilst the task of completing such a 
broad literature review was a significant challenge, the main objective of the research 
would only be achievable if a significant part of the experimental work was conducted 
by others.  
Fortunately, my role within the Major Hazards Research and Testing department at 
DNV GL meant I had access to the results of a number of extensive large-scale 
experimental programmes that had been undertaken by British Gas Research and 
Development (including MRS, BG Technology and Advantica), which for budgetary 
and/or political reasons had not been analysed or published. These research 
programmes were comprehensive and covered subject matter that still has not been 
reported in the literature to date. Accordingly, it was decided that it would be of benefit 
to the explosion research community and gas industry if the results of these 
experimental programmes were published as part of a wider PhD study. This research 
therefore consists of the analysis of five distinct experimental programmes to 
determine the effects of parametric variations on vented gas explosions and to 
characterise the evidential thermal damage that is a consequence of the exposure to a 
transient flame front. Of these experimental programmes, two were undertaken by 
MRS (one in collaboration with FRS), one was undertaken by Advantica and the 
remaining two were undertaken by me.  
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The experimental programmes carried out are listed as follows: 
1 Large-scale vented gas explosion tests in a multiple compartment chamber. 
Conducted in 1984 by the Fire Research Station (FRS) on behalf of the 
Midlands Research Station (MRS). The explosion tests carried out in this 
programme considered both the effects of interconnected rooms and the 
characterisation of thermal damage. 
2 Large-scale vented explosion tests in a 180 m3 explosion chamber with 
obstacle arrays. Conducted in 1993 by MRS to characterise an explosion 
chamber, this experimental work has been analysed by the author with regard 
to the effects of congestion on pressure generation and flame speed. 
3 Large-scale vented explosion tests in a 70 m3 explosion chamber. Conducted 
in 2000 by Advantica. The explosion tests carried out in this programme were 
concerned with the characterisation of thermal damage. 
4 Large-scale vented explosion tests carried out in a 70 m3 explosion chamber. 
The explosion tests carried out in this programme were conducted by the 
author and were concerned with the effects of furniture on vented explosions 
and the characterisation of thermal damage. 
5 Small-scale confined explosion tests carried out in a 1 m3 explosion vessel 
located at the University of Leeds. The explosion tests carried out in this 
programme were conducted by the author and Clara Huéscar and were 
concerned with the characterisation of thermal damage. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. GAS EXPLOSIONS IN DWELLINGS 
1.1. Introduction 
Natural gas and LPG are common fuels that have been used safely in the home for 
many decades. However, when there is a release of gas within a dwelling, or gas 
escaping from a leaking main or service migrates into a building, an explosion may 
occur, resulting in a rapid, uncontrolled liberation of energy. The sequence of events 
leading to an explosion in a dwelling are shown in Figure 1-1, which shows that specific 
conditions in respect of the concentration of gas are needed, together with a source of 
ignition, before an explosion can occur. 
 
Figure 1-1 Sequence of events required to cause a gas explosion 
To help prevent explosions, natural gas and LPG are odorised, which makes an 
escape of gas detectible at very small concentrations (20% of the lower flammability 
limit; i.e. 1% gas in air for natural gas and 0.4% gas in air for LPG). Furthermore, the 
UK gas industry has a dedicated emergency service that responds to reported gas 
escapes 24 hours/day and 365 days/year. This service, combined with a buried 
pipework replacement programme (replacing ageing metallic gas mains and service 
pipes) and the enforcement of stringent regulation and standards governing the correct 
installation and maintenance of gas pipework and appliances [1] means that the 
likelihood of a gas explosion is relatively low. In a 12 month period during 2012/13, 
there were twenty-six gas explosions in dwellings in the UK [2], with the number of 
households recorded at 26.4 million [3].  




Gas migrates into 
building
Gas mixes with air 
to form flammable 
mixture
Ignition
Explosion Thermal damagePressure damage
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During the same period, there were over 16,000 public reported gas escapes, of which 
there were 686 occurrences where gas escaping from an outside gas main or service 
entered an adjacent building [4]. These gas-in-building events represent a significantly 
higher fire and explosion risk to members of the public than external gas escapes and 
are a strong indicator of the safety of the gas network.  
The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) statistics on reported gas escapes, gas-in-
building events and gas explosions [2, 4] demonstrate that only a small proportion of 
gas escapes (< 4%) have the potential to cause the build-up of a flammable layer 
within a dwelling, and of those only a fraction actually lead to an explosion. Ideally, the 
safety measures described above would eliminate the occurrence of explosions, but in 
practice it is not possible to guarantee that a hazardous situation will not arise (e.g. 
during the same 12 month period of 2012/13, 115 buried gas pipes were damaged by 
third parties during excavation works). Nevertheless, the overall risk of being killed in a 
gas explosion in a dwelling is very low, and this is reflected in a comparison of the 
relative hazard from different sources of risk in the UK given in Table 1-1. The risk 
values have been calculated using 2012/2013 Office for National Statistics (ONS) and 
HSE fatality data [2, 5, 6], and by assuming a UK population of 63.7 million [7]. 
Table 1-1 Comparison of gas explosions with some every day risks 
Cause of Death Annual Risk of Death Annual Risk/Million People 
Cancer 1 in 390 2564 
Heart disease 1 in 404 2475 
Respiratory disease 1 in 809 1236 
Road traffic accident 1 in 35,280 28 
Homicide 1 in 96,690 10 
Accident at work 1 in 347,648 2.9 
Lightning strike 1 in 20,627,133 0.05 
Gas explosion 1 in 30,940,700 0.03 
 
Whilst the risk of an explosion in the UK has been shown to be small, there are still, on 
average, over twenty-five accidental gas explosions every year. These explosions, on 
average each year, cause two fatalities, thirty-two non-fatal injuries [2], and cost the UK 
millions of pounds. Indeed, in 2005, Transco received the UK’s largest fine, £15 million, 
for causing a gas explosion in a bungalow in Larkhall, Lanarkshire, which tragically 
killed four persons.  
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To reduce the number of gas explosions, the HSE have developed a legislative 
framework that requires conveyors of gas to investigate releases that could have 
resulted in a fire or an explosion, to determine the source of the release and the reason 
for it. This framework is enacted under the Health and safety at Work etc. Act 1974 [8] 
and enforced through the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996 (GS(M)R) [9]. 
1.2. The Investigation of Gas Explosions 
The investigation of explosions in buildings is undertaken by a number of parties 
including regulatory and enforcing bodies (e.g. HSE), fire investigators and forensic 
scientists and engineers working on behalf of gas conveyors and insurers. The range 
of activities carried out by such parties include extensive origin and cause 
investigations required for the purposes of criminal or civil litigation through to carrying 
out specific undertakings such as pipeline testing, failure analysis or solving complex 
technical issues. 
Burgoyne [10, 11] detailed the preferred approach to the investigation of fires and 
explosions; recommending that ‘a proper investigation should be of the nature of a 
research project in which a hypothesis is formed, tested and refined until it is in the 
fullest possible conformity with the facts ascertained’. More recently, updated versions 
of NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations [12] and IGE/GL/8: Reporting 
and Investigating of Gas Related Incidents [13] have been published, further 
recommending the use of this ‘scientific method’ of investigating incidents.  
NFPA 921 provides scientifically based guidance for the systematic investigation 
and/or analysis of fire and explosion incidents. As it is a guide, the recommendations 
are informative and advisory in nature and are not mandatory. However, courts in the 
USA are using NFPA 921 as the industry standard and benchmark to determine if the 
methodology used by an expert in conducting an investigation or forming a conclusion 
was reliable. In these courts, failure to use the scientific method jeopardises the 
conclusions of an investigation. An adaptation of the scientific method outlined in NFPA 
921, as applied to explosion investigation, is shown in Figure 1-2. 
In keeping with the philosophy of investigation outlined above, the investigation should 
normally proceed from a detailed examination of the damage caused by the explosion, 
through a scientific and logical interpretation of the evidence, to arrive at conclusions 
as to the cause of the incident that are consistent with the facts.  
In some cases, the purpose of the investigation will not be to determine origin and 
cause but to solve a complex technical problem or answer specific questions as part of 
a wider investigation or regulatory requirement.  
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In these cases, the general principles outlined in Figure 1-2 still apply. However, the 
scope of the work would define the issues that need to be addressed during the 
investigation and the hypotheses that need to be tested against the available evidence. 
 
 
Figure 1-2 The Scientific Method (adapted from NFPA 921 [12])  
 
Recognise the Need
A fire or explosion has occurred 
and an investigation is required
Define the Manner in Which the 
Problem Can be Solved.
An origin and cause investigation 
is required.
Collect Data
Examination of the scene, carrying 
out tests, interviewing witnesses, 
gathering records, conducting 
experiments etc.   
Analyse Data
The collected data is analysed by 
competent investigators with 
appropriate knowledge, training 
and experience.  
Develop Hypothesis
A hypothesis (or hypotheses) is 
formed, based on analysis of the 
data, to explain the fire or 
explosion event.
Test Hypothesis
The hypothesis (or hypotheses) is 
challenged by comparison with the 
known facts, scientific knowledge 
and experiments where 
appropriate.  
Select Final Hypothesis
The hypothesis that is determined 






If no hypothesis can withstand careful 
scrutiny then the cause of the explosion may 
be considered undetermined.
In some explosion investigations more than 
one hypothesis may withstand careful 
scrutiny. In these cases an opinion may be 
held to a higher or lower level of certainty. 
Commonly used levels of certainty in the UK 
are highly unlikely through to highly likely.
Avoid reaching a premature conclusion 
without having considered all data. 
Investigators must avoid ‘expectation bias’, 
for example, by choosing only to consider 
evidence that fits an initial determination of 
cause.





May be defined 
by the client 
commissioning 
the investigation.
The hypothesis (or hypotheses) should be 
based on the information gathered during the 
on-site investigation and developed into 
explanations of the event based on the 
investigators knowledge, training and 
experience.
Wherever possible, all other reasonable 
causes should be eliminated. 
The investigator does not have a truly 
provable hypothesis unless it can stand the 
test of careful and serious challenge. 
Gas Explosions in Dwellings 6 
A particular example of where an investigation may be limited in its scope arises from 
the UK GS(M)R [9]. These Regulations place requirements on the gas conveyor to 
carry out an investigation if an escape of gas has resulted in a fire or explosion. The 
investigation shall meet the following criteria: 
• for a fire or explosion resulting from a gas escape downstream of the 
consumers emergency control valve (ECV), the scope of the investigation 
has to be sufficient to identify, so far as is reasonably practicable, whether 
the gas escape was from installation pipework or from an appliance and, if 
the latter, which appliance. 
• for a fire or explosion resulting from a gas escape upstream of the ECV (i.e. 
from the gas main or services), the scope of the investigation has to be 
sufficient to establish the source of the gas escape, and so far as is 
reasonably practicable, the reason for it. 
Therefore, the purpose of a GS(M)R investigation is to determine, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, the source of the escape and, where appropriate, the cause. 
There is no specific requirement to determine the source of ignition or the gas 
concentration at the time of ignition etc. The gas conveyor may therefore limit the 
investigation to answering questions relating to the gas tightness (or otherwise) of the 
network, installation pipework, meter and any appliance(s). In such cases the evidence 
should be tested against these questions. 
In order to carry out an effective on-site investigation of a gas explosion it is necessary 
to have a thorough understanding of the following: 
• gas industry legislation and standards, 
• the properties and characteristics of hydrocarbons, 
• fracture mechanics and material properties of pipes, 
• metallurgy and corrosion mechanics, 
• gas tracking/movement through soils, 
• gas build-up in buildings and enclosures, 
• ignition, 
• explosion physics (flame propagation, pressure generation etc.), 
• fire chemistry/physics, and 
• response of structures to flame/pressure. 
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For the practicing gas explosion investigator, there are a number of textbooks [12-22] 
that provide guidance on some of the topics mentioned above. However, none really 
provide a comprehensive coverage of all of the required subjects, as well as equipping 
the reader with the necessary skills to undertake a gas explosion investigation in a 
dwelling. 
The most widely used reference for investigating gas explosions is that written by 
Harris [16], in one of a series of British Gas Research and Development monographs. 
The monograph presents some of the results of experimental work carried out 
predominately by British Gas’ Midlands Research Station (MRS), including information 
on the generation of pressure in confined vented explosions, the effect of explosion 
pressures on structures and structural components, and also providing guidance on 
how to investigate gas explosion incidents. Whilst it was published in 1983, it remains 
the most common reference for gas explosion investigators worldwide. Furthermore, 
the recently published edition of NFPA 921 [12], “Guide for Fire & Explosion 
Investigations”, which has a completely revised chapter on explosions, and Foster [15], 
still make significant reference to the British Gas explosion monograph.  
1.3. Explosions Propagating from One Room to Another 
On the 16th of May 1968, an accidental gas explosion occurred at Ronan Point, a 
twenty-two storey tower block in Newham, East London [23]; that was to shape 
legislation for the gas industry, initiate a significant body of research into gas 
explosions and introduce new regulations relating to the construction of dwellings of 
five storeys or more. 
The explosion occurred in a one-bedroom flat located on the south-east corner of the 
eighteenth floor of the twenty-two storey tower block, tragically killing four people and 
injuring seventeen others.  
The subsequent Inquiry into the incident determined that a defective cooker connection 
in the kitchen of Flat 90 had allowed gas to escape, resulting in the build-up of a high 
level layer of flammable town gas/air mixture throughout the flat (perhaps excluding the 
bathroom as the door was known to have been closed) [23]. This mixture was ignited 
when the occupant attempted to light the cooker hob. The Inquiry reported that the 
damage to the tower block was caused by a pressure pulse of at least 205 mbar, with a 
maximum overpressure likely approaching 830 mbar in the hall of the flat where the 
explosion took place. 
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The explosion blew out the façade of the non-load bearing kitchen and living room 
walls and crucially, also removed the external load bearing flank walls of the living 
room and bedroom. Consequently, the floor slab above collapsed and the flank walls 
and floors followed, resulting in the progressive collapse of the south-east corner of the 
tower block (see Figure 1-3). It is worth noting that it was the collapse of the building 
and not the explosion itself that caused the fatality and the majority of the injuries. 
Indeed, the occupant of Flat 90 survived the incident. 
 
Figure 1-3 Ronan Point after the explosion (photo from DNV GL archive) 
Whilst the potential for gas explosions to damage dwellings was understood prior to 
this explosion, little research into the causes, mechanisms and effects of such 
explosions had been undertaken. Indeed, much of the information used to estimate the 
damage an explosion could cause to a building, was gained from a series of nuclear 
tests undertaken by the US Atomic Energy Commission to determine the effects of 
nuclear weapons [24].  
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Consequently, an extensive experimental programme to investigate gas explosions in 
multi-storey load bearing brick structures was carried out by the British Ceramic 
Research Association (BCRA) in collaboration with the Midlands Research Station 
(British Gas Corporation Research & Development Division) and the Atomic Weapons 
Research Establishment (AWRE) [25]. The tests took place at Potters Marston in 
Leicestershire with the primary objective of determining the integrity of the load bearing 
brickwork when subjected to pressure pulses generated in accidental gas explosions. A 
limited number of tests were also undertaken to determine the effects of explosions 
propagating from one room to another. 
The tests carried out to examine the effects of so called ‘cascade’ explosions 
proceeding from one room to another, were undertaken in a purpose built full-scale 
building designed to simulate the top three floors of a cross-wall tower block. During 
one of the tests, where both rooms had a high level gas/air layer of stoichiometric 
concentration, major damage was caused to the building structure. It was believed that 
the explosion in the first room, which developed a pressure of 90 mbar, passed through 
the door into the second room causing a ‘cascade effect’, which resulted in a 
significantly higher pressure of 228 mbar being recorded. 
Because of the higher overpressure that was developed within the second room and 
the damage that was caused to the brickwork of the building, there was significant 
interest in the results of this test. As a consequence, two separate programmes of 
further tests were planned in order to improve understanding of explosions that 
propagate from one room to another. The first set of explosion tests was undertaken by 
the Fire Research Station (FRS) in a bunker containing two partitions, each with large 
openings [26].  
In this series of tests, a high level layer, 0.9 m in depth from the ceiling was ignited. 
The results demonstrated that it was possible to generate substantially larger 
pressures in an explosion that propagated from one room to another than would be 
expected in an explosion in a single room, even if the single room was completely filled 
with a stoichiometric gas/air mixture. However, the enhanced explosion pressures were 
only attained over a narrow gas concentration range. 
The second series of tests focussed on the effects of different layering conditions in the 
pair of rooms and was undertaken at Potters Marston by BCRA in collaboration with 
the Midlands Research Station (MRS), AWRE and FRS [27]. These tests were to 
include layers of both neat gas and gas/air mixtures. Due to time constraints, and 
because the building suffered extensive damage, the series of tests were not 
completed.  
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However, it was demonstrated that under certain conditions, it was possible to 
generate higher pressures in explosions where there was an interaction between 
adjoining rooms than that of an explosion in a single room [27]. 
Whilst the various programmes of experimental work had generated some data on 
‘cascade’ explosions, only a limited number of conclusions were able to be drawn 
concerning the nature of this type of event. 
By the early 1980’s, many more experimental and theoretical studies into confined gas 
explosions had been completed, for example Solberg et al. [28-32], MacFadyen and 
Tite [33], Tite [34, 35], Hammond [36] and Zalosh [37]. However, British Gas Research 
and Development were conscious that most of this work had been restricted to simple, 
single enclosures of cuboid or spherical geometry. Very few studies had been made of 
gas explosions in typical room sized enclosures, and still fewer of explosions in multiple 
compartments. The large multiple compartment case is clearly of importance, since it is 
typical of domestic, commercial and industrial premises.  
Accordingly, in order to provide a more detailed understanding of the mechanism of 
gas explosions in large and multiple compartment enclosures, typical of a dwelling, a 
comprehensive experimental programme was begun by British Gas Research and 
Development and FRS. This programme was completed in 1983, but only a summary 
of the work was disseminated internally and the main body of the work was not 
analysed in detail or published. The results of this experimental programme will be 
analysed as part of this research. 
Since this extensive programme of research was undertaken in the early 1980’s, no 
further large-scale vented gas explosion studies have been undertaken using 
enclosures that represent the conditions encountered in an accidental explosion in a 
dwelling. 
1.4. The Effect of Furniture on Gas Explosions 
When a gas explosion occurs in a confined enclosure or vessel, there is an associated 
pressure rise. The pressure rise is caused by the restriction, that the vessel or 
enclosure places on the expansion of the hot burnt gases. In accidental explosions, the 
dwelling is often inadvertently vented, when a weak part of the structure fails (i.e. a 
window), and the pressure is relieved. Up until this point the explosion may be 
considered as a confined explosion, but after venting begins, the rate of pressure rise, 
and hence the maximum pressure developed, is governed by the balance between the 
rate at which combustion products are produced and the rate of outflow through the 
venting process.  
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The rate at which hot combustion products are produced is directly related to the 
burning velocity of the fuel, and consequently, the rate of pressure rise in an accidental 
explosion is strongly dependent upon the fuels composition. 
The laminar burning velocity for most stoichiometric hydrocarbon gas/air mixtures is in 
the order of 0.4 m/s, but will increase if the chemical reaction takes place in a turbulent 
flow field. The turbulence in the gas/air mixture can be developed by jet mixing prior to 
ignition or by interaction of the unburnt gas/air mixture, pushed ahead of the flame by 
the expanding flame front, with obstacles located within the enclosure (Figure 1-4).  
 
Figure 1-4 Turbulence generation due to obstacles in a vented explosion 
(taken from Bjerketvedt et al. [14]) 
It is widely accepted that the acceleration of a propagating flame is enhanced when a 
solid obstacle is located in its path [38-44], with the degree of enhancement being 
strongly dependent on the flow structure that is formed in the wake behind the 
obstruction. Moreover, data from large-scale experiments, for example, Bauwens et al. 
[45], Hjertager et al. [46], Moen et al. [47] and Bimson et al. [48] have demonstrated 
that flame speed and pressure also have a strong dependence on obstruction size and 
gas concentration. However, it is also clear from further experimental studies that are 
relevant to gas explosions in buildings [29, 31, 33, 37, 45, 46, 49-64], that the 
acceleration of the flame front is a consequence of a complex interaction of many 
factors, including the size and geometry of the enclosure, local obstructions, 
instabilities and pressure wave interactions.  
Most flame acceleration studies to date (referenced above) have been undertaken 
using baffle-type or cylindrical obstacles that are representative of congested regions 
typically found in process plants (e.g. pipe racks etc.). Accidental explosions in 
dwellings are likely to be affected by obstructions that are non-uniform (furniture etc.) 
and may be sharp edged, and as a consequence the flame front is likely to interact in a 
different manner. A detailed review of large-scale vented explosion tests with obstacles 
will be presented in the next chapter. 
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The enhancement of the combustion process, and hence increased overpressure, as a 
consequence of the generation of turbulence is of great significance and determines 
the degree of damage that a building sustains during a gas explosion. Current 
guidance suggests that extensive pressure damage is not usually associated with 
either lean or rich mixtures [12, 16, 65]. Consequently, a better understanding of the 
mechanism of flow interaction through interconnected rooms, and of the interaction of 
the induced flow with furniture in a dwelling (both of which topics are explicitly 
addressed in this project), would greatly assist explosion investigators and may 
contribute to changes to building codes and gas safety standards that would improve 
public safety. 
1.5. Thermal Damage Sustained During Explosions 
Following an accidental gas explosion, a detailed examination of the thermal damage 
(scorching, blistering etc.) caused by the explosion, can provide critical evidence to the 
investigator [16]. The investigator will be able to determine the rooms through which 
the flame propagated (and hence where a flammable gas/air mixture was present prior 
to ignition), whether the flammable gas involved was more or less dense than air, and 
the depth of any flammable layer. This information may then be used to determine any 
credible sources of gas by calculating or measuring the release rate and estimating 
whether an escape of this magnitude is capable of mixing with air to form a flammable 
layer, or completely full mixture, which is in agreement with the scorching patterns. 
Following the release of a lighter than air gas, such as natural gas, a layer of 
flammable gas/air mixture will accumulate extending downwards from the ceiling to the 
location of the release source [66-71]. If the flammable mixture is subsequently ignited, 
the flame will propagate through the gas/air mixture at high level, and, because of high 
temperature and low density, the hot gases will rise and preferentially stay at high level. 
Consequently, evidence of the passage of the flame is expected to be found at high 
rather than low level. 
In contrast, explosions involving layers of heavier than air gases, such as LPG, will 
exhibit thermal damage at low level, from the point of leakage down to floor level. In 
these situations, more burning should be evident at low level, such as scorching to 
carpets, furniture etc., than at ceiling level.  
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Figure 1-5 Evidence of thermal damage following a layered LPG explosion 
(photo taken by the author) 
Other evidence as to the nature of the gas involved (e.g. its relative density) might be 
provided by the pattern of burn injuries suffered by individuals in the room through 
which the flame propagates. Although ordinary clothing provides some degree of short 
term protection against a transient explosion flame. Burns to the head and upper part 
of the body, but not the legs and lower torso, are indications that a layer of a buoyant 
gas had been involved (e.g. natural gas). If burns were restricted to the lower part of 
the body, this provides an indication that the explosion involved a heavier than air gas 
such as LPG or petrol vapour. However, caution should be taken when using this type 
of information, as hot combustion products are much more buoyant than air and may 
cause burn injuries to the upper part of the body, potentially providing a false indication 
that the fuel involved is lighter than air. 
1.6. Forensic Evidence 
The damage sustained by a building, and its decor, during an explosion can provide 
useful forensic evidence in the subsequent investigation. In particular, the pressure 
generated and the thermal damage sustained in an explosion can provide information 
in terms of the composition and distribution of the fuel/air mixture prior to ignition. This 
information is critical to the success of the investigation in determining the origin and 
cause of the explosion.  
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The level of damage a building sustains following a gas explosion is dependent upon 
the magnitude of the pressure generated and the relationship between the duration of 
the imposed pressure load and the natural period of vibration of the structure. Studies 
have shown that an overpressure generated by a gas explosion, in the region of 200 
mbar, has the potential to cause significant structural damage to a properly designed 
and constructed building. [16, 25, 72-75]. Guidance in the most widely used reference 
material [12, 15, 16] states that extensive thermal damage to decor, furnishings etc. is 
associated with fuel/air mixtures of stoichiometric or greater concentrations, whilst an 
explosion involving a fuel lean concentration will exhibit little signs of thermal damage. 
Consequently, the following interpretation of evidence is given by Harris [16] and 
Foster [15] for use during accidental gas explosion investigations: 
i. minimal structural damage (i.e. a low overpressure) and little evidence of 
thermal damage is indicative of an ignition of a lean fuel/air mixture. 
ii. significant structural damage (i.e. a high overpressure) and extensive 
scorching, blistering etc. is indicative of an ignition of a near stoichiometric 
fuel/air mixture. 
iii. minimal structural damage (i.e. a low overpressure) and significant evidence of 
burning is indicative of an ignition of a rich fuel/air mixture. 
A number of gas explosions investigated by the author of this study and other members 
of the DNV GL incident investigation team, have exhibited forensic evidence that has 
not been in agreement with the information given above. In particular, there have been 
incidents where the building has suffered significant structural damage (i.e. indicative of 
a near stoichiometric mixture) but there has been very little, and in some cases, no 
evidence of thermal damage (see Figure 1-6).  
It was believed that this apparent discrepancy in forensic evidence may be attributed to 
one or more of the following: 
i. the effects of turbulence caused by flame propagation through a dwelling with 
interconnected rooms; 
ii. the effects of turbulence caused by non-uniform obstacles such as furniture etc. 
that are commonly found in occupied buildings; 
iii.  the use of paints and other construction materials that are not susceptible to 
thermal damage during an explosion.  
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Figure 1-6 The author at the scene of a gas explosion 
1.7. Aims of the Research 
Whilst much experimental work has now been conducted into confined vented 
explosions in empty enclosures and flame acceleration by obstacles and other means 
(e.g. bends in ducts etc.) that are associated with vapour cloud explosions, little work 
has been undertaken on flame acceleration mechanisms of explosions that occur in 
typical occupied buildings. Furthermore, to the authors’ knowledge, other than the very 
brief coverage in the British Gas explosion monograph, no other experimental studies 
have been published concerning thermal damage sustained during a gas explosion in a 
dwelling. Therefore, the main aims of this research were to investigate and improve 
understanding of the following: 
1. the effects of interconnected rooms on gas explosions; 
2. the effects of furniture on gas explosions; 
3. the thermal damage sustained during a gas explosion in a dwelling. 
The main purpose of the work was to assist investigators with the interpretation of 
forensic evidence found at the scene of an explosion such that the composition and 
distribution of a fuel/air mixture, prior to its ignition, could be estimated and used to 
correctly determine the origin and cause of the explosion.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the fundamental parameters 
associated with gas explosions in dwellings and to discuss the influence of multiple 
compartments and obstacles (typically found in dwellings) on pressure generation. The 
interpretation of forensic evidence found at the scene of an accidental gas explosion is 
also discussed. 
An abundance of research has been published regarding confined vented explosions 
and the effects of turbulence on the combustion process. However, much of this work 
has been conducted using empty single chambers of cuboid or spherical geometries, 
which are not representative of those conditions encountered in accidental gas 
explosions in dwellings. Few studies have been carried out in large (room sized) 
enclosures and even fewer still have been conducted in multiple compartments. As it is 
not practical to present all the information available relating to confined vented 
explosions, and consequently, explosions in dwellings, this chapter outlines the 
important parameters of vented explosions but concentrates on research concerning: 
• the effects of multiple compartments with interconnecting doorways,  
• the effects of obstacles typically found in dwellings, and 
• the thermal damage associated with the exposure to a transient flame front.  
2.2. Fundamentals of Gas Explosion Theory 
An explosion in a building may be considered as an exothermic reaction that gives rise 
to a rapid increase in pressure. Explosions require a level of premixing of the fuel with 
an oxidant (typically oxygen from air) and confinement or congestion in order for 
pressure to be generated. Before considering the mechanisms involved in the 
development of accidental gas explosions and the important forensic evidence which 
may be used by the explosion investigator to determine the origin and cause of the 
explosion, it is beneficial to describe some of the fundamental explosion parameters.  
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Some values for relevant combustion parameters of different gas/air mixtures are also 
given. This information is required in order to understand some of the principles and 
interpret some of the analysis described in later chapters. 
Combustion may be described as a chemical reaction involving a fuel and air which 
emits energy and light. Flame is the visible oxidation process of the fuel gas. For 
combustion to take place, the following conditions must be satisfied: 
1. the fuel must be in its gaseous phase (liquid fuels must vaporise and solids 
pyrolyze);  
2. sufficient air must be available, and adequately mixed with the fuel;  
3. adequate energy must be available to initiate ignition. 
Combustion of gas/air mixtures has been studied extensively for decades and 
consequently there is a wealth of information available. For a detailed consideration of 
combustion, reference should be made to standard reference texts such as Lewis and 
von Elbe [76], Griffiths and Barnard [77], Williams [78], Strehlow [79], Mishra [80], 
Drysdale [81], Kuo [82] and Kuo and Acharya [83].  
2.2.1. Flammability Limits 
For gas/air mixtures there are limits of composition between which flame propagation 
can occur but outside which self-sustaining flames cannot exist. These limits are known 
as the 'flammability limits' and are usually expressed as percentages of gas in air by 
volume. 
The lower flammability limit (LFL), also known as the lower explosive limit (LEL), is the 
fuel lean concentration below which a flame will not propagate. The upper flammability 
limit (UFL), also known as the upper explosive limit (UEL), is the fuel rich concentration 
above which a flame will not propagate. 
Increasing the temperature of a gas/air mixture has the effect of widening the limits of 
flammability. This is an important concept to understand as a gas/air mixture which is 
non-flammable at ambient conditions may become flammable if the mixture 
temperature is increased. This effect is highlighted in Figure 2-1. Furthermore, 
increasing the pressure widens the limits of flammability but decreasing the pressure 
narrows the limits. 
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Figure 2-1 Schematic of the effects of temperature on the limits of flammability 
(taken from Zabetakis [84]) 
Values for flammability limits are usually quoted for mixtures of gases with air. Air 
typically consists of 21% oxygen, 78% nitrogen and 1% other gases. Altering the 
composition of air, for example by vitiation (i.e. reducing the oxygen concentration 
through the recirculation of products of combustion), can have a significant effect on 
the flammability limits and other combustion characteristics. Likewise, if the air 
composition consists of a sufficient concentration of ‘non-reacting’ components the 
gas/air mixture may not burn at all, even if it appears to be within its quoted flammable 
range. 
The most widely used data concerning the flammable limits of fuel gases is that taken 
from studies conducted by the US Bureau of Mines in the 1950’s and 60’s [84, 85]. 
Flammability data should be used with caution as UK natural gas reserves are 
declining and supplies are increasingly being sourced from Europe and further afield. In 
order to ensure security of supply, new import pipelines and three new LNG terminals 
have been constructed. Consequently, the specification of natural gas is altering. 
Additionally, the government focus on ‘green’ energy is seeing biogas being injected 
into the natural gas distribution system, which also has the potential to alter the 
specification of the gas within the distribution network.  
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2.2.2. Stoichiometry 
Stoichiometry is the branch of chemistry concerned with the proportions in which 
elements in compounds are combined. Thus, with reference to combustion associated 
with accidental gas explosions, there are several contexts in which the term 
stoichiometric may be used, including: 
• the stoichiometric air requirement - meaning the minimum (or theoretical) air 
requirement for complete combustion; 
• a stoichiometric mixture - the theoretically optimum mixture (i.e. there is just 
enough oxygen in the air to burn all the fuel). 
Stoichiometric combustion refers to the burning of a fuel under precise conditions; that 
is, there is the exact amount of oxygen for complete combustion to take place (for 
example, five moles of oxygen for each mole of propane). 
In accidental explosions the fuel is usually burned in oxygen from the air; which itself, 
for simplicity, may be considered to consist of approximately 79.1% nitrogen and 
20.9% oxygen. A general formula for the combustion of any hydrocarbon (CnHm) in air 
may be written using terms m, n and z (where z = n + m
4
).  
It is commonly known as the ‘general equation of the combustion of hydrocarbons in 
air’ and is shown below: 
Air-Fuel Ratio 
The volumetric air/fuel ratio (AFR) for the combustion of any hydrocarbon may be given 
by: 
Where: 
Va = amount of air required for stoichiometric combustion (m3). 
Vf = amount of fuel required for stoichiometric combustion (m3). 
The amount of air is obtained by adding the amount of oxygen to the amount of 
nitrogen. 
  
 CnHm + zO2 + z(3.78)N2 ⇒ nCO2 + �
m
2
� H2O + z(3.78)N2 (2-1) 
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The mass air/fuel ratio (AFR) for the combustion of any hydrocarbon may be given by: 
Where: 
ma = amount of air required for stoichiometric combustion (kg). 
mf = amount of fuel required for stoichiometric combustion (kg). 
When conducting on-site gas investigations, equipment used by emergency 
responders most commonly expresses the gas concentration as a percentage in air, or 
a percentage of the LEL. The percentage of gas in air (GIA) required for a 
stoichiometric concentration can easily be determined by: 
Fuel/Air Ratio 
The volumetric fuel/air ratio (FAR) for the combustion of any hydrocarbon may be given 
by: 
The mass fuel/air ratio (FAR) for the combustion of any hydrocarbon may be given by: 
In the literature there is often reference to the air to fuel ratio (AFR) which is effectively 
the inverse of FAR.  
Non-Stoichiometric Combustion 
Non-stoichiometric combustion simply refers to conditions under which the exact 
amount of oxygen is not available; that is, it can mean either too much or too little 
oxygen. 
If excess air (and hence excess oxygen) is present the gas/air mixture is said to be 
'lean'; and conversely, if there is less than the stoichiometric amount of oxygen 
available, the mixture is said to be 'rich’. 
  




 % GIAs = 
(Vf)s
(Va+Vf)s






 × 100 (2-4) 
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Normalised Hydrocarbon Composition 
It is useful to represent the combustion of hydrocarbons in an equation where the 
hydrocarbon composition has been normalised with respect to the number of carbon 
atoms [86]. Let a, b, e, m, n and y be convenient algebraic notation for stoichiometric 
combustion: 
Where: 
y =  No.hydrogen atoms
No.carbon atoms
 . 
a = 1 from a carbon balance. 
b = y
2
 from a hydrogen balance. 
n = a + b
2 
 or 1 + y
4
 from an oxygen balance. 
The normalised equation may now be written as: 
The air/fuel ratio equation (by volume) may be expressed as: 
Where: 
C = Carbon number (e.g. 3 for propane, 4 for butane etc.).  
The air/fuel ratio equation (by mass) may be expressed as: 
Where: 
The molecular weight of air, aMW  ≈ 29 kg/kmol. 
Using the above technique, the air fuel ratio and the stoichiometric gas concentration 
have been calculated for several hydrocarbon fuels and are given, in addition to some 
other important parameters, in Table 2-1. 
 CHy + n(O2+3.78N2) ⇒ aCO2 + bH2O + n(3.78)N2 (2-7) 
 CHy + �1+
y
4






� (3.78)N2 (2-8) 
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Table 2-1 Stoichiometric gas concentration and air/fuel ratio for a range of fuels 
(∆H taken from Harris [16]) 
In Table 2-1, ∆Hc air is calculated by dividing the net ∆Hc by the either the volume or 
mass based AFR. Table 2-1 highlights some useful stoichiometric combustion 
relationships: 
• the air/fuel ratio (by mass) for hydrocarbons (except methane) is 
approximately constant at 15:1; 
• the ∆Hc, (air) for hydrocarbons is approximately constant at 3 MJ/kg; and 
• the ∆Hc, (air) for hydrocarbons is approximately constant at 3.6 MJ/m3. 
This is because the calorific value of a fuel is proportional to the air requirement for its 
stoichiometric combustion [86]. 
Equivalence Ratio 
The equivalence ratio is a convenient non-dimensional combustion parameter that may 
be expressed in terms of mass or volume with the same result and is often used to 
analyse fundamental theoretical concepts in explosion science. The fuel/air 
equivalence ratio, ϕ, is defined by the relationship of the actual fuel/air ratio of a 
mixture to that of its fuel/air ratio at stoichiometric conditions. It may be expressed, in 
volume terms, as: 

































Methane (CH4) 9.56 17.26 9.5 55.50 50.03 2.90 3.57 
Propane (C3H8) 23.82 15.69 4.0 50.35 46.36 2.95 3.63 
n-Butane (C4H10) 30.96 15.47 3.1 49.50 45.72 2.96 3.63 
n-Hexane (C6H14) 45.18 15.24 2.2 48.31 44.74 2.94 3.61 
n-Decane (C10H22) 73.80 15.07 1.3 47.64 44.24 2.94 3.61 
Cyclohexane (C6H12) 42.84 14.79 2.3 46.58 43.45 2.94 3.61 
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Based on this definition of the equivalence ratio, the following gas concentration 
conditions are observed: 
ϕ < 1 = fuel lean.  
ϕ > 1 = fuel rich. 
In some of the literature the inverse definition of the equivalence ratio is used, in which 
case, the concentration conditions indicated above are reversed. 
2.2.3. Minimum Ignition Energy 
In accidental gas explosions in dwellings, the temperature of the gas/air mixture is well 
below the autoignition temperature and ignition is usually initiated by contact with an 
open flame, hot surface or spark (for example by operation of a light switch etc.).  
There is a minimum energy that is required to ignite a gas/air mixture by a spark. A 
spark with energy below this limiting level is not capable of establishing a flame above 
a critical minimum size such that the flame can propagate unsupported. This is 
because the heat losses to the unburnt gas around the flame kernel are relatively high 
and dissipate the heat of the reaction zone, quenching the chemical reaction and thus 
preventing the flame from propagating.  
The minimum ignition values, usually quoted in millijoules (mJ), vary for different fuel 
gases and for differing concentrations, and may be as low as 0.1 mJ for some fuel 
gases. Some reference books (for example, Crowl [87]) quote that the minimum 
ignition energy for a particular fuel gas lies at, or close to, its stoichiometric 
concentration. Figure 2-2 shows the minimum ignition energy for a number of 
hydrocarbons and highlights that the minimum ignition energy does not necessarily 
occur at its stoichiometric concentration. The graph also demonstrates that the energy 
required for spark ignition is dependent upon the gas concentration; with a greater 
energy required to ignite the gas/air mixture as it diverges to its flammable limits.  
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Figure 2-2 Variation of minimum ignition energy with fuel type and concentration 
(adapted from Lewis and von Elbe [76]) 
2.2.4. Flame Temperature 
Stoichiometric hydrocarbon/air flames have an adiabatic flame temperature, at 
conditions of constant pressure, of approximately 2150 – 2250K (see Table 2-2), but 
the flame temperature decreases as the gas/air concentration diverges towards its 
flammable limits. Figure 2-3 shows the adiabatic flame temperatures for methane, 
ethane and propane, at conditions of constant pressure and constant volume, 
calculated using the chemical kinetic calculation software Gaseq [88]. Gaseq is a 
software program which was developed by Dr Morley of Cambridge University. It is 
intended primarily for gaseous phase calculations and solves chemical equilibrium 
problems based on the minimisation of free energy (NASA method). 
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Table 2-2 Combustion properties of some hydrocarbon fuel/air mixtures 









































































































































































Hydrogen (H2) 2 4 75 30 54 3.5 2318 8.0 28 847 0.02 10.2 
Methane (CH4) 16 5 15 9.5 10 0.45 2148 7.4 3.5 813 0.29 34 
Ethane (C2H6) 30 3 12.5 5.6 6.3 0.53 2168 7.5 4.0 788 0.24 60.5 
Propane (C3H8) 44 2.2 9.5 4.0 4.5 0.52 2198 7.6 4.0 723 0.25 86.4 
Butane (C4H10) 58 1.9 8.5 3.1 3.5 0.50 2168 7.5 3.7 678 0.25 112.4 
Pentane (C5H12) 72 1.5 7.8 2.6 2.9 0.52 2232 7.7 4.0 533 0.25 138.1 
Hexane (C6H14) 86 1.2 7.5 2.2 2.5 0.52 2221 7.7 4.0 498 0.25 164.4 
Heptane (C7H16) 100 1.2 6.7 1.9 2.3 0.52 2196 7.6 4.0 488 0.25 190.4 
Acetylene (C2H2) 26 2.5 80 7.7 9.3 1.58 2598 9.0 14.2 578 0.02 51 
Ethylene (C2H4) 28 3.1 32 6.5 7.4 0.83 2248 7.8 6.5 763 0.12 56 
Propylene (C3H6) 42 2.4 10.3 4.4 5.0 0.66 2208 7.7 5.1 733 0.28 81.5 
Butylene (C4H8) 56 1.7 9.5 3.4 3.9 0.57 2203 7.6 4.3 658 0.28 107.1 
Benzene (C6H6) 78 1.4 7.1 2.7 3.3 0.62 2287 7.9 4.9 833 0.22 134 
Cyclohexane 
(C6H12) 
84 1.3 8.0 2.3 2.7 0.52 2232 7.8 4.1 518 0.24 167.3 
a The values given in this table are for comparative purposes and for consistency have been taken from 
one source. Some values of properties, that are widely accepted today, may differ from those shown. For 
example, the current accepted laminar burning velocity value for a stoichiometric methane/air mixture is 
0.38 m/s [122]. 
Literature Review 28 
 
Figure 2-3 Variation in flame temperature with gas concentration 
(calculated using Gaseq [88]) 
The typically quoted adiabatic flame temperatures are measured, or calculated, at 
room temperature and atmospheric pressure (i.e. constant pressure). When 
considering accidental explosions in dwellings, the volume is constant (at least in the 
early stages of the explosion) and the pressure increases. In these conditions, the 
flame temperature increases because the unburnt gas/air mixture is heated by 
compression. This can be clearly seen in the flame temperature calculations shown in 
Figure 2-3. 
2.2.5. Flame Propagation 
Burning Velocity 
A key characteristic of a flame is the burning velocity, which is defined as the velocity of 
a plane flame front in a direction normal to itself and relative to the unburnt reactants. It 
is independent of flame geometry, burner size and flow rate and depends only on the 
initial fuel composition and conditions of temperature and pressure.  
Values for burning velocity are usually determined experimentally. Several reviews 
have been undertaken on the methods of measuring burning velocity, for example 
Linnett [89], Andrews and Bradley [90], and Rallis and Garforth [91], but there is no 
agreement as to precise laminar burning velocity values.  
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Andrews and Bradley [90] recommended a maximum laminar burning velocity of 0.45 ± 
0.02 m/s for methane/air mixtures at (25°C and 1 atmosphere). This recommendation 
has been widely used in the gas industry, however, accepted values today are in the 
order of 0.38 m/s, but as discussed earlier, the composition of natural gas is changing 
so care should be taken when using any published value. Nonetheless, in terms of 
accidental gas explosions, the differences in published values are not significant and 
values of burning velocity appropriate for use in calculating explosion pressures are 
given in Table 2-2. 
The burning velocity of a flammable gas is dependent upon the heat and mass transfer 
processes within the flame front. Methane, which is the largest constituent of natural 
gas, has the lowest laminar burning velocity of all the hydrocarbons. The term ‘laminar’ 
burning velocity indicates that the gas/air mixture is flowing into the flame under 
conditions of laminar flow. Conversely, the term ‘turbulent’ burning velocity indicates 
that the gas/air mixture is flowing into the flame in a turbulent motion. The turbulent 
movement has the effect of intensifying the heat and mass transfer processes in the 
vicinity of the reaction zone, such that higher velocities are produced than under 
laminar conditions [92]. 
In controlled combustion, stationary flames are required, for example for cooking and 
heating. In order to achieve a stationary flame, it is necessary to pass the reactants 
(e.g. gas/air mixture) into the flame at an efflux velocity equal to that of the burning 
velocity and in an opposite direction.  
In uncontrolled combustion, a propagating flame (sometimes called an explosion flame) 
is observed as the burning velocity acts in the same direction as the flow of unburnt 
gas/air mixture (reactants) and the flame front is ‘pushed’ forward through the unburnt 
gases by the hot expanding gases behind it. 
The burning velocity of a particular flammable gas is also strongly dependent upon the 
concentration of the gas/air mixture. As discussed earlier, it is only possible to sustain 
flame propagation if the concentration of the gas/air mixture is within its flammable 
limits. Within these limits, the maximum laminar burning velocity value for any fuel gas 
is usually found to be just on the ‘rich’ side of the stoichiometric concentration and 
reduces as the concentration diverges towards its flammable limits (Figure 2-4).  
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Figure 2-4 The effect of gas concentration on burning velocity 
(adapted from Gibbs and Calcote [93]) 
In addition to the strong dependence upon gas concentration, burning velocity also 
varies with the initial pressure and temperature of the gas/air mixture. Lewis [94], 
proposed that the burning velocity dependence on pressure could be determined by 
the following relationship: 
Where: 
n = negative, for Su < 0.45 m/s (i.e. burning velocity decreases). 
n = 0, for 0.45 m/s ≤ Su ≤ 1.0 m/s. 
n = positive, for Su > 1.0 m/s (i.e. burning velocity increases). 
Egerton and Lefebvre [95] carried out research on the burning velocity of methane, 
propane, ethylene and propylene gas/air mixtures under increased pressure conditions. 




 Su ∝ P
n (2-13) 
 Su  =  cP
-x (2-14) 
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Where: 
c = a constant. 
x = 0.46 (lean) to 0.5 (rich) for methane/air mixtures. 
Generally, for the gas/air mixtures that are most commonly involved in accidental 
explosions, the burning velocity value decreases as the pressure increases (see Figure 
2-5). However, although there is a decrease in the rate of combustion in volumetric 
terms, the mass burning rate is increased due to the increased density of the gas.  
 
Figure 2-5 The pressure dependence of burning velocity 
(adapted from Egerton and Lefebvre [95]) 
In contrast to the dependence on pressure, the burning velocity value has been found 
to increase with increasing initial temperature.  
Dugger [96] carried out research to determine burning velocities dependence upon the 
initial temperature of methane/ propane and ethylene gas/air mixtures. The findings of 
this work have been used to plot the estimated burning velocities over a range of 
temperature conditions that may be encountered in an accidental gas explosion (see 
Figure 2-6). 
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Figure 2-6 The effect of initial temperature on burning velocity 
(adapted from Dugger [96]) 
Andrews and Bradley [90] in comparing a number of experimentally determined 
burning velocities measured at different initial mixture temperatures corrected the 
measurements to a standard temperature of 298 K (≈ 25°C) by assuming that the 
burning velocity varies as the square of the absolute temperature. They also corrected 
experimental results for the major errors of flame thickness and quenching distance, 
deriving an equation for the temperature dependence of burning velocity (stoichiometric 
methane/air) [97]: 
Where: 
uS  = burning velocity (cm/s). 
T = absolute temperature of the gas/air mixture (K). 
In a later study, conducted by Dixon-Lewis and Islam [98], a computational one 
dimensional flame modelling method was used to derive burning velocity values for 
methane/air flames. The results of this study indicated that the best value for a 
stoichiometric methane/air flame at 25°C was 0.37 m/s. 
Equation (2-15), derived by Andrews and Bradley [90], was used to plot the corrected 
experimentally measured burning velocities over the temperature range that may be 
encountered in an accidental gas explosion. Using Equation (2-15), the calculated 
laminar burning velocity at 25°C is 0.43 m/s in comparison to a value of 0.34 m/s 
observed by Dugger at 25°C.  
 Su = 10+0.000371T
2 (2-15) 
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Flame Thickness 
Flame thickness is known to be affected by flame speed whilst being dependent upon 
temperature, pressure, density and concentration of the fuel/air mixture [99]. Heravi et 
al. [99] derived an equation to predict the flame thickness for stoichiometric 
methane/air mixtures against conditions of increasing pressure and temperature that 
was suitable for temperatures up to 700 K and pressures up to 30 bar: 
Where: 
X = flame thickness (mm). 
T = temperature (K). 
P = pressure (bar). 
 
Figure 2-7 The effect of increasing pressure and temperature on flame thickness 
(calculated using Equation (2-16) Heravi et al. [99]) 
In Figure 2-7, curves have been plotted using Equation (2-16) to demonstrate the effect 
of increasing pressure and temperature on flame thickness. It can be seen that the 
flame thickness decreases with increasing pressure and temperature; the dependency 
on pressure being larger than that of temperature.  
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Andrews and Bradley [97] measured the flame thickness of methane/air mixtures of 
differing concentration using fine wire thermocouples (12.5 µm) and a schlieren 
interferometer. Values of flame thickness obtained during these experiments are 
shown, for different values of equivalence ratio, by the curve in Figure 2-8. It can be 
seen that the flame thickness increases as the concentration diverges towards the 
flammable limits. For the stoichiometric concentration the flame thickness is to be of 
the order of 1.2mm, significantly higher than the values indicated in Figure 2-7. 
 
Figure 2-8 The effect of gas concentration on flame thickness 
(adapted from Andrews and Bradley [97]) 
Flame Speed 
Some gas engineering text books confuse flame speed with burning velocity [100-102]. 
It is important to understand that burning velocity is not usually the same as the 
observed speed of flame propagation or flame speed. However, whilst flame speed is a 
very useful concept, and is used widely to describe explosion mechanisms, it is not a 
fundamental property of flame propagation. 
Flame speed may be defined as the speed at which the flame front travels through a 
flammable gas/air mixture, measured with respect to a fixed position. When 
considering a gas explosion, the flame speed is always greater than the burning 
velocity as the flame front is pushed forward by the motion of the expanding hot gases 
trapped behind it.  
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However, in terms of controlled combustion, for example a cooker burner, the flame 
speed would be zero, as the flame is stationary in relation to a fixed point (i.e. the 
burner), whilst the burning velocity would be in the region of 0.4 m/s (natural gas). The 
laminar flame speed is therefore a function of the burning velocity and the expansion of 
the gases as their temperature changes during combustion. 
As discussed, flame speed is measured with respect to some fixed reference point; 
consequently, it is possible that prior to ignition, the flammable gas/air mixture may be 
in motion in either a positive or negative direction. The velocity with which these gases 
flow will contribute to the flame speed, either increasing it or decreasing it depending 
upon their direction of flow. 
 
Figure 2-9 Propagating flame in uncontrolled combustion event 
(adapted from Harris [16]) 
In a laminar, spherical gas explosion, the flame speed may be given by:  
Where:  
Sf = laminar flame speed (m/s). 
Su= laminar burning velocity (m/s). 
ρu = density unburnt gases (kg/m3). 
ρb = density burnt gases (kg/m3). 
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Following combustion there is an associated increase in temperature and change in 
density of the burnt gases. The equation to determine the flame speed may also be 
expressed as: 
Where: 
E = an expansion factor, given by the ratio of the densities of the unburnt and burnt 
gases. 
The expansion factor may be determined by: 
Where: 
Nb = the number of moles of products remaining after combustion. 
Nu = the number of moles of reactants before combustion. 
Tb = the temperature of the burnt gases (K) (≈ flame temperature). 
Tu = the initial temperature of the gas/air mixture before combustion (K). 
The mole number ratio (Nb/Nu) varies for different gases and for different gas/air 
mixture concentrations. However, the mole number ratio for the most common fuel 
gases involved in accidental explosions in dwellings is approximately 1.0 and 
consequently the expansion factor, E, may be approximated as Tb/Tu. Calculations 
show that the expansion factor, at stoichiometric concentration, is approximately 8 - 9 
for hydrocarbons typically involved in accidental explosions. Care must be taken during 
calculations to ensure an appropriate flame temperature is used.  
As discussed earlier, many quoted adiabatic flame temperatures are calculated or 
measured under conditions of constant pressure, whereas, at least for the early part of 
an explosion, the volume is constant and the pressure rises. Flame temperatures are 
higher under constant volume conditions due to compression, with expansion factors in 
the region of 9 – 10 for hydrocarbons.  
Assuming the gas during combustion behaves as an ideal gas, the pressure and 
volume relationship is given by: 
 
 Sf = SuE (2-18) 








 = nR (2-20) 
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Where: 
P = Absolute pressure (atm). 
V = Volume (L). 
T = Temperature (K). 
n = no. moles. 
R = Gas constant (0.0821 L atm / K mol). 
If it is assumed that the quantity of gas remains constant, then the ideal gas law may 
be expressed as: 
Therefore, by observing the above equation, it can be seen that uncontrolled 
combustion will result in either a volume or pressure increase depending upon 
surroundings. In a fully confined explosion (e.g. in a closed vessel), where the volume 
may be considered as constant, there will be an associated increase in pressure, 
however, in an unconfined (and uncongested) area the pressure will remain constant 
and there will be an associated increase in volume.  
Using Equation (2-18) it can be demonstrated that the maximum laminar flame speed 
for hydrocarbons is typically less than 10 m/s. This calculation assumes that the burnt 
gases are completely trapped behind the flame front. In situations where this is not the 
case; for example ignition at the edge of a pocket of flammable gas/air mixture in a 
dwelling, some of the burnt gases may escape away from the flame front and 
consequently the flame front will not be pushed forward at the same velocity. Whilst the 
burning velocity will remain unchanged, the flame speed will be less than that 
calculated above.  
The initial expanding spherical or hemi-spherical flame, typical of a gas explosion in a 
dwelling, also pushes unburnt gas away from the flame front at a velocity Sg known as 
the ‘induced gas velocity’ (often called the explosion-induced wind). This is important in 
confined vented explosions and its effects on the maximum pressure generated will be 
discussed in later chapters. The induced gas velocity, Sg, may be determined by: 








 Sg = Sf - Su (2-22) 
 Sf = Su + Sg (2-23) 
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By rearranging Equations (2-18), (2-19), and (2-22), Sg may be expressed as:  
Or, in terms of the flame speed: 
Considering a stoichiometric methane/air mixture at 288K, under adiabatic conditions, 
the induced gas velocity may be calculated as 87% of the flame speed. Results of 
experimental work carried out by MRS [103] has shown that 80 – 85% of the flame 
speed is the velocity of the gases accelerating the flame forward. The difference 
between the calculated and experimental values is due to heat losses.  
Flame Instabilities 
It has been observed in the literature that explosion flames are conducive to the 
development of a cellular flame structure [104-107]. It is known that in such cases, the 
flame instability is a consequence of both hydrodynamic and thermodiffusive effects; 
that is, an instability resulting from the competing effects of heat conduction from, and 
reactant diffusion toward, the flame.  
The Lewis number (Le) is a dimensionless number used to characterize fluid flows 
where there is simultaneous heat and mass transfer. It may be defined as: 
Where:  
α = the thermal diffusivity of the bulk mixture. 
D = the mass diffusivity of the scarce reactant in the bulk mixture. 
The Lewis number can be interpreted as the ratio of the rate of diffusion of thermal 
enthalpy from the flame front to the unburned gas, to the rate of diffusion of chemical 
enthalpy (in the form of the scarce reactant) from the unburned gas to the flame front 
[108].  
The seminal work of Darrieus [109] and Landau and Lifshitz [110] demonstrated that, a 
planar flame front is intrinsically unstable due to hydrodynamic effects connected with 
the expansion of the hot combustion products behind the flame front. If a flame is 
slightly curved, the streamlines in the combustion products converge behind the 
convex part of the flame front and diverge behind the concave parts leading to a torque 
that acts to encourage flame wrinkling [111].  
 Sg = Su (E - 1) (2-24) 
 Sg = Su(E - 1) =  
Sf
E
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These instabilities that cause wrinkling can either be stabilised or further destabilised 
by thermodiffusion effects, resulting in a cellular flame structure. 
For a slightly wrinkled flame front, in addition to the hydrodynamic Darrieus-Landau (D-
L) instabilities, molecular and thermal diffusive instabilities may also not be balanced. 
When Le differs from unity, flame stretch causes changes in the rates of transport of 
chemical and thermal enthalpy that in turn affects the temperature at the flame front. 
Since the combustion of flammable gas/air mixtures are strongly exothermic reactions 
with relatively high activation energies, changes in flame front temperature can lead to 
changes in the reaction rate at the flame front and thus changes in the local burning 
velocity and flame propagation rate [108]. Explosion flame fronts in mixtures with Le 
below a critical value, that are concave towards the products of combustion, will result 
in an increase in the rate of chemical enthalpy to the flame front that is greater than the 
increase in the rate of thermal energy loss, and thus the curved flame will burn more 
intensely than a planar flame in the same mixture (i.e. increased burning velocity) and 
the flame would become more wrinkled leading to a cellular flame structure. 
Conversely, a flame front in a flammable mixture with Le above the critical value, would 
result in a lower local burning velocity and, therefore, the smoothing out of wrinkles.  
Cellular flame propagation has been widely researched by numerous authors including 
Markstein [112], Clavin and Williams [113], Joulin and Clavin [114], Pelce and Clavin 
[115], Abdel-Gayed et al. [116], Andrews et al. [117] and Bradley [118, 119]. It was 
recognised that whilst the flame is expanding, the hydrodynamic instability can be 
inhibited. This inhibition is governed by the Peclet number, which is defined as the ratio 
of the flame radius to the flame thickness: 
Where: 
Pe = Peclet number. 
Rf = radius of the flame. 
δ= flame thickness. 
For unstable flames (Le < 1), the cellular structure will develop when the radius 
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In the classic study on non-steady flame propagation, Markstein [112] suggested that 
the flame curvature is the main parameter that defines the flame structure and, 
consequently, the local speed of flame propagation. Markstein proposed that the 
normal propagation velocity of a curved flame, Sn, may be expressed as: 
Where: 
LM = the Markstein length. 
Rf,c = the radius of flame curvature. 
The ratio of the Markstein length to the flame thickness is known as the Markstein 
number, Ma: 
The values of the Markstein length, or number, are determined experimentally by 
measuring the propagation speed of spherical flames as a function of the flame radius 
[112]. 
Karlovitz et al. [121] proposed that it is the flame stretch rate that defines the local 
speed of flame propagation: 
Where: 
ks = Karlovitz flame stretch factor. 
Af = elementary area of the flame front. 
Karlovitz et al. [121] proposed that flame stretch may be created by both flame 
curvature effects (αc) and inhomogeneities of the upstream flow (strain rate, αs) and by 
combining the two the following equation for the propagation velocity of a stretched 
flame is derived: 
 Mu,l n u,l
f,c





MLMa =  (2-29) 
 fs
f







S1 =  = Ma
S S
 (2-31) 
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Authors, including Bradley et al.[122], Buckmaster [123], Matalon [124] and Chung and 
Law [125] separated the effects of curvature and strain rate, thereby allowing Equation 
(2-31) to be rewritten with two different Markstein numbers:  
The sign of the Markstein number in Equation (2-32) defines the response of the flame 
front to stretch and strain [111]. For Ma > 0, flame stretch causes a decrease in the 
local burning velocity, whilst Ma < 0 flame stretch tends to increase the burning 
velocity. The detailed studies of Clavin and Williams [113] and Joulin and Clavin [114, 
126] have demonstrated that for a positive Ma (i.e. Ma > 0), flame stretch works 
against the D-L hydrodynamic instability and has a stabilising effect on the flame 
wrinkling process. 
D-L and diffusive instabilities are relatively weak and only play a significant role during 
the initial stages of a vented explosion. As the explosion develops, interaction with the 
enclosure and obstacles within the enclosure, in addition to the process of explosion 
relief, causes instabilities that are considerably more influential in the development of 
fast flames and the generation of pressure. Generally, if confinement and/or 
obstructions are present (and dwellings will typically have both of these), two powerful 
hydrodynamic instabilities, namely Kelvin–Helmholtz (K–H) [127, 128] and Rayleigh–
Taylor (R–T) [129, 130], strongly influence flame propagation.  
Both the K-H and R-T instabilities are hydrodynamic instabilities that occur when there 
is an interface between fluids of different density. The K-H instability occurs when there 
is a velocity shear in a single continuous fluid, or where there is a velocity difference 
across the interface between two fluids, and the R-T instability develops when a less 
dense fluid is accelerated towards a more dense fluid. The flame surface must be 
distorted by an initial perturbation in order to develop an instability. Both K–H and R–T 
instabilities are triggered when the flame is accelerated over an obstacle or through a 
vent. Solberg et al. [31] carried out a series of propane/air vented explosions in a 35 m3 
chamber and suggested that R-T instabilities were the predominant factor in the 
development of significant overpressures. During the tests it was observed that it was 
necessary for a significant part of the flame to propagate in a direction away from the 
vent opening in order to develop an R-T instability (e.g. centrally ignited), but the 
distance from the point of ignition to the vent was not as important (e.g. R-T instabilities 
would develop if the gas/air mixture was ignited close to the vent opening) [31]. R-T 
instabilities were seen to be developed at the rear of the flame propagating away from 
the vent opening when the flame front reached the vent opening and hot, less dense 
combustion products were vented at high velocities. For rear ignition tests no R-T 
 u,l n c c s sS  - S  = Ma  + Maδα δα  (2-32) 
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instabilities were observed and it was suggested that this was because the whole flame 
front propagates towards the vent, so that an R-T instability will not have the same 
possibility to develop when the flame reaches the vent opening. 
Flame propagation in enclosures also generates acoustic waves that cause 
instabilities, but they are usually associated with relatively slow flames in enclosures 
that are free of obstacles [111]. The acoustic waves reflect off of the walls and 
obstacles within the enclosure and interact with the flame front to develop flame 
perturbations through a variety of instability mechanisms. These mechanisms include 
flame distortion caused by the flame acoustic wave interaction, and wave amplification 
caused by the coherence between the acoustic wave and the exothermic energy 
release [131].  
Acoustic instabilities have been observed in vented explosions by authors including 
van Wingerden and Zeeuwen [132], Tamanini and Chaffee [63], Harrison and Eyre 
[133] and Zalosh [37]; with these instabilities enhancing the peak pressure by a factor 
of eight for fuel rich propane/air mixtures [132] and by a factor of between two and nine 
for stoichiometric methane/air and propane/air mixtures [63]. Tamanini and Chaffee 
[63] demonstrated that that the presence of sound-absorbing material can eliminate 
acoustically-induced combustion instabilities; under quiescent conditions, the sound-
absorbing material decreased the explosion pressure by as much as a factor of ten but 
in turbulent explosions the reduction was typically by a factor of two. 
Flame Self-Acceleration 
Flame instabilities lead to a phenomena that many authors refer to as flame self-
acceleration. When an initially quiescent flammable gas/air mixture is ignited in a 
confined enclosure, the flame initiates as a kernel and a smooth spherical flame is 
formed. As the flame front propagates into the unburnt gas/air mixture ahead of it, 
consuming the flammable gas, it converts chemical energy into heat and leaves a 
sphere of hot, loss dense combustion products behind it. These combustion products, 
as discussed earlier, may be up to eight times less dense than the unburnt gases 
ahead of them. Consequently, the less dense gases expand and push the flame front 
forward. The chemical reaction and the motion of the burnt gases accelerating the 
flame front into the more dense unburnt gases, create thermodiffusion and 
hydrodynamic instabilities that cause ‘cracks’ to propagate across the flame surface, 
resulting in a cellular or wrinkled flame surface. 
The cellular structure of the flame surface (see Figure 2-10) creates a greater surface 
area in contact with the unburned gas, giving rise to an increased rate of combustion 
and hence increased flame speeds. 
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Figure 2-10 Cellular structure of a flame prior to venting 
(taken from DNV GL archive) 
The mass combustion rate may be given by: 
Where: 
fA  = Area of the flame. 
Although Equation (2-18) can be used to estimate flame speeds under idealised 
conditions, it does not take account of the increased rate of combustion caused by 
increases in flame surface area.  
A more accurate relationship between flame speed and burning velocity, for a centrally 
ignited gas/air mixture (hence spherical flame) in a dwelling, is therefore given by: 
Where: 
Ac = the cellular flame surface area (including wrinkles) (m2). 
As = the area equivalent to a smooth spherical flame area (m2). 
For a flame propagating spherically, As will be given by 4πr2. For rear ignition of a 




 = AfρuSu (2-33) 
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In practice, it is extremely difficult to account for, with any degree of accuracy, the 
cellular nature of the flames surface. When magnified, the wrinkles; which may be 
evident with spherical flames of radii of twenty to thirty centimetres, appear as 
individual peaks and troughs in the flame’s surface, making it very difficult to calculate 
the surface area. 
However, Bradley [134] has shown that, at the transition from cellular to self-turbulising 
flames, for the typical fuels and concentrations involved in accidental explosions, the 
turbulent to laminar burning velocity ratio may be estimated as: 
Where: 
Su,t = the turbulent burning velocity (m/s). 
Su,l = the laminar burning velocity (m/s). 
Or, in terms of flame speed: 
Where: 
St = the turbulent flame speed (m/s). 
Sl = the laminar flame speed (m/s). 
It can therefore be seen that the cellular nature of the flame surface increases the 
flame acceleration by a factor of approximately three. Consequently, a stoichiometric 
natural gas/air mixture would be expected to exhibit flame speeds in the region of 9 
m/s. This value is similar to that observed in experiments conducted by MRS [34, 35]. 
Deflagration and Detonation 
In explosions in air, flames propagate at speeds varying from a few centimetres per 
second to approximately two thousand metres per second. Flame propagation at 
velocities less than the speed of sound in air are termed subsonic, whilst flames 
propagating at velocities greater than that of the speed of sound are termed 
supersonic. In accidental explosions in dwellings, flames will initially propagate at low 
velocities in a laminar form but if the unburned gas becomes turbulent the propagation 
velocities will increase. Nonetheless, the velocities attained are still substantially lower 
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It has become convention to name a combustion process where the flame propagates 
at a subsonic speed as a deflagration and where the flame propagates at a supersonic 
speed as a detonation [92]. However, it is possible for a deflagration to propagate at a 
supersonic speed [103]. 
In a deflagration, combustion reactions occur through means of conduction and 
molecular diffusion of heat and species (laminar combustion) and through the turbulent 
mixing of the unburnt and burnt gases (turbulent combustion). In contrast, in a 
detonation, the reaction front is propagated by a strong shock wave that compresses 
the unburnt mixture ahead of it beyond its autoignition temperature. The energy 
released during the ensuing combustion reaction generates substantial heat which is 
sufficient to maintain the strength of the shock wave ahead of it, and the shock wave 
and flame front are coupled together to form a detonation wave [135]. 
2.2.6. The Effects of Scale 
The influence of scale in explosion applications that typically involve no great variation 
in scale is relatively unimportant (e.g. combustion engines). Conversely, the large-scale 
factors involved in the prediction of pressure generation in a vented explosion in a 
building make scale dependence critical [136]. To achieve scaling of an explosion, the 
flame speeds that occur at large-scale must be reproduced at the same relative 
position in a geometrically equivalent small-scale experiment [137]. However, 
experimental work has demonstrated that the scale dependence of the combustion 
processes will result in the small-scale tests generating lower flame speeds and 
overpressures [37, 48, 138-147]. The simple volume scaling method based on the cube 
law, assuming spherical flame and constant flame velocity, can only be expected to 
give an approximate description of the pressure time history before the first peak [148].  
In the MERGE experimental programme [149, 150] tests at ‘medium’ and ‘large’ scale 
were conducted with similar idealised pipework grids. The large-scale grids were twice 
the linear scale of the medium-scale grids. It was found that under otherwise identical 
conditions, the large-scale tests produced overpressures more than 50% greater than 
those at medium-scale. 
To achieve scaling it is therefore necessary to compensate for scale effects in both the 
laminar and turbulent combustion phases of the explosion. This is achieved by 
increasing the reactivity of the mixture used in the small-scale experimental set-up 
either by using a more reactive fuel (fractal model) [151-153] or by oxygen enrichment 
of the gas/air mixture [137]. Due to the plethora of vented explosion research, and to 
avoid the complications of small scale effects, this literature review will concentrate on 
large-scale vented explosion research and only the most relevant small-scale studies. 
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2.3. Confined Explosions 
When a gas explosion occurs in a confined enclosure or vessel, there is an associated 
pressure rise. The pressure rise is caused by the restriction, that the vessel or 
enclosure places, on the expansion of the hot burnt gases. As discussed earlier in the 
chapter, the expansion ratio (unburnt to burnt gases), for stoichiometric fuel/air 
mixtures, is approximately eight for hydrocarbons. This means, assuming adiabatic 
expansion, that the explosion of a flammable stoichiometric hydrocarbon gas/air 
mixture, which is initially at atmospheric pressure and temperature, completely 
confined in a vessel or enclosure, and ignited in the centre of the vessel or enclosure, 
will generate a pressure in the region of 8 bar. This is well in excess of that a dwelling 
is capable of withstanding and is the reason that dwellings sustain damage (often 
structural) when they are subject to an accidental gas explosion. Totally confined 
explosions that are initiated by an ignition source that is not located centrally will 
produce a lower maximum pressure. This is because the flame will touch the surfaces 
of the enclosure sooner than that of a centrally ignited propagating flame, which has 
the effect of ‘cooling’ the flame. Similarly, enclosures of L/D great than unity will also 
produce lower maximum pressures.  
The relationship that determines the maximum pressure rise developed in a totally 
confined explosion, assuming adiabatic conditions, is given by: 
Where: 
Pmax = the maximum pressure (bar). 
Pi = the initial pressure (bar). 
Nb = the number of moles of products remaining after combustion. 
Nu = the number of moles of reactants before combustion. 
Tb = the adiabatic flame temperature (K). 
Tu = the initial temperature of the gas/air mixture before combustion (K). 
The maximum pressure that can be generated in a totally confined explosion occurs 
when a stoichiometric gas/air mixture completely fills the enclosure. This is not 
surprising, however, what may not seem so intuitive is that the pressure developed, 
when considering fuels typically involved in accidental explosions, is independent of 
fuel type. This is because the energy density of most stoichiometric fuel gas/air 
mixtures is approximately the same (3.6 MJ/m3) [86], as tabulated earlier, Table 2-1. 
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When using Equation (2-37) to calculate the maximum overpressure in a totally 
confined explosion, care must be taken to use the correct adiabatic flame temperature 
value. The most commonly quoted adiabatic flame temperatures are measured or 
calculated at constant pressure and this would lead to an underprediction of the 
maximum overpressure. In experiments, common hydrocarbon fuels will generate 
maximum pressures in the region of 8 to 9 bar.  
Figure 2-11 shows the calculated pressure-time curves for three different fuel gas/air 
mixtures that were ignited in a totally confined 1 m3 vessel. Whilst it can be seen that 
the maximum overpressure is the same for the different fuel gases, the time taken for 
them to reach the maximum pressure varies (i.e. the rate of pressure rise is different). 
This is because the different fuel gases have different burning velocities and hence 
different flame speeds [16]. 
 
Figure 2-11 Pressure-time profiles for totally confined explosions in a 1 m3 
cubical vessel (taken from DNV GL archive) 
The rate of pressure rise may be determined by: 
Where dP/dt is the rate of pressure rise. 
The variation in the rate of pressure rise highlighted in Figure 2-11 is a measure of the 
explosion severity and is an important factor when considering accidental gas 







 bar/s (2-38) 
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than methane, and hence is capable of producing a more severe explosion. However, 
whilst some fuel gases are clearly capable of producing a more severe explosion than 
natural gas, it must be remembered that accidental explosions are inadvertently vented 
events that are subject to a number of other explosion parameters (construction of the 
building, number and size of inadvertent vents, density of flammable gas, fuel 
concentration, ignition position, turbulence etc.) that make it impossible for an 
investigator to determine the fuel type through assessment of the explosion pressure 
damage (or lack of it) alone. 
The maximum pressure that can be developed in a confined explosion is independent 
of the volume of the enclosure. That is, if vessels of different volume are completely 
filled with a stoichiometric gas/air mixture they are capable of producing a pressure of 8 
to 9 bar (constant volume adiabatic flame temperature). However, in addition to the 
fuel, the volume of the vessel will also have a significant effect upon the severity of the 
explosion [154].  
Figure 2-12 shows explosions of a stoichiometric propane/air mixture in three vessels 
of differing volume. It can be seen that all three generate the same maximum pressure 
but the explosion propagates more rapidly as the vessel volume decreases. 
Consequently, there is an indirect correlation rate of pressure rise and vessel volume. 
 
Figure 2-12 Influence of vessel volume on the development of a confined 
explosion (adapted from Bartknecht [154]) 
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The influence of vessel volume on the maximum rate of pressure rise may be 
determined by the cube law: 
Where V is the volume of the vessel. 
The constant, which is referred to as KG (for gases), is a fundamental characteristic of 
the given gas and is representative of its explosive nature. Values of KG for 
stoichiometric methane and propane gas/air mixtures, ignited with zero turbulence and 
an ignition energy of approximately 10 J are given in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3 KG values for common fuel gases (taken from NFPA 68 [155]) 
In Figure 2-12 it can be seen from the curve of the 20 m3 vessel, that there are two 
stages in the growth period of the confined explosion. An initial period of low pressure 
rise and then a rapid pressure rise period. Consider a typical room sized enclosure of 3 
m x 3 m x 2.5 m high, that is filled with a flammable gas/air mixture. If we consider a 
spherical flame of diameter equal to half the enclosure width (e.g. 1.5 m), then the 
volume of the spherical flame is approximately 1/12 of the enclosure volume. However, 
as the flame sphere contains burnt gases at approximately 1/8 of the density of the 
unburnt gas/air mixture, it contains only 1/96 of the mass and the pressure rise is a 
function of the mass burnt. Thus, in the time taken for the flame to grow to a diameter 
of approximately half the width of the enclosure, the pressure has only risen by 
approximately 1% of its maximum (i.e. ≈ 80 mbar). 
If we apply the above theory to vented explosions, and assume that the very early 
stages of the explosion may be treated as totally confined, it is simple to predict that 
early failure of a weak part of the enclosure (windows and brick walls typically fail at 
pressures less than 80 mbar) would result in a considerable amount of unburnt gas/air 
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2.4. Gas Explosions in Dwellings 
2.4.1. Vent Coefficients 
One of the parameters used in characterising the size of the explosion relief, or vent 
opening, is the 'vent coefficient'. This term characterises the area of relief required in 
terms of the size of the enclosure or vessel. There are several methods of defining the 
vent coefficient (K), the most common of which are, the area vent coefficient, given by: 
Where: 
KA = the vent (area) coefficient. 
Ax = the cross-sectional area of the enclosure or vessel in the plane of the vent. 
Av = the area of the vent opening. 
And, the volume vent coefficient, given by: 
Kv = the vent (volume) coefficient. 
V = the volume of the enclosure or vessel. 
These two definitions of vent coefficient give the same value for cubical vessels but the 
value differs when applied to non-cubical vessels. When more than one vent opening is 
present in an enclosure, the total vent coefficient (Ktotal) can be expressed in terms of 
the individual vent coefficients, given by: 
2.4.2. The Mechanism of Pressure Generation  
Numerous studies have attempted to explain the mechanism for the development of a 
vented explosion [32, 37, 45, 48, 49, 133, 139, 140, 142, 156-165]; which in general 
has taken the form of identifying a number of pressure peaks on an overpressure-time 
profile and discussing the cause of them. 
In the classic research conducted by Cubbage and Simmonds in the 1950’s [164, 165], 
on explosion reliefs for industrial drying ovens, the researchers were somewhat 
surprised when analysis of the pressure development, for explosions in drying ovens, 
revealed two pressure peaks. They had been expecting a sharp pressure rise during 
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the confined stage of the explosion, followed by a rapid pressure decay once the 
explosion relief had opened, to produce a pressure peak, P1.  
They theorised that the second pressure peak, P2, was due to the increased 
combustion rate as the flame continued to propagate following vent opening, and the 
imbalance between the rate of combustion and the outflow through the relief opening.  
A joint industry project was carried out in Sweden in 1957 [166]. Vented explosion 
experiments using propane/air and acetylene/air mixtures of varying concentration 
were carried out in a 200 m3 building with various sized vent openings. Meteorological 
balloons placed within the building were used to contain the gas/air mixtures such that 
the volume could be varied. Volumes of 15, 25, 40 and 70 m3 were used in the 
experiments in addition to the full enclosure volume of 200 m3 (no balloon).  
In these experiments, the double pressure peak was observed in addition to oscillatory 
combustion. As balloons were used, the tests are not directly relevant to this study due 
to the artificial situation where turbulence is generated upon bursting of a full balloon of 
gas. However, the importance of this pioneering work lies in the observation that the 
generation of high overpressures was associated with the subsequent turbulent 
combustion of flammable gas/air mixture that is expelled during venting.  
Butlin and Tonkin of FRS [160], undertook a number of vented layered explosion tests 
in a 28 m3 chamber, as part of a larger research programme, following the Ronan Point 
explosion. The tests were mainly concerned with the maximum pressure generated 
outside the chamber but a typical pressure-time trace was included in the published 
report. The pressure-time graph clearly showed three pressure peaks and an 
oscillatory peak which commenced just after the third pressure peak and was present 
until the explosion ended. The first, small, pressure peak, P1, occurred after 300 ms 
and was undoubtedly caused by the opening of the vent. After 540 ms there was a 
second pressure peak, P2, followed shortly afterwards, at 600 ms, by a third sharp 
pressure peak, P3, which was immediately followed by the oscillations, P4. The 
pressure peaks were likened to the two peaks described by Cubbage and Simmonds 
[164, 165]. However, the second peak was likely to be caused by the onset of burnt 
gas venting, whereas the second peak in the Cubbage and Simmonds tests is a 
function of the maximum flame area.  
Solberg et al. [28, 29, 31]; undertook a number of large-scale experimental studies on 
vented gas explosions in which they concluded that Taylor instabilities following the 
onset of burnt gas venting may be the dominant mechanism in terms of generating high 
pressures within an enclosure. They noticed that the instability develops at the rear of 
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the flame (i.e. the furthest point from the vent), when the hot combustion gases exit the 
opening at high velocities. 
Solberg et al. [30] discussed a series of large-scale explosion tests undertaken in a 35 
m3 prismatic steel explosion chamber. They proposed that the dominating mechanism 
governing pressure development during a vented explosion is R-T instabilities. 
Observations of flame development from high speed video of centrally ignited tests 
showed that, prior to the first significant pressure peak, the flame was smooth and 
almost spherical. As the flame front reached the vent opening, the volumetric flow of 
gases through the vent opening increased by a factor of approximately three, giving 
rise to a pressure peak that the authors considered P1.  
At this point, the combustion gases attain correspondingly higher flow velocities 
through the vent opening and the backward flame propagation of the rear part of the 
spherical flame is slowed down causing the flame to become R-T instabilised and 
highly turbulent giving rise to the second and maximum pressure peak P2 [30].  
Mercx et al. [147] and van Wingerden [156] carried out a large-scale experimental 
programme in a 38.5 m3 explosion chamber (4.0 m x 3.7 m x 2.6 m). A number of 
methane/air explosions were conducted in order to consider the effects of vent size and 
failure pressure and ignition position. In general, two pressure peaks were exhibited; 
the first pressure peak was generally attributed to the opening of the vent and the 
second, and maximum, pressure peak was due to acoustic oscillations. In a test where 
no vent cover was employed, it was recognised that the first pressure peak was caused 
by a minor external explosion of unburned gas/air mixture expelled from the enclosure 
after the vent had opened. As no video cameras were located externally, the cause of 
this pressure peak was determined by the authors by calculating the time that an 
externally generated pressure wave would take to reach the pressure transducers 
located within the enclosure (≈ 5 to 10 ms to travel a distance of 4 m through hot 
combustion gases). 
In two separate studies [156, 157], van Wingerden analysed the results of a number of 
vented explosion tests undertaken in a 38.5 m3 concrete enclosure and a 5.2 m3 
enclosure. Both studies produced multi-peak pressure-time profiles, with increased 
pressures inside the enclosure attributed to minor combustion outside the enclosure. 
The first pressure peak was found to be due to the vent failure and the second, 
dominating pressure peak resulted from oscillatory combustion. In some experiments 
acoustic driven flame instabilities gave rise to a third pressure peak [157].  
Bimson et al. [48] discuss a series of vented explosion tests carried out in a 550 m3 
[6.25 m (h) x 8.75 m (w) x 10 m (l)] steel explosion chamber; each wall lined with 
53  Chapter 2 
Rockwool to dampen acoustic oscillations, and with a vent opening of KA = 2 in the 
front face of the chamber which was covered with a thin polythene sheet to contain the 
gas/air mixture prior to ignition. The tests involved methane/air and propane/air 
mixtures at 10% above stoichiometric concentration. The authors determined that the 
inclusion of Rockwool eliminated resonant wall interactions and greatly simplified the 
interpretation of the pressure-time traces. In all explosions, two significant pressure 
peaks were observed. The first pressure peak, P1, was observed when the flame front 
reached the plane of the vent opening (signalling the onset of burnt gas venting), whilst 
the second pressure peak, P2, occurred as a consequence of the external explosion. 
The external explosion was considered extremely important as it increased the internal 
pressure by a factor of four above the P1 peak.  
The Stages of a Confined Vented Explosion 
Extensive large-scale experimental research carried out by MRS [33-36, 51, 54, 62, 
144, 167] has identified a number of distinct ‘stages’ that occur during a vented gas 
explosion. This work, which was summarised in a paper by Cooper et al. [64], 
demonstrated that each of the four critical stages of the explosion mechanism were 
capable of producing a local significant peak on a pressure-time graph, which 
depending on the circumstances of the explosion, could represent the maximum 
overpressure peak. Whilst the experiments summarised by Cooper et al. typically 
identified four significant pressure peaks, the authors recognised that, depending upon 
the situation, it was possible during a vented explosion to develop between one and six 
pressure peaks. 
By analysing the development of a vented explosion in terms of these four critical 
stages, it is possible to make a direct comparison of large-scale studies where differing 
numbers of pressure peaks were identified and/or where the pressure peak was 
identified as having being caused by a different explosion phenomena. A diagram 
detailing the four critical stages that were identified by MRS is given in Figure 2-13.  
The four stages of a vented explosion may be described as: 
• stage 1: confined explosion and vent opening, 
• stage 2: burnt gas venting and external combustion, 
• stage 3: low frequency oscillatory combustion and maximum flame area, 
• stage 4: high frequency acoustic oscillations. 
Figure 2-13 shows that there are potentially six pressure peaks that can occur during a 
vented explosion, each of which may be the maximum depending upon circumstances. 
However, it should be noted that most gas explosions in dwellings would not exhibit six 
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pressure peaks. Indeed, many vented explosion pressure–time profiles, representative 
of realistic accidental explosion scenarios, would only exhibit two or three pressure 
peaks. This is reflected in the most relevant large-scale research programmes that 
have been conducted to date [32, 37, 45, 48, 49, 133, 139, 140, 142, 156-163] (see 
Table 2-4). These pressure peaks have generally been identified in the literature, in the 
order in which they were observed on the pressure-time profile (i.e. P1, P2, etc.). 
Fakandu et al. [168], analysed the results of some vented explosion experiments and 
attempted to develop a standard terminology in order to better compare the various 
pressure peaks identified by vented explosion researchers. 
 
Figure 2-13 Pressure-time profile showing the four stages of a vented explosion 
The approach developed by Fakandu et al. has been extended in this study to the most 
relevant large-scale experimental work and the terminology has been amended to 
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better identify the pressure peaks. The following terminology is used to describe the 
pressure-time profile peaks, listed in the order in which they will typically occur:  
• Pv – Peak due to vent opening. 
• Pb – Peak due to the onset of burnt gas venting. 
• Pext – Peak due to the external explosion. 
• Plfo – Peak due to Helmholtz oscillatory/Taylor instabilities. 
• Pmfa – Peak due to maximum flame surface area. 
• Pac – Peak due to high frequency acoustic oscillations. 
Table 2-4 Potential pressure peaks in a vented explosion and the corresponding 
stages of the explosion in which they occur 
Experimental 
Programme 
Pressure Peak Identified 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Pv Pb Pext Plfo Pmfa Pac 
Bauwens et al. [45]   P1  P3 P2 
Bimson et al. [48]  P1 P2    
Cooper et al. [64] P1  P2  P3 P4 
Fakandu et al. [168] P1 P2 P3 P5 P4 P6 
Harrison & Eyre [133] P1 P2 P3    
Mercx et al. [147] P1 P2 (rear ign) 
P3 
(rear ign)   
P2 
(cent ign) 
Pappas et al. [142]  P1  P2   
van Wingerden [156] P1   P2   
van Wingerden [169] P1 P2    P3 
van Wingerden & 
Zeeuwen [157] P1 P2    P3 
Zalosh [37] P1   P2a   
a Attributed to flame instabilities, but likely caused by the external explosion. 
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Fakandu et al. [170] and Fakandu [171] considered the development of a vented gas 
explosion in a 10 litre explosion vessel. The pressure-time results of a slightly richer 
than stoichiometric methane/air explosion (10% gas in air, φ ≈ 1.05), undertaken as 
part of this work are shown in Figure 2-14. The pressure peaks (labelled 1 to 6 in the 
original work) have been labelled using the proposed terminology. Fakandu et al. [170], 
originally described the Plfo pressure peak as having been caused by flow reversal back 
into the chamber following the external explosion. The authors did not have the benefit 
of high speed cameras when determining the cause of this pressure peak but the 
results are identical to those attributed by Cooper et al. [64] and Bauwens et al. [45] as 
being due to low frequency oscillatory combustion.  
 
Figure 2-14 Pressure-time profile for vented gas explosion 
(adapted from Fakandu [171])  
To better understand whether there are observed differences, or simply different 
terminology in the literature, it is beneficial to consider each of the stages of a vented 
explosion in turn. 
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Stage 1: Confined Explosion and Vent Opening 
If a gas is released into a room, builds up to form a flammable gas/air mixture, and is 
ignited, the subsequent explosion will initially behave in the same manner as a totally 
confined explosion. Providing the mixture is quiescent, the flame will originate as a 
flame kernel at the point of ignition and initially propagate as a laminar spherical flame 
(largely smooth at this time; see Figure 2-15 A). 
Because of the confinement of the room, the expanding hot combustion products are 
contained and the pressure will begin to rise relatively slowly (at this early stage), with 
the rate of pressure rise determined by the flame speed, which is dependent on the fuel 
type and concentration. 
 
Figure 2-15 Confined explosion and vent opening stage 
(adapted from DNV GL archive) 
The flame will continue to grow spherically (for central ignition) and the pressure will 
continue to rise until it reaches the failure pressure of the weakest component of the 
room (usually the window), at which point the component fails allowing some of the 
unburnt gas/air mixture to vent to outside (see Figure 2-15 B). The vent opening phase 
of this stage should be considered with two different scenarios, the outcome of which 
will determine whether a pressure peak occurs, and if so, the magnitude of the peak. 
Consider scenario 1, where the room has a component that has a very low failure 
pressure (e.g. a single glazed window). In this case, the component will fail very early 
in the explosion, when the pressure is very low, allowing unburnt gas/air mixture to 
vent.  
If the flow through a vent opening is assumed to be incompressible, and the opening is 
treated as an orifice, the rate of volume flow through the opening may be calculated by: 
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Where:  
Q = the volume flow rate (m3/s). 
Cd = the discharge coefficient. 
Av = the area of the vent opening (m2). 
∆P = the difference in pressure across the opening (Pa) or (kg/m·s²). 
ρ = the density of the gas flowing through the opening (kg/m3). 
The venting process commences, typically causing the pressure within the enclosure to 
fall, producing a pressure peak, Pv. At this stage, in a low pressure vent failure 
scenario, there will not be a significant pressure gradient across the vent opening and 
consequently, the rate of outflow will be low, with Pv exhibiting itself as a low pressure 
peak (Figure 2-16).  
 
Figure 2-16 Pressure-time profile with a low failure pressure vent showing the 
four stages of a vented explosion (adapted from DNV GL archive) 
In certain instances, the flame propagates at a speed such that the combustion gases 
are produced at a rate greater than gases can be relieved through the vent. In these 
situations, the pressure may continue to rise, causing Pv to exhibit itself as a shoulder 
on an increasing pressure gradient (Figure 2-17).  
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Figure 2-17 Further pressure-time profile with a low failure pressure vent 
showing the four stages of a vented explosion (adapted from DNV GL archive) 
Consider now scenario 2, where the room has a component with a high failure 
pressure. In this case, the component will fail at a later stage in the explosion when the 
pressure is higher and consequently the pressure gradient across the vent opening will 
be greater. This facilitates a greater initial outflow through the vent opening and the 
pressure in the room will drop more significantly, producing a more noticeable pressure 
peak (see Figure 2-13). These effects have also been identified in early studies, for 
example Lunn [172], Burgoyne and Wilson [173] and Cubbage and Simmonds [164, 
165]. It should also be noted that with higher failure pressure vent openings, the flame 
may have become cellular in structure prior to the vent opening, whereas with low 
failure pressure vent openings this does not occur until stage two of the explosion.  
At this stage of the explosion, the pressure generated is proportional to the cube of 
both the flame speed and time, and consequently, the maximum rate of pressure rise is 
proportional to the cube of the flame speed and the square of time [16]. Therefore, 
more volatile fuels, with faster flame speeds, will have a greater rate of pressure rise 
and will reach a given pressure in a shorter duration. In addition, as the flame speed is 
a function of the burning velocity, changes in the concentration of the gas/air mixture, 
which alter the burning velocity, will affect the rate of pressure rise. It follows that 
explosions involving near stoichiometric concentrations generate higher pressures than 
those with lean or rich concentrations. Observing Figure 2-15 B, it can be seen that the 
vent has just opened (right edge of the photograph) and the diameter of the flame is 
approximately 3/8 of the diameter of the enclosure. By applying a similar analysis to that 
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carried out earlier in the chapter, the volume of the spherical flame can be found to be 
occupying approximately 1/13 of the volume of the enclosure and the resulting pressure 
(assuming the explosion is totally confined at this stage) at vent failure would be in the 
region of 70 mbar. This simple calculation predicts a pressure greater than a typical 
component failure in a dwelling (e.g. windows etc.) but is explained by the effects of 
inertia. The vent will begin to open at its failure pressure, but the outflow of gases will 
not begin immediately because of the inertia of the confined gases, resulting in a small 
time lag before venting becomes established.  
In addition, because the vent panel has mass, it also has inertia, and it takes a period 
of time for the vent panel to be moved a sufficient distance to allow full venting through 
the opening. As a consequence of the effects of inertia, there is a pressure ‘overshoot’, 
albeit, at a slightly reduced rate to that prior to commencement of vent opening.  
The effects of the weight of relief panels has been studied extensively and the reader 
should consult references such as Lunn [172], Bartknecht [154], Donat [174] and NFPA 
[155] for further information. 
In order to minimise the damage to a building involved in an explosion, it is therefore 
necessary to limit the pressure developed by some means. In industrial applications 
this is often achieved by the use of appropriately designed ‘vent panels or reliefs’, 
which are designed to reduce the maximum overpressure to a value, Pred, that can be 
withstood by the protected vessel or enclosure (typically set at 2/3 of the vessel or 
enclosure design strength) [155]. However, clearly these explosion protection systems 
would not be desirable in a habitable property. Fortunately, components used in the 
construction of dwellings are relatively weak, in terms of withstanding explosion loads, 
and often fail to provide an inadvertent vent opening (see Figure 2-18). 
In summary, the Pv pressure peak depends on the failure pressure of the vent opening 
(Pstat), and in non-turbulent environments may be taken to be approximately equal to 
Pstat. Whether there is any pressure overshoot (i.e. Pv - Pstat > 0), depends upon the 
inertia of the vent, the rate of pressure rise (i.e. the reactivity of the fuel) and the rate at 
which the unburnt gas/air mixture is expelled. 
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Figure 2-18 Accidental gas explosion where early failure of the window has 
provided adequate vent relief and prevented structural damage to the property 
 
Figure 2-19 Accidental gas explosion where inadvertant venting has failed to 
prevent structural damage to the property 
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Stage 2: Burnt Gas Venting and External Combustion 
At this stage, due to selective diffusion and hydrodynamic instabilities, the flame 
surface has adopted a cellular structure. The outflow of gases, both unburnt and burnt, 
causes the spherical flame to distort towards the vent, adopting a ‘pear’ like shape (see 
Figure 2-20 C). The flame continues to increase in size and cellular like structure and 
consequently the rate of production of burnt gases is also increasing. If the rate of 
production of these gases increases at a faster rate than the unburnt (and potentially 
some burnt) gases can be expelled, the pressure will increase still further even though 
the vent is fully open. 
Although venting commenced in stage 1 of the explosion mechanism, the gases vented 
at that stage were unburnt gases. With the onset of burnt gas venting, the volumetric 
outflow rate increases dramatically. As the hot combustion products are approximately 
eight times less dense than the unburnt gases, the volumetric outflow rate increases by 
a factor of approximately three (i.e. √8 = 2.8). This significant increase in outflow can 
manifest itself as a drop in pressure on a pressure-time profile resulting in a pressure 
peak Pb. However, in the case of a low pressure vent opening, it may be observed as a 
slight drop in pressure, as shown just before the Pext pressure peak in Figure 2-17. 
Furthermore, in the case of a higher pressure vent opening, the onset of burnt gas 
venting will occur much sooner after the vent opens, and coupled with the already 
increased venting due to the raised pressure gradient across the vent, the pressure 
drop caused by the increased venting may be superimposed on the already reducing 
pressure gradient [54]. It should be noted that in the conditions described for a high 
failure pressure vent, it is possible for a very small Pext pressure peak to be observed 
on the decreasing pressure gradient, immediately after burnt gas venting and before 
the low frequency oscillations.  
 
Figure 2-20 Burnt gas venting and external combustion stage 
(adapted from DNV GL archive) 
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In Figure 2-20 D, the distorted flame can be seen as it reaches the plane of the vent 
opening. It is this point when the onset of burnt gas venting generally commences but 
up until this point the vented gases have consisted of unburnt gas/air mixture. This 
unburnt gas/air mixture can form a turbulent flammable cloud outside the vent which is 
ignited when the flame front reaches the vent opening, giving rise to rapid external 
combustion which creates a pressure wave that, as well as causing a pressure pulse 
outside the vent, can be observed as a pressure peak of relatively short duration inside 
the room or enclosure. Figure 2-20 E & F show that the pressure wave generated as a 
consequence of the external combustion was of sufficient magnitude to push the burnt 
gases back through the vent opening and into the enclosure. Figure 2-21 shows a 
photograph of the external combustion stage taken by MRS during an experimental 
research programme [54]. 
The effects of the so called ‘external explosion’ have been subject to numerous studies 
[54, 59, 64, 133, 162, 167, 175-177]. Cooper et al. [64], hypothesise that the Pext peak 
is caused by the propagation of the external pressure wave into the enclosure. In a few 
of the tests, wooden boards were placed outside the enclosure and perpendicular to 
the vent opening, in order to create a partial confinement, and thereby maximising the 
size of the flammable gas/air mixture outside of the vent. The results of these tests 
showed a significant increase in the Pext peak whilst the other pressure peaks were 
unaffected [64]. Contrastingly, they also observed, that in some cases the pressure 
generated inside the enclosure was greater than that generated by the external 
pressure pulse. This effect was explained by a temporary restriction to the outflow of 
gases caused by the reduced pressure differential across the vent opening following 
the external combustion. 
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Figure 2-21 Photograph of external combustion at the second stage of a gas 
explosion (photo from DNV GL archive) 
MRS research [54, 167] has demonstrated that whilst the Pext peak is caused by the 
pressure wave generated by the external explosion, and that its magnitude may be 
enhanced by restriction of outflow through the vent opening; increases in the rate of 
combustion caused by turbulence and Taylor instabilities also contribute to the Pext 
pressure peak. To confirm that the external explosion was the origin of the Pext peak, 
Greening and Tite [54], examined video footage of several explosions, frame by frame, 
to determine the time at which the internal and external combustion rate was the 
greatest. The times at which the Pext pressure pulse was detected on the internal 
transducer and the external transducer nearest the vent were then also recorded. By 
comparing the time of peak combustion rate and arrival of the pressure pulse, 
Greening and Tite determined the time delay between the potential origin of the source 
and the time at which the pressure pulse arrived at the transducer. For each 
transducer, they then calculated the distance to the centre of the Pext reaction using the 
time delay and an appropriate value for the speed of sound in the atmosphere through 
which the pressure wave would have been travelling (i.e. for internally located 
transducers, with the speed of sound for hot combustion products). These distances 
were then used to triangulate the point of origin of the source pressure pulse. In all 
cases, the source was found to be outside the vessel, even if the calculations for the 
internal transducer were made using a value for the speed of sound in air.  
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Notwithstanding the above, results of an experimental programme undertaken by 
British Gas Research and Technology [178], where the external explosion was 
prevented by the use of a flame arrestor on the vent opening, provided further evidence 
that the Pext peak was not solely attributable to the external explosion. The availability 
of suitable flame arrestors meant the experimental explosion work was undertaken 
using Perspex tubes, 0.2 and 0.3 m in diameter, with L/D ratios of 2:1 and 3:1 
respectively. The 2:1 tube contained a single baffle and the 3:1 tube contained two 6 
mm baffles (50% blockage ratio). The vent opening on both tubes was covered with a 
flame arrester. Up until the flame front reached the vent opening, video records and 
overpressure-time profiles were found to be similar to tests undertaken without a flame 
arrestor. Consequently, the flame arrester was determined to have had no visible effect 
on the flame development within the tube. However the features occurring after the 
onset of burnt gas venting differed significantly. Firstly, the external flammable cloud 
was not ignited, and secondly, repeated oscillations of the gas flow within the tube, 
associated with the onset of burnt gas venting and rapid combustion within the 
enclosure, were observed. The oscillations were attributed, largely, to the inclusion of 
the flame arrestor. The magnitude of overpressures generated in the second stage of 
the explosions were similar to those developed with external combustion events, with 
the addition of the flame arrestor increasing the prominence of the pressure peak 
associated with the onset of burnt gas venting. The results of these tests suggested 
that the external combustion event did not necessarily cause the Pext peak and that 
turbulent combustion and flame instabilities could also be dominant factors. 
The Pext peak is more likely to be evident with low failure pressure vent openings (due 
to the relatively late arrival of the flame front), rear ignition (as more unburnt gas will be 
pushed through the vent opening) and possibly with richer gas concentrations (as the 
turbulent unburnt gas/air mixture expelled through the vent may mix further with 
available air, thus developing a large cloud of near stoichiometric concentration). These 
effects, in addition to the effects of interconnecting rooms will be explored in later 
chapters.  
Harrison and Eyre [133], carried out a series of eighteen explosion experiments using 
natural gas/air and propane/air mixtures in a 30 m3 explosion chamber [5.92 m (l) x 
2.38 m (w) x 2.16 m (h)] to investigate the effects of the external combustion stage of a 
vented explosion. 
The pressure-time profiles from the tests presented a variety of characteristics 
including single, multiple and oscillatory pressure peaks. All the pressure-rime profiles 
exhibited a small amplitude (10 – 20 mbar) Pv peak associated with the removal of the 
thin polythene sheet covering the vent opening. Pb peaks associated with the onset of 
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burnt gas venting were observed during experiments with rear and central ignition, with 
a Pext peak caused by the external explosion following almost immediately. In central 
ignition tests, low frequency R-T instabilities were triggered by the external explosion 
producing a Plfo peak which was followed by a Pac peak related to higher frequency 
acoustic oscillations. 
An important observation was that for any given fuel and vent size, greater pressures 
were observed for rear ignition than those with central ignition. Furthermore, the 
amplitude of the pressure peak for near vent ignition was very small (circa 10 mbar) 
except for those produced by acoustic pressure oscillations close to the end of the 
explosion. The reason for the increased overpressure for rear ignition tests was due to 
the increased amount of unburnt gas that was expelled from the vent. It was also noted 
that, in a number of tests, the external explosion influenced the magnitude of the 
pressure within the chamber. The reasoning for this conclusion was the restriction that 
the external event placed on the outflow of gases through the vent and the propagation 
of an acoustic pressure wave into the enclosure. Importantly, in all eighteen tests the 
magnitude of the pressure inside the enclosure was greater than that recorded outside. 
Consequently, the authors determined, in agreement with the findings of MRS [54, 167, 
178], that external combustion could not be solely attributable to the pressure peak 
generated by external combustion.  
Harrison and Eyre [133] also observed that in tests conducted with a larger vent, the 
flame typically emerged from the vent as a narrow jet and a few metres from the plane 
of the vent opening the flame propagated rapidly in all directions, giving rise to the peak 
external overpressure. For the small vent opening tests, the emerging jet velocity was 
very high and the unburnt gas/air mixture, by the time of flame arrival, was distributed a 
long way from the vent opening. In these instances, external flame propagation was 
elongated and not spherical. For large vent areas, the internally generated pressures 
were correspondingly lower and the peak external pressure typically exceeded the 
internal pressure at the time of the external explosion. For small vents, the reverse was 
found to be true. For this reason, and because the size of pressure wave that can 
propagate into the enclosure is limited by the size of the vent, the influence of the 
external explosion was found to be greater with larger vent areas. For small vents, the 
centre of the external explosion was typically several metres from the vent opening and 
it was noted to occur well before the normal maximum internal pressure was attained.  
This meant that in practice, for large vents, the external explosion was the dominating 
influence on the internal pressure whereas for small vents the effects of the external 
explosion were likely to be less significant.  
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The authors discussed the manner in which the external explosion influenced the 
pressure within the enclosure; recognising that three different effects were evident: 
i. The pressure generated outside the chamber by the external explosion reduces 
or reverses the pressure gradient across the vent opening, impeding the flow 
through the vent and thereby increasing the internal pressure. 
ii. The acoustic pressure wave generated by the external explosion may 
propagate into the enclosure thereby affecting the internal pressure. The 
acoustic wave was found to reflect from the rear face of the enclosure 
producing larger, narrower pressure peaks at the rear than the front of the 
enclosure as a consequence of the incident and reflected acoustic pressure 
waves. A negative phase, which is not expected from an ‘internal’ explosion, 
was also observed in the internally measured pressure traces, which was 
reasoned to be triggered by the external explosion. 
iii. The external explosion triggers low frequency oscillations (instabilities). 
Harrison and Eyre [133] analysed the earlier work of Zalosh [37] and reasoned that the 
pressure peaks attributed to flame instabilities by the author were likely caused by the 
external explosion.  
Stage 3: Low Frequency Oscillatory Combustion and Maximum Flame Area 
Cooper et al. [64], identified another effect that was evident in a number of the 
experimental tests that were undertaken. They observed the motion, of pockets of 
burnt gas within the vessel, towards and away from the vent opening. This type of 
motion is known as a Helmholtz, or organ-pipe, oscillation and is visible in Figure 2-16 
& Figure 2-17 as a low frequency oscillation just after the Pext pressure peak, giving rise 
to a pressure peak Plfo. Helmholtz oscillations can become more influential in large L/D 
ratio enclosures. 
Once the external combustion process is complete, the venting of both unburnt and 
burnt gases is re-established and the flame continues to propagate; increasing in area 
and hence combustion rate. The Helmholtz oscillations that were initiated in stage two 
are gradually damped out as the flame surface continues to expand. However, they 
can induce Taylor instabilities at the flame surface furthest from the vent opening 
(where the rear of the flame is propagating towards the rear of the enclosure, and in 
the direction of the unburnt, denser gases).  
It can be seen from Figure 2-22 G, that the whilst the flame surface area is increasing, 
it is beginning to be affected by the interaction of the walls of the enclosure, losing its 
spherical shape and taking on the shape of the enclosure (see Figure 2-22 G).  
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Figure 2-22 Maximum flame area (adapted from DNV GL archive) 
The changing in shape of the flame surface means that, in terms of gas explosions in 
dwellings, where the enclosures are typically rectangular, the maximum flame area will 
occur later in the explosion and its maximum surface area will be greater than a 
corresponding spherical flame, so a higher maximum pressure will be attained than 
might otherwise be expected with a spherical container. As a consequence of the 
increasing flame surface area, the pressure within the room will either rise or fall, 
depending upon the balance between the rate of production of combustion products 
and the outflow through the vent opening. Where the production of gases is greater 
than the rate at which they are expelled, such as with smaller vent openings, the 
pressure will once again rise.  
When the flame touches the surfaces of the enclosure it is cooled. The consequences 
of the flame cooling are twofold. Firstly, the combustion reaction is quenched, which 
results in a reduction in the flame surface area and hence a reduced combustion rate. 
Secondly, the reduced combustion rate causes a drop in the pressure within the 
enclosure which may be observed as the Pmfa peak on the pressure-time profile (see 
Figure 2-16 and Figure 2-17). It should be noted that the Pmfa pressure peak is typically 
broader and of longer duration than peaks Pv and Pext.  
Bauwens et al. [45] carried out large-scale vented explosion tests in a room sized 
enclosure of volume 63.7 m3 to determine the effects of obstacles on pressure 
generation. A number of explosion tests were conducted without obstacles, the results 
of which exhibited two pressure peaks. The authors determined that the first pressure 
peak was associated with the combination of external combustion, Helmholtz 
oscillations and Taylor instabilities, whilst the second peak was produced as a 
consequence of interactions between the surface of the flame, acoustics and the 
structure of the enclosure . 
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Figure 2-23 Pressure-time profile for a large-scale vented explosion 
(adapted from Bauwens et al. [45])  
The evidence of research to date, conducted in single empty enclosures, suggests that 
a pressure-time profile for an accidental natural gas explosion would not be dominated 
by a Pmfa peak. This is because relatively large inadvertent vent openings are typical 
and the fuel has a low burning velocity. Furthermore, the Pmfa peak may be expected to 
be considerably lower than peaks Pv and Pext. LPG, having a higher initial burning 
velocity, would be expected to produce a higher Pmfa pressure. However, these fuels 
are more susceptible to acoustic instabilities, which are often initiated before the flame 
has reached its maximum surface area, and which can mean that the pressure peak is 
not observed. Nevertheless, the conditions encountered in a typical dwelling mean the 
likelihood of acoustic stabilities occurring is significantly less than that of an 
experimental test which are typically carried out in metallic enclosures with thin walls 
and thus easily excitable acoustics. 
In summary, the Pmfa pressure peak is only likely to be dominant in situations where 
there is a very low failure pressure vent but of insufficient area (hence the rate of 
venting is insufficient to prevent the pressure rising) or where there is significant 
turbulence. The effect of turbulence in gas explosions in dwellings is to be considered 
later in this chapter. 
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Stage 4: Acoustic Pressure Oscillations  
Combustion derived pressure oscillations has been observed in large-scale 
experiments by Zalosh [37], van Wingerden and Zeeuwen [132, 157], Tamanini and 
Chaffee [63], Thorne et al. [179], Dragosavic [180] and McCann et al. [181]. The Pac 
peak shown in Figure 2-16 and Figure 2-17 usually, but not always, occurs at a late 
stage in an explosion and is associated with high frequency acoustic oscillations of 
large amplitude. MRS [33-35, 54, 62] undertook a significant research programme to 
determine the effects of oscillatory flame instabilities having become aware of a 
number of vented explosion tests where oscillatory pressure peaks had been observed. 
Over 120 vented explosion tests were undertaken during this programme during which 
it became apparent that oscillatory combustion effects were strongly dependent on the 
geometry of the enclosure and its acoustic characteristics [33].  
Accidental explosions occur in dwellings that have significant damping materials within 
them that are capable of absorbing the acoustic oscillations. Consequently, for the 
purposes of this study, the oscillatory stage of the explosion can be ignored. However, 
for completeness, there are a few fundamental observations that are worth noting: 
1. The oscillatory stage of the explosion always occurred during the period when 
the flame was venting through the opening and the oscillations coincided with a 
sudden increase in luminosity [33].  
2. The oscillatory pressure peaks were found to occur over a particular band of 
gas/air concentrations. For natural gas, this range was between 8 – 12% gas in 
air, with the highest pressures, perhaps not surprisingly, being recorded with 
near stoichiometric concentrations. However, other researchers reported that 
this peak occurs most frequently with fuel rich mixtures [132, 157]. 
3. The oscillatory peaks always marked the end of the explosion, that is, the 
combustion process ended and the mean pressure within the enclosure 
decreased to ambient shortly after the oscillations ceased. 
4. The magnitude of the pressure peak generated during this stage of the 
explosion was found to increase with vent failure pressure [33]. 
5. Because of the acoustic nature of empty cubical chambers, the magnitude of 
the pressure peak is likely to be greater in them than non-cubical chambers or 
chambers with sound dampening materials (e.g. wall surface coverings, 
furniture etc.). 
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The Effect of Enclosure Volume 
It has already been shown that the maximum pressure that can be developed in a 
totally confined explosion is independent of volume. However, in a vented explosion, 
the rate of pressure rise is a critical factor in pressure generation. So, given that the 
combustion rate is a key parameter in the development of pressure, and that the 
combustion rate is dependent upon the flame surface area (including the effects of 
flame disturbance), it follows that the enclosure volume should in some way affect the 
pressure generated in a vented explosion. 
During the confined stage of a vented explosion it is important to consider the 
maximum pressure generated, the rate of pressure rise and the pressure difference 
between the maximum pressure attained and the failure pressure of the vent 
(sometimes called the overshoot). This difference in pressure is found to be inversely 
proportional to the cube root of the volume of the enclosure: 
MRS [144] conducted research into the effects of enclosure volume during a number of 
large-scale experimental tests using cubical enclosures of volume ranging from 0.055 
m3 to 112 m3. The results of these tests revealed, that to a certain extent, all of the 
potential pressure peaks were dependent upon the enclosure volume. 
It was demonstrated that the pressure difference between the Pv maximum pressure 
and the failure pressure of the vent (Pstat) decreased with increasing enclosure volume. 
This is in agreement with the relationship shown in Equation (2-44). It was also shown 
that for small vent areas, the Pext pressure peak increased with increasing vessel 
volume. However, for larger vent areas the pressure appeared to be unaffected by 
changes in the volume of the enclosure.  
The pressure peak that occurs when the flame surface area has reached its maximum, 
Pmfa, was found to increase in proportion to the cube root of the enclosure volume 
[144]: 
Oscillatory pressure peaks were observed in large enclosures with small vent areas 
whereas they were rarely encountered in smaller enclosures with large vents, 
indicating that there is some dependence on enclosure volume. In addition, it was 
noticed that, in order to eliminate acoustic disturbances, more acoustic damping was 
required with enclosures of larger volume.  




 Pmfa ∝ √V
3  (2-45) 
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Zalosh [37] carried out vented explosion tests in small-scale and large-scale 
enclosures, and concluded that the amplitude of the second pressure peak was an 
order of magnitude greater for an explosion in a large enclosure than it was for an 
explosion in a small enclosure with comparable vent areas. The reason for this finding 
was explained by suddenly accelerated combustion caused by flame instabilities in the 
latter part of the explosion. This observation is supported by the study of McCann et al. 
[181], who observed that flame cellularity appeared at an earlier stage of the explosion 
in a larger enclosure; whereas in a smaller enclosure the onset of cellularity did not 
occur until just prior to vent failure and, consequently, did not have a significant effect 
on the flame size and hence pressure rise. 
Kasmani et al. [182], and Kasmani [183] also investigated the influence of vessel 
volume on vented gas explosions by conducting tests in vessels of volume 0.2 m3 and 
0.0065 m3. Their findings indicated that greater pressures were generated in 
explosions in enclosures of larger volume and that this was caused by flame self-
acceleration and the development of larger flame surface areas within the enclosure. 
The Effect of Vent Size 
Rasbash and Rogowski [184, 185] undertook a series of propane/air and pentane/air 
vented explosion experiments in long ducts of L/D 6 to 48, in which the size of the vent 
was varied from KA = 1 (i.e. completely open) to KA = 64. It was found that the 
overpressure was directly proportional to KA or inversely proportional to the vent size. 
Sutton and Tite [62] carried out natural gas/air vented explosion experiments in vessels 
of volume 2.39 and 0.68 m3 with an L/D ratio 3:1 and vent size that was varied between 
Kv = 3.2 to Kv 18.9. Reducing the vent size was found to affect not only the maximum 
pressure but also the mechanism responsible for the generation of the pressure. The 
authors found that as the vent size was increased, the magnitude of Pb decreased 
because unburnt gas venting was not significantly restricted by the vent opening and 
the external explosion, Pext, was dominant. However, as the size of the vent was 
reduced, venting was restricted which increased the magnitude of Pb. and the external 
explosion became less significant and in some instances (i.e. very small vent) resulted 
in its pressure peak, Pext merging with the pressure peak Pb, to produce a single broad 
peak. 
Rogers and Tite [144] conducted natural gas/air vented explosions in a 112 m3 vessel. 
They found, that for large volume vessels, whilst smaller vent areas generally resulted 
in greater Pb pressure peaks in comparison with larger vent areas, there was little 
significant difference in the pressure generated.  
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Alexiou et al. [186] reported on vented natural gas/air explosion tests carried out in a 
76 mm diameter cylindrical vessel of L/D 13.6 with vent sizes of KA = 1 to KA = 5. They 
found that for smaller vent areas (KA = 5), the P1 pressure peak was found to be 
dominant. This pressure peak was attributed by the authors to be due to the maximum 
flame area (Pmfa). It was also observed that smaller vent areas resulted in lower 
maximum flame speeds. This was due to the impeding of the flow through the vent 
opening in comparison to that of the larger vent openings. 
Bauwens et al. [45] observed, during explosion experiments in a cuboidal vessel of 
volume 63.7 m3 with a low failure pressure vent openings of KA = 5 and KA = 2.5, in 
agreement with the findings of Rasbash and Rogowski, that reducing the size of the 
vent had the effect of increasing the peak pressure for all configurations and ignition 
locations.  
Hammond [187] carried out research into multiple vents in enclosures. He observed 
that if the failure pressures of the vents were different, venting occurred predominantly 
through the single vent of lower failure pressure. 
The Effect of a Gas Layer 
In accidental gas explosions in dwellings, it is reasonably common for the escaping fuel 
gas to mix with air in a room and form a flammable layer. The position of the layer is 
dependent on the relative density of the gas, the location of the release and the type of 
ventilation pattern. The reader is referred to Harris [16], for detailed information relating 
to the build-up of gas in a dwelling. In very general terms, releases of natural gas (i.e. 
less dense than air) may form a high level layer from the point of release to the ceiling 
and escapes of LPG (more dense than air) may form a low level layer from the point of 
release to the floor.  
Buckland [188], as part of a larger FRS study of vented explosions, presents work 
undertaken to consider the effects of explosions of gas layers in room sized 
enclosures. The conclusion of the study was that the explosion pressures produced by 
buoyant layered explosions should not cause any significant structural damage to a 
dwelling. 
Earlier in the chapter, it has been shown that in a totally confined explosion, the 
maximum pressure that can be generated depends solely upon the energy density of 
the gas. Nonetheless, Cubbage and Marshall [189], demonstrated that the pressure 
generated in a vented layered explosion (i.e. the gas/air mixture does not fill the 
enclosure); can, under certain circumstances, be as high as when the enclosure is 
completely full of flammable gas/air mixture, even though the energy density is less. By 
plotting the pressure in the enclosure (at the time of vent opening), against energy 
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density, they were able to observe that, for large vent areas, it is necessary to fill as 
little as 1/E (i.e. 1/8 for typical hydrocarbons) times the volume of the enclosure to 
generate the same maximum pressure that would be produced if the enclosure were 
completely filled with a flammable mixture (see Figure 2-24). However, under most 
circumstances, greater maximum pressures will be produced by near stoichiometric 
concentrations that completely fill the enclosure. For clarity, it should be stressed that 
the pressure generated with layered explosions only has the potential to equal that of a 
completely full enclosure in the first stage of the explosion, in the later stages of the 
explosion the pressure generated by a layer will always be lower in comparison. 
 
Figure 2-24 Pressure generated at time of vent opening during a layered natural 
gas explosion (adapted from Cubbage and Marshall [189]) 
Butlin and Tonkin [160], carried out a number of vented explosion experiments to 
determine the effect of layer depth on the pressure generated within a 28 m3 enclosure 
with varying vent opening sizes. High level layers of stoichiometric natural gas/air 
mixture were ignited at the rear of the enclosure. The results are shown in Figure 2-25, 
where it can be seen, for a given vent size, that the pressure generated within the 
enclosure increases with layer depth. 
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Figure 2-25 Effect of layer depth on pressure produced inside enclosure 
(adapted from Butlin & Tonkin [160]) 
Explosions Produced by Pockets of Flammable Gas-Air Mixtures 
When investigating accidental explosions, it is sometimes necessary to determine if a 
‘pocket’ of flammable gas/air mixture, filling a small fraction of the room or enclosure, 
was capable of causing the explosion. 
Experimental work carried out by Cubbage and Marshall [189], demonstrated that the 
maximum pressure that could be generated in an enclosure by a pocket of gas, was a 
function of the energy contained within the pocket, relative to the volume of the 
enclosure (i.e. a function of the energy density). For explosions of pockets of gas 
where venting does not occur, the maximum pressure may be estimated by the 
following equation: 
Where:  
ξ = the energy density (kJ/m3).  
If the explosion was vented, and it is suspected that a pocket of flammable gas was 
involved, a modified equation is given in Cubbage and Marshall [189].  
 P = 1.87ξ + 0.8 × 10-3ξ2 (2-46) 
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The Effect of Gas Concentration 
In all of the confidential, large-scale vented explosion research programmes, carried 
out by MRS [33-36, 51, 54, 62, 144, 190], explosion tests were undertaken with gas 
concentrations across the natural gas flammable range. In addition, a number of the 
tests were repeated with varying concentrations of propane. Consequently, there is a 
wealth of information available regarding the effects, on pressure generation, of varying 
gas concentration.  
There are two main effects of varying the concentration of a flammable gas/air mixture. 
It has already been shown earlier in the chapter that the burning velocity alters with gas 
concentration, with the value reducing from a maximum, that is slightly rich of 
stoichiometric, as the concentration diverges towards the flammable limits. This is of 
critical importance in vented explosions as it governs the rate of production of 
combustion products and if this is greater than the rate at which they can be vented 
from the enclosure, the pressure will rise. Consequently, whilst it was shown earlier 
that the burning velocity does not affect the maximum pressure generated in a totally 
confined explosion, it can affect the maximum pressure generated in a vented 
explosion. The effect of changing natural gas concentration on explosion pressure (in 
the early stages of a vented explosion) is shown in Figure 2-26. 
 
Figure 2-26 The variation in explosion pressure with gas concentration 
(stage 1 natural gas/air – adapted from Cubbage and Marshall [189]) 
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Not surprisingly, the pressure-gas concentration curve is similar to the shape of the 
burning velocity-gas concentration curve, with the maximum pressure occurring near 
the stoichiometric concentration, and values reducing as the concentration diverges 
towards the flammable limits. 
It was noted [34, 35], under certain circumstances, that the highest pressure generated 
in a vented explosion did not always occur when the burning velocity was at its 
maximum (i.e. the gas concentration was not just rich of stoichiometric). This was 
found to occur in situations where the most significant contributory factor to pressure 
generation was the external combustion and the dominant pressure peak was Pext. In 
these situations, fuel rich unburnt gases, which are expelled through the vent opening, 
mix with air to produce a flammable gas/air mixture that is close to stoichiometric 
concentration.  
Figure 2-27 shows how the pressure produced within the enclosure, during stage 2 of 
the vented explosion, may vary with gas concentration prior to venting. Contrastingly, 
fuel lean and stoichiometric mixtures may be diluted to produce leaner gas/air mixtures 
and consequently lower pressures within the enclosure.  
 
Figure 2-27 Variation in explosion pressure with gas concentration 
(stage 2 natural gas – adapted from Cubbage and Marshall) [34]) 
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The second effect of gas concentration on pressure generation within the enclosure is 
caused by changes to the expansion factor. The expansion factor is largely dependent 
on the flame temperature and to a lesser extent the combustion chemistry (i.e. mole 
number ratio). It has been shown that the flame temperature reduces as the gas 
concentration diverges to its flammable limits, and consequently, the expansion factor 
is strongly dependent upon gas concentration.  
Changes in gas concentration also affect the mole number ratio. For fuel lean mixtures, 
the effects of changing mole number ratio are insignificant. However, as the fuel/air 
mixture increases in concentration, the mole number ratio increases significantly. 
Calculations for the mole number ratio vs. equivalence ratio for methane, ethane and 
propane have been carried out using GASEQ [88] and are plotted in Figure 2-28 for 
comparison. 
 
Figure 2-28 Variation in mole number ratio with gas concentration 
(calculated using GAEQ [88]) 
The effect of the increase in mole number ratio with increasing gas concentration, 
counteracts the effect of reduced flame temperature. Indeed, at the upper flammable 
limit, the mole number ratio increases the expansion factor of methane by over 20% 
and by approximately 30% for propane, offsetting to some degree, the reduction in 
expansion factor caused by changes to the flame temperature. The combined effects of 
flame temperature and combustion chemistry on the expansion factor are shown in 
Figure 2-29. 
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Figure 2-29 The variation of expansion factor with equivalence ratio (gas/air 
mixture temperature of 288 K) 
Ferrara et al. [191], carried out a number of propane/air explosion tests using varying 
gas concentrations. Earlier in this chapter, it was shown that the burning velocity varies 
with gas concentration. Consequently, as the flame shape, for a given ignition position 
(e.g. central or rear), would be the same regardless of gas concentration, it would be 
logical to expect the maximum flame speeds to be recorded during tests involving near 
stoichiometric gas/air mixtures, and lower flame speeds to be observed during tests 
with fuel lean and fuel rich gas/air mixtures. However, whilst the results of Ferrara et al. 
[191], are in agreement for fuel lean mixtures, fuel rich mixtures were found to have 
considerably higher flame speeds than would be expected on the basis of the 
corresponding laminar burning velocity. These findings may be explained as fuel rich 
gas/air mixtures are known to be more susceptible to developing cellular flames, and 
furthermore, larger flames, such as those developed with rear ignition, are predisposed 
to instabilities that cause the flame to adopt a cellular structure. As a consequence of 
these two factors, rear ignition of fuel rich mixtures, will result in the propagation of fast 
cellular flames giving rise to higher overpressures.  
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The Effects of Ignition Location 
In totally confined explosions in spherical vessels, the maximum pressure will be 
generated if the ignition source is located in the centre of the vessel [154, 155, 174]. An 
ignition source, located elsewhere in the vessel, would result in the flame front reaching 
the vessel walls sooner and being cooled. 
Kindracki et al. [192] have undertaken a number of small-scale experiments in a closed 
vertical cylindrical vessel. Their findings, that centrally ignited explosions produce 
higher maximum pressures than explosions ignited at the top or bottom of the vessel, 
are in agreement with the work of Bartknecht [154], Donat [174] and NFPA [155]. 
Solberg et al. [30] ascertained that explosions ignited at the rear wall of the enclosure 
behaved differently to those ignited centrally or near the vent opening. A major part of 
the flame must be able to propagate in a direction away from the vent opening in order 
to develop a R-T instability, but the distance from the point of ignition to the vent is not 
important. With explosions ignited at the rear wall of the enclosure, the whole flame 
must propagate in a direction towards the vent opening, and consequently, R-T 
instabilities do not have the same opportunity to develop when the flame front reaches 
the vent opening and hot, less dense combustion gases, vent at high velocity. In the 
rear ignited explosion tests discussed by Solberg et al., two pressure peaks were still 
observed, the first of which was noted to be caused by the onset of burnt gas venting, 
but the second was attributed to the development of shear turbulence in the boundary 
layer between the unburnt gas/air mixture at low velocity and burnt gases at higher 
velocity. Consequently, according to Solberg et al. [30], R-T instabilities may be 
developed in all ignition locations except the rear wall (or very close to it). Interestingly, 
during this experimental programme, Solberg et al. observed that rear ignition tests 
exhibited lower maximum pressures than centrally ignited tests or those ignited close to 
the vent opening. 
Mercx et al. [147] and van Wingerden [156] found that the pressure-time profiles for 
rear ignition experiments were completely different to those exhibited by central or near 
vent ignition locations. With ignition close to the vent, one significant oscillatory 
combustion pressure peak was observed, Pac; and, whilst the maximum pressure for 
centrally ignited explosions was also found to be produced by oscillatory combustion, 
two further pressure peaks were noted. The first of these, P1, was explained by the 
opening of the vent, Pv and the second was perceived as being caused by the onset of 
burnt gas venting, Pb. With rear ignited experiments, three pressure peaks were clearly 
visible; the first two of which were similar to those of centrally ignited explosions, but 
the third, and maximum pressure peak, which occurred almost immediately after Pb, 
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was caused by an external explosion as the unburnt gas/air mixture that had been 
expelled from the enclosure was ignited. It was also noted that in some instances, 
flame jets of up to 18 m in length exited the vent opening [156]. The results of this 
experimental programme suggested to the authors, that whilst the mechanism for 
developing the maximum overpressure during an explosion in an empty large-scale 
enclosure differed depending upon ignition position, the location of the ignition source 
had a limited effect on the maximum overpressure generated. 
MRS work [33-36, 51, 54, 62, 144], has demonstrated that in vented explosions, the 
location of the ignition source can have a significant impact on the severity of the 
explosion, and consequently, the damage a building or dwelling sustains. However, in 
contrast to totally confined explosions, whilst non central ignition would result in the 
flame front reaching the walls of the enclosure sooner than with central ignition, higher 
pressures may be generated than with central ignition.  
Notwithstanding cooling of the flame front, the main effect of the ignition position is to 
determine the time at which the flame front will reach the vent opening. This signifies 
the time at which burnt gas venting commences, which often determines the maximum 
pressure generated in the explosion. It follows that ignition sources located close to the 
vent opening will allow burnt gases to vent earlier in the explosion and consequently 
lower pressures will be observed inside the enclosure. Conversely, ignition sources 
located some distance from the vent opening (e.g. on the wall of a room furthest from 
the vent), will result in a delay in burnt gas venting, giving rise to higher pressures. 
Furthermore, if the enclosure has a considerable quantity of gas/air mixture within it 
(e.g. completely full or a considerable layer), and the ignition source is some distance 
from the vent opening, then a significant quantity of unburnt gas/air mixture will be 
expelled through the vent before the flame front reaches the plane of the vent opening. 
The accelerating flame front will exit the vent opening as a ‘jet’ of flame, igniting the 
unburnt gases, causing rapid combustion. This event is sometimes termed the ‘external 
jet explosion’. It follows that the greater the volume of unburnt gas outside the vent, the 
higher the potential overpressure within the enclosure.  
Ponizy and Leyer [193, 194] carried out research on small-scale vented vessels 
connected to ducts with open vents of KA between 9 and 45. They concluded that 
central ignition, even in cases of simply vented vessels, produces the highest pressure 
within the vessel. They argue that whilst rear ignition produces higher combustion rates 
due to flow disturbances and greater flame surface areas, the smaller amount of 
unburnt gas left in the vessel after vent opening, and heat losses to the walls, lead to 
lower maximum pressures than explosions with central ignition. This does not appear 
to be in agreement with the significant amount of large-scale research conducted by 
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MRS [33-36, 51, 54, 62, 144, 167, 195, 196]; and Bauwens et al. [45], possibly due to 
scaling difficulties. 
Ferrara et al. [191] carried out vented propane/air explosion experiments using a 200 
litre vessel connected to a large ‘dump’ vessel via a 1 m duct. The flame speeds 
measured during the experimental tests ranged from 5 to 10 m/s for central ignition to 
15 (lean & rich mixtures) to 50 m/s (near stoichiometric) for rear ignition. The faster 
flame speeds observed with rear ignition are explained by that fact that the flame front 
is pushed forward in one direction, as opposed to being pushed spherically with central 
ignition. This results in an elongated flame with a greater increased surface area 
(compared to a spherical flame), and consequently a faster combustion rate than that 
associated with spherical flame propagation. 
To investigate this effect further, the authors ‘normalised’ the flame speed by dividing 
by the laminar burning velocity, thus allowing them to determine the effective 
expansion ratio; and allowing comparison with typical laminar expansion factors 
determined earlier in this chapter. The effective expansion factors were in the order of 
30 for central ignition and up to 130 for rear ignition, approximately 16 times greater 
than that for laminar spherical expansion.  
As no turbulence was induced in the early stages of the explosions, and since the 
effective expansion ratio is correlated to the combustion rate (which is a function of the 
flame surface area and the burning velocity), the differences in the measured flame 
speed values (compared to laminar flames) were attributed to the elongated increased 
flame surface area caused by distortion effects. 
Willacy et al. [197] carried out a number of vented explosion experiments in a vessel 
connected to a duct, using homogeneous and stratified propane/air mixtures. The duct 
was of similar size to the vent opening and was connected to a large ‘dump’ volume 
such that the experimental venting arrangement could be assumed as venting to 
atmosphere. The authors found that with end ignition the flame propagated in a 
unidirectional manner away from the end wall towards the vent. In a manner identical to 
the earlier work of Ferrara et al. [191], the flame front, which initially propagated in a 
hemispherical shape was pushed forward in one direction by the hot combustion 
products, causing the flame to elongate. This elongation of the flame results in a 
greater flame surface area, faster flame speeds and consequently higher pressures. In 
addition, the greater distance from the vent to the point of ignition provides additional 
distance for flame acceleration to take place.  
Bauwens et al. [45], in addition to investigating the effects of obstacles on large-scale 
vented explosions, also determined the effects of ignition location. The results of their 
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tests showed that rear ignition produced higher pressures within the enclosure than 
centre or front ignition. These pressures were associated with external combustion and 
increased flame surface area. The oscillatory peak pressures were found to be lower 
with rear ignition. This is due to the fact that there is little unburned gas left within the 
enclosure at the time the acoustic oscillations develop. 
High pressures may also be generated in rare occurrences when two or more sources 
of ignition are located simultaneously. In this instance, the separate flame kernels 
propagate and at some point merge to produce a larger flame surface area giving rise 
to higher pressures within an enclosure.  
In accidental explosions, it is not typical for the origin of the explosion (i.e. point of 
ignition) to be in the centre of the room or enclosure. This is because, the most 
common sources of ignition are pilot lights on gas appliances, electrical switches or 
electrical appliances. All of the above are most commonly located around the periphery 
of the room.  
It is also worth noting that dwellings often have appliances with a fixed source of 
ignition (e.g. pilot light etc.). Where these situations occur, the pressure generated in 
an accidental explosion is often minimised as any escape of gas is ignited immediately 
it reaches its LEL. This reduces the severity of the explosion and often prevents 
significant structural damage to the building. 
Effects of Enclosure Geometry 
In accidental explosions in dwellings, the most commonly encountered enclosures are 
rectangular and do not typically have significantly large L/D ratios. In such cases, the 
geometry does not have a significant effect on the magnitude of the pressure produced 
at the time of vent opening. This is because, as demonstrated earlier, the flame 
occupies only a small fraction of the volume of the enclosure at the time the vent fails 
(unless for some reason there is a vent with a particularly high failure pressure). 
Explosion pressures generated within enclosures that are not cubical can be either 
higher or lower than the maximum in a cubical enclosure, depending upon 
circumstance. In some instances (e.g. when fuels with high burning velocities are 
involved), the greatest explosion pressure occurs when the flame surface area has 
reached its maximum. Where the L/D ratio is close to unity, and assuming central 
ignition, the flame will propagate spherically and its maximum surface area will occur 
when the diameter of the flame is equal to the second smallest dimension of the 
enclosure. It follows, that for enclosures that have L/D ratios that are increasingly 
greater than unity, but do not lead to significant flame acceleration, lower pressures 
could be realised. However, in enclosures where the flame is elongated due to 
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distortion effects, such as L/D greater than 3:1, flame acceleration will occur if the 
ignition is in the centre or rear of the enclosure, and higher explosion pressures will be 
realised [62]. This is a consequence of the increased surface area of the flame, the 
increased flame speed because of the unidirectional expansion and because for 
significant periods of the explosion, only cold unburnt gases are being expelled through 
the vent opening. 
The Effect of Initial Pressure 
In terms of accidental explosions in dwellings, typical changes in the initial 
(atmospheric) pressure will have little consequence on the magnitude of the maximum 
pressure generated during the explosion. Consequently, these effects can be ignored. 
In totally confined explosions, however, increases in the initial pressure will result in an 
increased energy density and consequently a greater total energy within the enclosure. 
Therefore, the rate of pressure rise and the magnitude of the explosion pressure will be 
increased. 
The Effect of Initial Temperature 
Changes to the initial temperature will affect both confined and vented explosions. The 
critical explosion parameters of burning velocity and expansion factor are both affected 
by changes in temperature. The effects of these changes have been discussed earlier 
in this chapter. 
2.5. Turbulence and Flame Acceleration 
2.5.1. General 
There is a wealth of literature concerning turbulent combustion, much of which is not 
directly applicable to this study and consequently it is beyond the scope of this project 
to review it in detail. However, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the principles 
of turbulent combustion and to critically appraise the current literature relating to the 
effects of obstacles in vented explosions in dwellings. For a thorough review of 
turbulent combustion, the reader is referred to the works of Andrews et al [117], Bray 
[198, 199], Clavin [200], Clavin et al. [201], Abdel-Gayed et al. [116, 202] and Kuo and 
Acharya [83]. 
It is the need to predict the flame speed during explosions that has driven the 
comprehensive body of turbulent combustion research over the past twenty five years. 
In order to predict the flame speed in a turbulent explosion it is necessary to have a 
thorough understanding of the local speed of flame propagation and the characteristics 
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of a turbulent flame that enable the local burning velocity to be related to the turbulent 
flame speed [203]. 
It is interesting to note that despite significant advancements in the theory of turbulent 
combustion, our present understanding is still essentially based on the classic study of 
Damkӧhler published in English in 1947 [203, 204]. It was Damkӧhler that first 
suggested that there are two distinct regimes of turbulent combustion that may be 
related to the flame thickness, namely small-scale and large-scale. 
In the small-scale turbulent regime, the internal flame structure is disrupted by small-
scale energetic motion, enhancing molecular diffusion and thermal conduction. In this 
regime the turbulent flame speed is governed by the following relationship: 
Where:  
St = turbulent flame speed. 
Sl – laminar flame speed. 
Dt = effective turbulent diffusivity. 
D = molecular diffusivity. 
In the large-scale regime, the flame structure is dependent on large-scale (i.e. greater 
than the flame thickness) turbulent motion. The motion stretches and folds the flame, 
thereby increasing its surface area and consequently the flame speed. The turbulent 
flame speed may therefore be determined by: 
Where:  
St = turbulent flame speed (m/s). 
Sl – laminar flame speed (m/s). 
At = surface area of the turbulent flame (m2). 
Al = surface area of the laminar flame (m2). 
The laminar burning velocity for most stoichiometric hydrocarbon gas/air mixtures is in 
the order of 0.5 m/s, but will increase if the chemical reaction takes place in a turbulent 
flow field. The turbulence in the gas/air mixture can be developed by mixing prior to 











Literature Review 86 
expanding flame front, with obstacles located within the enclosure. The latter of these 
turbulence mechanisms may be important in accidental explosions; by the interaction 
of flow through interconnected rooms and the interaction of the induced flow with 
furniture in a dwelling, thereby enhancing the combustion process.  
As a flame propagates during an explosion, the expansion of hot combustion gases 
behind the propagating flame front sets up a flow in the unburnt gas/air mixture ahead 
of the reaction zone, thereby generating a turbulent flow field. If there are obstacles in 
the path of the induced gas flow, the turbulent flow field will be enhanced. When the 
flame encounters such turbulence it is affected in two ways [205]: 
1. small-scale turbulence increases the local heat and mass transfer rates. 
2. large-scale turbulence distorts the flame front and increases the flame area.  
This flow in the unburnt gas/air mixture is a critical element in the combustion process. 
As the flame propagates into the turbulent flow field, its effective combustion rate is 
increased by stretching and folding of the flame, generating turbulence and initiating 
instabilities, causing the flow velocity and turbulence ahead of the flame to increase still 
further [206]. This enhanced combustion rate can be further influenced by obstacles, 
the geometry of the enclosure, ignition position and the interaction of adjoining rooms.  
Consequently a ‘coupling’ is created which manifests as a strong positive feedback 
mechanism which is largely generated by the interaction with obstructions located in 
the path of the advancing flame front [207]. It is this coupling process (see Figure 
2-30), known as the Schelkin mechanism, between flame acceleration and gas flow 
dynamics, that is the key problem in gas explosions, whether confined or unconfined 
[206]. Phylaktou and Andrews [40, 208, 209] demonstrated, during experiments in a 
long vessel with one or two orifice-plate obstacles in the path of a propagating flame, 
that the strength of this feedback loop can be extreme, causing the flame speed to 
increase by a factor of up to two hundred. Other studies [39, 42, 103] have 
demonstrated that very fast flame speeds, in excess of 600 m/s, may be generated 
when a flame propagates through a flammable gas/air mixture in the presence of 
repeated obstacles. To predict the pressure generated during these type of fast flame 
events, it is necessary to understand the role that the obstacle configuration, blockage 
ratio, and the parameters that affect the turbulent flow field, play in effecting the 
strength of the feedback mechanism. 
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Figure 2-30 Positive feedback mechanism causing flame acceleration 
(adapted from Phylaktou et al. [39]) 
The Concepts of Turbulent Flow 
In fluid dynamics, flow regimes are divided into laminar flow and turbulent flow. In 
laminar flow, the fluid flows in smooth layers, whilst in turbulent flow, the flow contains 
eddying motion of all sizes. 
Turbulent flow may be considered as the random irregular motion of local masses of 
fluid superimposed over any uniform flow that exists, with its over-riding characteristic 
being its randomness and three dimensionality [76]. 
Turbulent flow in explosions may be generated by increasing the flow velocity, altering 
the geometry of the confining enclosure or by placing obstructions in the path of the 
fluid in motion. 
Osborne Reynolds developed an expression to predict the change in flow regime for 
any fluid: 
Where:  
ρ = density of the fluid (kg/m3). 
u = the mean velocity (m/s). 
l = length (m). 
μ = the dynamic viscosity of the fluid (Pa·s or kg/m s). 
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u = the mean velocity (m/s). 
l = length (m). 
ν = the kinematic viscosity of the fluid (m2/s). 
Osborne Reynolds demonstrated that the variable velocities which are part of turbulent 
flow, create much larger stresses than the already present viscous stresses caused by 
molecular motion [210, 211]. Turbulent energy is fed into the fluid in motion by virtue of 
the straining that takes place against such Reynold stresses [117]. 
Lighthill [212] showed that the ratio of the rate of production to the rate of dissipation of 




 = the turbulent Reynolds number. 
u' = the velocity scale, taken to be the root mean square (rms) value of the fluctuating 
component of velocity (u), ∴ 2u u′ = (m/s). 
  = mean length scale of the large eddies (average distance over which the low 
frequency turbulent velocity fluctuations occur). 
ν = the kinematic viscosity of the fluid (m2/s). 
Turbulent flow and combustion chemistry are each characterised by a broad spectrum 
of length and time scales [199]. The largest scales in a turbulent flow are related to the 
physical dimensions of the confinement and to the flow velocity, while the smallest 
scales characterise the dissipation of turbulence energy through viscosity. 
The Reynolds stresses are predominantly generated from the larger eddies which are 
anisotropic and of large-scale,  , are of the same order as the physical structure that 
induces the turbulence [117]. As the turbulent Reynolds number increases, vortex 
stretching effects increase rotational energy and consequently smaller, faster 
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dissipative eddies are created. Vortex stretching produces ever smaller scales of 
turbulence of ever increasing velocity and vorticity. This energy is eventually converted 
into randomised molecular motion through the effects of viscosity. 
Because angular momentum is conserved during this flow process, the kinetic 
rotational energy increases and the vortex stretching eradicates the original anisotropy 
of the large eddies and creates isotropy amongst the small scale eddies [42]. It should 
be noted that this process of eddy decay from large to small scale only occurs in the 
free stream. At the origin of turbulence, for example jet mixing of a gas/air mixture, the 
reverse process occurs, where small scale eddies coalesce into large eddies. 
Taylor [213] demonstrated that the kinetic energy associated with turbulent velocity 
fluctuations is related to their frequency. That is, large eddies are associated with 
velocities of low frequency and small scale eddies with velocities of high frequency. 
Taylor [214] has also shown that for isotropic turbulence, the rate of energy dissipation 
per unit mass, may be expressed as: 







e = rate of energy dissipation (m2/s3). 
ν = the kinematic viscosity of the fluid (m2/s). 
u = fluctuating component of velocity (m/s). 
x = distance between eddies (m). 
Taylor also defined the Taylor microscale, λ, which is a length scale, such that: 
Simplifying Equation (2-53) by substitution: 
The rate at which large eddies supply energy to small eddies may be considered to be 
proportional to the kinetic energy per unit mass of the large eddies divided by the time 
scale of the large eddies, � l
u'























 [117]. In the steady state, the production rate is equal to the rate of 
viscous dissipation; thus: 
From Equations (2-54) and (2-55), it can be determined that the Taylor microscale is 
related to the macroscale, , by: 
A number of researchers, including Abdel-Gayed and Bradley [202], and Dryden [215], 
have conducted experiments to determine the proportionality constant. Abdel-Gayed 








The turbulent Reynolds number, Rλ , based on the microscale λ, is given by: 
Combining the above equation with the equation of a turbulent Reynolds number given 
in Equation (2-51) gives: 
In turbulence, a cascade of eddy sizes exist from macro to micro scales. These are the 
mechanism through which turbulent energy is dissipated. If the energy supply to 
generate turbulence is removed, the larger scales disappear first. 
The isotropy of the dissipative eddies make their detailed structure independent of that 
of the large eddies. It has already been discussed that the Taylor microscale, λ, is 
primarily based upon large eddy parameters. However, in his universal equilibrium 


















 Rλ = 6.36�R (2-59) 
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Where 
η = Kolmogorov microscale – length. 
vη = Kolmogorov microscale – velocity. 
τη= Kolmogorov microscale – time. 
The Taylor and Kolmogorov microscales are theoretical parameters and consequently 
will not precisely describe the actual microstructure of the turbulence. 
2.5.2. Turbulent Combustion Correlations 
Fluid flows become turbulent as a result of flow instabilities that initially possess 
discrete characteristic length and time scales. A wider range of scales become involved 
as the turbulence is characterised by a broad continuous spectrum of essentially 
random velocity fluctuations. The large-scale motion depends on the size and nature of 
the mean flow field, whereas, at the smallest scales, the velocity fluctuations are found 
to be nearly isotropic and universal in character. 
The Classical Correlation 
This model was originally published by Damkӧhler [217]. The equation relates the 
turbulent burning velocity, Su,t, to the Laminar burning velocity Su,l and the rms 
fluctuating velocity of the flow field. It is given by: 
Where: 
Su,t = turbulent burning velocity. 
Su,l = laminar burning velocity. 
C = a constant. 
u' = the velocity scale, taken to be the root mean square (rms) value of the fluctuating 
component of velocity (u), ∴ 2u  = u′ . 
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In his original work, Damkӧhler proposed that the constant C is 1. Phylaktou [42] 
suggests that a value of 2.0 provides a better fit to much of the experimental data 
available.  
A number of researchers have proposed equations similar to Equation (2-63), often 
with different values for the constant. Detailed information on these equations may be 
found in the reviews of Andrews and Bradley [117] and Gülder [204]. Nonetheless, in 
all of the variations of Equation (2-63) above, the turbulent burning velocity, Su,t, is 
found to be dependent only on u′  and Su,l. Furthermore, at high turbulence levels, Su,t 
is effectively dependent on u′  only [42]. 
2.5.3. Interaction with Solid Obstructions 
In an accidental explosion, the rise in burning rate and pressure occurs due to the 
propagation of the flame front travelling through a flammable gas/air mixture that is 
contained within the dwelling. It is widely accepted that the acceleration of a 
propagating flame is enhanced when a solid obstacle is located in its path [38-44], with 
the degree of enhancement being strongly dependent on the flow structure that is 
formed in the wake behind the obstruction. Moreover, data from large-scale 
experiments carried out by Moen et al. [47], and Hjertager et al. [46] have 
demonstrated that flame speed and pressure also have a strong dependence on 
obstruction size and gas concentration. 
Bimson et al. [48] discuss a series of sixteen vented explosion tests carried out in a 
550 m3 [6.25 m (h) x 8.75 m (w) x 10 m (l)] steel explosion chamber; each wall lined 
with Rockwool to dampen acoustic oscillations, and with a vent opening of KA = 2 in the 
front face of the chamber which was covered with a thin polythene sheet to contain the 
gas/air mixture prior to ignition. The tests involved methane/air and propane/air 
mixtures at 10% above stoichiometric concentration and utilised four internal 
configurations: 
i. an empty chamber; 
ii. a row of seven, vertically positioned, PE pipes of 0.5 m diameter, located 5.74 
m from the vent; 
iii. a row of seven, vertically positioned, PE pipes of 0.5 m diameter, located 2.78 
m from the vent; 
iv. a combination of ii and iii above (i.e. two rows of obstacles). 
Bimson et al. [48] determined that the inclusion of Rockwool eliminated resonant wall 
interactions and greatly simplified the interpretation of the pressure-time traces. In all 
explosions, two significant pressure peaks were observed. The first pressure peak, Pb, 
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was observed when the flame front reached the plane of the vent opening (signalling 
the onset of burnt gas venting), whilst the second pressure peak, Pext, occurred as a 
consequence of the external explosion. The pressure-time profile for explosions with 
obstacles typically followed the empty chamber curve until the flame front reached the 
obstacles (Figure 2-31). At this point, the flame speed increased and as soon as the 
flame front reached the vent opening a Pb peak was observed. This Pb peak; which 
was observed earlier than the corresponding peak in the empty chamber and was of 
significantly greater amplitude, was quickly followed by an external explosion which 
produced the maximum pressure peak, Pext. 
 
Figure 2-31 A pressure-time profile of Shell SOLVEX tests with differing internal 
configurations (taken from Bimson et al. [48]) 
Video and photographic records of the explosion tests allowed the authors to gain 
valuable insight into the explosion mechanism. The video showed the flame transition 
from the typical self-wrinkling behaviour to flame distortion as the flame front 
approached an obstacle, followed by rapid acceleration. Unburnt gas/air mixture is 
driven ahead of the expanding flame front and expelled through the vent opening to 
take the form of a mushroom shaped ring vortex, which is rapidly ignited by the flame 
front when it reaches the vent opening. The flame was seen to adopt the mushroom 
shape and was rapidly totally inflamed, producing a significant pressure pulse that 
registers as the Pext peak within the explosion chamber This mechanism was found to 
be in agreement with the observations of other large-scale experimental programmes 
[133, 167]; an example of which is shown in Figure 2-32.  
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Figure 2-32 Expelled unburnt gas/air mixture forming a mushroom shaped vortex 
(taken from DNV GL archive) 
A very interesting observation by the authors was that even at the time of maximum 
energy release of the external explosion, and for some duration following, burning gas 
continued to stream at high velocity (≈ 100 m/s) through the burning mushroom. This 
continued until flow reversal back into the explosion chamber had occurred.  
Cates and Samuels [218] produced a simple theoretical model to predict overpressures 
in vented explosions. They argued that the worst case overpressures would be 
generated in explosions in the presence of obstacles, ignited at the farthest point from 
the vent. The work was based on the belief that the external explosion would dominate, 
but they also stated that this may not be the case in some situations. The results of this 
model were compared to the work of Pappas et al. [140, 163] and were found to be in 
broad agreement. However, the authors limited the scope of this model to single 
enclosures with aspect ratios close to one and scenarios where the external explosion 
dominates.  
Chamberlain and Rowson [219] described a series of confined and unconfined 
experiments, considering the effect of partially filled congested environments and the 
effect of obstacles located near the ignition point. The confined vented explosion tests 
were undertaken in a steel explosion chamber measuring 2.5 m (l) x 1.5 m (h) x 2.25 m 
(w), with a KA of 2. The explosion chamber was fitted with seven arrays of steel bars, 
each 50 mm thick and 6 mm wide providing a uniform area blockage at each array of 
17% (one experiment was carried out with the last three arrays removed). The tests 
were carried out using methane, with an equivalence ratio of 1.1, and the ignition 
position was in the centre of the rear wall of the chamber. The distance from ignition to 
the 1st array was not altered during the confined vented tests. 
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For tests with a full volume of gas/air mixture, overpressures were generated between 
315 and 473 mbar. In contrast, tests involving a partially filled chamber produced 
overpressures ranging from 10 mbar with a partial fill volume of 10.2% to 349 mbar 
with a fill volume of 41.2%. The partial volume was contained using a thin polythene 
sheet secured to an appropriate obstacle array. The authors observed that whilst the 
effect of increasing fill volume was correctly predicted by the Shell Code for 
Overpressure Predictions in Gas Explosions (SCOPE), the overpressures were 
overpredicted, particularly at lower levels of partial fill. They determined that this was 
due to the transient mixing of the pre-mixed fuel/air mixture with air in the chamber (as 
the polythene sheet was broken by the developing pressure) resulting in a weaker 
mixture overall. A similar trend was observed in the unconfined explosion tests. 
The effects of obstacles located near to the ignition position were investigated during 
the unconfined explosion tests. Obstacles located close to the ignition source were 
found to have little effect on the maximum overpressure in experiments with a full 
gas/air volume, but the time taken to reach the peak was reduced. This behaviour is 
explained by the enhancement of combustion in the early stages of the explosion due 
to the initial turbulence induced by the obstacle arrays located close to the ignition 
source. However, the peak overpressure is dominated by the later stages of the 
explosion when the flame front is interacting with the outer obstacle arrays and flame 
speeds are greater. Consequently, the influence of the obstacles during the early 
stages of the explosion is less significant. However, the influence of the obstacles in 
the early stages of the explosion was far more significant in tests with a low partial fill 
volume, significantly enhancing the maximum overpressure. This was because the 
outer obstacle arrays were outside the flammable region and therefore had 
comparatively small or no influence. 
Small-scale experiments conducted by Fairweather et al. [220, 221] to investigate 
turbulent flame interaction with obstacles revealed a strong link between the developed 
peak pressure and the amount of unburnt fuel/air mixture trapped behind the 
obstruction(s). In further small-scale experiments to study the flame interaction with 
baffle-type obstacles located within a chamber, Sakthitharan [222], and Lindstedt and 
Sakthitharan [223], witnessed the flame front pass over the obstacle and then interact 
with an eddy that was formed and remained behind the baffle. In a more accurate 
representation of an accidental gas explosion in a dwelling, the flame front will 
propagate around the obstruction and the interaction is likely to be different. As the 
flame structure and the amount of unburnt gas/air mixture trapped behind the 
obstruction will be liable to differ from the small-scale tests (due to the effects of 
scaling), the pressure-time history will also be different. Nevertheless, small-scale 
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experiments are still extremely useful in improving the understanding of turbulent 
explosions. 
In a series of small-scale vented explosion experiments, Ibrahim et al. [43] considered 
the effects of a solid wall-type obstruction with methane/air mixtures of varying 
concentration. They found that for a variety of equivalence ratios (φ = 0.8, 1.0 & 1.2), 
three different phases of flame propagation appeared to exist. During phase 1, the 
flame accelerates as it interacts with the solid wall. The greatest rate of acceleration 
occurred with stoichiometric concentrations, showing an increase from 5 to 39 m/s. 
Lower flame acceleration was observed with non-stoichiometric concentrations, with 
the flame front accelerating from 5 to 32 m/s for a rich mixture and 5 to 27 m/s for a 
lean mixture. This initial flame acceleration may be attributed to the increase in flame 
surface area as a consequence of the interaction with the wall boundary. Furthermore, 
high momentum jetting through the gap between the obstruction and the enclosure 
walls further enhances flame propagation, by convecting heat from the flame farther 
downstream, before the flame front interacts with the flow vortices behind the 
obstruction. 
In phase 2, the authors observed that the flame front starts to interact with the flow 
vortices behind the obstruction and the flame speed was found to decrease for all 
equivalence ratios. In phase 3, highly turbulent combustion was triggered in the wake 
of the obstruction as the flame front interacted with the flow vortices. The nature of the 
flow around solid obstacles was found to be critical as the vortices formed in the wake 
of the obstruction caused an amount of unburnt gas/air mixture to be trapped and 
subsequently burnt in a highly turbulent combustion phase leading to increased flame 
speeds and resultant pressure rise. The variations in the observed flame speeds 
correlate to the change in flame surface area as the flame front interacts with the 
obstacle. 
Fairweather et al. [220] carried out a study of explosions in a cylindrical tube where 
obstruction rings were placed at various axial locations on the wall of the vessel. Flame 
visualisation studies revealed that unburnt gas/air mixture becomes ‘trapped’ behind 
the obstruction in vortices, which then reacts violently after the flame front was seen to 
exit the plane of the vessels vent opening. 
Ibrahim and Masri [224] conducted a number of small-scale vented explosion 
experiments where cylindrical, square and diamond shaped obstructions, amongst 
others, were positioned within the enclosure. Most flame acceleration studies prior to 
this were undertaken using baffle-type obstacles. In real situations, accidental 
explosions in dwellings are likely to include obstacles of various size and geometry 
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(e.g. rectangular, sharp edged etc.), and the flame front is likely to interact in a different 
manner. 
For tests carried out with walls/plates and squares, increasing the blockage ratio 
resulted in higher P1 and P2 pressures whilst the vent failure pressure remained 
constant. It was observed that as the obstruction ratio increased, the time taken to 
reach the peak pressure decreased. 
As tests were undertaken with obstacles of different geometry, it was noticed that the 
shape of the obstruction had a direct influence on the flame speed and the pressure 
generated. The pressure was found to be greatest in enclosures with wall/plate type 
obstructions (≈ 90 mbar) whilst cylindrical objects caused the lowest pressure rises (≈ 
30 mbar). Pressure rises from interaction with diamond (≈ 75 mbar), square (≈ 45 
mbar) and triangular (≈ 40 mbar) shaped objects caused intermediate level pressure 
rises. 
Not surprisingly, the time delay to reach the peak overpressure was shortest for 
wall/plate type obstructions, for similar blockage ratios, indicating the rate of flame 
acceleration was dependent upon both the obstruction geometry as well as the 
blockage ratio. 
Whilst velocity and turbulence measurements were not recorded during the 
experiments, the authors speculated as to the nature of the flame dynamics during the 
explosions. As the flame approaches the 1st obstruction, it travels at laminar speeds 
since the flow field ahead of the flame is undisturbed. When the flame reaches the 
obstacle, it starts to interact with a modified flow field where the turbulence levels and 
length scales will vary depending on the obstacles geometry and size. When the 
blockage ratio increases, the gaps between the obstructions and the enclosure will 
decrease resulting in increased gas velocities around the obstacle. This increases the 
reaction rate, leading to faster flames and higher pressures, providing the gap is not of 
a sufficiently small size to quench the reaction. 
The effect that the shape of the obstruction has on the overpressure in the enclosure is 
significant. It implies that the manner of the flow around the obstruction, the intensity of 
the re-circulation zone which is formed, and the amount of unburnt gas trapped in the 
wake of the obstruction are all critical in determining the overpressure. It seems logical 
that the wall/plate type obstruction that gave rise to the highest pressures caused the 
largest volume of unburnt gas/air mixture to be trapped. In contrast, it is expected that 
the cylindrical shaped obstruction would trap the least amount of gas. 
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As turbulent flame propagation is sensitive to obstacle geometry, the effects of shape 
may be considered by applying the following correlations for the coefficient of 
discharge [57]: 
• CD = 1.2 – cylinder, 
• CD = 2.0 – square, 
• CD = 2.2 – triangle. 
Abdel-Gayed and Bradley [202] have produced a vast array of experimental data which 
allow the turbulent enhancement of burning velocity to be determined. However, in real 
situations, the acceleration of the flame front is a consequence of a complex interaction 
between the propagating flame front, the local obstruction and the size and geometry of 
the enclosure. 
Such blockages set up a complex interaction between the propagating reaction front 
and the flow fields around the obstructions resulting in local flame acceleration in the 
form of jetting. The motion of gas movement around the obstacles creates both 
turbulence by vortex shedding and local wake/recirculation which can cause the flame 
to ‘fold’ on itself. This folding, increases the flame surface area available for 
combustion but may produce localised flame quenching.  
The studies of Moen et al. [47], Phylaktou et al. [39] and others have produced 
conclusive evidence that the presence of repeated obstacles increases flame speed 
and hence pressure. 
In considering the turbulence generated downstream of a grid plate obstacle by 
explosion induced flow [41], Phylaktou and Andrews presented a method for predicting 
the maximum turbulence levels. It was shown that the turbulence intensity, defined as 
the ratio of the rms turbulence velocity to the mean velocity of the induced gas flow, 
was given by: 
Where: 
u' = the rms turbulent velocity of the flow (m/s); 
Sg = the induced gas flow (m/s); 
CT = a turbulence generation constant (Phylaktou and Andrews [41] recommmend 
0.225 for thin or sharp edged obstacles and 0.076 for thick or round edged obstacles); 
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The pressure loss coefficient, Ko, may be defined as: 
Where: 
∆P = the difference in pressure across the obstacle (Pa) or (kg/m·s²); 
ρ = the density of the fluid (kg/m3). 
For incompressible flow, Ko can also be expressed in terms of the geometry alone as a 
function of the area blockage ratio, ABR, and the coefficient of discharge, Cd [39]: 
Phylaktou conducted a series of explosion experiments in long, closed vessels with 
grid plate obstacles [42] and developed a method that enabled the quantification of the 
turbulent burning velocity, ST, directly from experimental measurements. The author 
subsequently investigated the variation of the turbulent burning velocity with the test 
parameters and derived a turbulent combustion model : 
Where: 
SL is the laminar burning velocity; 
Rℓ = the turbulent Reynolds number; 
Le = the Lewis number; 
ν = the kinematic viscosity of the mixture; 
νa = the viscosity of air.  
This model was subsequently validated with a large set of experimental data 
(explosions with obstacles) from various sources shown to correlate well (correlation 
coefficient in excess of 90%) [42].  
To confirm the suitability of this model to realistic industrial explosion problems, 
calculations were undertaken using Reynolds number in the range of 26 to 113000 (the 
upper end of which is comparable to the Reynolds numbers induced in large-scale 
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industrial explosions). Based on the turbulent combustion correlation given in Equation 
(2-67) an explosion-overpressure scaling model was derived: 
Where: 
ℓ = the characteristic length scale. 
E = the expansion factor.  
This equation demonstrates the dependence of the blast overpressure on the 
geometric configuration and gas/air mixture properties.  
Masri et al. [44] carried out small-scale vented explosion tests (commercial propane in 
a 20 litre cuboidal chamber) in the presence of obstacles of differing geometry. They 
observed that in the early stages of the explosion, a very symmetrical flame develops, 
which is similar, regardless of the geometry of the obstruction ahead of it.  
It is important to distinguish between the effects that direct and indirect obstructions 
have on the flame. Direct effects are those which occur when the flame impinges on 
the obstacle. The indirect effects are the complex effects that arise from changes in the 
flow field due to drag, turbulence and volume reduction induced by the obstacle. Masri 
et al. [44] observed that the shape and size of the obstruction determine the formation 
of vortex pairs of different size behind the obstacle and this greatly affects the distortion 
of the flame front. The volume of trapped flammable gas/air mixture in the wake of the 
obstacle was found to be proportional to the vortex size and was higher for obstacles of 
triangular cross-section. Rectangular and circular cross-sections were found, 
respectively, to have lower volumes of trapped unburnt gas. These pockets of trapped 
gas are the last to be combusted. 
Dorofeev [225] comments that flame acceleration due to obstacles in large-scale 
vented explosion tests produces similar dynamics to flame acceleration in closed 
systems. However, there are a few specific characteristics of vented explosions that 
effect flame acceleration. These include Helmholtz oscillations, the external explosion 
and Rayleigh Taylor instabilities. 
Hall et al. [226] carried out a series of small-scale tests to investigate the effect of 
position and frequency of obstacles on the pressure generated in a vented explosion. 
They concluded that increasing the blockage ratio, up to a critical value, increases the 
overpressure and that whilst increasing the number of obstacles generally increases 
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obstacles results in a decrease in pressure. No explanation could be given, by the 
authors, for this finding. 
They also observed that the location of the obstacles with respect to the ignition source 
can have a significant effect. Increasing the distance between the obstacles allows the 
turbulence to ‘re-laminarise’ causing less distortion of the flame front and lowering the 
flame speeds. This is in agreement with the work carried out by Phylaktou [42]. 
Bauwens et al. [45] investigated the effect of obstacles for varying ignition position in a 
room sized enclosure of volume 63.7 m3. They found the presence of obstacles greatly 
increased the amplitude of pressure peak P1, particularly for back-wall ignition due to 
the increase in flame surface area and turbulence as unburned gas is forced around 
the obstacles (Figure 2-33). Surprisingly, the authors found that the addition of 
obstacles only increased the overall peak pressure in half of the tests, typically for tests 
where the pressure profile was dominated by either peaks P1 or P3. 
 
Figure 2-33 A pressure-time profile showing the effects of obstacles 
(taken from Bauwens et al. [45]) 
When obstacles were positioned in the enclosure a third peak was sometimes noticed. 
This peak is identical to the Pmfa peak determined by MRS and was observed to 
correspond to the time when the flame surface area was at its maximum. However, in 
this instance, the pressure was magnified by the acceleration effects of the obstacles, 
thus making the peak more noticeable. It was also identified that the presence of the 
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obstacles reduced the acoustic instabilities and significantly reduced the value of the 
second peak identified in the tests without obstacles. 
Chao et al. [159] presented experimental data gathered from vented explosion tests 
carried out using methane/air mixtures in a 63.7 m3 chamber. The purpose of this work 
was to present a simple model to estimate the peak pressure for each of the pressure 
transients encountered in a vented explosion. The authors noted some interesting 
characteristics of the explosion experiments when obstacles were placed in the 
enclosure.  
In most instances, experiments without obstacles did not produce an obvious pressure 
peak associated with the maximum flame area. However, in agreement with the work 
of Bauwens et al. [45], the authors found the inclusion of obstacles, produced a 
pressure peak that correlated to the time of maximum flame area. Furthermore, the 1st 
pressure peak was of greater magnitude with explosions that included obstacles than 
those that did not.  
Although obstacles enhanced the peak pressure associated with the maximum flame 
area, they interfered with the acoustics of the enclosure and consequently eliminated 
the acoustic peak. Surprisingly, Bauwens et al. [45] found that the addition of 
obstacles, due to the acoustic disrupting effect, did not always result in increased 
maximum overpressures, when compared to experiments without obstacles and in 
which the maximum pressure peak was caused by acoustic oscillations. 
Park et al. [57] reviewed the experimental data obtained from vented explosions in 
various enclosures with obstacles and developed an empirical model for predicting the 
pressures associated with vented explosions. They developed the model as a two-
stage method in order to consider the effects of obstacles. The 1st stage divided the 
chamber into two at the obstacles and applied existing correlations to each chamber 
section. In the 2nd stage they applied a correction in order to characterise the important 
turbulent parameters such as boundary conditions, L/D ratio and turbulence factor. This 
model seems of limited value when representing the conditions encountered in a real 
explosion situation. 
Mercx et al. [147] and van Wingerden [156], in addition to tests in an empty chamber, 
carried out tests with a single large steel box shaped obstacle located within the 
enclosure (chosen to represent central heating plant). Its dimensions were 1.5 m (h) x 
0.75 m (w) x 0.5 m (l). The pressure-time profiles from these tests also revealed three 
pressure peaks; P1 due to vent opening, P2 due to the external explosion and, 
contradictory to rear ignition tests without the obstacle, P3 due to oscillatory 
combustion. In these tests, the magnitude of P2 was found to increase as the distance 
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between the obstacle and ignition source was increased. It was noted that the 
presence of a single large obstacle had increased the overpressure when compared 
with similar tests in the empty enclosure but only when the distance between the 
obstacle and ignition source was large. Mercx et al. [147] concluded that the presence 
of a single large obstacle in an enclosure had only a minor influence on the explosion 
effect. 
Mercx et al. [227], in an article concerning vapour cloud explosions, postulated that 
explosions involving homogeneous obstacle configurations could be characterised by 
only two parameters, volume blockage ratio and obstacle size; with a combination of 
these two parameters being a measure for the spacing between the obstacles. The 
number of obstacles met by the flame front was considered the most important factor 
for the development of pressure. The authors proposed that this is given by the ratio of 
flame path length and the spacing between obstacles. Because of the feedback 
coupling triggered by repeated obstacles, flame propagation develops in an 
approximately exponential manner. Consequently, the authors proposed the following 
correlation: 
Where: 
P = pressure generated. 
VBR = volume blockage ratio (i.e. the proportion of volume occupied by obstacles). 
Lf = flame path length. 
D = average diameter of obstacle. 
b = a constant. 
Work by Taylor and Hirst [151] and Catlin [228], modelling the scale-effects on gas 
explosions suggested that the flame speed obtained in some gas explosion 
experiments was related to the laminar burning velocity and a scale factor (a linear 
dimension of the experiment) Sc, by the following approximation: 
Mercx et al. [227] hypothesised, that if on the basis of acoustics, a quadratic 
relationship between overpressure and flame speed is assumed, the maximum 
explosion overpressure Po, can be considered to have the following dependence upon 
the laminar burning velocity and scale: 
 P ∝ �
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Developing the concept, Mercx et al. [227] postulated that if the three factors of 
influence; namely, the boundary conditions, the mixture reactivity, and the scale, are 
considered together, a general approximate relation can be used to determine the 
maximum overpressure in an explosion with obstacles: 
Where: 
Po = maximum overpressure (bar). 
a = a constant (0.84 for conservative estimate). 
VBR = volume blockage ratio. 
Lf = flame path length - taken to be the longest distance from ignition to obstacle (m). 
D = average obstacle diameter/width (m). 
b = a constant (2.75 for conservative estimate). 
Su,l = laminar burning velocity (m/s). 
Sc = scale factor – assumed to be equal to the average obstacle diameter D (m). 
Accidental gas explosions in dwellings are not idealised. However, it is possible to 
assume average volume blockage ratios for typical buildings such that the maximum 
overpressure could be predicted given knowledge of the fuel gas, building geometry, 
and potential ignition sources (and hence location). 
2.5.4. The Conditions for Turbulence Generation in Gas Explosions in 
Dwellings 
In 1969, Rasbash [229] suggested that explosions involving stationary fuel/air mixtures 
inside well vented enclosures would not develop serious turbulence, providing there 
were not too many obstacles present in the enclosure that would obstruct the motion of 
the flame towards the vent opening. As most dwellings will contain turbulence 
generating obstructions, it is important to understand their influence on turbulent 
combustion. Turbulence in accidental gas explosions in dwellings may be pre-existing 
or induced by combustion. 
In the former case, the flammable mixture is already turbulent prior to ignition. This 
turbulence may occur, for example, as a result of cooling fans ‘stirring up’ the mixture 
or by the escape of high pressure gas into the room or enclosure. In the latter case, the 
 Po ∝ Su,l
2.7 Sc
0.7 (2-71) 
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turbulence is generated by the interaction of the combustion driven flow with obstacles 
in the room, or through interconnected rooms.  
In practical situations, all dwellings will contain obstructions such as furniture, 
appliances, cupboards, beds etc., which will produce turbulence in the unburnt gases 
as they flow ahead of the advancing flame, and they will all have a number of 
interconnected rooms that may, or may not have closable doors. The effect of these 
influences on the combustion process is typically modelled by the introduction of a 
turbulence factor β, to correlations used to predict flame speed or overpressure. 
Turbulence factors are usually employed so that the design of explosion mitigation 
systems may be appropriately considered, with the explosion mitigation system being 
required to activate and respond much earlier in the explosion in order to suppress or 
relieve the pressure at a faster rate than that required in a laminar explosion. However, 
it is also important to understand the influence of turbulence generating scenarios 
when investigating a gas explosion in order to accurately determine the origin and 
cause of the explosion. This is because turbulence significantly enhances the rate of 
pressure rise, and consequently, the severity of damage sustained to the dwelling. 
Rasbash et al. [230] suggested a turbulence factor of 1.5 be applied to assessments of 
buildings where furniture and other obstacles was restricted to one level or 5 where a 
flammable mixture would likely be distributed such that the flame front would propagate 
from one room to another or where furniture and other decorative items were 
distributed throughout the entire enclosure. In more severe turbulence generating 
events, such as where it was possible for a pre-turbulent gas/air mixture to be ignited in 
the presence of an obstacle congested room, Rasbash et al. [230] recommended a 
turbulence factor of 8 to 10 be considered. This was in agreement with the work of 
Phylaktou and Andrews [40] where a factor of 10 was recommended for enclosures 
with a high blockage ratio. 
Phylaktou and Andrews [40] conducted an experimental programme to determine the 
effect of a single baffle on the characteristics of gas explosions in a closed vessel of 
large length to diameter ratio and demonstrated that the normalised rate of pressure 
rise (defined as the rate of pressure rise with the obstacle to that without the obstacle) 
is equal to the turbulence factor. Dorge et al. [231], conducted a series of experiments 
to study flame induced turbulence by locating wire mesh grids in the path of a 
propagating flame. The flame speed was measured either side of the grids through the 
use of a high speed camera, allowing the turbulence factor to be determined using the 
flame speed approach: 
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2.6. The Effects of Interconnected Rooms 
2.6.1. General 
There have been very few large-scale experimental studies of the effects of 
interconnected rooms on gas explosions. To the author of this study’s knowledge, the 
only published works are those conducted at the BCRA facility at Potters Marston [25-
27] and by TNO in the Netherlands [180, 232]; both instigated as a consequence of the 
Ronan Point explosion in the UK. However, there have been a small number of 
theoretical studies and reviews of the BCRA experimental work. Rasbash et al. [230] 
hypothesised that the amount of explosion relief necessary to protect large enclosures 
could be calculated using an empirical formula based on experimental work on ducts 
and compact vessels. The effect of turbulence on explosion overpressures has been 
discussed earlier in this chapter, however in relation to interconnected rooms, using 
fans to generate turbulence, Burgoyne and Wilson [173], Harris [233], Andrews [234] 
and Andrews et al. [235], demonstrated that the greater the degree of turbulence, the 
greater the maximum pressure generated in the explosion. The source of the 
turbulence is of secondary importance [230]. Whilst there is a plethora of information 
relating to turbulence generated through the induced flow of unburnt gas/air mixture 
over and around obstacles, turbulence can also be generated by inducing flow over 
surfaces or through openings such as doorways [26]. 
The work of Cubbage and Simmonds [164, 165] on box ovens had shown that shelves 
positioned in the ovens provided a degree of blockage which resulted in higher 
pressures being generated in explosions than were the case when the shelves were 
absent. This situation was analogous to a multi-compartment experiment in which 
flame propagated through openings from one compartment to another or to a situation 
where furniture may be present. 
Although no direct experiments had been carried out under conditions identical to those 
of a room in a domestic dwelling, Rasbash [229, 236] considered that the explosion 
relief work of the Swedish Committee for Explosion Testing [166], Cubbage and 
Simmonds [164, 165, 237] and Rasbash [238] had been undertaken in conditions that 
were roughly similar in one or more respects to provide an estimate of the maximum 
pressure developed in explosions in dwellings with rooms of L/D less than 3:1 and KA 
between 1 and 5: 
 t lS  = β × S  (2-73) 
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Where: 
Pmax = maximum overpressure (kPa). 
Pv = vent opening pressure (kPa). 
KA = vent coefficient defined as the ratio of the area of the face containing the vent to 
the area of the vent itself (dimensionless). 
Rasbash [236] recognised that combustion during an explosion in a dwelling is likely to 
be turbulent and therefore the equation presented in his work was likely to underpredict 
the maximum pressure generated, particular given that no research had been 
conducted on the effect of furniture. Rasbash hypothesised that due to the turbulence 
generated by flow through internal door openings and it’s exacerbation by the use of 
‘strong’ windows, the way to avoid high pressures in dwellings was to have some 
explosion relief that was open all the time, or that opened at very low pressure and 
before the flame propagated through an internal door to ignite a turbulent flammable 
mixture in an adjoining room. Rasbash referred to this type of relief as ‘back relief’ as it 
was relief provided in the room of ignition and was open prior to the flame propagating 
into an adjoining room (see Figure 2-34). 
 
Figure 2-34 The concept of explosion back relief 
Rasbashs’ insightful paper concluded by stating that it should be practical to design 
dwellings to withstand gas explosions by using windows that were of generous 
proportion and designed with a low failure pressure. He also stated that back relief 
should also be provided by doors opening into open spaces, or if in the case of flats, 
into verandas or large open corridors. Where it was not possible to provide back relief 
in a room in which ignition of a flammable gas/air mixture could occur, Rasbash made 
 max v AP  = 1.5P  + 3.5K  (2-74) 
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the following recommendations to prevent turbulent explosions propagating from one 
room to another: 
i. Use self-closing doors which could withstand the maximum pressure of a low 
turbulence explosion in the room. 
ii. Use sufficient mechanical ventilation to prevent the accumulation of a 
flammable mixture. 
iii. Use flammable gas detectors which provide an audible warning and are 
interlocked to the gas system and mechanical ventilation. 
Some of these recommendations are not practical and could actually enhance a gas 
explosion. For example, mechanical ventilation is a turbulence generator and a source 
of ignition. It is unlikely that a flame proof ventilation system would be cost effective in a 
dwelling. Self-closing doors could enhance explosions by isolating pre-turbulent areas 
which could be subsequently ignited as partition walls fail in an explosion; further work 
is needed to investigate this mechanism. Rasbash [236] concluded by stating that 
large-scale experimental work was required to determine pressure-time curves for 
single sets of rooms containing furniture. To the authors’ knowledge, some forty-five 
years after the recommendation, this work has yet to be undertaken. 
Rasbash et al. [230], developed a correlation to predict the maximum overpressure 
generated in a vented explosion in a building where turbulence was generated either 
from the effects of interconnected rooms or through turbulence: 
Where: 
Pmax = maximum overpressure (KN/m2). 
Pv = vent opening pressure (KN/m2). 
f = a turbulence factor (1.5 where furniture is on one level of the building, 5 where there 
are interconnected rooms with furniture or furniture is located throughout the whole 
building). 
The function PI, represents the contribution to the increase in pressure due to inertia of 
the vent cover and is given by: 
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Where: 
PI = the increased pressure due to inertia (KN/m2). 
w = the mass of the vent cover per unit area (KN/m2). 
V = volume of the enclosure (m3). 
Stretch [239] examined how gas explosions in dwellings are controlled by the particular 
features of the building. The author considers that the maximum pressure that could be 
attained in a gas explosion in a sealed container is approximately 7 bar, if the reaction 
occurred under adiabatic conditions (which is an underestimate). The author continues 
by reasoning that a dwelling could not withstand a pressure of this magnitude; a low 
failure component of the building will yield. Stretch stated that this not only relieves the 
pressure but also allows a major portion of the flammable mixture to escape the 
building before the combustion reaction is complete. The author states that this 
removal of potential energy before it can be released plays the main part in protecting 
the building from destruction. He reasoned that the extent to which the overpressure is 
minimised depends upon a number of variables, including the reactivity of the 
flammable mixture, the characteristics of the building, the degree to which internal 
building features, including furniture and room layouts, generate turbulence, restrict 
pressure relief and either connect or isolate different parts of the building. Stretch 
continued to argue however, whilst recognising that in accidental explosions vent relief 
is typically provided by windows and doors, that the most important factors of all, was 
the vent failure pressure, the weight of the vent cover and the vent area. It is these 
factors, he concluded, that govern the degree to which the reaction is completed within 
the building, and hence the degree of damage sustained to the structure. 
The degree to which a building is damaged is dependent not only on the peak pressure 
but also on the duration of the pressure wave (i.e. the impulse). The requirement to 
ensure wind loadings did not damage buildings had resulted, at the time Stretch wrote 
the article, in windows that were capable of withstanding pressures in the order of 35 
mbar. Stretch reasoned that the common practice of painting window frames and 
maintenance activities meant that it was unrealistic to expect or rely on the relief of 
dwellings at much less than 70 mbar. The author also makes the point that the 
pressure-time curves for explosions in enclosures demonstrates that the peak pressure 
is usually an order of magnitude greater than the vent failure pressure meaning that the 
more severe gas explosions expose the building to pressures of the order of 0.7 bar.  
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Figure 2-35 Explosion propagating through dwelling 
(adapted from Stretch [239]) 
Figure 2-35 is adapted from Stretch [239] with the arrows highlighting the path that the 
flame front might follow if a flammable mixture was ignited in the kitchen (assuming the 
flammable mixture was distributed throughout the dwelling). This illustration of the 
flame path is not particularly enlightening (it also assumes that the partition walls will 
not fail), but its importance is in the recognition, in 1969, that most dwellings had rooms 
with small interconnecting areas, partition walls, and windows of different vent area and 
failure pressure. Consequently, the maximum pressure developed in an explosion in a 
dwelling is dependent upon the individual characteristics of the building. 
The work of Stretch is important as it recognises the role that both interconnected 
rooms and furniture play in the development of an accidental gas explosion and the 
necessity for research into their effects. However, there is also a miss-understanding of 
the mechanism of a vented explosion as there is a belief that the ejection of unburnt 
gas helps protect the building when the external explosion peak may be the dominant 
factor in a domestic explosion. In the conclusions, Stretch noted that full-scale 
experiments are difficult to carry out with a high degree of reliability, and are expensive; 
however, when the investment and risks involved are considered, further experimental 
work is quite clearly demanded. To date, no work of this nature has been published.  
Molkov [240] analysed the Ronan Point explosion and simulated the overpressure-time 
profile using a simple mathematical model largely based on two parameters; namely 
the discharge coefficient, µ, and the turbulence factor, χ. Molkov, used data from the 
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Ronan Point explosion to establish values for the turbulence factor. The turbulence 
factor was described as the “real area of flame front surface to area of imaginable 
sphere to which the combustion products, being inside the vessel at the same moment, 
might be collected”. This designation makes the assumption that in accidental vented 
explosions, combustion is spherical; which, for many reasons, may not always be the 
case. Firstly, the fuel air mixture may be a layer; secondly, ignition may be initiated 
close to a wall (e.g. light switch etc.), making spherical propagation impossible, thirdly, 
once the vent opens, the flame is stretched towards the vent opening, assuming a 
‘pear’ shape; and, fourthly, interaction between connecting rooms also alters the flame 
shape. Nonetheless, the ratio of actual flame area to hypothetical flame area may be 
used as an estimation of turbulence, providing the assumed flame shape is the same 
as the actual flame shape. 
Molkov argued that because windows do not fail until the threshold pressure is 
reached, explosions in premises would be ‘aggravated’ due to venting through 
interconnecting doors into adjoining rooms, leading to conditions of high turbulence and 
pressure piling. Based on the maximum overpressure assumed to have been 
developed in the Ronan Point explosion, Molkov, calculated that for explosions in real 
domestic structures with internal obstacles, the turbulence factor would appear to be 11 
± 3. This is somewhat higher than the estimates of Rasbash [230] and Phylaktou and 
Andrews [40]. 
Figure 2-36 shows Molkovs’ predicted overpressure-time profile of the Ronan Point 
explosion based on a turbulence factor of 12. What is immediately apparent is that 
there are two predicted pressure peaks, PV and Pmfa, and that the time profile appears 
to be very fast, even for Towns gas. In the discussion, Molkov states that the two 
pressure peaks are in agreement with the “well known” pressure peaks, related to vent 
opening and mixture burnout. It is assumed that the author, when talking of mixture 
burnout, is referring to the latter stages of combustion and maximum flame area. In 
addition, he added “that as the result of inertia the first pressure peak depends on the 
value of the turbulence factor. This means that after removal of the vent cover, the 
pressure continues to increase until the vent is open enough for the pressure to start to 
decrease. Clearly, the higher the turbulent burning velocity, the higher the first pressure 
peak”. 
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Figure 2-36 Predicted overpressure-time profile of Ronan Point explosion 
(taken from Molkov [240]) 
Whilst, very little work has been conducted into the effects of interconnected rooms, a 
number of studies have been published relating to interconnected process-type vessels 
[241-254], however, these do not have the same geometry as a room or an 
interconnecting door that can be either open or closed prior to the explosion. 
Furthermore, the inadvertent venting arrangements on dwellings make the comparison 
of experiments conducted in vessels, with interconnecting ducts or pipes, limited in 
value. Nonetheless, for completeness, the most important literature is reviewed.  
2.6.2. Explosion Tests Conducted at Potters Marston 
General 
In 1968, in order to better understand the events of the Ronan Point gas explosion, an 
extensive experimental programme to investigate gas explosions in multi-storey load 
bearing brick structures was commenced by the British Ceramic Research Association 
in collaboration with MRS (British Gas Corporation Research & Development Division, 
now DNV GL) and the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment [25]. The tests took 
place at Potters Marston in Leicestershire with the primary objective of determining the 
integrity of the load bearing brickwork when subjected to pressure pulses generated in 
accidental gas explosions. A limited number of tests were also undertaken to determine 
the effects of explosions propagating from one room to another. 
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The phrase 'cascade effect' had been widely used after the Ronan Point explosion, and 
was used to describe the increase in pressure and rate of pressure rise in the 
progression of an explosion from one room or enclosure to another. However, as the 
explosion mechanism comprises the combined effects of turbulence and pre-
compression of the gas air mixture in the secondary room or enclosure prior to ignition 
(pressure-piling), the phrase is a little misleading.  
The most important tests carried out to examine the effects of so called ‘cascade’ 
explosions proceeding from one room to another, were undertaken in a purpose built, 
full scale building, designed to simulate the top three floors of a cross-wall tower block. 
The building is shown in Figure 2-37 and Figure 2-38. 
  
  
Figure 2-37 The main test building at Potters Marston 
(adapted from photo from DNV GL archive) 
 
Figure 2-38 Plan view of the main test building at Potters Marston 
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The tests were undertaken in either rooms 1 and 2 or rooms 3 and 4. The volume of 
each of the rooms was approximately 25 m3. 
In addition, some cascade explosion tests were undertaken in a ‘bunker’ which had a 
volume of approximately 35 m3 (see Figure 2-39). 
 
Figure 2-39 The bunkers at Potters Marston (photo from DNV GL archive) 
Phase I & II 
The experimental tests undertaken in Phase I of the full scale research programme, 
had a specific set of objectives: 
(a) to determine the effectiveness of venting provided by the cladding and 
windows, and to measure the pressure involved, 
(b) to determine the pressure necessary to damage a load bearing-brick wall, 
and, 
(c) to test the ability of the structure to withstand progressive collapse following 
the failure of the main structural wall. 
In phase II of the tests some additional objectives were considered: 
(d) to determine the pressure profiles of different types of explosions, and, 
(e) to determine the effect of cascade explosions (i.e. explosions proceeding from 
one room to another through a doorway when both rooms contain flammable 
gas). 
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In Phase I of the tests, meteorological balloons were located in one of the rooms, filled 
with stoichiometric gas/air mixtures and ignited electrically. In Phase II of the 
experimental programme, more tests were undertaken using gas filled meteorological 
balloons, but in addition, explosion tests using layered gas/air mixtures of nominal 
stoichiometric concentration were also undertaken. Both natural gas and town gas 
were used in each phase of experimentation. 
It was found that in all the balloon experiments in the building, the pressure in the room 
containing the balloon was much greater than the pressure in the adjoining room. 
However, where layers of flammable gas/air mixture were used, the pressure was 
always greater in the secondary room (i.e. the room in which ignition had not been 
initiated). The absence of high overpressures in these experiments was attributed to 
the presence of a large glass window acting as an explosion relief in the ignition room, 
which provided ‘back relief’. 
An empirical relationship for the pressures in the adjoining rooms was derived [25]: 
Where: 
P1 is the pressure developed in the room in which ignition is initiated (lb/in2). 
P2 is the pressure developed in the secondary room (lb/in2).  
It should be noted that the equation was derived from data taken from just three of the 
experiments and information on the pressure developed in the kitchen of the Ronan 
Point explosion. No theoretical attempt was made to justify the relationship. 
It was observed in some of the preliminary experiments that the rate of pressure rise 
was greater for tests involving town gas than natural gas. This was simply attributable 
to the greater burning velocity of town gas. 
From the results of the Phase I and II tests it was maintained that because the 
pressure impulse (taken as the integral of the pressure-time profile ( )
t
o
P t dt∫ ) was 
found to be similar, for layered town gas and meteorological balloon-contained town 
gas, then the use of balloons to simulate layer explosions was justified. However, this 
assumption may not have been correct, as the method for forming layers of gas of 
uniform concentration in the rooms was of limited accuracy [255]. 
During phase II, test No. 49 was carried out in the main building with both rooms 
having a high level gas/air layer of stoichiometric concentration. The explosion caused 
major damage to the building structure. It was hypothesised that the explosion in the 1st 
 P2 = 0.59P1 + 1.14P12 (2-77) 
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room, which developed a pressure of 90 mbar, passed through the door into the 2nd 
room with a cascade effect leading to a significantly higher pressure of 228 mbar being 
recorded. 
Because of the higher overpressure that was developed within the 2nd room and the 
damage that was caused to the brickwork of the building, there was significant interest 
in the results of this test. As a consequence, two separate programmes of further tests 
were planned in order to improve understanding of explosions that propagate from one 
room to another.  
Using the results of the Potters Marston experiments, Cubbage and Marshall [189] 
derived a correlation to determine the maximum pressure in the primary and secondary 
enclosures: 
Where: 
P1 = the maximum pressure in the compartment in which the explosion is ignited 
(lb/in2). 
PV = the failure pressure of the vent (lb/in2). 
a = a constant (Cubbage and Marshall [189] recommend a value of 0.5). 
KA = the vent coefficient. 
w = the weight of the vent per unit area (lb/ft2). 
Su = the laminar burning velocity (ft/s). 
V = the volume of the enclosure (ft3). 
E = energy density of the gas/air mixture (BTU/ft3). 
E0 = energy density at which the vent is removed (BTU/ft3). 
F(E,E0) is therefore, a measure of the energy content of the gas/air mixture in excess of 
that required to remove the vent. Where the enclosures are full of stoichiometric gas/air 
mixtures, F(E,E0) may be taken as 1. 
The average of the function (KAw) may be determined by: 















+ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (2-79) 
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Where (i) and (j) refer to separate vents in a single room (e.g. doors and windows). 
N.B.: the averaging of vents in this manner is only valid if their failure pressures are 
approximately similar. 
The maximum pressure in the secondary enclosure may be determined by: 
Where the subscripts refer to the primary and secondary enclosures and where the 
vent area coefficient subscripts are separated by a comma the subscripts refer to a 
vent that is common to both enclosures (e.g. an interconnecting door). 
The Cubbage and Marshall correlation given in Equation (2-80) suggests that the 
maximum pressure developed in the secondary enclosure is a function of the enclosure 
volume ratio, the laminar burning velocity, the vent coefficient between the two 
enclosures and finally on the weight and vent coefficients for the vents on both the 
enclosures venting towards the external atmosphere. Whilst there is an account of the 
potential pre-compression through the use of the P1 pressure there is no accounting for 
any additional turbulence that may be developed. 
Phase III 
The 1st set of explosion tests was undertaken by FRS, BCRA and MRS in a bunker 
containing two partitions each with large openings [26].  
In order to better understand the effects of turbulence on explosions in interconnected 
rooms, which is generated by the propagation of the flame front, and the movement of 
unburnt gas, past obstacles and through restricted openings, nine experiments were 
carried out in the bunker at Potters Marston.  
The tests were all undertaken using a high level layer, nominally 0.9 m in depth from 
the ceiling, of town gas or natural gas. The 35 m3 bunker was divided into three 
compartments, by internal brick walls, with large openings between the compartments. 
The front face of the bunker was sealed using a polythene sheet. 
Ignition was initiated in the compartment furthest from the vent, so ‘back relief’ was 
eliminated and higher pressures were generated than those measured in phases I and 
II. Measured flame speeds were found to be an order of magnitude higher in the 
secondary and tertiary compartments than the ignition compartment, with maximum 
overpressures of approximately 340 mbar using town gas as the fuel, and 205 mbar 
using natural gas. It was concluded that turbulence was created by the flow through the 
openings between compartments, induced by flame expansion in the ignition 
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compartment. This led to an increased burning velocity in the secondary and tertiary 
compartments, giving rise to pressures some 2 to 3 times higher than a comparable 
explosion in a single empty chamber. 
The results demonstrated that it was possible to generate substantially larger 
pressures in an explosion that propagated from one room to another than would be 
expected in an explosion in a single room, even if the single room was completely filled 
with a stoichiometric gas/air mixture. However, the enhanced explosion pressures were 
only attained over a narrow gas concentration range. 
Phase IV 
The second, further set of experiments at Potters Marston, Phase IV [27], were 
conducted in both the main building and the bunker. The purpose of the tests carried 
out in the main building included the following: 
(a) to gain further understanding of explosions of layered town gas/air and natural 
gas/air mixtures, where the explosion propagated from one room with vent(s), 
to an adjacent room with vent(s), via a doorway. 
(b) to examine the effects of layer thickness, gas concentration and position of 
ignition on pressure-time profiles. 
(c)  to investigate the effect of the interconnecting door position before ignition 
(i.e. open or closed).  
The test that caused structural damage to the building during Phase II (test 49) was 
also repeated during this phase of testing. 
The purpose of the tests in the bunker was to measure the failure pressure of single 
and double glazed windows. 
Due to difficulties in obtaining acceptable layering of gas mixtures, many of the 
experiments originally intended were abandoned. Consequently, it was not possible to 
make positive conclusions from the results of many of the experiments. Nonetheless, 
some general conclusions were made: 
• Much higher pressures were generated with layered town gas explosions than 
layered natural gas. 
• The direction in which the door connecting the two rooms opened was 
important, since: 
- when ignition took place in the room into which the door opened, gas 
was ‘sucked’ into the ignition room from the secondary room by a 
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rarefaction wave after an explosion and venting had already occurred, 
leading to low pressure generation. 
- when the door opened into the secondary room (with ignition still in the 
primary room), the flame was able to enter the secondary room, via the 
doorway, before the vent had opened, leading to the generation of 
higher pressures. 
• When there is a layer of flammable gas/air mixture in two adjoining rooms, both 
with vents, and with an inter-communicating open door, higher pressures are 
observed in the secondary room than in the room in which ignition took place. 
• Three pressure peaks were observed during some of the experiments, 
comprising the common double-peak for a vented enclosure plus an extra peak 
corresponding to the vented explosion in the adjoining room.  
• The experiments which measured the failure pressure of single and double-
glazed windows showed, that in general terms, double glazed windows failed at 
pressures about 30 per cent higher than for the equivalent single sheet of glass. 
2.6.3. Experimental Tests Carried out by TNO 
TNO undertook large-scale experimental work in a one storey building consisting of two 
rooms of different size (2 m x 4 m and 3.5 m x 4 m) connected by an open doorway 
[180, 232]. Each room had an open front face so that the vent material and opening 
size could be varied.  
Thirty four explosion tests were undertaken during this experimental programme. 
During the experimental tests, each room was filled with a stoichiometric natural gas/air 
mixture. The typical pressure-time traces were found to be very similar to those 
observed by Tite [34, 35], Greening and Tite [54], Cooper et al. [64] and Bauwens et al. 
[45] in single enclosure experiments (see Figure 2-16, Figure 2-17 and Figure 2-23). 
However, Dragosavic [180, 232] described the pressure-time histories as being 
generally characterised by two peaks, the first peak was associated with the failure of 
the vent and the venting of unburnt gas/air mixture and the second peak had a high 
frequency (200 Hz) oscillation superimposed (acoustic oscillations) and occurred near 
to the end of the explosion. 
One interesting finding was that ignition at the centre of a room led to higher pressures 
being generated than ignition in locations adjacent to one of the walls. Very low overall 
pressures were recorded when the explosion propagated via an open doorway from 
the smaller to the larger room. In this instance, the vent in the smaller room had failed 
before the vent in the larger room. 
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Dragosavic summarised the findings of the experimental programme in terms of 
pressure generation as the following: 
i. Even with a large vent of negligible strength, explosion overpressures of 30 
mbar were possible. 
ii. The first observed pressure peak increased proportionally to the vent failure 
pressure. 
iii. The second observed pressure peak (as reported by Dragosavic) increased in 
accordance with the relationship 0.5Pv. 
Dragosavic developed correlations to predict the overpressure developed during an 
explosion in a building with interconnected rooms. For the first pressure peak: 
Where: 
P1 = the 1st peak pressure, caused by the vent opening and relief of unburnt gases 
(kN/m2). 
Pv = the vent failure pressure (kN/m2).  
For the second pressure peak: 
Where: 





The larger of the two values must be adopted, such that: 
2.6.4. Studies on Interconnected Vessels 
The potential for pressure piling, when a flame propagates from one chamber into 
another, was first identified by Beyling [256], in 1906. The substantial increase in 
pressure in the secondary chamber was attributed to pre-compression, as the hot 
combustion gases from the ignition chamber were pushed ahead of the flame front into 
the adjoining chamber. After ignition in the primary vessel, the expanding flame front 
causes a rise in pressure in the vessel and sets-up a flow from the primary to the 
 P1 = 3 + Pv (2-81) 




 Pmax = 3 + 0.5Pv +
0.04
ψ2
 ≥ 3 + 0.5Pv (2-83) 
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secondary vessel, creating turbulent conditions and raising the pressure in the 
secondary vessel above atmospheric. When the propagating flame front reaches the 
secondary vessel, conditions may be intensely turbulent and, due to pre-compression, 
the maximum pressure may be significantly higher than the adiabatic value calculated 
thermodynamically from initial atmospheric conditions [244]. 
Despite a significant number of studies related to the phenomena of pressure piling 
[241-245, 247-251, 257-260], very few correlations have been published to predict the 
pressure peak in interconnected vessels. 
Grice and Wheeler [261], in 1929, followed on from the work of Beyling and recognised 
that the rapid increase in pressure in the second chamber was not solely attributable to 
pressure piling. They concluded that there were three contributory factors: 
1. Compression of the gas/air mixture, in the secondary chamber, before ignition. 
2. Turbulence, created by the high velocity inrush of gases. 
3. Jetted ignition as the flame rapidly propagates through the communicating 
passage. 
Gleim and Marcy [262], of the US Bureau of Mines, investigated the effects of differing 
vessel size and ignition position. Their results indicated that higher peak pressures are 
attained as the vessel volume ratio ( )1 2V V increases. In addition, they found that the 
pressure piling was more pronounced when the distance between the ignition source 
and the secondary chamber was increased. 
Brown [260], in 1959, investigated the effect that the length of the connecting pipe had 
on explosions propagating from one vessel into another. He concluded that the 
pressure generated in the secondary chamber was independent of the length of the 
pipe. This was because the pressure in the primary chamber is the ‘driving force’ 
causing flow into the secondary chamber and the pressure in the secondary chamber 
at the time of flame entry was likely to be similar to that when the flame entered the 
pipe [257]. Brown also observed that peak pressures were dependent on changes in 
the cross-sectional area of the interconnecting pipe. That is, the peak pressure in the 
vessels increased when the pipe diameter was decreased. 
Bartknecht [154] reports on a range of experiments conducted in interconnected 
vessels. On experiments conducted with a vessel ratio of 1, he noted that, in 
agreement with Brown [260], the length of the connecting pipe did not alter the course 
of the explosion, but the diameter had a significant influence on the violence of the 
explosion in both vessels. Due to pressure oscillations, the rate of pressure rise in the 
primary (ignition) vessel was found to be 4 times as high as it would be for an 
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equivalent single vessel, but the maximum pressure was not increased. However, the 
rate of pressure rise in the secondary vessel was up to 10 times higher than an 
equivalent single vessel and the maximum pressure was found to have an increase of 
approximately 10%. The elevated pressure in the secondary chamber was attributed to 
jet ignition and turbulence.  
Bartknecht also reported on experiments conducted on vessels of differing size, that is, 
( )1 2 1V V ≠ . In these experiments it was found that if the primary vessel was of lesser 
volume than the secondary vessel, it was possible for the peak pressure to be recorded 
in the primary vessel. However, in general terms, the pressure in both vessels was 
found to increase by approximately 40 to 50% of equivalent single vessel explosions. 
Contrastingly, if the primary vessel was of greater volume than the secondary vessel, a 
different explosion mechanism was observed. In these instances, there was a 
significant amplification of the violence of explosion (rate of pressure rise). Whilst the 
pressure recorded in the primary vessel was considerably lower than that recorded in 
the secondary vessel, there was an overall pressure increase of approximately 200%. 
Of significant interest to this study, was the finding that the gas concentration; at which 
the maximum pressure was measured, varied, and was not in agreement with that of a 
single vessel explosion (i.e. close to stoichiometric). It was observed, that the gas 
concentration at which maximum pressure occurred, appeared to be influenced by the 
diameter of the interconnecting pipe and the location of the ignition source. The rate of 
pressure rise in the secondary vessel, in all cases, occurred when the distance 
between the ignition source and plane of the interconnecting pipe connection was at a 
maximum. On the basis of the experimental tests he conducted, Bartknecht concluded 
that excessive pressures may be avoided if the interconnecting vessels were of the 
same size, that is ( )1 2 1V V = , and the ratio of the cross-sectional area of the 
connecting pipe to the vessel volume did not exceed 0.002 m2/m3 or was greater than 
0.4 m2/m3.  
Solberg [207], in 1982, theorised that flame speeds, in explosions in interconnected 
compartments, may strongly accelerate as the flame propagates from compartment to 
compartment. He predicted that as the explosion becomes faster, the pre-compression 
in the next compartment will be less, which counteracts the energy release in this 
compartment as the flame arrives. He also suggested that the pressure increase would 
be greater for larger interconnecting openings. 
Singh conducted several small-scale studies of pressure piling and its effects [251, 
258, 259]. Of particular interest was the investigation of the effects of the volume and 
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size of the vessels, the ignition location, and the length and diameter of the 
interconnecting pipe. In general terms, Singh confirmed the findings of previous studies 
[260, 262]. He concluded that ignition at the rear of the primary vessel, or central 
ignition in a vessel of large L/D, resulted in a larger volume of unburnt gas being 
pushed into the secondary vessel, pre-compressing the flammable mixture in the 
second vessel, and thus producing a higher peak pressure. He also found that the 
peak pressure in the secondary vessel was independent of the length of the 
interconnecting pipe but dependent upon its diameter; and that increasing the vessel 
volume ratio had the effect of increasing the peak pressure, up to a point where back 
venting from the secondary vessel caused the pressure to level out or even decrease 
depending upon the gas concentration and pipe diameter. The main finding of 
importance to this study, was that the maximum developed pressure and peak rate of 
pressure rise were more pronounced in larger scale setups. However, although the 
conclusion may be right, the basis for it seems debatable, given that whilst Singh 
varied the vessel volume during the experiments, the opening into the secondary 
vessel was fixed. As a consequence, tests involving vessels of smaller volume would 
result in more efficient back venting of the explosion in the secondary vessel.  
Singh developed a correlation for determining the maximum pressure in the secondary 
vessel. The correlation, which does not take into account the effect of turbulence on the 
pressure peak [244], is given by: 
Where: 
Pk = the maximum pressure in the secondary vessel (g/cm s2). 
P1 = the pressure in the secondary vessel at the time the flame front reaches the linked 
vessel (g/cm s2). 
E = the expansion factor. 
dc = the diameter of the interconnecting duct (cm). 
Su = laminar burning velocity (cm/s). 
V = volume of vessel (cm3). 
The use of this correlation requires the prediction of the P1 pressure peak. Singh 
derived a series of further correlations and graphs to predict P1. As the Singh 
correlation is based on small-scale studies in spherical or cylindrical vessels, and is 
dependent upon idealised conditions, it will not be further considered in this study.  
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Abdullin et al. [241], developed a model for predicting the mechanism of an explosion 
in interconnected vessels by focusing on the interaction of the combustion rate and the 
energy transferred during the flow of gases from vessel to vessel.  
Phylaktou and Andrews [249], carried out a number of methane/air explosion tests in 
interconnected vessels of equal size (0.5 m diameter x 0.5 m length), that is 
( )1 2 1V V = , that were connected by a 76 mm diameter pipe that was 1.7 m in length. 
By instrumenting the vessels and connecting pipe (using thermocouples and pressure 
transducers), the authors were able to measure the transient pressure-time data for the 
explosion and monitor flame propagation from vessel to vessel.  
Following central ignition in the primary vessel, they observed an initial period of delay 
before any appreciable pressure rise was observed in the 1st vessel. From this point, 
the flame propagated in a spherical, laminar manner, and the pressure began to 
increase slowly. This created a difference in pressure between the two vessels and 
therefore initiated flow into the secondary vessel. As the rate of flame propagation 
increased, the pressure difference was increased and the flow through the 
interconnecting pipe accelerated. Just prior to the flame reaching the inlet of the 
interconnecting pipe, there was a pressure difference between the two vessels of 
approximately 80 mbar, creating flow into the secondary vessel at high velocity (≈ 80 
m/s). This rapid flow of unburnt gas/air mixture ahead of the flame created turbulence 
in the pipe. The flame front, already accelerating due to the expansion of hot 
combustion products, underwent further rapid acceleration as the combustion rate was 
enhanced significantly due to the turbulent flow. When the flame front entered the 
second chamber, the pressure increased dramatically from approximately 200 mbar to 
3.7 bar, with the maximum rate of pressure rise in the order of 584 bar/s. This very 
rapid increase in pressure was due to the jetted ignition (as the flame excited the pipe 
at high velocity) of the turbulent gas/air mixture. This abrupt pressure rise resulted in a 
reversal of flow (as the pressure in vessel two was greater than that of the primary 
vessel) back into the primary vessel, which up to this point had been burning in laminar 
manner. The consequence of this reversal of flow was to create turbulence in the 
primary vessel, which increased the combustion rate and increased the pressure in the 
1st vessel. The pressure in this vessel was found to increase at a similar rate to the 
initial pressure increase in the secondary vessel and consequently the direction of flow 
altered again. The changes in flow direction set up oscillatory combustion. The 
maximum pressure recorded during this explosion was 6.7 bar in the primary vessel 
and 7.4 bar in the secondary vessel, the difference between the two being associated 
with pre-compression. 
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With end ignition, a different explosion mechanism was noted. In the initial laminar 
stage of the explosion, it took longer for the flame to reach the plane of the connecting 
pipe, simply because the flame front had farther to travel. However, by the time the 
flame front reached the pipe the pressure difference between the two vessels was 180 
mbar (over twice the value for central ignition) and consequently a much higher flow 
regime was set up, resulting in a greater turbulence intensity. Accordingly, the 
combustion in this vessel was almost instantaneous, with a maximum rate of pressure 
rise of 2068 bar/s.  
The results of the central ignition tests of Phylaktou and Andrews [249] are in broad 
agreement with the findings of Bartknecht [154] with a rate of pressure rise in the 
primary vessel approximately 4 times that of an explosion in equivalent sized single 
vessel and up to 10 times greater for the secondary vessel. However, when the results 
of end ignition are considered, the rate of pressure rise was found to have increased by 
a factor of 17. That is almost double the value predicted by Bartknecht [154]  
In 1996 Lunn et al. [247], published a report on totally confined coal dust and toner dust 
explosions in interconnected vessels. The experimental arrangement consisted of 
several vessels with sizes ranging between 2 m3 and 20 m3 connected with a 5 m long 
pipe of varying diameter (15, 25 and 50 cm). The experimental work was focused 
mainly on the effects of vessel volume, vessel volume ratios and pipe diameter. The 
authors confirmed much of the findings of earlier work and noted that pressure piling 
did not occur for volume ratios less than 0.25.  
In 1996 Holbrow et al. [245], published a report on vented coal dust, toner dust and 
anthraquinone dust explosions in interconnected vessels. The experimental setup 
consisted of several vented vessels with sizes ranging between 2 m3 and 20 m3 
connected with pipes of varying diameter (15, 25 and 50 cm) and varying length (up to 
15 m). Interestingly, the authors concluded that varying the pipe length had some effect 
on the maximum pressure and the pressure–time profile. The longer the pipe length, 
the greater the separation between the pressure peaks recorded in the individual 
vessels. Furthermore, the backflow also decreased as the pipe length was increased. 
These findings are not in agreement with the work of others [154, 251, 258, 259]. 
Maremonti, et al. [248] investigated the ability of a CFD program (AutoReaGas) to 
model gas explosions in linked vessels. They used the experimental data of Phylaktou 
et al. [249], and found reasonable agreement between the measured and calculated 
data with regard to the peak pressure but less agreement when comparing values for 
the rate of pressure rise and flame speed. The computed values of the turbulence 
intensity in both chambers demonstrated that turbulence induced in the secondary 
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vessel is a major factor affecting the explosion violence. With the interconnecting pipe 
diameter being a key influencing parameter. 
Razus et al. [250] carried our small-scale experiments on two cylindrical interconnected 
vessels using stoichiometric propylene/air mixtures. The explosion transmission 
between the linked vessels was found to be strongly dependent on the vessels 
configuration, position of the ignition source, and length and diameter of the connecting 
pipe. The explosion was found to propagate from one vessel to another when the 
pressure in the primary vessel reached a critical value. This critical pressure increased 
with decreasing interconnecting pipe diameter. 
The results showed that the initial pressure and the tube diameter were the major 
parameters in the development of explosions in interconnected vessels. Other factors, 
such as the vessel volume ratio and the location of ignition source were also important. 
The effects of partially filled interconnected enclosures on vented gas explosions is of 
importance to investigators of accidental gas explosions, where there is a potential for 
the release of a flammable gas to fill only a single room because the door to an 
interconnecting room is closed. This situation was investigated by Willacy et al. [253] in 
2006. The major purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of how 
explosions develop in interconnected enclosures when one enclosure is full of 
flammable mixture and the adjoining enclosure is free of gas. 
The results showed that the mechanism of flame propagation and pressure 
development of an explosion in a partially filled interconnected vessel, was similar to 
that of completely full interconnected systems. However, not surprisingly, the key 
difference was that, whilst the total explosion time was similar, a partially full explosion 
in an interconnected vessel did not generate maximum pressures of the same 
magnitude as that of a completely full interconnected system. However, there is the 
possibility that a pocket of rich gas/air mixture in the primary vessel, could get pushed 
into the secondary vessel at high velocity, whereupon it mixes turbulently with the air in 
the secondary vessel to produce a stoichiometric mixture. In this situation it may be 
possible to develop a pressure in the secondary chamber comparable to that of a 
completely full system. 
Di Benedetto et al. [243] and Di Benedetto and Salzano [242], recognised that a 
universal chemical model had not been developed to fully consider the various 
combustion regimes present during an explosion in interconnected vessels (e.g. 
laminar, flamelet, corrugated, well mixed distributed regime) and developed a CFD 
model in which the combustion models adapt to the specific combustion regime arising. 
The model was directly validated by means of a blind test carried out with the 
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experimental findings of Singh [258]. Whilst the work was entitled “Modeling Explosion 
In Compartmented Vessels” [243], the work was related to equipment found in 
industrial applications (e.g. reactors, tanks, vessels etc.) where pressure piling due to 
pre-compression was important. Vented explosions through interconnected rooms 
present a different problem.  
Di Benedetto et al. [244] when considering the effects of pressure piling in two 
interconnected vessels (they were considering buildings, mines, reactors and tanks as 
interconnecting vessels), evaluated empirical correlations to determine their suitability 
to predict the intensity of the pre-compression induced by flame propagation in the 
primary vessel and the flow of gases into the secondary chamber. The authors suggest 
that the correlation developed by Molkov [263] for vent sizing of a single vessel is the 
most appropriate correlation for predicting peak pressures in linked enclosures. The 
reason for this, it is argued, is because the correlation takes into account the initial 
pressure and turbulent flame propagation. The peak pressure is determined by: 
or: 
Where: 
Pred = the reduced explosion pressure, which is lower than the maximum possible 
pressure (i.e. ≈ 8 bar) for example, through venting; but in the context of this work is 
equal to the maximum overpressure peak, Pmax,abs – Pi, abs (bar). 
πred = dimensionless reduced explosion overpressure (πred = Pred,abs/Pi,abs). 
πv = dimensionless vent failure pressure (πv = Pv,abs/Pi,abs). 
Pred∗ = the reduced pressure when Brt = 0, thus being the reduced pressure reached in 
the equivalent adiabatic closed vessel. Molkov [263] assumed this to be equal to 7, but 
the value would vary as different fuels are used (e.g. 6.7 for methane and 8.2 for 
propane). 
Brt = the turbulent Bradley number. 
The turbulent Bradley number may be given by: 
 Pred = 
πred
πv1.5
= Brt−2.4, Pred ≤ 1, Brt ≥ 1 (2-85) 
 Pred = 
πred
πv1.5
= Pred∗ − 6Brt0.5, Pred > 1, Brt < 1 (2-86) 
 t
u
E μBr  = 0.21
γ χ
Br   (2-87) 
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Where: 
E = the expansion ratio. 
γu = the specific heat ratio for the unburned fuel at initial conditions. 
µ = a discharge coefficient. 
χ = a turbulence factor after vent opening. 
Br = the Bradley number. 
The Bradley number may be determined by: 
Where: 
Av = the area of the vent (m2). 
V = volume of the vessel (m3). 
c0 = the speed of sound at initial conditions of the explosion (m/s). 
Su = laminar burning velocity (m/s). 
The turbulent Bradley number is a modification of the Bradley number to take account 
of turbulent conditions. This is achieved through the introduction of the deflagration 
outflow interaction (DOI) parameter, χ/µ, given by:  
Where: 
α = empirical coefficient (suggested value 1.75 [263]). 
V# = dimensionless volume (numerically equal to enclosure volume). 
β = empirical coefficient (suggested value 0.5 [263]). 
π1,# = dimensionless initial pressure expressed as the ratio of absolute initial pressure 
to the pressure of 1bar. 
Di Benedetto et al. [244] undertook a series of calculations using the Molkov correlation 
to compare the predictions with the results of Singh [251]. The authors found good 
agreement with the experimental results and suggested that this was because the 
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interconnected vessels and the initial pressure in the secondary vessel, both of which 
are accounted for in the correlation.  
Konishi [264] undertook a programme of small-scale experimental testing and CFD 
modelling to attempt to understand the explosion mechanism of a ‘real’ accidental 
gasoline vapour explosion that occurred in a boat with multiple compartments. He 
concluded that the key contributor to the compartmental explosion was the transition 
from laminar to turbulent combustion as the flame propagated through the adjoining 
openings. 
2.7. Thermal Damage in Explosions 
2.7.1. General 
Heat that is released as a consequence of the combustion process is transmitted to the 
surroundings by conduction, convection and thermal radiation. During the course of a 
gas explosion the flame front will propagate through the entire flammable mixture. As a 
gas explosion is a very short duration event, it is flame contact and thermal radiation 
that present the most significant hazard when the effects on humans, clothing and 
furnishings are considered; with the incident heat flux being at a maximum when the 
receiver is engulfed by the flame. 
Following an accidental gas explosion, a detailed examination of the thermal damage 
(scorching, blistering etc.) caused by the explosion, can provide critical evidence [16]. 
The investigator will be able to determine the rooms through which the flame 
propagated, whether the flammable gas involved was more or less dense than air, and 
the depth of any layer. This information may then be used to determine any credible 
sources of gas by calculating or measuring the release rate and estimating whether an 
escape of this magnitude was capable of mixing with air to form a flammable layer, or 
completely full mixture, which is in agreement with the scorching patterns. 
Following the release of a lighter than air gas, a layer of flammable gas/air mixture may 
accumulate, extending downwards from the ceiling to the location of the release source 
[66-71]. If the flammable mixture is subsequently ignited, the flame will propagate 
through the gas/air mixture at high level and consequently evidence of the passage of 
the flame is expected to be found at high level rather than at low level. In contrast to 
the location of thermal damage in a natural gas explosion, explosions involving layers 
of heavier than air gases, such as LPG, will exhibit thermal damage at low level, from 
the point of leakage down to floor level. In these situations, more burning should be 
evident at low level, such as scorching to carpets, furniture etc., than at ceiling level 
(see Figure 2-40).  
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Figure 2-40 Evidence of thermal damage following a layered LPG explosion 
(photo taken by the author) 
Other evidence as to the nature of the gas involved (e.g. its relative density) might be 
provided by the pattern of burn injuries suffered by individuals in the room through 
which the flame propagates. Although ordinary clothing provides some degree of short 
term protection against a transient explosion flame. Burns to the head and upper part 
of the body, but not the legs and lower torso, are indications that a layer of a buoyant 
gas had been involved (e.g. natural gas). If burns were restricted to the lower part of 
the body, this provides an indication that the explosion involved a heavier than air gas 
such as LPG or petrol vapour. However, caution should be taken when using this type 
of information, as hot combustion products are more buoyant than air and may cause 
burn injuries to the upper part of the body, potentially providing a false indication that 
the fuel involved is lighter than air. 
2.7.2. Thermal Radiation 
Thermal radiation may be considered as the transfer of heat by electromagnetic waves, 
generated by the motion of charged particles. Electromagnetic waves travel at the 
speed of light and are typically described by the frequency, wavelength, or photon 
energy. However, in terms of thermal radiation they are most commonly described by 
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Where: 
f = frequency (Hz). 
c = the speed of light in a vacuum (2.9979 x 108 m/s). 
λ = wavelength (m). 
The electromagnetic waves of thermal radiation have wavelengths of approximately 0.3 
to 50 μm, depending on the radiating source temperature, and span the infrared and 
visible ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum [265].  
The thermal radiation emitted from a flame is the net result of radiation emitted by 
radiating gases, particularly carbon dioxide and water vapour, and by carbon particles 
(i.e. soot). Consequently, it depends on the type of fuel and on the nature of the 
combustion. A flame in which the radiation is emitted solely from the gaseous 
constituents is termed non-luminous and one in which there is soot is termed luminous 
[265]. Natural gas flames contain relatively little soot and are generally termed non-
luminous (in relative terms). 
Gas explosions in buildings are very brief transient events with a typical duration of 
approximately 1 s. The emitted radiation of a vented gas explosion will depend on the 
actual distribution of flame temperatures, partial pressure of combustion products, 
geometry of the combustion zone, and absorption of radiation in the expanding flame 
front itself. The incident heat flux is therefore a function of flame temperature, 
emissivity, distance to receiver and view factor. As a consequence, the incident thermal 
radiation, received by a person or object located within the building, would vary as the 
flame propagated through the flammable mixture (i.e. depending upon location of the 
receiver) and would be a maximum when the flame is largest relative to the target (i.e. 
just before the flame arrives at the target). Thermal radiation decreases approximately 
by the square of the distance from the radiating source; meaning that a receiving object 
situated 2 m from the source would receive ¼ of the radiation than if it were sited 1 m 
from the source. It should be noted that the flame area (and hence the view factor) is at 
a maximum for a very short duration (i.e. tens of milliseconds). 
The total emissive power at which radiation is emitted over all wavelengths may be 
determined by Stefan-Boltzmann Law: 
Where: 
E = total emissive power (kW/m2). 
σ = Stefan's constant, 5.67 x 10-11 kW/m2 K4. 
 4E T= σε  (2-91) 
Literature Review 132 
ε = emissivity. 
T = source temperature (K). 
The use of the Stefan-Boltzmann law to estimate the thermal radiation effects from a 
gas explosion therefore require a detailed knowledge of the flame temperature and its 
emissivity. To calculate the emissive power, the flame temperature can be determined 
from adiabatic calculations at constant volume and the emissivity of gases formed 
during the combustion process (i.e. CO2 and H2O) are typically calculated using 
diagrams, such as that given by Hottel and Sarofim [266]. Leckner [267], gives 
empirical correlations for the total emittance for both water vapour and carbon dioxide. 
The correlations, for the emissivity of water vapour and carbon dioxide at atmospheric 
pressure, which are derived from calculations summing narrow band behaviour over 
the full spectrum [268], are given below: 
Where: 
ϵ = emissivity. 
p = partial pressure (bar). 
Le = mean beam length (cm). 
The coefficient, aj, is given by: 
The values of cij, for both water vapour and carbon dioxide, may be found in a table of 
coefficients published in Leckner [267] and Hottel and Sarofim [266]. A plot of 
emissivity using Equation (2-92) shows that the emittance increases with pressure-path 
length (pLe). However, observations for temperature show that emittance generally 
decreases with increasing temperature for water vapour, whilst in contrast, emissivity 
goes through a peak at approximately 1200 K for carbon dioxide and then decreases 
with increasing temperature. 
The spectral average of the mean beam limit may be determined by an approximation 
given, for example, by Howell et al. [268] and Bejan and Kraus [269]: 
















=  (2-94) 
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Where: 
V = volume of the flame (cm3). 
A = flame surface area (cm2). 
There are a number of simple geometric relationships that may also be used to 
determine the spectral average mean beam length. For example, the mean beam 
length for the flame given from a gas explosion ignited centrally in a room (i.e. an 
approximately spherical flame radiating to its surface), may be estimated from the 
relationship given by Howell et al. [268]: 
Where D is the diameter of the spherical flame (cm). 
The emissivity correlations given in Equation (2-92) are for carbon dioxide, water 
vapour and air with a total pressure of 1 atm. If the total pressure differs considerably 
from this pressure, a pressure correction needs to be applied. For water vapour, this 
correction is given by: 
Where: 
and: 
Where: Pt is the total pressure of the air/H2O mixture, 
and: 
For carbon dioxide, the pressure correction is given by: 
Where: 
and: 
 eL 0.65D=  (2-95) 
 CH2O  = 1 + �ΔH2O-1�ΞH2O (2-96) 
 ΔH2O = 
[1.888 - 2.053log10(T/1000)]PE,H2O + 1.10(T/1000)
-1.4
PE,H2O + [1.888 - 2.053log10(T/1000)] + 1.10(T/1000)-1.4 -1
 (2-97) 
 PE,H2O = Pt �1 + 4.9�pH2O/Pt��(273/T)� (2-98) 
 ΞH2O = exp �-0.5�log10�13.2(T/1000)
2� - log10�pH2OLe��
2� (2-99) 
 CCO2 = 1 + �ΔCO2-1�ΞCO2 (2-100) 
 ΔCO2 = 
�1 + 0.1(T/1000)-1.45�PE,CO2 + 0.23
PE,CO2 + [1 + 0.1(T/1000)-1.45] - 0.77
 (2-101) 
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Where: Pt is the total pressure of the air/CO2 mixture, and: 
The individual emittances for water vapour and carbon dioxide must be modified when 
both gases are in a mixture, such as that of an explosion in air, because the individual 
spectral lines and absorption for the two gases overlap in some spectral regions, and 
simple addition of the individual emittances would overpredict the total emittance of the 
mixture. Consequently, an ‘overlap’ correction must be applied: 
Where: 
and,  
The total emissivity, including corrections for pressure and overlap may be calculated 
by: 
Using the total emissivity correlation [Equation (2-107)], for a stoichiometric 
methane/air vented explosion in a typical dwelling (i.e. Le ≈ 2.5 m, T ≈ 2200 K, and 
typical pressure Pt of 1.5 bara), the total emissivity is calculated to be 0.23. Using the 
Stefan-Boltzmann Law [Equation (2-91)] (ϵ = 0.23 and T ≈ 2200 K), the emissive power 
of a stoichiometric vented methane/air explosion is estimated to be in the order of 305 
kW/m2. 
Table 2-5 shows the range of surface emissive powers measured from various 
hydrocarbon fire experiments. For a detailed study of the thermal effects of 
hydrocarbon fires, the reader is referred to Cowley [270, 271], Cowley and Johnson 
[272], Chamberlain [273-279], Drysdale [81], Lowesmith et al. [280] and Wickens and 
Lowesmith [281]. It should be noted that the most important radiative element in these 
values of surface emissive power for hydrocarbon fires is soot. Soot is not likely to be 
as significant in vented natural gas explosions. 
 PE,CO2 = Pt�1 + 0.28�pCO2/Pt�� (2-102) 
 ΞCO2 = exp �-1.47�log10�0.225(T/1000)
2� - log10�pCO2Le��
2� (2-103) 
 Δϵ = �
ζ
10.7+101ζ
 - 0.0089ζ10.4� [log10(pLe)]2.76 (2-104) 




 p = pH2O + pCO2 (2-106) 
 ϵ(pLe) = CH2OϵH2O�pH2OLe� + CCO2ϵCO2�pCO2Le� - Δϵ (2-107) 
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Table 2-5 Emissive power from various types of hydrocarbon fire 
(taken from Mannan [265]) 
Fire Type Surface Emissive Power (kW/m2) 
Flash Fire 173 
Jet Fire 50 - 220 
Pool Fire 60 - 200 
Fireball 350 
 
It can be seen from Table 2-5 that the estimated maximum surface emissive power of a 
vented explosion in a typical room (circa 305 kW/m2) is greater than that of a flash, jet 
or pool fire, and similar to that of a fireball.  
The level of thermal dose received in an explosion is determined by the intensity, 
duration and wavelength of the event as well as the exposure time. The thermal dose is 
therefore based on a combination of the radiation intensity and the exposure duration: 
Where: 
TD = thermal dose (kW/m2 s). 
Ι = radiation intensity (kW/m2). 
t = duration of exposure (s). 
Given that explosions are too fast for escape, the exposure time may be considered 
equivalent to the duration of the event. Equation (2-108) is the simplest form for 
estimating the impact of radiation on people, structures and materials. Lees [265] 
states that whilst this correlation is relatively accurate at predicting the effects of 
thermal radiation at low intensity with long exposure duration, it under-predicts the 
effect of thermal radiation at high intensity. Consequently, Lees suggests that a better 
correlation for higher intensity radiation events, such as explosions, is of the form: 
Where: 
TDU = thermal dose units [(kW/m2)n s]. 
Eisenberg et al. [282], based on ultra-violet radiation data from nuclear explosions, 
proposed that the exponent, n, should take the value of 1.33 (4/3) for correlating fatality 
data and 1.15 for non-fatal injuries. Hymes et al. [283] reasoned that it was acceptable 
 TD = It (2-108) 
 TDU = Int (2-109) 
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to use n = 1.33 for both fatal and non-fatal situations, although it was accepted that in 
non-fatal cases the value was more approximate. Consequently, using a value of 1.33 
for n in non-fatal cases may result in an over-prediction (but nonetheless conservative 
estimate) of the impact of thermal radiation. 
2.7.3. Response of People and Materials Exposed to Heat 
In order to estimate the response of persons and materials following an explosion, of a 
given gas concentration, in addition to estimating the thermal dose it is also necessary 
to have an understanding of the response of the persons and/or materials exposed to 
the explosion [284]. Whilst much work has been undertaken on the intensity of 
hydrocarbon fires (referenced above) and the behaviour of materials and people 
exposed to compartment fires [285-339], little work was found in the literature relating 
to the radiative heat flux of a vented explosion. 
The full effect of radiation on humans and materials is outside the scope of this study 
and the reader is advised to consult Hymes et al. [283], Hockey and Rew [340], Stoll et 
al. [325-329], Backer et al. [341], Babrauskas [342], Burrell and Hare [343] and 
Horrocks and Anand [302] for a detailed analysis of the topic. However, with basic 
material and burn data it is possible to model and predict the thermal effects of a 
vented explosion. Table 2-6 lists the observed effects of people and materials exposed 
to varying levels of radiation but it should be noted that the exposure duration is much 
longer than that of a vented gas explosion for all of the situations referred to in this 
Table.  
There are a number of factors that determine the likelihood of a person surviving the 
thermal effects of a vented explosion [340]. These include: 
• The incident thermal dose. 
• The degree and effectiveness of any protective clothing. 
• The degree of burn sustained. 
• The age of the person. 
• Any inhalation injury. 
• Any pre-existing medical condition. 
• The speed and medical response and any medical complications. 
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Table 2-6 Observed effects of incident thermal radiation 







Sufficient to damage process 
equipment and cause collapse of 
mechanical structures. 
100% lethality in 1 min. 
1% lethality in 10 s. 
35 Cellulosic material will pilot ignite within one minute’s exposure.  
25.0 
Minimum energy to ignite wood at 
indefinitely long exposure without a 
flame. 
Unprotected steel will reach thermal 
stress temperatures that can cause 
failure. 
Fully Insulated thin steel may lose 
mechanical integrity. 
100% lethality in 1 min. 
Significant injury in 10 s. 
12.5 
Minimum energy to ignite wood with a 
flame or spark (piloted ign). 
Melts plastic tubing. 
1% lethality in 1 min. 
1st degree burns in 10 s. 
11.7 Partly insulated steel may lose integrity.  
10.0 Certain polymers may ignite.  
7.0 
 Tolerance limit for persons completely 
covered by Nomex protective clothing. 
6.5 
 Causes pain within 10 s. 
Escape is only possible if rapid. 
4.7 
 Causes pain in 15-20 s and burns after 
30 s. 
4.0  Causes pain if duration is longer than 20 s but blistering of skin is unlikely. 
1.6  Causes no discomfort for long exposure. 
1.2 
 Received from the sun at noon in 
summer. 
 
A dangerous thermal dose is defined by Rew [284] as the dose at which serious burns 
may be received or a small percentage of the population may die. The level at which 
serious burns may be obtained has been well defined by the UK medical profession as 
being a burn that covers more than 10% of the total body surface area in children and 
the elderly, and more than 15% in the average population. This definition only refers to 
partial-thickness burns, with full-thickness burns being classed as severe [346]. 
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A superficial burn, that is one which does not penetrate the epidermis (outer layer of 
skin), is referred to as a first degree burn and is not considered to be serious. Partial-
thickness or second-degree burns are those where the epidermis (which is 
approximately 0.1mm thick) and some of the underlying secondary skin layer, known 
as the dermis, are destroyed. The dermis, which contains blood vessels, hair follicles 
and sweat glands, can heal itself while some portion of the dermis remains. However, 
when all of the dermis is destroyed, the skin is unable to heal itself and serious medical 
treatment, such as skin grafts will be required. These burns are referred to as full-
thickness or third-degree burns. The key factor that affecting the likelihood of fatality for 
a given burn is age [346]. This is largely due to the reduction in skin depth with age and 
the reduced tolerance to surgery. 
Table 2-7 Effects on persons of increasing thermal dose (taken from Rew [347]) 
Thermal Dose Units 
(kW/m2)4/3 s 
Injury Criterion 
80 - 130 First degree burn 
240 - 730 Second degree burn 
1000 - 1400 Third degree burn 
1000 1% probability of lethality 
1800 Ignition of clothinga 
2000 50% probability of lethality 
a The lower bound ignition criterion corresponding to a duration of 10 s. 
The criterion given in Table 2-7 have been derived for radiation incident on a target 
located outside the boundary of the flame front. Persons within a building that are 
subjected to a gas explosion would be engulfed by the flame and the above criterion for 
the probability of lethality would have to be modified (i.e. because all the unclothed skin 
area would be simultaneously exposed to heat flux). Rew and Spencer [348] 
recommend that the doses for the probability of lethality are halved for engulfment 
situations. In addition, when assessing the risks associated with fire or explosion 
events, it is typical to assume that ignition of clothing will result in 100% probability of 
fatality [284].  
The earlier estimate of the emissive power (≈ 305 kW/m2), may be extended using 
Equation (2-109) to estimate the thermal dose from a typical vented stoichiometric 
methane/air explosion. Video records from vented explosion experiments (Chapter 5) 
showed that the flame front had expanded to approximately half the width of the 
enclosure, some 500 ms after ignition. Therefore, assuming that significant emissive 
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power occurs for a duration of approximately 500 ms (time taken from when the flame 
front is half the width of the enclosure to the end of the explosion), conservative 
estimates in the region of 360 (kW/m2)4/3 s for n = 1.15 to 1026 (kW/m2)4/3 s for n = 4/3 
are calculated. Using the upper value of n suggests that following a stoichiometric 
methane/air explosion, people may sustain third degree burns and there is a greater 
than 1% probability of fatality (if the person is located in a room where the gas/air 
mixture is distributed). The calculated probability of fatality for persons involved in a 
gas explosion is less than the statistical average of 22% [2] (taken over the period 2009 
to 2014). This is because fatalities in explosions are also caused by injuries sustained 
during the collapse of all or part of the building, by projectiles, by inhalation of hot 
combustion gases and by burns caused by flame engulfment. Consequently, as a 
person exposed to radiation from a vented explosion flame is most likely in an 
enclosure where a flammable mixture is present, burns due to radiation exposure are 
of less interest than those associated with flame engulfment. 
In terms of materials, there are a number of different forms of thermal damage by 
radiation. If a cellulosic material (e.g. wood, fabric etc.) is exposed to a heat source its 
temperature will rise. If the intensity of the heat source is high enough, and the duration 
is long enough such that the net thermal dose is sufficient, pyrolytic decomposition of 
the material substrate will occur [341]. The products of this decomposition include 
combustible gases, non-combustible gases and carbonaceous char. The combustible 
gases will mix with air, and once flammable and above their ignition temperature, will 
ignite, yielding flame. 
There is a plethora of literature regarding the ignition, pyrolysis, burning and charring 
behaviour of wood and other cellulosic materials. However, the literature is mainly 
concerned from a fire science perspective and little material is related to the scorching 
of fabrics and materials following an explosion. For a detailed review on the ignition of 
wood and cellulosic materials, the reader is referred to Babrauskas [342], Lawson and 
Simms [303], Simms [323], Simms and Law [324], Spearpoint and Quintiere [349], 
Thunman and Leckner [350], Wesson et al. [351], Shen and Fang [352], Shen et al. 
[353], Thomas et al. [333], Burrell and Hare [343] and Staggs et al. [354].  
The ignition of solids cannot be characterised as easily as gases (auto ignition 
temperature) or liquids (flash point) because of their low thermal conductivity and lack 
of mass transfer [343]. However, the point of ignition can be measured as a surface 
temperature, a mass flux (pyrolysis) or a heat flux (radiation). The lowest radiative flux 
capable of ignition of the solid in the presence of a pilot flame is termed the minimum 
critical heat flux (after prolonged exposure). 
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The effect of heat on a cellulosic material can produce both physical and chemical 
effects. Physical changes are mainly exhibited by thermoplastic fibres (e.g. polyamide, 
polyester and polyolefin), which soften above a glass-transition temperature, Tg, and 
subsequently melt above a melting temperature, Tm, whilst chemical changes begin at 
a temperature at which pyrolysis (thermal degradation) occurs, Tp, and may proceed to 
oxidation and flaming combustion at a temperature, Tc, [301]. Consequently, the 
magnitude of the thermal transitions Tg, Tm, Tp, and Tc, provide an indication as to the 
resistance of a given fibre to heat and/or flame. 
In terms of chemical action, the first action of heat on any fibre, once the fibre reaches 
the temperature TP, is to pyrolyse it. If after pyrolysis, the temperature is equal to or 
above Tc, the volatiles and gases are combustible, and oxygen is present, then flaming 
combustion may take place producing products such as carbon dioxide and water 
vapour. Pyrolysis of cellulosic material is considered to occur via two competing 
reactions; the first one creates char via dehydration and the second, via 
depolymerisation generates the non-volatile ‘liquid fuel’ levoglucosan, which 
subsequently pyrolyses, producing highly flammable gases as well as secondary char 
formation [318]. Charring is the chemical process of incomplete combustion of certain 
solids when subjected to high heat, with the resulting residue being called char. 
Through this process of incomplete combustion, charring removes hydrogen and 
oxygen from the solid material, so that the remaining char is composed primarily of 
carbon (charcoal) [342]. Polymers like thermosets, or most solid organic compounds 
like wood or biological tissue, exhibit charring behaviour. 
A convenient measure of the flammability of cellulosic material is the critical (or limiting) 
oxygen index (LOI) which is the volume percentage of oxygen required in the 
atmosphere for sustained combustion to occur [302]. As air contains about 21% 
oxygen by volume, fibres with LOI < 21 burn readily in air. It is generally considered 
that fabrics with LOI values in the range of ≈ 27 to 30 are flame resistant [341]. Table 
2-8 provides the respective LOI values for some common fibres. 
Non-thermoplastic fibres (thermosets) are often called heat-resistant because their 
physical properties do not change significantly at high temperatures. Table 2-8 shows 
that cotton, some other natural fibres and some speciality fibres, are non-thermoplastic 
with a low inherent flammability. This can be beneficial, in terms of thermal protection, 
since fabrics made from them do not recede from a flame and so offer protection to the 
wearer. The advantages of this property are shown by both flame-retardant cotton and 
wool, as well as the speciality synthetic fibres like Nomex, Kevlar and PBI [302]. 
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Table 2-8 Thermal transitions of fibres (taken from Horrocks [301]) 






combustion Thermoplastic LOI (%) 
Wool   245 600 No 25 
Cotton   350 350 No 18.4 
Viscose rayon   350 420 No 18.9 
Triacetate 172 290 305 540 Yes 18.4 
Nylon 6 50 215 431 450 Yes 20-21.5 
Nylon 6-6 50 265 403 530 Yes 20-21.5 
Polyester 80-90 255 420-447 480 Yes 20-21 
Acrylic 100 > 220 290 > 250 Yes 18.2 
Polypropylene -20 165 469 550 Yes 18.6 
PVC < 80 > 180 > 180 450 Yes 37-39 
PVDC -17 180-210 > 220 532 Yes 60 
PTFE 126 ≥ 327 400 560 Yes 95 
Nomex 275 375 410 > 500 Yes 28.5-30 
Kevlar 340 560 > 590 > 550 No 29 
PBI > 400  ≥ 500 > 500 No 40-42 
 
In certain situations, such as when subjected to stationary flames, thermoplastic fibres 
can give the impression of low flammability due to the softening and melting of the 
fabric which causes the structure to shrink away from the flame [302]. In those fibres 
that melt, molten drips help to extinguish the flame by removing the flaming regions 
from the textile. As a consequence of this tendency to melt and ‘drip’, these fibres (e.g. 
nylon 6-6 and polyester) may pass certain standard tests (e.g. BS 3119 and BS 5438). 
However, such fabrics, not only expose the wearer to the direct heat from the igniting 
source but also have the potential to cause burns through contact with flaming drips 
[301]. 
Of the few studies in the literature concerning thermal damage from an explosion, the 
most relevant work is that of Wąs [355], and Wąs-Gubala and Krauß [356-358]. The 
authors attempted to identify fibres after their thermal alteration using infrared 
spectroscopy, optical microscopy and scanning electron microscopy (SEM) with energy 
dispersive X-ray microanalysis (EDX). Thermally altered fibres are commonly the focus 
of crime scene investigators who are required to determine the original type of the fibre 
and the conditions through which the fibre underwent the thermal alteration, in order to 
determine whether it was possible to link clothing (textile fibres) and hence people to a 
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possible crime [355]. Whilst this work is primarily related to murder or arson 
investigations, it is of some relevance to investigators of accidental gas explosions. 
In a study subjecting a variety of fibres to two different types of heat; an electric heating 
plate set to 350°C (to ensure the fabric melting point was exceeded) and a gas burner, 
Wąs-Gubala and Krauß [357] exposed fibre samples to the heat sources for a duration 
of 30 s, except for acrylic, polyester, silk and wool where the duration was shortened to 
15 s due to the very rapid melting/charring of the fibre samples. The samples were 
subsequently analysed through an optical microscope and SEM.  
The initial change in the fibre, that occurred with either heat source, and which was 
particularly prevalent in cellulosic materials, was a discolouration from yellowish initially 
through to brown. The fibre ends of nylon, polyester, acrylic and wool were found to 
have melted and fused together to form ‘bulb-like’ ends (Figure 2-41). Cotton fibres, 
after contact with the flame were found to lose their normal appearance and take on a 
lacelike, delicate charred consistency. Whilst these results are of relevance to this 
study, they need to be treated with caution as the experiments are not fully 
representative of the conditions of an explosion, particularly in terms of duration and 
flame temperature. 
 
Figure 2-41 Woolen carpet fibres showing bulb ends after flame contact 
(taken from Wąs-Gubala [356]) 
The titles of two of the published articles of particular interest [356, 358] indicate that 
the work was specifically concerned with the damage caused to textiles by vapour 
cloud explosions. However, the authors have confused vapour cloud explosions with 
confined vented explosions involving petrol/air mixtures; with their main interest being 
related to crime scene investigation of arson or murder. In recent years, arson cases 
resulting in explosions of petrol/air mixtures have become more prevalent [359]. A 
variety of clothing and household garments, differing in colour, fibre composition and 
textile construction were subjected to vented petrol/air explosions in a small metal tin. 
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The tin had a volume of 850 ml, with 0.17 ml of petrol being used to provide a petrol 
vapour concentration of 2.9%. The authors concluded that whilst the degree of thermal 
damage was very dependent upon the garment construction, explosions cause very 
specific damage to textiles and single fibres. In general terms, the following was 
observed: 
• Areas of affected and unaffected fibre material were evident, corresponding to 
areas of different textile construction.  
• Textiles discoloured, generally from a yellowish colour through to brown. 
• Often the fibres would have melted to leave bulb shaped ends (acrylics, 
polyesters, wool, Figure 2-41). 
• Single natural fibres (e.g. cotton and wool) in contact with the flame front 
became burned, exhibiting brownish or blackish ends (Figure 2-42). 
• Cellulosic textile (of cotton, viscose) composed of thermoset fibre polymer, 
appears to burn exhibiting black fibres and black ends.  
• Synthetic fibres (acrylics, polyamide, polyester) melted to form conglomerates 
and their fibre ends fused together to form bulb or shovel like shapes.  
• The yarns of garments become more clearly visible, due to some fibre 
destruction.  
 
Figure 2-42 Cotton fibres showing brown and black ends 
(taken from Wąs-Gubala [356]) 
The objective of a gas explosion investigation is to use the forensic evidence and 
information gathered from witnesses to determine the origin and cause of the 
explosion, and consequently the most credible source of gas that led to the build-up of 
a flammable mixture prior to ignition. In terms of thermal damage, most of the literature 
was found to have been concerned with the ignition, pyrolysis, burning and charring 
behaviour of wood and textiles, that are associated with compartment fires. Few 
studies were found that were directly relevant to the scorching of fabrics and materials 
following an explosion.  
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The most relevant studies are those of Harris [16] and Wąs-Gubala and Krauß [356, 
357, 360]. The work of Harris is still the most widely used guide to explosion 
investigators but provides scant information to assist in the determination of the 
concentration of the flammable mixture prior to ignition. The studies of Wąs-Gubala 
and Krauß considered whether thermal damage to clothing could be used to determine 
if arson had been committed. Whilst this work provides very useful guidance on how 
textiles behave when exposed to flame, its use is limited to explosion investigators as it 
was restricted to the ignition of stoichiometric petrol/air mixtures in a small container.  
2.8. Objectives of the Research 
In Chapter 1, it was highlighted that there are over twenty-five gas explosions in 
buildings in the UK each year; which on average, cause two fatalities, thirty-five non-
fatal injuries and cost the UK millions of pounds. 
The investigation of these incidents is undertaken by a number of parties including 
regulatory bodies, fire investigators and forensic scientists and engineers who may 
undertake an extensive origin and cause investigation, or a more basic investigation to 
answer specific questions as part of a wider investigation or for the purposes of 
meeting specific regulatory requirements. 
In order to carry out an effective on-site investigation of a gas explosion, in addition to 
having a detailed knowledge of the physical and chemical characteristics of 
hydrocarbons and gas engineering practices, it is necessary to have a thorough 
understanding of the mechanism by which pressure is generated in an explosion and 
the response of structures to the passage of a transient flame front. 
In Chapter 2, a comprehensive literature review was carried out to determine the 
current understanding relating to accidental gas explosions in buildings and the 
investigative techniques that can be used to determine their origin and cause. This 
review included the fundamentals of gas explosion theory, the mechanisms through 
which pressure is generated in confined vented explosions and the thermal damage 
caused by a propagating flame front. 
It was found that the vast majority of confined vented explosion research has been 
conducted using empty single chambers of cuboid or spherical geometries, which are 
not representative of the conditions encountered in accidental gas explosions. 
Dwellings differ in that they consist of a series of furnished, interconnected rooms 
joined by doors and this highlights a problem that has received little attention. It is not 
possible to keep the flame and pressure effects of an explosion contained in one room, 
either because the flammable gas/air mixture may be distributed in more than one 
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room prior to ignition, or because it is pushed from one room to another during the 
course of the explosion. Consequently, whilst the mechanisms for generating pressure 
in idealised vented explosions are relatively well understood [45, 48, 64, 147, 156, 157, 
171, 183], there is little information in the published literature relating to pressure 
generation in accidental explosions in buildings.  
In gas explosions, pressure is generated either through confinement, or through the 
production of turbulence enhanced ‘fast flames’, or as a combination of the two. The 
structural damage that a building sustains, as a consequence of a gas explosion, is 
dependent upon the magnitude of the pressure pulse and the relationship between the 
duration of the imposed pressure load and the natural period of vibration of the 
structure [16, 25, 65, 72-74, 190, 232, 361-369]. In a vented gas explosion, the peak 
overpressure is a function of the rate at which combustion gases are produced and the 
rate at which they are vented, whilst the duration of the various pressure peaks is 
dependent upon many factors, including the fuel type, concentration, distribution of 
flammable mixture, ignition position, geometry of the enclosure(s) (including vent size 
and location) and turbulence.  
The role of turbulence has been discussed as a mechanism for increasing the burning 
velocity by distorting the flame front, thereby increasing its surface area and burning 
rate. There have been numerous studies of flame acceleration due to the presence of 
circular or flat obstacles in the path of a propagating flame [40-42, 45, 46, 103, 145, 
192, 205, 206, 208, 209, 226, 370-387]. In an accidental explosion in a dwelling, 
following ignition, the flame will propagate through the enclosure, interacting with the 
interconnecting area and doorways, and obstructions of various size and cross-section 
such as cylinders, squares, flat objects and sharp edges, all in the form of furniture. 
The propagating flame front is likely to interact in a different manner with these non-
idealised obstacles. Consequently, it is important to understand and predict the effects 
of turbulent combustion in this situation. This is usually achieved by the introduction of 
a turbulence factor. 
The tragic gas explosion at Ronan Point in 1968 shaped current gas safety legislation 
and initiated a significant body of research into the causes, mechanisms and effects of 
gas explosions in buildings that was unprecedented in its scale. It was believed that the 
cause of the widespread damage to the tower block was largely produced by the 
propagation of a flame from one room to another, generating higher overpressures 
than would have been expected if the explosion had been confined to a single room. 
Whilst the research [25-27, 160, 180, 232, 255] demonstrated that higher pressures 
could be generated in these so called ‘cascade’ explosions, the mechanism for 
producing these overpressures was not fully understood. However, Astbury et al. 
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[Equation (2-77)], Cubbage and Marshall [Equation (2-78) to (2-80)] and Dragosavic 
[Equations (2-81) to (2-83)] developed correlations for predicting the pressure in an 
adjoining room.  
Although no direct experiments had been carried out under conditions identical to those 
of a room in a domestic dwelling, Rasbash et al. [230] and Rasbash [229, 236] 
developed a correlation for predicting the maximum pressure in an accidental explosion 
[Equation (2-74)] and suggested a turbulence factor of 1.5 for furniture and other 
obstacles restricted to one room and 5.0 where the flame propagates from one room to 
another through an open door or where furniture and other decorative items were 
distributed throughout the entire enclosure. In more severe turbulence generating 
events, such as pre-turbulent gas/air mixtures, which are subsequently ignited in the 
presence of an obstacle congested room, the authors recommended a factor of 8 to 10 
be considered. Molkov [240] estimated that for explosions in real domestic structures 
with internal obstacles, the turbulence factor would be in the range 8 to 14 for the most 
dangerous near stoichiometric mixtures. 
Whilst studies concerning ‘pressure piling’ are analogous to explosions propagating 
from one room to another, there are a number of significant differences between an 
explosion propagating from one vessel to another through an interconnecting duct and 
an accidental explosion in a building (e.g. inadvertent venting, the presence of a door, 
size and geometry of enclosures, furniture etc.). However, Di Benedetto [244] 
suggested that the correlation developed by Molkov, for vent sizing of a single vessel 
[Equations (2-85) to (2-89)] was the most appropriate correlation for predicting peak 
pressures in linked enclosures.  
The insightful work of Stretch [239] and Rasbash [229, 236] is especially important to 
this study as it recognised the role that both interconnected rooms and furniture play in 
the development of an accidental gas explosion and the necessity for research into 
their effects. The authors identified in 1969, that as most dwellings had rooms with 
small interconnecting areas, partition walls, and windows of different vent area and 
failure pressure, the maximum pressure developed in an explosion would be 
dependent upon the individual characteristics of the dwelling. They also realised, that 
the effect of self-closing doors (e.g. fire doors) which are now commonly used in 
buildings of three storeys or more, could enhance an explosion in which there is high 
turbulence (e.g. a room cluttered with furniture). 
Rasbash and Stretch concluded that large-scale experimental work was required to 
determine pressure-time curves for single sets of rooms containing furniture. They 
noted that whilst full-scale experiments are difficult to carry out with a high degree of 
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reliability, and are expensive, when the investment and risks involved are considered, 
further experimental work is quite clearly demanded. To date, some forty-five years 
after this recommendation, no work of this nature has been published. 
Following a gas explosion, a detailed examination of the thermal damage may provide 
critical evidence to determine the rooms through which the flame propagated, whether 
the flammable gas involved was more or less dense than air, and the depth of any 
layer. This information may then be used to determine the most credible source of gas 
that caused the explosion. However, most of the literature related to thermal damage 
has been conducted in terms of fire investigation and is concerned with the ignition, 
pyrolysis, burning and charring behaviour of wood and textiles. Consequently, there is 
little directly relevant material regarding the scorching of fabrics and materials following 
an explosion. The most relevant studies are those of Harris [16] and Wąs-Gubala and 
Krauß [356, 357, 360]. The former reference source is the most widely used guide to 
explosion investigators and states that the degree of scorching, along with the degree 
of pressure damage, may be used to determine the gas concentration prior to ignition, 
such that:  
i. minimal structural damage and little evidence of thermal damage is indicative of 
an ignition of a lean fuel/air mixture. 
ii. significant structural damage and extensive scorching, blistering etc. is 
indicative of an ignition of a near stoichiometric fuel/air mixture. 
iii. minimal structural damage and significant evidence of burning is indicative of an 
ignition of a rich fuel/air mixture. 
The studies of Wąs-Gubala and Krauß considered whether thermal damage to clothing 
could be used to determine if arson had been committed. Whilst this work provides 
very useful guidance on how textiles behave when exposed to flame, its use is of 
limited value to explosion investigators, as it was restricted to the ignition of 
stoichiometric petrol/air mixtures in a small container.  
The author of this study and other members of the DNV GL incident investigation team, 
have investigated explosions where the building has suffered significant structural 
damage but there has been very little, and in some cases, no evidence of thermal 
damage. No information was found during the literature review to relate the degree of 
thermal damage to the gas concentration prior to ignition or the depth of any layer of 
flammable mixture. 
In view of the above information, this research will address some of the gaps in the 
current understanding of accidental explosions in buildings, through the following 
objectives: 
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1 To develop a better understanding of the effects of multiple compartments with 
interconnecting doorways; by 
a. determining the mechanism of pressure generation in gas explosions in 
large and multiple compartment enclosures, representative of a dwelling, 
through the analysis of an unpublished, comprehensive, large-scale 
experimental programme conducted by MRS and FRS in the early 1980’s. 
b. comparing existing correlations to the results of the experimental 
programme. 
2 To develop a better understanding of the effects of obstacles typically found in 
dwellings; by 
a. determining the pressure and flame speeds generated by idealised 
obstacle arrays in a large-scale enclosure (representative of the degree of 
congestion typically found in a dwelling), through the analysis of a series of 
unpublished, large-scale vented explosion experiments, conducted by MRS 
in the early 1990’s. 
b. determining the pressure and flame speeds generated by furniture through 
a series of large-scale vented explosion experiments. 
3 To develop a better understanding of the behaviour of common building 
materials (e.g. wood) and furnishings when involved in a gas explosion; by 
a. determining whether the severity of thermal damage to building materials 
and décor associated with the passage of a transient flame front can be 
used to estimate the gas concentration prior to ignition through the analysis 
of a series of unpublished, large-scale vented explosion experiments, 
conducted by MRS and FRS in the early 1980’s and by Advantica in the 
late 1990’s; and through a series of large-scale vented explosion 
experiments and small-scale confined explosion experiments. 
b. determining whether some modern ‘quick-drying’ paints affect the 
characteristic thermal damage of building materials exposed to the passage 
of a transient flame front through a series of large-scale and small-scale 
vented explosion experiments. 
c. determining whether the thermal damage associated with the passage of a 
transient flame front can be used to estimate the depth of a layer of 
flammable gas/air mixture prior to ignition through the analysis of a series 
of unpublished, large-scale vented explosion experiments, conducted by 
MRS and FRS in the early 1980’s and by Advantica in the late 1990’s. 
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These objectives will result in a better understanding of the development of an 
accidental explosion in a dwelling and will provide investigators with the tools required 
to interpret the forensic evidence found at the scene of an explosion such that the 
composition and distribution of a fuel/air mixture, prior to its ignition, may be estimated 
and used to correctly determine the origin and cause of the explosion.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP AND MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES 
3.1. Introduction 
Carrying out gas explosion tests, even in a controlled manner, clearly presents some 
risks that have to be carefully thought through and managed. Safety of people, property 
and the environment is of the utmost priority. With that in mind, but also considering the 
objectives of the study, a number of requirements were considered as essential in the 
selection of test facility, the development of the test programmes and the design and 
instrumentation of the experimental rigs. These requirements were: 
i. the absolute requirement to carry out the gas explosion tests in a safe manner, 
with due regard to the environment, 
ii. the requirement to carry out full-scale tests, wherever possible, to meet the 
objectives of the individual components of the study, whilst considering credible 
gas explosion parameters, 
iii. the requirement to provide appropriate instrumentation so that the important 
parameters could be measured, 
iv. the requirement to film and photograph the tests, wherever possible, so that 
explosion development could be monitored, 
v. the requirement to meet the budgetary and time constraints of the study. 
3.2. Experimental Facilities 
During this study, five distinct experimental programmes have been undertaken and/or 
analysed to determine the effects of parametric variations on accidental gas explosions 
in dwellings and to characterise the evidential thermal damage that is a consequence 
of the passage of a transient flame front. Consequently, a number of different test set-
ups have been used throughout this study. To avoid confusion over which experimental 
rig has been used during the various programmes, experimental layouts have been 
labelled and this reference will be used throughout the thesis. Table 3-1 details the test 
facility, its location and the experimental rig that was used.  
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Table 3-1 Location of test facilities and experimental rig 
Experimental 
Programme Location and Test Facility 
Experimental 
Rig 
1 FRS Explosion Research facility at Cardington A 
2 DNV GL Major Hazard Research and Testing facility at Spadeadam B 
3 DNV GL Major Hazard Research and Testing facility at Spadeadam C 
4 DNV GL Major Hazard Research and Testing facility at Spadeadam C 
5 University of Leeds Explosion Hazards – High Pressure Test Facility D 
 
In order to ensure the essential requirements listed in Section 3.1 were adhered to, a 
number of Hazard Identification Studies (HAZID) and Operational and Experimental 
Requirements Studies were carried out. As a consequence of these studies, it was 
determined that the test facilities should be located in an area where security could be 
maintained, adequate exclusion zones could be enforced and fuel supplies could be 
stored safely. It was also determined that the experimental rig should consist of: 
• an explosion chamber,  
• high voltage and low voltage power supplies, 
• fuel gas supplies (natural gas and propane), 
• a nitrogen or air supply for the control of pneumatic valves (where used), 
• a gas filling, mixing and purging system, 
• a gas sampling and analysis system, 
• an ignition system (including safety interlocks),  
• instrumentation, 
- vent and interconnecting door failure, 
- overpressure, 
- flame speed, 
• photography and video equipment, 
• a control and data acquisition system, and 
• firefighting equipment. 
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3.2.1. FRS Explosion Research Facility 
The FRS explosion research facility was located at the Building Research 
Establishment (BRE) site at Cardington in Bedfordshire. The FRS explosion chamber 
was situated within one of two former airship hangars (see Figure 3-1). In the early 
1970s FRS needed a large facility in which to carry out gas explosion research 
following concerns about gas explosions in buildings as a result of the collapse of 
Ronan Point in 1968. As the 1930s airship sheds at RAF Cardington had been largely 
unused for some years, FRS was granted permission to use one of the hangers for 
explosion and high rack storage fire research. 
The former airship hangars were approximately 247 m in length x 80 m in width x 55 m 
maximum height and were constructed from steel sections which were clad with 
corrugated steel sheeting. The explosion chamber was sited at the North-northeast end 
of airship hangar No. 2 (right sided hangar Figure 3-1), located in an area 40 m x 25 m 
which could be cordoned-off from the rest of the airship hangar for safety purposes 
during explosion tests. 
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3.2.2. DNV GL Major Hazard Research and Testing Site at Spadeadam 
The DNV GL explosion research facility was located on an active Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) site at Spadeadam in Cumbria. The Spadeadam research and test site is one of 
the world’s leading full-scale major hazard test facilities, occupying some 50 hectares 
of land (Figure 3-2) in a remote part of northern England. The sheer size and 
remoteness of the facility means that appropriate exclusion zones may be enforced, 
thus allowing full-scale tests such as vapour cloud explosions, rapid crack propagation, 
BLEVE’s, confined vented explosions etc. to be undertaken.  
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3.2.3. University of Leeds Explosion Hazards – High Pressure Test 
Facility 
The University of Leeds explosion research facility was located in room B11 
(basement) of the Houldsworth Building (Figure 3-3). The test facility consisted of a 
number of explosion vessels that could be used for confined explosion tests, either 
totally confined or vented. 
 
Figure 3-3 Explosion Hazards – High Pressure Test Facility 
This small-scale test facility has been operational since 1997 and consists of two 
adjoining rooms in a secure part of the building. A concrete partition safety wall 
separates the main test room and the control room (Figure 3-4).  
Access into the main test room was controlled by two safety doors which were 
interlocked to the control system thereby preventing ignition from being initiated whilst 
either of the doors are open. These interlocked doors are an essential component in 
the safe operation of the facility by isolating power to the explosion chambers ignition 
system and thereby minimising the risk of a person being in the main test room when 
an explosion test was undertaken.  
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Figure 3-4 Explosion Hazards – High Pressure Test Facility 
(taken from Willacy [388]) 
3.3. Explosion Chambers 
3.3.1. The FRS Explosion Chamber (Rig A) 
The explosion chamber was sited inside one of the airship hangars so that it was 
protected during adverse weather conditions (Figure 3-5). During explosion 
experiments the hangar doors were opened.  
The explosion chamber was constructed on a solid concrete plinth that was 
approximately 7.6 m in width, 5 m in length and 0.46 m thick. The concrete plinth was 
sunk into the concrete floor of the hangar to a depth of 0.36 m, leaving a raised 
platform approximately 0.1 m above the hangar floor.  
The gross dimensions of the explosion chamber were 7.2 m in width x 4.8 m in length x 
2.4 m in height. It was designed and constructed to ensure maximum flexibility, 
consisting of a series of steel columns with steel plates fitted in-between, to form 
removable walls and doorways. Consequently, the volume of the chamber could be 
varied between 10 m3 and 80 m3. 
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Figure 3-5 Location of the FRS explosion chamber 
In the sides and rear of the explosion chamber, provision was made for the introduction 
of gas mixtures, for the outflow of displaced air during filling, and for purging the 
chamber of combustion products after each explosion test. This was achieved by the 
installation of the following: 
• for filling - a 3” British Standard Pipe (BSP) connection, located at the centre of 
the rear wall, at a point 4” from the roof; 
• for outflow of air - 3 x 3” BSP connections installed at high level on one side of 
the chamber (0.75 m, 1.8 m and 3.5 m from the rear wall, at a height of 1.1 m 
from the top of the chamber) and 2 x 3” BSP connections installed at low level 
on the opposite side of the chamber (0.8 m and 3.5 m from the front of the 
chamber, at a height of 0.5 m from the floor); 
• for purging – a 3” BSP connection which was connected to the delivery pipe of 
a centrifugal fan on the side of the explosion chamber nearest the control 
room. 
The inlet and outlet connections on the explosion chamber were actuated by 
compressed air, controlled by 3” electro-magnetic solenoid valves situated in an 
‘intermediate control station’ located at a safe distance from the explosion chamber. 
The solenoid valves were energised by 2-way electrical switches incorporated in the 
control room. 
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In the roof of the chamber, provision was made for fitting gas sampling probes. The 
roof, which had safety rails positioned around its perimeter, was accessible via two 
fixed ladders located either side of the explosion chamber (see Figure 3-6).  
Although the explosion chamber was sited inside the hangar, a weatherproof cover 
was fitted to protect the gas sampling equipment when the hangar doors were open. A 
control room was sited at a distance of 12.5 m from the side of the explosion chamber. 
The explosion chamber may be considered as being comprised of three sections: 
i. the columns and roof, 
ii. the moveable wall-plates and doorways, and,  
iii. the front face of the chamber and vent openings. 
 
 
Figure 3-6 The FRS explosion chamber (Rig A) 
The explosion tests undertaken in this facility were for the purpose of determining the 
effects of interconnected rooms on accidental explosions in dwellings and the 
characteristics of evidential thermal damage. The geometry of the explosion chamber 
was configured such that there were two enclosures of equal dimensions, with a 
corridor running along the back and sides (see Figure 3-7). Each enclosure measured 
2.4 m in width x 3.6 m in length x 2.4 m in height, giving a volume of 20.7 m3.  
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Periodically, the explosion chamber was tested for leaks using smoke from a smoke 
generator which created a positive pressure in the enclosure of approximately 1 mbar. 
Any leaks that were found were sealed with fire retardant silicone sealant.  
 
Figure 3-7 Explosion chamber configuration (Rig A) 
The Columns and Roof 
Twenty-nine, 200 mm steel columns were set into the concrete plinth to provide the 
vertical structure for the explosion chamber. Five roof beams were then bolted to their 
corresponding upright steel columns to complete the basic chamber design. The steel 
columns were fitted with 75 mm flanges, which were drilled with clearance holes (to 
take M12 threaded bolts) at 150 mm centres so that they would align with holes on the 
removable steel plate walls. 









Figure 3-8 Structural design of the FRS explosion chamber (Rig A) 
The Moveable Wall-plates and Doorways 
The walls and ceiling of the enclosure were made from reinforced 6 mm steel plates. 
These plates had holes drilled into them such that they aligned with the columns and 
beams and were secured using M12 bolts, nuts and washers. The roof and wall plate 
joints were strengthened using either 6 mm plate or angle drilled to match the bolt 
holes. The steel plates were 1.2 m in width but were of various height in order to allow 
additional sections to be added, if required (e.g. observation panels etc.).  
Access to the enclosures was via a doorway fitted into the rear enclosure wall (Figure 
3-7). The door frames were constructed from steel plate bolted to the columns. The two 
rear enclosure doors were constructed of two 18 mm thick sheets of plywood, bolted 
together using six lengths of M14 studding. The doors were hung so that the explosion 
load was against the doorframe. In order to provide a gas-tight seal to the enclosure, 
an adhesive foam gasket was laced around the door and frame, and the doors were 
held shut by bolting three sections of steel channel over the door studding and 
tightening against the doorframe. 
The two enclosures were connected by a standard size doorway, 1.98 m in height x 
0.76 m in width, with a steel door jamb bolted to the steel column. The door frame was 
adjustable such that the door could be hinged to open into either the left or right 
chambers, and fitted with several types of latch. This was important as the direction in 
which the door was oriented and the force required to initially open the door were 
believed to play some part in the development of the explosion.  
In tests where the door was scheduled to be open, no door was fitted and the doorway 
was left ‘clear’. In most experiments where the door was closed (in most cases 
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completely, but in a small number, partially), a lightweight semi-hollow door with an 
‘egg-box’ core for stability was fitted. In some of the latter experiments, a heavier, fire 
door was used. The door was normally hinged such that it would open into the right 
room. However, in a small number of tests, the door was hinged so that it would open 
into the left room. In addition, in a small number of tests, different latch types were 
used to secure the door closed. 
The Front Face of the Chamber and Vent Openings 
The front face of the chamber was constructed in a manner similar to the walls and 
roof. However, each enclosure had a vent in the upper half of its front face so that 
explosion reliefs (designed to simulate a failing window), could be fitted to either 
enclosure (Figure 3-9). The vent sizes used during the experimental tests were 2.48 
m2, 1.49 m2 and 0.74 m2, which corresponded to vent coefficient values, KA, defined as 
the ratio of the area of the face containing the vent to the area of the vent itself, of 
approximately 2.4, 4 and 8 respectively. The vent opening in each enclosure was 
adjustable such that three different sizes of vent could be selected. The KA = 4 reliefs 
could also be fitted at either the left or right side of the upper front face of each 
enclosure (see Figure 3-9). 
 
Figure 3-9 The front face of the chamber (Rig A) 
The material covering the vent openings (explosion relief, which in a dwelling would 
most likely be glazing) was clamped over the vents behind a steel strip, using the 
mechanism shown in Figure 3-10. In all but two of the experimental tests, 12.5 mm 
fibreboard was used as the relief material. In the remaining two experiments single 
panel glass was used. 
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Figure 3-10 Vent relief clamping mechanism (Rig A) 
3.3.2. The DNV GL Explosion Chamber (Rig B) 
Explosion chamber B, located at the DNV GL Spadeadam Test Site, was a 182 m3 
enclosure constructed of steel with a 2:1:1 aspect ratio (Figure 3-11). The explosion 
chamber, of dimensions 9.0 m in length x 4.5 m in width x 4.5 m in height, was 
constructed of 10 mm thick steel plates braced on the outside by regularly spaced Ι-
beams. The explosion chamber, weighing over 60 tonnes, was positioned on a 
concrete pad and anchored to two buried steel vessels filled with concrete in order to 
prevent movement during explosion tests. 
 
Figure 3-11 Spadeadam explosion chamber (Rig B) 
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The rear face of the chamber was constructed of two hinged pressure relief panels, 
with a failure pressure of 4 bar, to protect the explosion chamber from damage during 
the experiments. On one side wall of the chamber, 2 x 0.5 m steel pneumatic flap 
valves were fitted for filling and mixing. These will be described in Section 3.5. 
The Front Face of the Explosion Chamber and Vent Openings 
The size of the opening on the front face of the explosion chamber could be varied by 
attaching one of a series of 10 mm thick steel fascia plates to the explosion chamber 
via a number of threaded M24 steel bolts. These fascia plates incorporated a variety of 
sizes of vent opening. The vent openings were either 20.25 m2, 10.13 m2, 5.06 m2 or 
2.25 m2. Correspondingly, the vent coefficients (KA), defined as the area of the front 
face of the chamber divided by the area of the vent opening, were approximately 1, 2, 4 
or 9. The opening was covered by a polythene sheet (low failure pressure) to prevent 
the gas/air mixture escaping during filling.  
Internal Congestion 
Obstacle supports were attached to the side walls of the explosion chamber such that 
eight pipe arrays, each capable of supporting up to ten horizontal pipes, of 4.5 m in 
length and 0.18 m in diameter, could be positioned perpendicular to the direction of 
flame propagation (Figure 3-12).  
 
Figure 3-12 Internal obstacles (Rig B) 
The arrays were positioned at 1 m intervals along the length of the explosion chamber, 
with the 1st array positioned 1 m from the rear wall. This meant that a maximum of 80 x 
180 mm diameter pipes could be positioned within the chamber providing a maximum 
area blockage (AB) of approximately 40% and a maximum volume blockage (VB) of 
approximately 5%. The area blockage was calculated as the percentage of the cross-
sectional area of the explosion chamber occupied by the pipes in a single array. The 
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volume blockage was calculated as the percentage of the total volume of the chamber 
occupied by the pipes in all arrays. The number of obstacles and the separation 
distance between obstacles (pitch) was varied during the experiments so the effects of 
volume blockage and pitch on flame speed and overpressure could be investigated 
(Figure 3-13). 
 
Figure 3-13 Internal congestion configurations (Rig B)  
(N.B.: For ease of reference, a seperate copy of this diagram may be found inserted in 
the pocket on the rear cover of the Thesis).  
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3.3.3. The DNV GL Explosion Chamber (Rig C) 
Explosion chamber C, located near test pad C at the DNV GL Spadeadam Test Site, 
was a 70 m3 enclosure constructed of steel with an approximate L/D ratio of 3:1 (Figure 
3-2). The explosion chamber, of dimensions 8.3 m in length x 3 m in width and 2.8 m in 
height was constructed of 10 mm thick steel plates braced on the outside by regularly 
spaced I beams (Figure 3-14). It was positioned and anchored onto a 0.5 m thick 
reinforced concrete pad in order to prevent movement during explosion tests. 
 
Figure 3-14 Spadeadam explosion chamber (Rig C) 
The roof and one of the side walls of the chamber had an opening, 0.75 m x 0.75 m, 
which could be used to attach high speed cameras to allow filming of flame 
propagation inside the chamber during experiments. On one side wall of the chamber, 
2 x 0.5 m steel pneumatic flap valves were fitted for filling and mixing. These will be 
described in Section 3.5. 
The explosion tests undertaken in this chamber during experimental programme 4 
were used to determine the effects of non-uniform obstacles on flame propagation and 
pressure development in accidental gas explosions in dwellings, and also to further 
characterise evidential thermal damage for new paint materials.  
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Interconnected Compartments 
The explosion tests undertaken in this chamber during experimental programme 3 
were carried out for the purpose of characterising evidential thermal damage caused to 
décor and furnishings by a transient flame front. To meet this objective, it was 
necessary to consider both the degree of thermal damage sustained by materials 
present in an enclosure in which there was a flammable gas/air mixture and those 
present in a connected enclosure in which the atmosphere was not flammable. In order 
to consider both scenarios, and also the scenario where a ‘jetting’ flame exits the 
flammable atmosphere and passes into the non-flammable zone in the neighbouring 
enclosure, the chamber was divided into two interconnected enclosures by a steel 
partition wall. The partition wall had a door shaped opening 2 m in height and 0.85 m in 
width and was located such that one enclosure was 4.3 m in length and the other was 
4 m. A schematic of the experimental chamber is presented in Figure 3-15. In 
experimental programme 4, the explosion chamber was configured as a single room 
enclosure and consequently the steel partition wall was removed. 
 
Figure 3-15 Rig C configured as multiple compartment enclosure 
The Front Face of the Chamber and Vent Openings 
The size of the opening on the front face of the explosion chamber could be varied by 
attaching one of a series of 10 mm thick steel fascia plates to the explosion chamber 
via a number of threaded M24 steel bolts (Figure 3-16). These fascia plates 
incorporated a variety of sizes of vent opening. The opening was covered by either a 
polythene sheet (low failure pressure) or 12.5 mm fibreboard to prevent the gas/air 
mixture escaping during filling.  
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In experimental programme 3, a vent opening of 2.1 m in height x 2.1 m in width was 
used, which corresponded to an approximate KA value of 1.9. This vent opening was 
reduced to 1.55 m in width by a thermal marker-board at position X (increasing the KA 
value to approximately 2.5) and covered with polythene sheeting. In experimental 
programme 4, a vent opening of 2.5 m in width x 1.25 m in height was used, which 
corresponded to a KA value of approximately 2.7. The vent opening was covered with 







Figure 3-16 Schematic of the front face of explosion chamber (Rig C) 
Internal Congestion 
The explosion tests undertaken in this chamber during experimental programme 4 
were carried out for the purpose of determining the effects of furniture on vented 
explosions and the characterisation of thermal damage caused to décor and 
furnishings by a transient flame front. In the average UK home, a doorway may be 
considered as an opening with a volume blockage of approximately 82% and the 
average room congestion (by volume) is approximately 17% (estimated using the 
average UK house size, and data from UK removal companies [389-391]). Inadvertent 
individual vent openings, in the form of windows, will provide a minimum area vent 
coefficient (KA), of 4 where openings are provided on one wall of the room or 8 if 
windows are provided on more than one wall [392]. To meet the first objective of these 
tests, it was necessary to source a selection of furniture, including sofas, televisions, 
storage units etc. The furniture was placed in a layout representative of a typical 
furnished room (see Figure 3-17) and the volume blockage was calculated for 
comparison with more idealised experiments carried out in experimental programme 2. 
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Figure 3-17 Typical furniture layout (Rig C) 
3.3.4. The University of Leeds Explosion Chamber (Rig D) 
Explosion chamber D, located at the University of Leeds Explosion Hazards – High 
Pressure Test Facility, was a 1.138 m3 cylindrical steel vessel with a L/D ratio of 1:1. 
(Figure 3-18 and Figure 3-19). As the main purpose for the vessel was the explosion 
characterisation of dust/air and gas/air mixtures, it was designed to meet the 
specifications of ISO 6184 [393, 394] and was consequently commonly referred to as 
the ISO 1m3 (nominal volume) explosion vessel.  
The steel vessel was constructed in accordance with BS 5500: 1997 [395]. It consisted 
of a 1.2 m diameter cylinder with semi-ellipsoidal dished ends. The front dished end 
had a 0.5 m diameter steel hinged front door that was secured during testing by twenty-
four steel bolts tightened using a 678 newton metre (500 pound foot) torque wrench. 
The design pressure of the vessel was 25 barg and the vessel was periodically 
hydraulically tested (using water) to a pressure of 35 barg. 
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Figure 3-18 1m3 explosion vessel – front elevation (Rig D) 
 
Figure 3-19 1m3 explosion vessel – side elevation (Rig D) 
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3.4. Services 
3.4.1. General 
The experimental facilities were provided with the following services: 
• 410 V three-phase power; 
• 230 V ac mains power; 
• 110 V ac power (external); 
• 24 V dc power; 
• Air or nitrogen for pneumatic control systems. 
3.4.2. Experimental Rig A 
Natural Gas 
All experiments were undertaken using natural gas/air mixtures of varying 
concentration. Natural gas (≥ 92% methane by volume) was supplied from Air Products 
type Y steel cylinders containing 6 m3 of compressed natural gas at a pressure of 200 
bar. The cylinders were fitted with 5/8” cylinder valves manufactured in accordance 
with BS 341 No. 3. 
Air 
Air was used, throughout the experimental work, as the fluid to operate the pneumatic 
control systems. High pressure air was supplied by 82 kg (gross weight) BOC type N 
cylinders (1.46 m high x 0.23 m diameter) which were positioned in a safe location 
approximately 30 m from the explosion chambers. The maximum storage pressure in 
the cylinders was 230 barg (at 15°C) giving a storage volume of 8.85 m3. A pressure 
regulator was required in order to reduce the pressure to that required to operate the 
various pneumatically operated valves and equipment (typically 5.0 barg). BOC 9500 
multi-stage high pressure air regulators were chosen to regulate the air pressure as 
they are designed to give constant, accurate delivery over a range of 0 – 10 bar, 
without the need for continuous readjustment as the temperature drops due to the 
Joule-Thomson effect and the cylinder pressure reduces with consumption. The high-
pressure regulator has a large surface area first-stage diaphragm that enables the 
accurate control of pressure and a heavily finned first-stage bonnet which is designed 
to provide adequate dissipation of any cooling as a result of the pressure reduction of 
gas, particularly under high-flow conditions. The regulators, which were equipped with 
two pressure gauges (one reading the cylinder pressure, the other providing the outlet 
pressure), were connected directly to the cylinders and adjusted such that the outlet 
pressure was reduced to that required by the control system (typically 5 barg). 
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Air was distributed to the various pneumatic systems through 8.0 mm (internal 
diameter) nylon tube which was manufactured to BS 5409, with a maximum operating 
pressure of 40 bar.  
3.4.3. Experimental Rigs B and C 
Natural Gas 
Natural gas was supplied to the test facilities from the on-site high pressure natural gas 
storage facility. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) was brought to site by road tanker under 
conditions of atmospheric pressure and a temperature of approximately -164°C. At this 
temperature, LNG occupies only 1/164th of its gaseous volume and consequently large 
amounts of energy can be stored in relatively small cryogenic tanks. The LNG from the 
road tanker was either transferred via a pump into cryogenic storage tanks, where it 
was stored at atmospheric pressure or into the sites high pressure pipe arrays where it 
was stored at approximately 80 barg (maximum pressure 200 barg). This latter method 
of storage, where gas was stored in the pipeline, is known as linepack. Gas was then 
distributed around the site through a gas distribution system (network of underground 
pipes) with pressure regulating stations strategically located to reduce the pressure. A 
local pressure regulating station reduced the natural gas pressure from distribution 
system pressure to 3 barg prior to it being introduced into the explosion chambers 
mixing system. Further pressure reduction was also used for certain experiments to 
reduce the gas pressure to ≤ 75 mbarg (typically for layered explosions). 
Methane 
Methane (G20 Reference Gas - 99.5% methane) was supplied to the explosion 
chambers via groups of eleven Air Products type n steel cylinders (1.46 m high x 0.23 
m diameter), each containing 12 m3 of compressed natural gas at a pressure of 200 
bar (at 15°C), manifolded together and located in secure ‘cages’ (Figure 3-20). The 
cylinders, which provided 87 kg of gas per cage when full, were each fitted with 5/8” 
cylinder valves manufactured in accordance with BS 341 No. 3.  
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Figure 3-20 87 kg methane (G20) cylinders 
Propane 
Propane was supplied by 47 kg commercial propane cylinders (> 90% propane) which 
were positioned in a safe location approximately 30 m from the rear of the explosion 
chamber. A single stage Comap Novacomet BP1813 pressure regulator was 
connected directly to the cylinder and reduced the pressure from vapour pressure 
(dependent upon composition and liquid temperature) to 150 mbarg. Gas was 
distributed to the explosion chamber through an 18.0 mm (outer diameter) propane 
hose, (manufactured to BS 3212 type 2) which was connected to the outlet of the 
regulator, via a rotameter and pressure gauge.  
Nitrogen 
Nitrogen was used, throughout the experimental work, as the fluid to operate the 
pneumatic control systems. Nitrogen was supplied by 85 kg (gross weight) BOC type 
W cylinders (1.46 m high x 0.23 m diameter) which were positioned in a safe location 
approximately 30 m from the explosion chambers (Figure 3-21). The maximum storage 
pressure in the cylinders was 230 barg (at 15°C) giving a storage volume of 9.78 m3. 
BOC multi-stage high pressure nitrogen regulators were chosen to regulate the 
nitrogen pressure as they are designed to give constant, accurate delivery over the 
range 0 – 41 bar. The design of the regulator was very similar to the BOC 9500 
regulator described in Section 3.4.2. The regulators were adjusted such that the outlet 
pressure was reduced to that required by the control system (typically 5 barg).  
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Figure 3-21 Nitrogen supply to pneumatic systems 
Nitrogen was distributed to the various pneumatic systems through 8.0 mm (internal 
diameter) black nylon tube supplied by Pirtek fluid transfer systems (manufactured to 
BS 5409, with a maximum operating pressure of 40 bar). The nylon tube was directly 
connected to the outlet of the regulator (Figure 3-21).  
3.4.4. Experimental Rig D 
Methane 
Methane (G20 Reference Gas - 99.5% methane) was supplied to the explosion vessel 
via a BOC type L steel cylinder (1.64 m high x 0.23 m diameter), containing 13.5 m3 of 
compressed natural gas at a pressure of 200 bar (at 15°C). The cylinder, which 
provided 9 kg of gas when full, was located in the main test room. It was fitted with a 
5/8” cylinder valve manufactured in accordance with BS 341 No. 3. The pressure was 
regulated by a Freshford multi-stage regulator manufactured in accordance with BS EN 
ISO 2503 (Figure 3-22). Gas was distributed to the explosion vessel via a mixing 
control system. The mixing control system allowed the correct amount of gas to be 
added to the explosion vessel through the use of partial pressure measurement. 
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Figure 3-22 Multi-stage regulator fitted to methane cylinder (Rig D) 
Propane 
Propane was supplied by a 4.8 kg propane research grade (≥ 99.5% propane) type BA 
steel cylinder (0.43 m high x 0.27 m diameter) which was located within the main test 
room. A single stage Comap Novacomet BP1813 pressure regulator was connected 
directly to the cylinder and reduced the pressure from vapour pressure (dependent 
upon composition and liquid temperature) to 150 mbarg. Gas was distributed to the 
explosion vessel through an 18.0 mm (outer diameter) propane hose, (manufactured to 
BS 3212 type 2) via a mixing control system.  
Ethylene 
Ethylene (≥ 99.99% ethylene) was supplied to the explosion vessel via a BOC type BC 
steel cylinder (0.43 m high x 0.10 m diameter), containing 0.05 m3 of compressed 
ethylene gas at a pressure of 21 bar (at 15°C). The cylinder was located within the 
main test room and was fitted with a 5/8” cylinder valve manufactured in accordance 
with BS 341 No. 3. A two stage HTP1700T regulator was connected directly to the 
cylinder outlet and reduced the pressure to 150 mbarg. Gas was distributed to the 
explosion vessel via a mixing control system. The mixing control system allowed the 
correct amount of gas to be added to the explosion vessel through the use of partial 
pressure measurement. 
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Air 
Compressed air was used, in addition to ambient air, as the oxidant for the gas/air 
explosions. A central compressor supplied high pressure air to the University 
laboratories). A Norgren combined pressure regulator and filter unit, located in the main 
test room, reduced the pressure to 300 mbar prior to it entering the mixing control 
system. Air was distributed to the explosion vessel through 8.0 mm (internal diameter) 
nylon tube which was manufactured to BS 5409, with a maximum operating pressure of 
40 bar.  
3.5. Gas Filling, Mixing and Purging 
3.5.1. Experimental Rig A 
The gas supply pressure from the cylinder was reduced via two diaphragm operated 
pressure regulators to a pressure of 0.7 barg. During periods of high flow in cold 
weather, the pressure regulating valves were heated in a water bath at 50°C in order to 
ensure the gas was kept at a reasonable temperature due to the Joule-Thomson effect. 
Downstream equipment (rotameter, gas meter etc.) in the gas supply line was 
protected by two pressure relief valves that vented the gas line to atmosphere in the 
event that a pressure regulator failed and high pressure gas passed through the 
regulator(s).  
The natural gas and air were premixed prior to release into the explosion chamber; 
filling the chamber by the direct ‘purge’ process. Gas was diverted into a 3” diameter 
mixing tube, via a 3-way electro-pneumatic valve, which was also used to isolate the 
gas supply when no further gas was required. Air was delivered by a motor driven 
centrifugal fan into a 3” supply line which was connected to the mixing tube via a check 
valve that prevented the flow of gas into the air supply. The fan was capable of 
delivering air at a flowrate of up to 1.5 m3/min against a head of 45 mbar. The gas and 
air mixed by the action of turbulence in the mixing tube. The airflow from the fan was 
regulated using a needle valve and was isolated using an electro-magnetic valve. The 
gas/air mixing tube was 3” in diameter and consisted of a mixture sampling point, a 
flame arrester and an electro-pneumatic isolation valve. It was connected to two gas 
diffusers (one in each enclosure) by a 3.0” BSP connection located in the centre of the 
rear wall of the explosion chamber and at a point 4” from the roof. The gas diffusers 
were 250 mm wide x 250 mm high x 600 mm sheet metal boxes packed with non-
flammable mineral wool, and where the upper side was constructed of an open grid 
mesh. The diffusers were used to minimise further mixing with air already in the 
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chamber by reducing the efflux velocity of the mixture and encouraging the formation of 
natural gas/air layers extending downward from the ceiling. 
In order to gain the correct gas/air concentration prior to release into the explosion 
chamber, the relative proportions of gas and air were controlled by the operation of 
electro-pneumatic operated flow control valves, with gas and air flows metered using 
rotameters. The natural gas supply also passed through a G6 diaphragm meter (min 
flowrate 0.6 m3/hr, max flowrate 10 m3/hr) to monitor the total gas consumption during 































































Figure 3-23 Schematic diagram of gas mixing and filling system (Rig A) 
The air that was displaced as the gas/air mixture was released into the enclosures was 
allowed to escape to ‘outside’ via electro-pneumatic operated ball valves sited near the 
ground at the front of the explosion chamber. A light indicator system in the control 
room showed when the valves were open or closed. 
To prevent the gas/air mixture composition changing after the desired concentration 
had been reached in the explosion chamber, the action of isolating power to the fan 
closed the electro-pneumatic valve in the air line and diverted the 3-way electro-
pneumatic valve in the gas line such that no further gas entered the mixing tube.  
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3.5.2. Experimental Rigs B and C 
Three filling and mixing techniques were used during the experiments: 
i. Low pressure purge filling (≤ 75 mbarg) – for layered explosions. 
ii. Premixed low pressure purge filling (≤ 75 mbarg) – for explosions in multiple 
compartments. 
iii. Recirculation filling. 
A PC-based system control and data acquisition (SCADA) system was used to control 
the gas mixing system by opening and closing pneumatically operated gas and air 
valves, and by turning on and off the mixing fan. 
Purge Filling 
Purge-filling is a process by which air in the explosion chamber is displaced by 
introducing a flammable gas or premixed flammable gas/air mixture of known 
concentration. For the interconnected enclosure tests, a polyethylene sheet was 
secured across the partition opening so that only the rear enclosure was filled with 
gas/air mixture.  
The natural gas supply pressure from the distribution pipeline was reduced via a BD-
RMG 241 pressure regulator to low pressure (≤ 75 mbar). The pressure regulator 
assembly included an overpressure shut off device (OPSO) which isolated the gas 
supply in the event that there was a fault with the regulator and high pressure gas was 
measured downstream of the device. In order to ‘fine tune’ the gas concentration within 
the explosion chamber, the gas supply passed through an electro-magnetic flow control 
valve with a rotameter before passing through a 3-way electro-pneumatic valve which 
allowed the gas supply to be isolated to the explosion chamber and the gas line to be 
vented to atmosphere before a test. A schematic drawing of the purge filling system is 


























Figure 3-24 Schematic diagram of purge filling system (Rig C) 
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The supply pipe then passed into the rear enclosure of the explosion chamber where it 
was connected to a stand which had 4 orifices, at heights of 1 or 2 m above ground 
level (Figure 3-25). 
 
Figure 3-25 Gas release orifices for layered explosion tests 
For layered propane experiments, propane was supplied from the 47 kg cylinder into 
the centre of the rear enclosure at a point 0.3 m above ground level. The tube through 
which the gas was released was oriented either horizontally or vertically upwards.  
During purge filling, a high level natural gas/air layer was then allowed to build up 
between the points of release (i.e. 1 or 2 m above ground level) and the roof of the rear 
enclosure or a low level propane/air layer was allowed to build up between the point of 
release and the floor. The air that was displaced as the gas/air mixture was released 
into the enclosures was allowed to escape to ‘outside’ via electro-pneumatic operated 
ball valves sited at high or low level (depending upon the density of the fuel gas) at the 
rear of the explosion chamber. A light indicator system in the control room showed 
when the valves were open or closed. To prevent the gas/air mixture concentration 
changing after the desired concentration had been reached in the explosion chamber, 
the electro-pneumatic isolation valve was turned-off using the SCADA system and the 
fuel storage isolation valve was isolated. Prior to ignition, the gas line was vented to 
atmosphere.  
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Premixed Purge Filling 
For homogenous gas explosion tests in a multiple enclosure, where the rear enclosure 
was completely filled with a gas/air mixture of a given concentration, the explosion 
chamber was filled by premixed ‘purge-filling’. A polyethylene sheet was secured 
across the partition opening so that only the rear enclosure was filled with gas/air 
mixture. A polythene tube was used to mix the gas with air and convey the mixture to 
the explosion chamber. It was connected at one end to a 0.6 m diameter steel duct 
connecter located at low level at the front end of the chamber side wall. The duct 
connector also housed the pneumatic ram for the flap valve (see Figure 3-26). Opening 
of the flap valve (controlled by the SCADA system) allowed the gas/air mixture to be 
released into the explosion chamber. The polythene tube was used as a safety 
measure to prevent damage to the mixing system in the unlikely event that the 
flammable mixture was ignited or a jetting flame from the explosion chamber entering 
the duct. 
 
Figure 3-26 Pneumatic flap valve (left) and ram (right) 
The polythene tube was connected at the opposite end to a 0.5 m diameter aluminium 
duct, into which the gas supply (same system as for purge filling) and an air supply, via 
a check valve, from a motor driven fan were connected. The fan was a Fläkt Woods 5.7 
kW, 0.5 m diameter, ATEX compliant (i.e. suitable for use in explosive atmospheres), 
long cased, axial fan (model No. 50JM ATEX 20/2/6/28, see Figure 3-27). 
 
Figure 3-27 ATEX compliant axial fan 
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Gas was released into the mixing tube via a pneumatic valve controlled by the SCADA 
system and air was blown into the tube via the fan. At the rear end of the fan unit, a 
300 mm diameter pneumatic blast gate damper (sometimes referred to as a guillotine 
valve) was installed in order to open or close the mixing duct. Air then passed through 
the fan unit, past a sampling point and then entered a tee-junction. On one side of the 
tee-junction a second pneumatic guillotine valve was installed and the other side was 
connected to the polythene tube. The second guillotine valve was installed so the 
mixing tube could be purged of gas prior to the explosion test. The volume flow rate of 
air was controlled by varying the fan speed using the SCADA system and the gas flow 
rate was controlled by altering the gas valve position. Once the pre-determined gas/air 
concentration had been reached in the rear enclosure, the flap valve was closed, the 
gas supply to the chamber was isolated, the guillotine valve(s) closed and the air fan 
switched off. The mixture was then allowed to become quiescent. A schematic drawing 
of the premixed purge filling system is shown in Figure 3-28. 
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Recirculation Filling 
For a series of homogenous natural gas explosion tests, where the chamber was 
completely filled with a gas/air mixture of a given concentration, the explosion chamber 
was filled using a procedure known as ‘recirculation filling’. Recirculation filling is a 
process by which fuel gas is added to a recirculation duct, which is connected to the 
bottom of one end of a side wall of the explosion chamber and at the top of the 
opposite end (Figure 3-29). A Fläkt Woods 50JM ATEX 20/2/6/28 fan was used to re-
circulate the mixture around the recirculation duct and through the explosion chamber 
until the gas/air mixture reached its desired gas concentration. This method has been 
found by MRS to be particularly successful when used in large explosion chambers.  
 
Figure 3-29 Recirculation duct 
Gas was taken from the fuel supply via a 25 mm pneumatic isolation valve with a 
Norton actuator (Figure 3-30).  
 
Figure 3-30 Pneumatic isolation valve located adjacent to gas supply 
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A 23.4 mm gas hose, manufactured in accordance with BS EN 559 conveyed the gas 
from the supply to the recirculation duct. A further 25 mm pneumatic isolation valve 
with Norton actuator was located just prior to the gas supply entering the recirculation 
duct (Figure 3-31). At either end of the mixing duct were 300 mm diameter pneumatic 
blast gate dampers. The blast gates were fitted to allow air to enter the recirculation 
system and to purge the recirculation duct of flammable fuel/air mixture prior to carrying 
out the explosion test.  
 
Figure 3-31 Pneumatic isolation valve located at recirculation duct 
Prior to filling, the chamber flap valves were opened, Gas was released into the 
recirculation duct via the two pneumatic valves which were controlled by the SCADA 
system and the fan was switched on to circulate the gas through the duct and the 
explosion chamber. Initially, the gas was only mixed with air that was within the 
explosion chamber. However, if the gas concentration within the chamber became 
richer than required, then the pneumatic blast gate on the suction side of the fan was 
opened to allow additional air to enter the recirculation system. The gas flow rate was 
controlled by adjusting the gas supply regulator and by opening and closing the 
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pneumatic gas isolation valve. Once the pre-determined gas/air concentration had 
been reached in the chamber, the flap valves were closed, the gas supply to the 
chamber was isolated and the air fan switched off. The mixture was then allowed to 
become quiescent. The pneumatic blast gates were opened and the fan switched on in 
order to purge the recirculation system of flammable gas/air mixture. A schematic 
drawing of the recirculation system is shown in Figure 3-32. 
 
Figure 3-32 Schematic drawing of recirculation system (Rigs B and C) 
For homogenous propane experiments, the above procedure was followed, with 
propane (of at least 97% purity) being supplied from a 47 kg propane cylinder. 
However, the direction of flow was reversed by rotating the orientation of the mixing fan 
through 180° such that the fuel/air mixture was entering the top of the explosion 
chamber and returning into the duct via the bottom of the chamber. 
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3.5.3. Experimental Rig D 
The desired fuel gas/air concentration was obtained by partial pressure measurement 
using a mixing control system. As the tests were conducted at standard atmospheric 
pressure (i.e. 1013.25 mbar), to induce a flow from the mixing control system into the 
explosion vessel, and to facilitate mixing, the pressure within the vessel was reduced to 
200 mbar (i.e. a partial vacuum was obtained) with a three-phase Edwards E2M175 
two stage oil sealed rotary vane vacuum pump (Figure 3-33). The vacuum pump, which 
had a maximum displacement of 3.0 m3/min, was also used for purging the products of 
combustion from the vessel after the explosion. It was water cooled (from the mains 
water supply), and had a combined oil trap and filter to prevent oil being released to the 
atmosphere, and to keep the oil clean and free from deposits. In order to protect dust 
particulates contaminating the pump, a dust filter was fitted to its inlet connection.  
 
Figure 3-33 Vacuum pump (Rig D) 
The vacuum pump line from the explosion vessel to the inlet connection of the vacuum 
pump, consisted of a Pirtek 1” nominal bore, full vacuum rated, flexible hose, and a 
section of 1” nominal bore steel pipe. The flexible hose was connected to the explosion 
vessel to facilitate movement of the vessel (Figure 3-34). 
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Figure 3-34 Vacuum pump inlet line (Rig D) 
The flow of air and of fuel gas into the explosion vessel was controlled by the mixing 
control system (see Figure 3-35). The control system had a four-way rotary valve which 
allowed three different gas inlet lines to be connected to a fourth, outlet line, which was 
connected to the explosion vessel. The rotary valve allowed only a single gas to pass 
through to the explosion chamber, no mixing was allowed in the valve. During this 
experimental work, only pure gases were used (i.e. methane, propane and ethylene), 
and consequently, only two inlet lines were required; namely the fuel line and 
compressed air, with the fuel source being changed at a quick action connector 
upstream of the mixing control system.  
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Figure 3-35 Mixing control system (Rig D) 
A schematic drawing of the mixing control system is given in Figure 3-36. Fuel gas was 
taken from the appropriate cylinder at a pressure of 5 bar and passed through a series 
of controls before entering the four-way valve. Fuel gas was allowed to flow into the 
vessel through the opening of the appropriate isolation valves and the rate of gas flow 
through the four-way valve was controlled by adjusting the pressure regulator. The 
amount of gas required for the desired fuel/air concentration was determined using 
partial pressure measurement. For example, a natural gas concentration of 10% (by 
volume), which is slightly rich of stoichiometric, requires 10% of the absolute pressure 
within the vessel, prior to ignition. As the tests were conducted at standard atmospheric 
pressure (i.e. 1013.25 mbar), a natural gas pressure of 101.325 mbar, was required. 
As soon as the desired partial pressure had been reached (i.e. 101.325 mbar + partial 
vacuum of 200 mbar = 301.325 mbar), the fuel isolation valve was closed. 
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Figure 3-36 Schematic drawing of mixing control system (Rig D) 
A BOC Edwards model 600 Barocel absolute vacuum pressure transducer and an 
absolute pressure gauge (connected in series) were used to monitor the pressure 
within the explosion vessel during mixture preparation. The DC output of the pressure 
transducer was converted into a digital display using a BOC Edwards Datametrics 
1500 Barocel readout manometer with an accuracy of ± 0.05 mbar. The ambient 
temperature and pressure measurements were also monitored in the mixing control 
system.  
The fuel/air filling and mixing process was then completed by adding air until the 
pressure within the explosion vessel was at standard atmospheric pressure. Initially, as 
the explosion vessel was still under partial vacuum conditions, ambient air was added 
by opening the isolation valve located at the bottom of the explosion vessel. The 
addition of a sonic jet of air into the vessel promoted mixing throughout the volume. 
The filling process was completed by adding compressed air, which was regulated to a 
pressure of 300 mbar and passed through a series of controls before entering the four-
way valve. From this valve, the flow of air into the vessel was controlled until standard 
atmospheric pressure was attained. The mixture was allowed to stand for 
approximately 10 minutes for diffusion mixing before the explosion was initiated. The 
fuel and air supplies were disconnected from the mixing system and the supply line to 
the vessel was disconnected and isolated prior to ignition. The accuracy of the mixing 
control system meant that at standard atmospheric conditions, a 10% fuel/air mixture 
could be prepared to an accuracy of 0.05%. 
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3.6. Ignition 
The main requirement governing the choice of ignition source was that sufficient 
energy was provided to ignite mixtures of concentrations near the flammability limits 
and that the mixture should be ignited by a single spark. In Section 2.2.3 it was shown 
that there is a minimum energy that is required to ignite a gas/air mixture by a spark 
and that this minimum energy significantly increases as the gas/air mixture diverges 
towards its flammable limits. 
Safety was a critical factor in the design of the ignition system. The systems were 
designed such that it was not possible to initiate ignition if a number of safety measures 
had not been completed. These measures included ensuring the safety doors had 
been closed (in the case of rig D), fuel supply lines had been disconnected, mixing 
ducts had been purged of flammable mixture and that isolation valves had been closed. 
In addition to these measures the enforcement of stringent procedures ensured that 
no-one could be present within prescribed exclusion zones. 
3.6.1. Experimental Rig A 
Initially an inductive spark was used to ignite the gas mixtures but following difficulties 
igniting rich mixtures (12% gas in air), ignition was undertaken by a capacitive spark 
produced by discharging a 60 µF capacitor (charged to 250 V) through a 10 kV 
transformer (test 28 onwards). 
Ignition was initiated in the left chamber (viewed from the front) at a height of 1.22 m 
down from the ceiling in either a central position or centre of the rear wall. 
3.6.2. Experimental Rigs B and C 
For tests involving methane or natural gas, the spark was generated by the discharge 
of a 68 µF capacitor, charged to 160 V dc through the primary windings of a high 
tension coil. The spark gap was connected to the secondary windings of the coil 
(Figure 3-37).  
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Figure 3-37 Spark ignition (Rigs B and C) 
For natural gas or methane tests where the gas/air mixture filled the entire volume of 
the compartment, from floor to ceiling, the spark was located at mid-height, 1.4 m 
above the ground in either the centre or the rear of the enclosure. For layered natural 
gas explosions, the spark was located at the centre of the rear enclosure, at a height of 
0.5 m from the roof of the chamber.  
For the propane explosions, the spark was generated by putting a 240 V dc, 50 Hz 
voltage across the primary windings of a Danfoss Trafo type 52L transformer coil. The 
8 kV output from the transformer was applied across a spark plug. In the non-layered 
tests, the spark gap was located at a point 1.5 m above the centre of the rear enclosure 
and in the layered tests the spark was located at ground level. 
A PC using DNV GL bespoke software called ‘TIMER’ controlled the automated timing 
of the ignition sequence. This sequence triggered the transient recorders, video timers, 
ionisation probes and the spark igniter with an accuracy of better than 1 ms. 
3.6.3. Experimental Rig D 
The gas/air mixture was ignited by a 16 J spark generated by a capacitive discharge 
circuit supplying energy to a conventional automotive spark plug with electrodes that 
were extended 0.5 m in length in order to ensure its placement in the centre of the 
vessel. The electrodes were extended by welding stainless steel strips, of the same 
dimension as the electrode, to the required length. To prevent the electrode arcing at 
any point along the extension, the central electrode was passed through ceramic beads 
and secured using electrical insulating tape. The electrode gap at the sparking point 
was set at 2 mm. The ignition point was located in the geometrical centre of the vessel. 
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3.7. Measurement of Gas Concentration 
3.7.1. General 
The concentration of the gas/air mixtures were measured using calibrated Servomex 
1400 infra-red absorption analysers. To ensure accuracy of measurement, the analyser 
was calibrated with a test gas of known composition (e.g. 99.95% methane) prior to 
each test. In order to sample the gas concentration in the mixing tube (where required), 
and at different locations within the explosion chambers, without using multiple 
analysers, a system of separate sampling lines was used, each sampling continuously. 
Gas samples were drawn from the sample points into the analyser by a KNF 
diaphragm vacuum pump. The gas flows through the sample lines were diverted in turn 
through a manifold system which was connected to the analyser via 6.5 mm butyl 
rubber tubing. 
Where natural gas/air mixtures were required, the methane component of the natural 
gas within the enclosure was measured by a methane calibrated Servomex 1400 infra-
red analysers, and thus, knowing the composition of the natural gas, the natural gas 
concentration was calculated.  
3.7.2. Experimental Rig A 
The concentration of the gas/air mixture was measured prior to being released into the 
chamber, thus enabling adjustments to be made to the flow rates at an early stage. The 
gas concentration in each of the enclosures was measured at the centre point and at 
various heights through a specially designed sample probe. The gas sampling probe 
consisted of a hollow stainless steel cylinder, inside which were installed six 8 mm 
(outer diameter) stainless steel gas sampling tubes [396]. The inner tubes were radially 
displaced at 30° between adjacent tubes, with the lower ends bent through a right 
angle such that they terminated flush to the outer cylinder. The uppermost sampling 
tube terminated at a height of 150 mm from the ceiling, with each further probe 
terminating at a vertical interval of 300mm.  
Prior to ignition, the sampling probes were raised and withdrawn from the chamber 
using a combined pneumatic/hydraulic lifting system [396]. This was to prevent the 
probes acting as an obstacle and inducing turbulence. 
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3.7.3. Experimental Rigs B and C 
A PC-based system control and data acquisition (SCADA) system was used to control 
the gas mixing system by opening and closing pneumatically operated gas and air 
valves, and by turning on and off the mixing fan. The SCADA system was also used to 
control the gas sampling stream selection system with the gas concentrations logged. 
The locations of the gas concentration sampling points for the various experimental 
tests are shown in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 Location of gas concentration sampling points 




Location of Sample Points 
Height from 
floor (m) 
Distance from front 
of chamber (m) 
Distance from 
side wall (m) 
B Single enclosure 3 
0.5 4.5 0.5 
4.0 4.5 0.5 
2.25 8.5 2.25 
C Single enclosure 1
a 1.4 7.5 0.5 
C Multi compartment 3 
1.5 5.5 1.5 
1.0 (2.3b) 3.0 0.5 
0.8b 5.5b 1.5b 
0.5b 4.0b 1.5b 
a Following extensive use with 3 sample points. 
b For layered explosions. 
3.8. Measurement of Pressure 
3.8.1. Experimental Rig A 
Explosion pressures within the enclosures were measured using eight acceleration 
compensated piezoelectric pressure transducers (Kistler type 7031), four in each 
enclosure (labelled P1 to P8, see Figure 3-38). The pressure transducers were 
calibrated for use in the range 0 – 2.5 bar. Glass wool and silicone sealant were used 
to protect the transducer diaphragms from flames and heat and transducer leads that 
were also heat sensitive were protected by steel deflectors and rock wool insulation.  









Left Room Right Room
 
Figure 3-38  Location of pressure transducers 
3.8.2. Experimental Rigs B and C 
In order to measure the explosion overpressures generated in the experiments, PCB 
113A26 piezoelectric pressure transducers were located at various positions both 
inside and outside the explosion chambers (see Table 3-3). The transducers were 
located along the centre line of the horizontal axis of the rigs. They were mounted in 
weatherproof boxes and coated with an insulating layer of silicon grease and 
aluminium foil to protect them from the effects of flame contact and heat, thereby 
preventing spurious readings during the later stages of an explosion (Figure 3-39). 
Transducers located within the vessel or external cloud were secured to the floor 
(except transducer number six, which was secured to the centre of the sill of the vent 
opening), whilst those located externally were mounted on transducer stands which 
were positioned to record the side-on overpressure (Figure 3-40).  
The pressure transducers were calibrated prior to the experiments using a PCB model 
903B pulse calibrator (0 to 10 barg range). The pressure signals were recorded on a 
microprocessor controlled Thorn EMI Datatech series 246 transient recorder. The 
transient recorder was controlled by a sequence timer unit during tests. 
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Table 3-3 Location of pressure transducers (Rigs B and C) 
Rig Location Transducer Number 





















External T7 12.3 
 
 
Figure 3-39  Piezoelectric pressure transducer in weatherproof box 
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Figure 3-40  External piezoelectric pressure transducer and stand 
3.8.3. Experimental Rig D 
Explosion pressures were measured using two Keller PAA-11 piezoresistive pressure 
transducers mounted in the wall of the test vessel. One of the pressure transducers 
was calibrated for a range of 0-25 bara and other was calibrated for a range of 0-10 
bara.  
3.9. Opening of the Interconnecting Door 
3.9.1. Experimental Rig A 
A microswitch was mounted on the door jamb to provide an indication of the position of 
the interconnecting door during an explosion test (i.e. whether it opened, and if so, at 
what time). This data was compared with the pressure-time histories on a high 
resolution storage oscilloscope. Some of the later tests also used an internal high 
speed video camera to follow the movement of the door during the explosion. 
3.10. Failure of the Vent 
The time at which the vent failed (for tests using experimental rigs A, B and C) was 
determined by examining the video footage taken from the high speed cameras. 
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3.10.1. Experimental Rig C 
In addition to using video cameras, a timing wire was fitted to the vent cover. The 
timing wire was an electrical circuit which consisted of two electrical cables joined by a 
metallic tape which was stuck onto the front of the vent cover (Figure 3-41). As soon as 
the vent failed, the metallic tape broke and the time at which the circuit was broken was 
recorded on the data acquisition system. The accuracy of the time the metallic tape 
broke is in the region of ± 0.2 ms based nominally on the decay time for the electrical 
circuitry to discharge to earth after a breakage. 
 
Figure 3-41  Timing wire to record the time of vent failure 
3.11. Flame Propagation 
3.11.1. Experimental Rig A 
Each explosion test was filmed using a video camera positioned outside the explosion 
chamber. On some of the tests, footage provided by the video camera was 
supplemented by that of a motor driven Nikon F3 and a Locam cine camera (filming at 
200 fps). In several of the later tests, high speed cine cameras were also used to film 
internal flame propagation in each enclosure. The film records were used to determine 
the times at which the vent opened, and also the times at which the flame front first 
appeared at the plane of the vent openings. 
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3.11.2. Experimental Rigs B and C 
The explosion tests were recorded by a Phantom high speed video camera positioned 
outside the explosion chamber and by two Phantom high speed video cameras located 
in the walls of the explosion chamber. The film records were used to monitor flame 
propagation through the explosion chamber and to determine the times at which the 
vent opened. 
3.12. Flame Speed 
Thermocouples or flame ionisation probes were used to determine the flame arrival at 
specific locations within the explosion chambers. When the hot junction of a 
thermocouple is exposed to something hotter than that of its cold junction, a voltage 
develops. This potential difference can be calibrated to determine the source 
temperature. A thermocouple junction placed in the path of a travelling flame will 
therefore register its arrival as a change in voltage potential across the junction, which 
can be recorded as a distinct change in the analogue output of the thermocouple. In 
the context of flame speed, it is not necessary to accurately measure temperature, but 
rather, register the point at which the flame arrives at the thermocouple through a 
change in temperature. As thermocouple junctions have an inherent mass, there is a 
response time to heat. Consequently, it is important to use thermocouples made to the 
same specification such that response times are identical. The time delay or response 
time of a thermocouple, usually refers to the time lag for full response to the stimulus 
and is therefore not directly relevant in the detection of a flame. Providing the distance 
between two thermocouples or ionisation probes is known, the accurate measurement 
of the time of this signal change relative to that measured from an adjacent 
thermocouple or probe, allows the average flame speed to be calculated at the 
midpoint between the two instruments: 
Where: 
Sf = the flame speed (m/s). 
x = the distance from the spark ignition (m). 
t = the time of flame arrival (s). 
Tn = a numbered thermocouple. 







S  = 
t - t






S  = 
t - t
 (3-1) 
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When a flame reaches an ionisation probe, which consists of two electrodes separated 
by a small gap which provides a high resistance, ions in the flame front will lower the 
electrical resistance of the gap, triggering a voltage output from the electronic circuit. 
This voltage output may be recorded on a counter device mounted in a PC. Providing 
the distance between the probes is known, the time difference between the voltage 
outputs allows the average flame speed to be calculated at the midpoint. 
3.12.1. Experimental Rig A 
Flame speeds were not measured during experiments undertaken in these rigs. 
3.12.2. Experimental Rigs B and C 
The time of flame arrival at specific positions inside the chamber was measured using 
flame ionisation probes (Rig B) and flame ionisation probes and thermocouples (Rig 
C1) (see Table 3-4). Flame arrival times were not measured in the twin compartment 
arrangement. The flame ionisation probes consisted of two electrodes (the bared ends 
of two core heat resistance cable) separated by a 5 to 10 mm gap which provided a 
high resistance to voltage across the cable (Figure 3-42). The presence of ions in the 
advancing flame front lowered the resistance across the gap and at a pre-set level, 
triggered a voltage step output from a bespoke electronic timer circuit designed by 
MRS. This voltage ‘spike’ terminated counting in registers on a counter board mounted 
in a PC. The counting was initiated by a sequence timer at the time of ignition, with the 
count frequency being 100 kHz. Downloading the counter registers after the test, 
enabled the time of flame arrival to be calculated at each ionisation probe. The IP data 
were logged using in-house software called IP. 
                                               
1 Flame arrival times were not measured in the multiple compartment arrangement. 
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Table 3-4 Location of flame ionisation probes and thermocouples (Rigs B and C) 
Rig 
Distance from Rear Wall (m) 
Ionisation Probe  Thermocouple  
B 
IP1 0.900 - - 
IP2 3.375 - - 
IP3 3.625 - - 
IP4 6.375 - - 
IP5 6.625 - - 
IP6 7.375 - - 
IP7 7.625 - - 
IP8 8.250 - - 
IP9 8.500 - - 
IP10 8.750 - - 
C 
IP1 0.210 T1 0.470 
IP2 0.470 T2 4.560 
IP3 2.650 T3 5.920 
IP4 3.850 T4 7.450 
IP5 5.260 - - 
IP6 6.620 - - 
IP7 8.060 - - 
IP8 3.850 - - 
 
The thermocouples used in this experimental rig were exposed junction, mineral 
insulated type K; supplied by TC Direct (Figure 3-42). The ionisation probes (except 
IP8, Rig C) and thermocouples (Rig C only) were located along the centre line of the 
explosion chambers at mid height. As there were likely to be high velocity flows and 
significant overpressures generated in the explosion tests, the ionisation probes and 
thermocouples were supported on a suspension wire coated with heat protective tape 
(Figure 3-43). The exception to this was where an ionisation probe (IP8, Rig C) was 
located at a distance of 200 mm from the chambers left side wall (looking towards the 
vent), in order to determine the time at which the flame reached its maximum surface 
area (Figure 3-43).  
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Figure 3-42  Flame ionisation probe and thermocouple (Rig C) 
 
Figure 3-43  Instrumentation to measure flame arrival times (Rig C) 
 
  
Experimental Set-Up and Measurement  202 
3.12.3. Experimental Rig D 
Two arrays of thermocouples were used in this experimental rig in order to detect flame 
arrival and hence determine the flame speed during the constant pressure period of the 
explosion. The constant pressure period occurs when the spherical flame propagation 
is between 0.2 and 0.7 of the vessel radius. Outside of this region, flame propagation is 
neglected due to the effects of the ignitor in the early stages of the explosion and flame 
curvature caused by the flame-wall interaction in the latter stages. 
The thermocouples used were exposed junction, mineral insulated type K; supplied by 
TC Ltd. The thermocouple arrays were fitted to the explosion vessel using Swagelock 
compression fittings with PTFE ferrules (pressure rating of 69 bar) and positioned 
inside the vessel along its vertical and horizontal axis (see Figure 3-44). 
 
Figure 3-44  Horizontal and vertical thermocouple arrays (Rig D) 
 
In the horizontal axis, the array consisted of thirteen thermocouples located along the 
centreline of the vessel, twelve of which were positioned either side of the ignition 
point, providing flame arrival times in the horizontal right and horizontal left directions. 
In the vertical axis, the array comprised nine thermocouples positioned in the bottom 
half of the vertical radial centreline (see Figure 3-45 and Table 3-5). 
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Figure 3-45  Rig D Thermocouple arrangement 
(taken from Phylaktou et al. [397]) 
 
Table 3-5 Location of thermocouples (Rig D) 
Horizontal Left Horizontal Right Downward Propagation 
Thermocouple Distance from spark (mm) Thermocouple 
Distance from 
spark (mm) Thermocouple 
Distance from 
spark (mm) 
T1 69 T9 25 T14 89 
T2 132 T10 93 T15 153 
T3 194 T11 155 T16 212 
T4 266 T12 224 T17 270 
T5 332 T13 292 T18 330 
T6 392 - - T19 387 
T7 460 - - T20 452 
T8 525 - - T21 511 
- - - - T22 574 
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3.13. Measurement of Thermal Damage 
3.13.1. Experimental Rig A 
The measurement of thermal damage was carried out by placing thermal marker 
boards at various points in the two enclosures (see Figure 3-46).  
 
Figure 3-46  Thermal marker boards 
The marker boards were 0.6 m in width and were of approximate floor to ceiling height 
so that thermal damage sustained from layered and full room explosions could be 
assessed. The boards were constructed such that 3 strips of different material could be 
attached to them. The materials to be attached to the marker boards were chosen 
because they represented building or decorative materials that were likely to be found 
in a typical dwelling. Strips of different material were placed on each marker board prior 
to each explosion test and were removed for visual examination after the test was 
completed. As the flame and hot gases propagated during the explosion the thermal 
strips were subjected to heat (from the hot gases) and short duration flame 
impingement. Assessment of the degree of thermal damage was undertaken by visual 
comparison and is reported in Chapter 6.  
Seven different materials were selected for the experimental tests. These materials 
could be broken into two distinct groups, as shown in Table 3-6: 
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Table 3-6 Selected Materials 
Wall Coverings Wood Surfaces 
Ordinary wallpaper on plasterboard White gloss painted wood 
Vinyl wallpaper on plasterboard Varnished wood 
Anaglypta type wallpaper painted with 
emulsion on plasterboard Untreated wood 
Emulsion painted plasterboard  
 
All of the material strips were prepared a maximum of 6 months prior to the 
experimental programme commencing. The wood material strips were 75 mm in width 
and the length was cut so that they were the approximate height of the explosion 
chamber. The painted wood was given 1 coat of primer, 1 coat of undercoat and 1 coat 
of gloss paint. The varnished wood was given 2 coats of polyurethane varnish. The wall 
covering material strips were approximately 200 mm in width. The location of the strips 
on the marker boards is shown in Figure 3-47 and the location of the materials during 
the experimental tests is given in Table 3-7.  
 
Figure 3-47  Location of material strips on thermal marker boards 
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Table 3-7 Selected materials and their location on the thermal marker boards 
Material Locations Test No’s. 
Ordinary wallpaper A I J 1 - 19 
Vinyl wallpaper C G L 1 - 19 
Anaglypta F M 1 - 19 
Emulsion painted plasterboard D O 1 - 19 
Painted wood B H K 1 - 19 
Varnished wood E 1 - 19 
Untreated wood N 1 - 19 
Painted wood B H K 23 - 24 
Varnished wood E 23 - 24 
Untreated wood N 23 - 24 
Painted wood E N 25 - 44 
Varnished wood H 25 - 44 
 
 
3.13.2. Experimental Rig C 
The measurement of thermal damage was carried out by placing thermal marker 
boards at various locations in the explosion chamber. During the multiple compartment 
tests, the measurement of thermal damage was carried out by placing thermal marker 
boards at various points in the two enclosures (see Figure 3-48).  
 
Figure 3-48  Thermal marker board locations 
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The marker boards were constructed from sheets of plywood 2.2 m in length and 0.6 m 
in width. A series of 12 samples of materials (see Table 3-8), in the form of strips 
approximately 3 cm in width, were attached, or painted, to the thermal marker boards 
(see Figure 3-49). The objective of the design of these boards was to enable the 
examination of as many materials as practicable (typically used in the decoration or 
construction of dwellings), in order to try to identify the pattern of thermal damage 
caused by a gas explosions. The same materials were attached to each marker board 
and each marker board was used for a single test only. Following completion of an 
explosion test, the board was removed and assessment of the degree of thermal 
damage was undertaken by visual examination and, in the case of the tests in the 
single compartment, by using a Digital SLR camera under consistent laboratory lighting 
conditions and Axiovision microscopy software.  
Table 3-8 Selected materials attached to the thermal marker boards 
Material Description 
Backing Board Plywood sheets 2.2m high x 0.6m wide by 18mm thick 
Emulsion paint Two coats of Leyland vinyl matt emulsion – brilliant white 
Gloss paint One coat of Leyland primer undercoat (white) then one coat of Leyland gloss finish – brilliant white 
Polythene sheet Co-op refuse sacks (60% recycled PE) – black bin liners 
Newspaper Single sheet of newspaper 
Heavy-duty wallpaper Homebase luxury vinyl (Code 736936) 
PVC coated electrical cable Grey 1.5mm
2 twin and earth (type 6242Y) and 0.5mm2 two 
core (type 2182Y) 
Varnish Leyland polyurethane varnish – clear 
Cotton Strip Richmond house fine Egyptian cotton (king sized sheets) 
Wallpaper Vymura quality wallpaper (Intaglio stripe, code 61-111 – washable peelable) 
PVC Tape Advance AT7 - flame retardant 
Wool Wendy Aran (25% wool, 75% acrylic) 
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Figure 3-49  Location of material strips on thermal marker boards 
In the single compartment tests, two purpose made marker stands were used, each of 
which secured 2 x softwood panels (Figure 3-50). One panel was placed such that the 
softwood panels were ‘face-on’ to the propagating flame and one was positioned close 
to the vessel chamber walls and perpendicular to the propagating flame (see Figure 
3-51).  
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Figure 3-50  Softwood panel support (Rig C) 
 
 
Figure 3-51  Location of thermal marker stands prior to explosion test (Rig C) 
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The softwood panels were supplied by Homebase and measured 0.9 m in height x 
0.096 m in width x 0.0075 m in depth. Three different finishes were selected for the 
tests; painted with gloss paint (oil based), painted with quick drying gloss paint (water 
based) and untreated. Prior to testing, the softwood panels were prepared in the 
following manner: 
i. Gloss painted wood – the softwood was given one coat of primer, one coat of 
undercoat and one coat of oil based gloss; 
ii. Quick drying gloss painted wood - the softwood was given one of coat primer, 
one coat of undercoat and one coat of water based gloss; 
iii. Untreated wood – the sample was left as supplied. 
3.13.3. Experimental Rig D 
The measurement of thermal damage was carried out by directly placing softwood 
panel samples on the inside face of the opening door (see Figure 3-52). The softwood 
panels were identical to that used in Rig D. The softwood panels were cut to a length of 
0.25 m such that four samples could fit onto the door during each test. The samples 
were secured to the steel door using double sided duct tape.  
 
Figure 3-52  Location of softwood samples (Rig D) 
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Five different finishes were selected for the tests; painted with gloss paint (oil based), 
painted with quick drying gloss paint (water based), varnished, untreated and covered 
with wallpaper. For consistency, the softwood panels were prepared in an identical 
manner to that described in Section 3.13.2, with the addition of varnished wood and 
wallpaper samples: 
i. Gloss painted wood – the softwood was given one coat of primer, one coat of 
undercoat and one coat of oil based gloss; 
ii. Quick drying gloss painted wood - the softwood was given one of coat primer, 
one coat of undercoat and one coat of water based gloss; 
iii. Untreated wood – the sample was left as supplied; 
iv. Varnished wood – the softwood was given two coats of polyurethane varnish; 
v. Wallpapered – anaglypta wallpaper samples were pasted onto the softwood 
surface using wallpaper paste. 
Following completion of an explosion test, the samples were removed and assessment 
of the degree of thermal damage was undertaken by visual examination and by 
scanning electron microscope (SEM).  
The SEM was used to analyse the damage at the microscopic level and to determine if 
this method of analysis could aid explosion investigators. Prior to analysis by SEM the 
sample must be clean and dry, such that it will not outgas during the examination. Any 
surface oils should be removed with a solvent and dirt particles must also be removed 
by compressed gas. To prepare the softwood sample for use in the SEM, a section of 
each softwood sample was selected and cut to fit within the 25 mm diameter circular 
specimen stub. After the samples had been selected and cut to size, they were placed 
under vacuum for twenty-four hours in order to remove any moisture. After the sample 
was dry, it was fixed to the sample stub using double-sided conductive tape. The 
perimeter surface of the sample was also coated with carbon paint to ensure 
continuous conductivity of the sample to the stub. Any dirt on the sample surface was 
then removed with compressed gas before the sample was sputter coated with gold 
using an EMSCOPE SC500 SEM specimen vacuum coater to ensure the sample was 
coated with a thin layer of conductive material. 
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3.14. Control and Data Acquisition 
3.14.1. Experimental Rig A 
A transient data capture and recording system was used to record the experimental 
results. The transient recorder was a Data Laboratories Multitrap DL 6000 modular 
waveform system. This modular recorder received input from the pressure transducers, 
amplified and filtered the signals with computer controlled modules, and converted the 
analogue signals to digital such that they could be recorded on a storage disk.  
The transient recorder was fitted with a Tabor 6010 125 MHz universal counter and 
eight 6024 memory modules. Each module could be used as a four channel recorder 
giving a capacity of 36 data channels. The maximum recording rate for the 36 channel 
configuration was 200 kHz at 12 bit resolution, with a maximum recording time of 4 s. 
The 12 bit analogue to digital conversion gave a resolution of 1 part in 212 (= 4096). 
The voltage measurement range of the pressure transducers was 0-100 mV. For a 
pressure measurement range of 0-2.5 bar, the resultant transducer resolution was ± 
0.6 mbar. 
The transient recorder was controlled from a PC using the Acquire software package 
supplied by Data Laboratories. The Pressure-time histories of the 8 pressure 
transducers were recorded at a rate of 2 kHz for a period of approximately 2 seconds. 
3.14.2. Experimental Rigs B and C 
In rig B, two 32 channel transient recorders were used to record the experimental 
results. In rig C, a third 32 channel recorder was used to capture the thermocouple 
data. The pressure signals from the pressure transducers were amplified by a PCB 
control unit prior to entering the transient recorders. A Synergy transient recorder 
operating at 50 kHz at 16 bit resolution was used as the primary data logger for 
measurement of pressure transducer and flame ionisation probes outputs. The 16 bit 
analogue to digital conversion gave a resolution of 1 part in 216 (= 65536). For a 
pressure measurement range of 0-10 bar, the resultant transducer resolution was ± 
0.15 mbar. 
The signal from each instrument was recorded on two channels of the transient 
recorder, the secondary channels covering twice the range of the primary channels. 
Thus should the pressure generated have exceeded the full scale of the primary 
channel, the data would also have been logged at lower resolution on the secondary 
channel. The pressure range for the primary channel was set to cover the anticipated 
pressure range for the given configuration. A TEAC GX1 transient recorder (with 
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internal signal conditioning), operating at 50 kHz, was used as a ‘backup’ data logger 
such that data would still be recorded in the event of primary equipment failure. A 
Spartan transient recorder operating at 500 Hz was used to record flame arrival times 
using thermocouples and gas concentration readings (recorded on the Synergy data 
logger when the Spartan was not used). A schematic drawing of the data acquisition 
system (Rig D) is shown in Figure 3-53. 
 
Figure 3-53  Schematic drawing of data acquisition system (Rig D) 
The transient recorder and the data collection were controlled by DNV GL bespoke 
software (TRANSE). The software was used to initiate the control signals and to store 
the data. After initialising the control signals the test and data capturing process was 
initiated through an internal time sequence generator which initiated the spark ignition.  
3.14.3. Experimental Rig D 
A 34 channel Microlink 4000 transient recording system was used to record the 
experimental results. The Microlink 4000 was a modular data acquisition system that 
was designed to capture pressure and flame speed data at a sampling frequency of up 
to 100 KHz per channel. Each channel contained its own amplifier, 12 bit analog to 
digital converter and memory for the storage of data. A separate channel was used for 
each pressure transducer and thermocouple such that there was no delay in the 
transmission of data.  
During this experimental programme, the sampling frequency used by the data 
acquisition system was 5 KHz, meaning that a sample was taken every 0.2 ms. The 
voltage measurement range of the pressure transducer was 0 – 100 mv and for 
thermocouples was -100 – 100 mv. The 12 bit analogue to digital conversion gave a 
resolution of 1 part in 212 (= 4096). For a pressure measurement range of 0-10 bar, the 
resultant transducer resolution was ± 2.4 mbar. A schematic drawing of the data 
acquisition system is shown in Figure 3-54. 
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Figure 3-54  Schematic drawing of data acquisition system (Rig D) 
Windmill Wavecap software was used to initiate the control signals and to store the 
data. The software program enabled the sampling frequency and pre and post trigger 
controls to be varied. After initialising the control signals through Wavecap, the test and 
data capturing process was initiated through an external trigger (time sequence 
generator). The trigger mechanism was set by the software to respond on the positive 
edge of the signal (digital signal transition from low to high, i.e. 0 to 1).  
The time sequence generator had four time sequence channels, although in this 
experimental programme only channels 1 and 4 were used:  
• Channel 1: to trigger the data logger;  
• Channel 4: to send a signal to the spark ignition system. 
Channels 1 and 4 were activated at the same time, when the start button on the 
sequence generator was activated. The Wavecap software program stored the data in 
imc FAMOS format (Fast Analysis and Monitoring Of Signals) in preparation for 
analysis. 
3.15. Hazard Identification and Mitigation 
It was essential that the risks associated with the explosion tests were thoroughly 
identified and controlled to an acceptable level. Demonstrating that the risks are at an 
acceptable level whilst conducting explosion testing requires careful consideration as 
the normal method of controlling risk (i.e. prevent and mitigate) is clearly not entirely 
possible given that the purpose of the study is to deliberately cause explosions. 
However, some of the hazards associated with conducting the experiments may be 
eliminated. Consequently, the most appropriate method for controlling risks during this 
study was to identify these potential hazards and to thoroughly assess measures that 
could be taken to prevent their occurrence (wherever possible) and to mitigate their 
effects. 
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A series of hazard identification studies (HAZID) were undertaken to identify hazards 
that would be present as a consequence of undertaking vented explosion and confined 
explosion experiments. A HAZID study is a systematic method of identifying hazards 
associated with the design and operation of hazardous equipment and plant. The 
studies were undertaken in order to determine the effects of exposure to identified 
hazards and to implement measures to mitigate the risk of injury or harm to persons or 
property. 
The latter HAZID studies (using Rigs C and D) were undertaken in accordance with BS 
EN ISO 17776 [398], whilst the earlier studies (using Rigs A, B and C) were conducted 
in accordance with guidance given by Lee [399]. Due to the structured manner of the 
HAZID procedure undertaken, the hazards, as well as their possible escalations were 
identified. A number of reference words were used during the HAZID to prompt 
identification of hazards. These guidance words are shown in Table 3-9:  
Table 3-9 HAZID guidance words 
Guidance Words 
leaks and spillages rough ground slips, trips and falls 
thermal radiation unignited gas hot work 
overpressure high pressure gas pressure testing 
non process fires human factors proximity of equipment 
toxic release smoke asphyxiation 
transport accidents venting/depressurisation missiles 
structural failure aircraft communications 
heavy machinery noise lighting 
dropped object overfilling competence 
maintenance cryogenics instrumentation & control 
extreme weather multiple activities burning fragments 
emergency response isolation electrical 
 
A number of hazards were identified during the HAZID. The preventative and mitigative 
measures were then considered and a semi quantitative risk assessment undertaken. 
The results of the HAZID (for all Rigs) are shown in Table 3-10 and the results of the 
risk assessment (for all Rigs) are shown in Table 3-11.
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Safeguards Consequence Mitigation 
1 Working at height 
Sheeting rigs A, 
B, C and D. 
Closing/opening 
Rig D door. 
Stairs with hand 
rails. Harnesses. 
Safe system of 
work. 

























prior to test 
























































misting of local 
area in dry 
weather 
6 Failed ignition Ignitor failure. 
Procedure for 
failed ignition - 
purged through 
with air. 
Delayed test  

















Shutting off of 
Road (Rigs A, B, 
C and D). 
Injury to 
operators/visitor. 






Raised bank for 
protecting gas 



















Failure of gas 
supply lines Missiles. 
Pipes hoses and 
couplings are 
suitable for the 
purpose 
pressure tested 








area (Rigs B, C 
and D). 
 Burns, smoke inhalation. 
All persons are 
briefed on 
escape routes. 













The hazards identified in the HAZID (e.g. 1-11) are shown in the ‘traffic light’ coloured 
boxes of Table 3-11. The coloured boxes represent the risk presented by the hazard, 
after preventative and mitigatory measures; with red being unacceptable, amber being 
tolerable and green being broadly acceptable. 
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Probableb 11     
Possiblec 6 1, 2    
Remoted  5 4 3, 10  
Unlikelye     7, 8, 9 
a Almost certain to occur if conditions remain unchanged. 
b Would not require extraordinary factors to occur at some time. 
c Could occur at some time. 
d May only occur under exceptional circumstances. 
e Could only occur under a freak combination of factors. 
Unacceptable (prevent) Tolerable (mitigate) Broadly Acceptable 
 
The role of prevention techniques are to eliminate the possible causes for an explosion 
to occur; for example by ensuring the fuel/air mixture remains outside of its flammable 
limits, eliminating all potential sources of ignition source or through the use of inerting. 
The role of protection techniques are to mitigate the effects of an event (protecting 
people and property/plant), if it is not possible to prevent the event from occurring; for 
example by designing equipment to withstand explosion overpressures, isolating 
equipment from the explosion through the use of quick acting valves, suppressing the 
explosion by the addition of an inertant or by the use of explosion relief.  
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3.15.1. Firefighting Equipment 
During testing in Rigs A, B, C, and D, two dry powder fire extinguishers were positioned 
outside the control room and were available to extinguish any fire within or outside the 
explosion chamber. For tests undertaken at the Spadeadam testing and research 
facility, a fire engine was available should any fire not be controllable through the use 
of fire extinguishers.  
3.16. Operating Procedures 
For each of the test rigs, there were six distinct phases to their safe operation, each of 
which was carried out in a consecutive manner, under the guidance of a written 
procedure. The phases were: 
i. Pre-test instrumentation, data logging and safety checks. 
ii. Gas filling and mixing. 
iii. Ignition. 
iv. Test rig purging. 
v. Data check. 
vi. Post-test safety checks. 
The operational procedures for each of the test rigs are given in Appendix A. 
3.17. Experimental Repeatability at Large-Scale 
It has been identified previously, that at large-scale, there can be significant variations 
in the results obtained from two nominally identical experiments [369, 400, 401]. Given 
the importance of large-scale data in terms of understanding how pressure is 
generated in explosions, and in the development of guidance to industry and for 
explosion model evaluation, the HSE commissioned a series of large-scale 
experiments to study experimental repeatability [402]. 
There are several factors that can affect the severity of an explosion including the scale 
of the experiment, the geometry of the explosion chamber (including vent size and 
congestion arrangement), vent material and fixing, ignition location and fuel reactivity 
(including fuel type, concentration, oxidant and ambient conditions). 
Typically, with large-scale experiments, there will be a small experimental variability in 
the fuel concentration and ambient conditions (including air temperature, atmospheric 
pressure and ambient humidity), which can have the effect of changing the average 
fuel equivalence ratio. 
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The experimental programme identified that significant variation in the peak 
overpressures measured at the same location in nominally identical experiments was 
possible but that the variations were not random across the pressure transducer 
locations and experiments. That is, if an experiment gave a relatively high peak 
overpressure at one transducer location compared to the other tests in the series, then 
the overpressures at all locations in that experiment tended to be higher than those in 
the other tests. These variations were attributable to shock waves being formed ahead 
of the flame front. The reflection of these shock waves by obstacles and regions of 
confinement, and the subsequent interaction with the flame front can produce peak 
overpressures that are highly variable. The global influence of these variable high 
pressure regions was considered to be the likely cause of any significant variability 
between nominally identical experiments. Variations in atmospheric conditions were not 
found to be of significance. 
Confidential research undertaken by MRS [403] into the repeatability of large-scale 
confined vented explosions demonstrated that relatively slow explosions in empty 
chambers and explosions with idealised obstacle arrays typically produced 
overpressures that were within 10% of nominally identical experiments. However, 
explosions involving highly congested regions had the potential to produce significant 
variability in a manner similar to that described above. 
The repeatability of tests during the experimental programmes is discussed at the 
relevant section of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It is shown that, with the exception of one test, 
the results were within the 10% criteria discussed above. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. THE EFFECTS OF INTERCONNECTED ROOMS 
4.1. Introduction 
The current knowledge on the development of an explosion in single empty enclosures 
has been discussed in detail in the literature review (Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6). Whilst 
a number of studies were found to have demonstrated that reducing the vent size and 
increasing congestion can affect the flame speed and increase overpressures, the 
confined and congested situation found in buildings, wherein both adiabatic expansion 
and turbulent flame acceleration play a role, has received little large-scale attention. 
Typical modern furnished dwellings will have a pathway, for flame propagation, through 
the whole structure to the outside, that consists of a number of interconnected rooms, 
each of which may have significant congestion as well as its own vent area providing 
relief.  
It has been qualitatively recognised for over 45 years (Section 2.6) that the pressure 
generated by an explosion that propagates from one room to another may be 
significantly greater than that of a single room of similar volume. Consequently, 
quantitative experimental research that can develop the understanding of the effects of 
interconnected rooms on accidental gas explosions is of critical importance.  
The experimental programme presented in this chapter represents a substantial body 
of research, the results of which will be of significant value, not only to those involved in 
gas explosion investigation, but to standards committees and parties interested in the 
design and construction of buildings. It details the results of 87 full-scale natural gas 
explosion tests carried out, on behalf of MRS, at the FRS explosion test facility.  
4.2. Experimental Programme 
Experiments were undertaken in the two interconnecting rooms at the FRS facility 
(Figure 3-6 and Figure 3-7). The ‘corridor’ in the explosion chamber was not used in 
any of the experiments although it was planned to be included in a later study (these 
plans were later abandoned due to budgetary constraints).  
A number of nominally identical tests were undertaken to check repeatability (tests 1 
and 2, 3 and 4, 6 and 7, 9 and 10). The results were within the 10% criteria discussed 
in Section 3.17, except for tests 6 and 7. The reason for this variation is discussed later 
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in this Chapter (layer variability). As there were a wide range of experimental test 
combinations used in the experimental programme, it was beneficial to consider the 
experimental programme as a number of test ‘types’, conducted in a series of tests. 
The test type refers to the configuration of the vents. The test types are numbered as 
follows: 
I. Both enclosures had large vent areas of equal size. 
II. The enclosures had different vent sizes. The ignition room (L) had a large vent 
area and the adjoining room (R) had a small vent area. 
III. The enclosures had different vent sizes. The ignition room (L) had a small vent 
area and the adjoining room (R) had a large vent area. 
IV. Both enclosures had small vent areas of equal size. 
The test series referred to the specific size and location of the vent, the gas 
concentration in adjoining rooms, and the door type, latching mechanism and 
orientation. The classification of the types and series of tests is given in Table 4-1. 
Specific information on each test series is given in the introduction to Sections 4.4, 4.5, 
4.6 and 4.7. 
Table 4-1 Experimental test classification 






1 – 22 I A 22 2.4 2.4 
23 – 29 & 42 II B 8 2.4 4.0(l) 
30 – 36 II C 7 2.4 8.0 
37 – 41 II D 5 2.4 4.0 (r) 
43 – 49 III E 7 4.0 (r) 2.4 
50 – 56 III F 7 8.0 2.4 
57 – 59 IV G 3 4.0 (l) 4.0 (r) 
60 – 68 III H 9 4.0 (r) 2.4 
69 – 70 IV I 2 4.0 (l) 4.0 (r) 
71 – 87 III J 17 4.0 2.4 
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1 A I 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 38 37 38 
2 A I 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 39 39 39 
3 A I 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 40 83 103 
4 A I 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 41 82 85 
5 A I 10 10 Full 2.4 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 41 138 145 
6 A I 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 44 152 179 
7 A I 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 44 76 83 
8 A I 10 10 Full 2.4 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 44 152 152 
9 A I 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Open 2.4 2.4 47 47 47 
10 A I 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Open 2.4 2.4 46 44 46 
11 A I 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 39 45 48 
12 A I 10 10 Full 2.4 Central Open 2.4 2.4 44 48 48 
13 A I 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 38 37 38 
14 A I 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 41 88 88 
15 A I 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 66 103 138 
16 A I 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Closed 2.4 2.4 47 52 62 
17 A I 10 10 Full 2.4 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 44 172 179 
18 A I 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 44 97 90 
19 A I 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 46 76 103 
20 A I 10 10 Full 2.4 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 36 131 138 
21 A I 10 10 Full 2.4 Central Open 2.4 2.4 40 55 62 
22 A I 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Closed 2.4 2.4 40 48 55 
23 B II 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 4l 44 55 62 
24 B II 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 4l 46 83 90 
25 B II 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 4l 43 179 214 
26 B II 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 4l 55 317 400 
27 B II 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Closed 2.4 4l 55 179 269 
28 B II 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 4l 44 117 145 
29 B II 12 12 Full 2.4 Rear Closed 2.4 4l 41 172 172 
30 C II 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 8 44 103 131 
31 C II 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 8 40 131 138 
32 C II 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 8 46 110 152 
33 C II 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 8 47 138 234 
34 C II 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Open 2.4 8 47 152 200 
35 C II 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Closed 2.4 8 44 124 207 
36 C II 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 8 40 283 372 
37 D II 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Open 2.4 4r 55 62 76 
38 D II 10 10 Full 2.4 Central Open 2.4 4r 57 97 117 
39 D II 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Closed 2.4 4r 51 103 172 
40 D II 10 10 Full 2.4 Rear Closed 2.4 4r 41 303 338 
41 D II 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 4r 50 276 414 



































42 B II 10 10 Full 2.4 Rear Closed 2.4 4l 41 283 317 
43 E III 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 4r 2.4 41 276 234 
44 E III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 4r 2.4 55 372 338 
45 E III 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 4r 2.4 41 207 207 
46 E III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Closed 4r 2.4 46 76 83 
47 E III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Open 4r 2.4 55 179 186 
48 E III 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 4r 2.4 51 69 69 
49 E III 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 4r 2.4 51 117 110 
50 F III 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 8 2.4 50 103 83 
51 F III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 8 2.4 62 324 234 
52 F III 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 8 2.4 47 159 138 
53 F III 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 8 2.4 55 317 276 
54 F III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 8 2.4 59 462 462 
55 F III 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 8 2.4 48 214 193 
56 F III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Closed 8 2.4 57 97 90 
57 G IV 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 4l 4r 52 159 166 
58 G IV 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 4l 4r 69 283 276 
59 G IV 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller Latch 4l 4r 62 179 179 
60 H III 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller Latch 4r 2.4 50 290 262 
61 H III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller Latch 4r 2.4 55 428 372 
62 H III 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller Latch 4r 2.4 50 393 310 
63 H III 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Fire Door - Unlatched 4r 2.4 50 331 283 
64 H III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Fire Door - Unlatched 4r 2.4 55 400 386 
65 H III 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Fire Door - Unlatched 4r 2.4 48 407 379 
66 H III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear 
Fire Door - 
Roller 
Latch 
4r 2.4 55 501 455 
67 H III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Mortice Latch 4r 2.4 66 227 214 
68 H III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear 
Fire Door - 
Mortice 
Latch 
4r 2.4 72 331 317 
69 G IV 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear 
Fire Door - 
Roller 
Latch 
4l 4r 14 138 152 
70 G IV 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear 
Fire Door - 
Roller 
Latch 
4l 4r 83 331 359 
71 J III 8 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 39 262 193 
72 J III 10 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 55 400 338 
73 J III 8 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 55 310 248 
74 J III 12 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 50 241 193 
75 J III 10 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 55 276 228 



































76 J III 12 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 50 352 283 
77 J III 6 13 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 50 234 186 
78 J III 13 6 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 41 290 241 
79 J III 6 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 41 83 69 
80 J III 10 6 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 52 345 276 
81 J III 10 10 Layer 0.3 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 61 103 97 
82 J III 10 10 Layer 0.6 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 58 221 186 
83 J III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Hinged into left room 4r 2.4 77 262 269 
84 J III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Hinged into L - 45° 4r 2.4 61 703 655 
85 J III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Hinged into L - 45° 4r 2.4 39 683 641 
86 J III 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Hinged into L - 90° 4r 2.4 66 345 317 
87 J III 10 0 Layer 1.2 Rear Roller latch 4r 2.4 44 234 166 
a Layer depth from ceiling. 
The following parameters were investigated in detail: 
• gas concentration; 
• distribution of the flammable gas/air mixture; 
• depth of layer; 
• vent opening dimensions and location; 
• ignition position; 
• the position, orientation and strength of the interconnecting door. 
4.2.1. Gas Concentration 
Tests were undertaken using the following natural gas/air mixtures: 
• 6% gas in air (fuel lean, φ = 0.61); 
• 8% gas in air (fuel lean φ = 0.83); 
• 10% gas in air (near stoichiometric concentration, φ = 1.05); 
• 12% gas in air (fuel rich, φ = 1.30); and 
• 13% gas in air (fuel rich, φ = 1.42).  
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As the development of the explosions were likely to be most marked with fuel/air 
mixtures slightly richer than stoichiometric, the majority of the explosion tests were 
undertaken with a concentration of 10% natural gas in air by volume.  
4.2.2. Distribution of the Flammable Gas/Air Mixture 
In most of the experiments, it was ensured that both of the rooms were filled with 
gas/air mixture to the same concentration. However, actual gas explosions occur in 
dwellings where circumstances are such that the gas concentration in neighbouring 
rooms may vary. Consequently, some of the later experiments were carried out with a 
different concentration in each of the enclosures. Moreover, in one of the experiments, 
one of the rooms was given a stoichiometric layer of gas/air mixture and the other room 
was kept free of gas. 
4.2.3. Depth of Layer 
In most of the experiments the mixture was distributed to form a high level layer that 
was half the height of the explosion chamber. Other experiments were conducted using 
layers of varying depth or with the enclosures completely filled with gas/air mixture. 
4.2.4. Vent Opening Dimensions and Location 
The façades of typical dwellings in the UK vary widely, ranging from small single 
fronted terraced houses to large detached double fronted houses. Consequently, it was 
necessary to consider a wide range of inadvertent explosion reliefs (i.e. a range of 
window configurations that are representative of common façades of UK dwellings). 
Therefore, vent coefficients, KA, of 2.4, 4 and 8 were chosen for the experiments and 
used in different combinations. The combination KA = 8 in both enclosures was not 
used as the developed overpressure may have damaged the explosion chamber.  
4.2.5. Ignition Position 
Two ignition positions were used for all of the experimental tests. The centre of the left 
room and the centre of the rear wall of the left room. No experiments were undertaken 
with ignition in the right enclosure.  
4.2.6. Interconnecting Door 
Experiments were undertaken with both a lightweight and heavyweight interconnecting 
door, and with the door in the open, partially open and closed positions. The door was 
normally hinged such that it would open into the adjoining (right) room. In a small 
number of tests, the door was hinged so that it would open into the ignition (left) room. 
In addition, in a small number of tests, different latch types were used to secure the 
door closed. 
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4.3. General Observations 
In almost all of the experiments, the explosion overpressure-time profiles displayed 
pressure peaks similar to that of an explosion in a single compartment (Section 2.4.2 
Figure 2-13); that is, pressure peaks related to the opening of the vent, the onset of 
burnt gas venting, the external explosion, acoustic and hydrodynamic instabilities and 
maximum flame area were observed.  
In general terms, there were three dominant pressure peaks, not all of which were 
present in each test but each produced the maximum peak in one or more tests:  
i. The first dominant pressure peak was always associated with the removal of 
one or both of the explosion relief vent panels (in either of the two enclosures) 
and its magnitude was equal to or slightly greater than the failure pressure of 
the vent panel. The pressure peak occurred, because initially, combustion was 
taking place in a totally confined enclosure and the expansion of the hot 
products of combustion generated a pressure rise. As soon as the vent covers 
failed, unburnt fuel/air mixture was allowed to escape through the openings 
causing the pressure to fall and giving rise to a pressure peak, PV. Interestingly, 
in many of the type I tests, immediately after the PV pressure peak, the pressure 
dropped rapidly to below ambient and then immediately increased to form a 
second positive peak that was approximately the same value as the negative 
pressure trough (i.e. if the pressure dropped to -10 mbar, it would then ‘bounce 
back’, with a compression wave, to form a peak of approximately +10 mbar [see 
Figure 4-4)]. The negative pressure phase is caused by the momentum of the 
outflow of unburnt gas/air mixture, which ‘over-vents’ the explosion chamber 
and as the explosion is still in its early stages, the expanding flame front does 
not generate sufficient pressure to maintain a positive pressure within the 
chamber. The difference in pressure across the vent opening subsequently 
causes air and unburnt gas/air mixture to flow back into the vessel which 
creates turbulence.  
ii. The second dominant peak was caused by the external explosion in a similar 
manner to that of a single compartment explosion.  
iii. The third dominant peak, which occurred in many of the explosion tests, and 
which was observed to produce the maximum pressure in many experiments, 
was found to be more complex in origin and significantly more variable in its 
magnitude. The generation of this pressure peak was found to arise from the 
complex interaction of the combustion in each of the two compartments. This 
mechanism is discussed in more detail in the next sections. 
The Effects of Interconnected Rooms  230 
4.4. Type I Experiments 
In the type I tests, undertaken as series A, both the left and right enclosures had the 
largest vent opening, with a KA value of 2.4. In all the tests, the vent material used was 
12.5 mm fibreboard. Essentially four groups of test were undertaken: 
1 Open doorway: 
a. rear ignition, 
b. centre ignition. 
2 Closed door: 
a. rear ignition, 
b. centre ignition. 
For each of these groups of test, the effects of gas concentration and depth of layer 
were investigated. 
4.4.1. The Effects of Gas Concentration 
Test number 1 was undertaken with a layered natural gas/air mixture of 8% 
concentration (v/v) in each enclosure. The interconnecting doorway was open and 
ignition was in the rear position. The overpressure-time history is shown in Figure 4-1. 
The pressure measurements shown in the diagram were taken from pressure 
transducers P4 and P8. The pressure measurements taken from other transducers had 
similar profiles. 
As the natural gas/air mixture was moderately lean in concentration, there was an 
initial, relatively slow pressure rise up to approximately 580 ms after ignition, followed 
by a rapid drop in pressure to below ambient (Figure 4-1). It can be seen that the 
maximum pressure was generated in the first pressure peak and was recorded at 38 
mbar. The video footage showed that both enclosure vents began to fail simultaneously 
at 540 ± 40 ms and were clear of the vent openings approximately 80 ms later. The 
pressure peak of 38 mbar at 580 ms therefore corresponds to the vent opening and 
onset of venting. The flame reaches the plane of the vent opening at 900 ± 40 ms but 
no significant pressure rise was measured inside the explosion chamber (usually seen 
shortly after an external explosion). However, bulk oscillations about ambient pressure 
start very shortly afterwards, at approximately 1 s, and occur at a frequency of 
approximately 60 Hz. The pressure oscillations recorded for each enclosure appear to 
have an opposite phase indicating that there is bulk movement between rooms via the 
doorway. In general terms, the pressure-time profile was similar to that expected of an 
explosion of a lean mixture in a single enclosure with a similar vent opening and failure 
pressure. 
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Figure 4-1 Overpressure-time profile for type I test (fuel lean, φ = 0.83) 
The dominant pressure peak in the fuel lean layered tests generally corresponded to 
the failure of the vents and the onset of venting, with the external explosion being less 
influential. This was because the entrainment of air, as the unburnt fuel/air mixture was 
expelled from the vent openings, diluted the forming cloud to a point where it was either 
not flammable or the severity of the external explosion was not sufficient to generate 
further overpressure within the explosion chamber. 
Figure 4-2 shows the pressure-time history for test number 4. Test number 4 was 
undertaken with a layered natural gas/air mixture of 10% concentration (v/v) in each 
enclosure. The interconnecting doorway was open and ignition was in the rear position. 
Consequently, the test was identical to test number 1 except the concentration was 
now slightly rich of stoichiometric. However, in comparison with the overpressure-time 
history of test number 1, there were a number of significant differences. 
The initial pressure rise is considerably more rapid in this test because of the higher 
burning velocity associated with the near stoichiometric concentration. Observation of 
the video footage showed that both enclosure vents began to fail simultaneously at 
approximately 270 ± 40 ms (see Figure 4-3) and were clear of the vent openings 
approximately 80 ms later.  
The Effects of Interconnected Rooms  232 
 
Figure 4-2 Overpressure-time profile for type I test (≈ stoichiometric, φ = 1.05) 
However, as a consequence of the vent opening, and in a similar manner to test 
number 1, a rapid pressure drop to below ambient pressure occurred, giving rise to a 
pressure peak of similar magnitude (approximately 40 mbar) at 300 ms after ignition. 
Following this pressure drop to below ambient, a number of bulk gas oscillations 
occurred with flow reversal through the vent opening. However, these oscillations were 
interrupted by a sudden, very rapid pressure rise beginning at 460 ms, giving rise to a 
sharp pressure peak of 86 mbar at 480 ms. The video footage indicates that the flame 
reached the plane of both of the enclosure vent openings at 460 ms ± 40 ms (frame 
three of Figure 4-3). The sharp pressure peak therefore corresponds to the arrival of 
the flame at the vent openings and may be attributed to ignition of the flammable cloud 
expelled from the chamber during venting. In most of the tests observed during this 
series, there was a slight ‘dip’ in the overpressure-time profile just before the Pext peak. 
This slight reduction in overpressure was caused by the onset of burnt gas venting. 
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Figure 4-3 Photo sequence from onset of vent opening to external explosion 
(test No. 4) 
Figure 4-4 shows the pressure-time history for test number 7. This test was undertaken 
with a layered natural gas/air mixture of 12% concentration (v/v) in each enclosure. The 
interconnecting doorway was open and ignition was in the rear position. Consequently, 
the test was similar to test numbers 1 and 4 except the concentration was now rich. 
The timing of vent failure and the flame reaching the plane of the vent opening was 
similar to that of the slightly rich mixture of stoichiometric test No. 4, with the maximum 
pressure peak occurring immediately after the flame front had reached the vent 
opening. This indicates that the pressure peak was caused by the external explosion. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the magnitude of the maximum pressure peak, caused by the 
external explosion was similar to that of test No. 4. Previous experimental work has 
shown that there is a direct correlation between the pressure inside the explosion 
chamber following an external explosion and increasing gas concentration [34, 35].  
 
Figure 4-4 Overpressure-time profile for type I test (fuel rich, φ = 1.30) 
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The unburnt gas/air mixture entrains air as it is expelled through the vent opening and 
therefore stoichiometric mixtures are likely to be fuel lean when ignited by the explosion 
flame front and fuel rich mixtures are likely to be closer to stoichiometric. An identical 
test (test No. 6), produced a maximum pressure peak of 179 mbar in the right 
enclosure, which, in accordance with the previous work of Tite [34, 35], was greater 
than the results of the near stoichiometric tests.  
The results of test number 7 may be understood when it is recognised that the layer of 
fuel/air mixture within the enclosures, prior to ignition, was only half full and 
consequently there may have been dilution of the mixture by air in the lower half of the 
enclosures in addition to entrainment of air during venting.  
The effects of gas concentration on maximum overpressure for type I tests with rear 
ignition and no interconnecting door are summarised in Figure 4-5.  
 
Figure 4-5 Maximum overpressure vs. gas concentration (type I tests, series A) 
Interestingly, the maximum overpressure peak for the 8% gas concentration tests 
corresponded to the failure of the vents, resulting in an overpressure of 39 mbar, whilst 
both the 10% and 12% maximum peak pressure peaks were related to the external 
explosion, with maximum values measuring 103 and 179 mbar respectively. The 
results of the fuel rich tests (No’s 6 and 7), show a difference in peak overpressure of 
96 mbar. The reason for this has been described above. 
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4.4.2. The Effects of Layer Depth 
The overpressure-time profile comparing half layer and full volume tests is shown in 
Figure 4-6. In this example, both enclosures contained a fuel/air mixture of 10% gas 
concentration, ignition was at the rear of the chamber and the doorway was open. It 
can be noticed that whilst the profile of the two tests are similar (except for the 
oscillatory combustion), the magnitude of the pressure peaks and the time at which 
they occur is significantly different. It is clear from the overpressure-time profile that the 
rate of pressure rise during the early stages of the explosion (up until vent failure) is 
greater in the full volume test. Furthermore, in the full volume test, the flame arrives at 
the vent opening sooner (≈ 400 ms vs. 505 ms) indicating that the flame speed was 
also faster. The rate of pressure rise and flame speed are directly proportional to the 
flame surface area. In the half layer tests, ignition was initiated in the left chamber, at 
the centre of the rear wall; a height, which is at the flammable mixture–air interface. 
Consequently, during the early stages of the explosion, the expanding flame front 
would have started to propagate in the shape of a quarter-sphere whilst the full volume 
flame would have propagated in a hemispherical shape. Accordingly, the total surface 
area of the flame would have been significantly greater in the case of the full volume 
test, and this is demonstrated by the shorter time taken for the flame front to arrive at 
the vent opening. 
 
Figure 4-6 The effects of layer depth (type I, series A) 
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The difference in magnitude of the Pext pressure peak may be explained by a reduction 
in gas concentration and hence flame speed. Firstly, as the flame propagates through 
the half layer within the enclosures, the bunt gases expand creating flow. This flow, 
causes the air in the lower half of the chamber to mix with the fuel/air mixture, diluting 
its concentration. Secondly, further dilution takes place as the mixture entrains air as it 
is expelled through the vent opening. It was demonstrated in Chapter 2 that the 
greatest burning velocity, and hence most violent explosion, occurs just rich of 
stoichiometric; so it is logical to assume that the greatest overpressure generated 
outside the chamber will occur with the ignition of a slightly rich flammable cloud. This 
concentration is more likely to have occurred with a full volume than that of a half layer, 
and this is demonstrated by the difference in magnitude of the Pext overpressure peaks. 
It would have been desirable to have a transient record of the changing concentration 
of the external flammable cloud, but this was outside the scope of this study. 
4.4.3. The Effects of Ignition Position 
Figure 4-7 shows the overpressure time profile of test number 10 in which a 10% 
natural gas half layer was ignited at the centre ignition position. No interconnecting 
door was present. When compared to similar tests with rear ignition, the initial rate of 
pressure rise in the central ignition test was higher due to the increased flame surface 
area as the flame propagated hemispherically (centre ignition position is at the 
mixture/air interface for half layer tests). The rate of pressure rise should be similar to 
that of a full volume rear ignition test as the flame surface area would, in theory, be 
similar. Observation of the overpressure-time profile of test number 8 (Figure 4-6) 
confirms that this theory is correct as the PV peak occurred at around 280 ms for both 
tests and there was only a 2 mbar difference in magnitude. 
In central ignition tests, a single, sharp Pext pressure peak was not observed. Instead, 
two separate pressure peaks, generally smaller in magnitude [labelled P(L)ext and 
P(R)ext in Figure 4-7] occurred, separated by 40 – 50 ms. The observation that the 
magnitude of the Pext pressure peak was smaller than that associated with rear ignition 
tests was in agreement with the findings detailed in Chapter 2, where it was illustrated 
that with central ignition, much less unburnt gas is expelled before the flame front 
reaches the vents. This is because the flame propagates away from the point of 
ignition, trapping a quantity of the unburnt gas/air mixture behind the expanding flame 
front, towards the rear of the chamber. Hence the external cloud is much smaller than 
in the rear ignition case where a large quantity of unburnt gas/air mixture is expelled 
ahead of the expanding flame front, and combustion of this smaller cloud gives rise to a 
much lower maximum overpressure.  
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Figure 4-7 Overpressure-time profile for type I test (central ignition) 
The two pressure peaks P(L)ext and P(R)ext were recorded by the pressure transducers 
in both enclosures and occurred immediately after the flame front had reached the left 
vent and right vent respectively. Observation of the video records showed that there 
appeared to be two external explosions separated by a short time interval (40 to 50 ms) 
and this was in agreement with the pressure peaks observed in the overpressure-time 
profiles. The P(L)ext pressure peak originated from ignition of the unburnt cloud expelled 
mainly from the vent in the left enclosure, by the flame front as it jetted out of the left 
vent opening. The P(R)ext pressure peak corresponded to ignition of the unburnt cloud 
outside the right vent opening. It was not within the scope of this project to determine 
the actual cause of this mechanism, but it is possible that two separate flammable 
clouds were formed outside the enclosures, which were separated by a non-flammable 
gap. Consequently, the flammable clouds were ignited by the flame fronts exiting from 
each of the enclosures. It is also possible that the expelled flammable cloud from the 
left vent opening had sufficient momentum to carry it clear of the explosion chamber, 
preventing the immediate ignition of the unburnt mixture subsequently expelled from 
the right vent. This second external cloud would then have been ignited some 40 to 50 
ms later, by the jetting flame front exiting the right vent opening, and giving rise to the 
pressure peak P(R)ext. 
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Centre ignition in a type I experiment with both chambers full of a 10% natural gas/air 
mixture (test number 12) gave rise to a slightly greater rate of pressure rise when 
compared to half layer tests and slightly larger P(L)ext and P(R)ext pressure peaks. The 
increased magnitude is in part due to the increased surface area of the spherical flame 
front but also to the dilution effects associated with a layer that were discussed in 
Section 4.4.2.  
4.4.4. The Effects of an Interconnecting Door 
In tests undertaken where an interconnecting door was present, there were some 
noticeable differences in the overpressure time profiles. Figure 4-8 shows the 
overpressure-time profile of the right enclosure for test number 14 and Figure 4-9 
shows both the left and right enclosure profiles for comparison. In this test a 10% 
natural gas/air half layer was ignited at the rear ignition position, with the lightweight 
door in the closed position. The door was pushed closed but was not latched at the 
time of ignition. 
It can be observed from the diagrams that the overpressure-time profiles were 
significantly different from profiles with an open doorway. Whist, the first pressure peak, 
PV, corresponded to the simultaneous failure of both the vents, and was of a similar 
magnitude (41 mbar) to tests with an open doorway, the second major pressure peak, 
Pext, was completely different in profile. 
 
Figure 4-8 The effects of an interconnecting door (type I test, right room) 
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The pressure rise leading to Pext was considerably slower than in the open door 
experiments, leading to a peak of approximately twice the duration. A sharp pressure 
spike, immediately preceded by a slight fall, was superimposed on this broad peak, 
attaining a maximum pressure of 88 mbar, so the peak was similar in magnitude to 
those recorded in the open doorway tests. The flame front was observed at the plane 
of the vent openings at 450 ms after ignition, which was some 40 to 50 ms after the 
start of the broad duration peak, coinciding with the slight fall in pressure immediately 
prior to the sharp spike. This indicates that the fall in pressure corresponded to the 
onset of burnt gas venting and that the spike that was superimposed onto the broad 
pressure peak was the Pext peak caused by ignition of the cloud of unburnt mixture 
expelled from the vent openings. However, the cause of the broad pressure peak must 
be caused by another mechanism. The overpressure time profiles of the left and right 
enclosures are shown in Figure 4-9.  
 
Figure 4-9 The effects of an interconnecting door (left and right rooms) 
Although the pressure-time profiles for the two enclosures are very similar, there are 
time periods where there are differences in magnitude that reflect the development of 
the explosion and, when the status of the door permits, indicate that there is flow from 
one room to another. The difference in pressure between the two enclosures is shown 
from ignition to 400 ms as the plot, ∆P, on the secondary Y axis in Figure 4-9. During, 
the initial stage of the explosion, the expanding flame kernel in the ignition enclosure 
caused the pressure to rise but did not increase the pressure in the adjoining room as 
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the door was initially closed. Examination of video records shows that at approximately 
150 ms after ignition, the interconnecting door began to swing open into the right 
enclosure. The overpressure time profiles indicate that the pressure differential at that 
time was in the order of a few mbar, which was sufficient to overcome the inertia of the 
lightweight door that was not latched. Consequently, there was a mass flow of unburnt 
gas/air mixture from the left enclosure into the right enclosure which caused the 
pressure to rise until it equalised across the two rooms. The process of the door 
swinging open and the subsequent mass flow into the right enclosure created 
turbulence, which caused an increase in the burning velocity and a mass combustion 
rate that was greater than that of the initially quiescent stage of combustion in the left 
enclosure. 
In addition to this effect, the propagating flame front would have become ‘stretched’ as 
it approached the interconnecting doorway and propagated into the adjoining room. 
Because of the turbulence in this room and because of the increased surface area of 
the flame front caused by distortion as it passed through the doorway, a rapid rise in 
combustion rate would have occurred, resulting in a significant increase in pressure. 
This pressure rise would clearly have occurred before the flame front reached the vent 
openings and that is demonstrated in the rapid increase in pressure which commenced 
at 400 ms after ignition. The broad part of this pressure peak has been labelled Pt to 
reflect the turbulent combustion, but it is also clear from the overpressure-time profiles, 
and the video records, that the external explosion also contributes to the magnitude of 
the pressure peak. Consequently, they are both marked on the diagrams. 
In order to investigate the effect of the door opening, the pressure differential between 
the enclosures and the volume flowrate though the doorway (from the time the door 
opened until the flame front reached the doorway), are plotted in Figure 4-10. The 
volume flowrate has been calculated using the equation for the flow through an orifice 
[Equation (2-43)], taking the pressure differential across the door from the 
overpressure-time profiles. As the position of the door was not accurately known, it has 
been assumed to be fully open for the purposes of the calculations. 
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Figure 4-10 Potential volume flowrate though open doorway (test 14) 
It can be seen that the maximum flowrate that could have passed through a doorway 
that opened instantaneously would have been 24.5 m3/s. Correspondingly, the 
calculated maximum velocity through the doorway would have been 16 m/s. As some 
flow would have been directed towards the partition wall, the mean velocity, U, may be 
determined by multiplying the maximum flow velocity by the door area blockage ratio, 
ABR (0.174), giving a mean velocity of 2.8 m/s towards the partition wall. If the open 
doorway is assumed to be a large grid type obstacle, then Equation (2-64) may be 
used to calculate the turbulence intensity. The CT value required in Equation (2-64) was 
calculated to be 0.225, based on the t/d ratio for the door opening (Section 2.5.3), and 
the pressure loss coefficient, K, also required in Equation (2-64), was determined using 
Equation (2-66), assuming a Cd value of 0.61. The turbulence intensity, u′/U was 
calculated to be 0.22, giving a root mean square (rms) of the fluctuating component of 
velocity, u’, a value of 0.63 m/s. This clearly demonstrates that turbulence is being 
generated. Similar values of turbulence were calculated for the peaks at 320 ms and 
360 ms. 
It should be noted that there are some assumptions used in the above calculation of 
the turbulence within the right enclosure that are not strictly valid but are representative 
of the levels of turbulence within the room for comparative purposes. The calculation 
assumes that the flame front is fully developed within the left enclosure and just about 
to enter the right enclosure. This is not an accurate representation of the condition as 
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the explosion involved a layer of flammable/air mixture and the flame would not have 
been fully developed. However, as the same assumption will be made for three of the 
test types, the calculations provide a sufficient accuracy for comparative purposes.  
In general terms, explosions involving less reactive mixtures, provided sufficient time 
for turbulent combustion to develop in the secondary enclosure before the flame 
arrived at the vent opening, and consequently Pt tended to dominate. However, in the 
faster flame speed tests (φ = 1.05), the flame front reached the vent opening before 
combustion of the turbulent mixture at the rear of the enclosure and Pext tended to 
dominate. 
In a few tests involving more reactive mixtures, the flame arrived at the plane of the 
vent opening after the Pt peak and there was no significant Pext peak produced (Figure 
4-11). In these tests, the flame front reached the doorway at approximately the same 
time as the vents failed. This resulted in the flame front in the right enclosure being 
distorted towards the vent opening.  
 
Figure 4-11 Overpressure-time profile showing late flame arrival at the vent 
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4.4.5. Proposed Mechanism for Explosion Development 
Whilst the turbulent combustion mechanism noted in these tests was extremely 
important (in terms of explosion development), and occurred in all tests where a door 
was present, it did not result in a maximum pressure greater than that observed in the 
open doorway tests. A proposed mechanism for the type I tests with a closed door is 
given in Figure 4-12. 
 
 
Figure 4-12 Proposed mechanism for type I tests (door closed) 
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4.4.6. Summary of Findings of Type I Tests 
With the exception of some tests involving fuel lean layers, the overpressure-time 
profiles were characterised by two dominant pressure peaks. The first of these peaks, 
occurred in all tests and corresponded to the failure, often simultaneously, of the 
explosion vents. The second peak corresponded to either the external explosion or 
turbulent combustion as a consequence of the interaction between adjoining rooms. 
In tests where there was an open doorway, the second dominant peak tended to 
correspond to the external explosion. The magnitude of the pressure peak generated 
by the external explosion was comparable to previous experiments conducted in a 
single compartment of the same explosion chamber [179]. It therefore appears that the 
adjoining room does not have a significant effect on the overpressure if there is an 
open doorway between the rooms and the vent areas are similar in both enclosures. 
The situation in which a closed interconnecting door was present between the 
enclosures, may be considered as two adjoining rooms connected via a very low failure 
pressure vent. In experiments of this scenario, the delayed opening of the door caused 
a pressure differential to develop between the rooms, which initiated flow from the 
ignition room (L) to the adjoining room (R) when the door swung open. The action of 
the door swinging open and the flow between the rooms (until the pressure equalised) 
generated turbulence, which resulted in a rapid pressure rise (Pt) once combustion was 
established. In some instances (12% layer, or 10% full volume), the flame arrived at the 
plane of the vent opening after the Pt peak and there was no significant Pext peak 
produced, and consequently, Pt dominated. 
In vented explosions, any parameter that affects the rate of mass combustion can 
influence the development of the explosion. Varying the gas concentration, layer depth 
and ignition position all influenced the overpressure-time profiles. As each of the above 
parameters alter the mass burning rate, either by changing the burning velocity 
(concentration) or the flame surface area (layer depth and ignition position), they each 
affect the rate of pressure generation and its magnitude. Thus, altering any of the 
parameters influenced the time taken, from ignition, to reach the first pressure peak. 
Furthermore, all three parameters affected the magnitude of the Pext pressure peak 
because they each influenced the size and composition of the external cloud.  
A summary of the time taken for vent failure, the maximum overpressure generated 
and the dominant mechanism for the maximum pressure peak is given in Table 4-3. 
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Table 4-3 Summary of type I test conditions and results 
Test 
No. 
Gas in air 


















Ign (L) Adj (R) 
1 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 540 38 PV 
2 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 580 39 PV 
3 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 330 103 Pext 
4 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 270 85 Pext 
5 10 10 Full 2.4 Rear Open 250 145 Pext 
6 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 275 179 Pext 
7 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Open 250 83 Pext 
8 10 10 Full 2.4 Rear Open 250 152 Pext 
9 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Open 260 47 PV 
10 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Open 270 46 PV 
11 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 450 48 Pt 
12 10 10 Full 2.4 Central Open 260 48 Pext 
13 8 8 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 480 38 PV 
14 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 260 88 Pt + Pext 
15 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 180 138 Pexta 
16 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Closed 240 62 Pext 
17 10 10 Full 2.4 Rear Closed 250 179 Pext 
18 10 10 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 280 97 Pext 
19 12 12 Layer 1.2 Rear Closed 260 103 Pta 
20 10 10 Full 2.4 Rear Closed 260 138 Pt 
21 10 10 Full 2.4 Central Open 250 62 Pext 
22 10 10 Layer 1.2 Central Closed 240 55 Pext 
a Test ignited with Ce-Mg fuses – failed to ignite with spark. 
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4.5. Type II Experiments 
The type II tests, undertaken as series B, C and D, had a larger vent in the left (ignition) 
enclosure, KA(L) = 2.4, and the right enclosure had a smaller vent: 
• Series B, KA(R) = 4(l) (i.e. the vent was fitted in the left side of the fascia panel). 
• Series C, KA(R) = 8 (fitted to the centre of the fascia panel). 
• Series D, KA(R) = 4(r) (i.e. the vent was fitted in the right side of the fascia 
panel). 
In all the tests, the vent material used was 12.5 mm fibreboard. Similarly to type I tests, 
the same four group of tests were undertaken by varying the ignition and door position. 
For each of these groups of test, the effects of gas concentration and depth of layer 
were investigated. 
4.5.1. Proposed Mechanism for Explosion Development 
Figure 4-13 shows the overpressure-time profile for test number 26. In this test, a 10% 
natural gas half layer was ignited at the rear ignition position and the doorway was 
closed with an unlatched lightweight door. Figure 4-13 shows the profile for the both 
enclosures separately, with a further plot to show the two curves superimposed. It also 
shows the difference in overpressure between the two enclosures (∆P on the Y axis). 
Though at first glance, the overpressure-time profile looks very similar to that of the 
type I profile, there are a number of significant differences.  
Whilst in the type I tests the first pressure peak was caused by the simultaneous failure 
of both vents (in most tests), the first pressure peak in the type II test corresponded to 
the failure of the left vent (KA(L) = 2.4) only. Measuring 55 mbar, it was also appreciably 
greater in magnitude. The second dominating pressure peak measured 400 mbar in 
test 26, which is over double the highest value attained in any type I experiment.  
In the very early stages of the layered explosion (< 50 ms), the flame front begins to 
propagate in the shape of a quarter-sphere and a slight pressure differential is 
developed between the rooms, caused by the presence of the closed door. This 
continued to build and at approximately 180 to 200 ms the inertia of the door was 
overcome by the pressure differential and the interconnecting door swung open, 
allowing unburnt gas/air mixture to flow into the right enclosure. The action of the door 
swinging open and the flow into the room generated turbulence. At approximately 220 
ms, the pressure had equalised between the two compartments and flow between 
them would have ceased. A proposed mechanism, generalising the events observed in 
the type II tests is given in Figure 4-14. 
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Figure 4-13 Overpressure-time profiles for type II test 
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At 250 ms the pressure in the enclosure was of sufficient magnitude that the left 
enclosure vent failed, allowing unburnt gas/air mixture to be rapidly expelled, giving rise 
to the pressure peak PV(L) in the left enclosure some 20 ms later, with a magnitude of 
48 mbar. The expanding flow, distorts the flame front in the left room (ignition) towards 
the doorway such that at a similar time to the vent failure, combustion has begun in the 
right enclosure. The right enclosure vent, being smaller in size, had a greater failure 
pressure and remained intact at this time. The pressure in the left enclosure then 
dropped, passing through ambient at 350 ms and, as it was very early in the explosion, 
reaching a slightly negative value due to over-venting. Combustion in the right 
enclosure was rapid at this point, due to the turbulent mixture, so the pressure in the 
right enclosure continued to rise after PV(L) had occurred in the left enclosure, producing 
a PV(L) pressure peak in the right enclosure at approximately 290 ms, with a value of 55 
mbar. Thus PV(L) occurred 20 ms later in the right enclosure than in the left. As a 
positive pressure differential had now developed between the right enclosure and the 
left enclosure, the flow reversed through the doorway and the flame front was ‘pulled’ 
back towards the door. The sudden venting of the right enclosure into the left, caused 
the pressure to drop to 20 mbar below ambient at 350 ms, whilst the pressure 
decrease in the left enclosure was less marked because the venting losses were 
somewhat offset by the inward flow from the right enclosure. It is clear to see, that even 
in these early stages of the explosion, the mechanism is extremely complex with flow 
reversing between the rooms, and into and out of the enclosure, as the pressure 
differential changed. This would have generated significant turbulence. 
Whilst the venting of the right room was occurring, at approximately 330 ms, the 
pressure differential had now reversed again which caused the flow to reverse through 
the doorway into the right enclosure. The pressure in both rooms then began to rise 
again, slightly faster in the right enclosure, so that at 390 ms the pressures had again 
equalized. At this point, combustion of a highly turbulent mixture in the right enclosure 
was fully established. The very rapid combustion, coupled with the restricted venting 
through the doorway, caused a very rapid rise in pressure to occur, such that at 400 ms 
the right vent failed. Examination of the video records indicated that the flame front first 
appeared at the left hand vent immediately after the start of the second peak and this 
initiated the external explosion. Thus a significant pressure peak was generated, which 
was somewhat higher in the right enclosure than the left, and was attributed to both 
turbulent combustion and the external explosion. The pressure peaks were measured 
as 400 mbar in the right enclosure and 317 mbar in the left.  
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Figure 4-14 Proposed mechanism for type II tests (rear ignition, door closed) 
(adapted from the observational notes of Skippon and Field [404]) 
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The video records and overpressure-time profiles for type II tests demonstrate that 
whilst the external explosion plays an important role in the development of the 
maximum explosion overpressure, the dominating factor was the turbulent combustion. 
The effect of this turbulent combustion was significantly more influential than in the type 
I experiments, because it takes place under a much higher degree of confinement. In 
the type I experiments the right enclosure is relieved through the doorway and the KA(R) 
= 2.4 right vent during the whole of the turbulent combustion phase, whilst in the type II 
experiments, relief occurs only through the doorway, and at a late stage through a 
much smaller KA(R) = 4 or KA(R) = 8 vent. Furthermore, a series of flow reversals created 
a significantly greater degree of turbulence than would have been generated in the type 
I experiments, giving rise to overpressures more than double that measured in type I 
tests. Previous studies of interconnected vessels have identified that that expanding 
flame front in the ignition vessel can precompress the fuel/air mixture in the secondary 
vessel leading to significantly increased overpressures [154, 207, 241, 249, 251, 256-
262]. However, this work demonstrates that the situation is in fact more complicated in 
vented explosions with interconnected rooms, since it is apparent that a number of flow 
reversals across the doorway occur. Moreover, in Figure 4-13, it can be seen that at 
350 ms, between the first and second pressure peaks, that the pressure in the right 
enclosure falls below ambient and any precompression that occurred between 350 ms 
and 390 ms, when the flame re-entered the right room and turbulent combustion was 
fully established, was small and would not account for the magnitude of the second 
pressure peak. 
4.5.2. The Effects of Gas Concentration 
The effects of concentration on maximum overpressure are shown in Figure 4-15. Both 
the closed door and open doorway results are given for tests involving a half layer and 
rear ignition. It has already been discussed in Section 4.5.1 that the maximum pressure 
corresponds to a combination of turbulent combustion and the external explosion with 
the former being the dominant factor. Consequently, there is a direct correlation 
between the magnitude of the pressure peak and the turbulent burning velocity; and as 
the burning velocity is dependent upon gas concentration, it would be expected, with 
closed door tests, that tests with 10% concentration produced the maximum 
overpressures. Figure 4-15 confirms this hypothesis. However, for open doorway tests, 
the degree of turbulence was less influential and the external explosion became more 
significant (Figure 4-16). Consequently, in these tests, the maximum overpressures 
would be expected to occur with fuel rich concentrations; Figure 4-15 confirms this 
observation. 
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Figure 4-15 The effects of gas concentration (type II tests, series B) 
4.5.3. The Effects of an Interconnecting Door 
Where an interconnecting door was absent, the degree of turbulence generated in the 
right enclosure must have been significantly less than when the door was closed. 
Some turbulence would have been generated as the expanding flame front in the left 
enclosure initiated flow through the doorway, but in comparison, there would not have 
been a sudden flow as the door was opened and neither would the door have acted as 
a turbulence generating obstacle. Consequently, turbulent combustion in the right 
enclosure was less influential on the maximum overpressure developed within the 
explosion chamber, and the contribution of the external explosion played a more 
significant role. 
In test number 28 (Figure 4-16), which was a fuel rich test with an open doorway, at 
approximately 400 ms, the pressure starts to increase rapidly due to the turbulent 
combustion. However, immediately after the flame front arrived at the left vent opening, 
there was a sharp pressure rise corresponding to the external explosion, which 
produced a sharp spike on top of the Pt pressure peak. This contribution from the 
external explosion is the reason for the increase in maximum overpressure, as a 
function of gas concentration seen in Figure 4-15. 
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Figure 4-16 Comparison of tests with open doorway and closed door 
Closing the door had a significant effect on the maximum overpressure and on the 
development of the explosion, as discussed in Section 4.5.1. This effect can be clearly 
seen in Figure 4-16, which allows for two identical tests (except for the door position) to 
be compared. The test with the open doorway generated a maximum overpressure of 
145 mbar whilst closing the door increased the maximum pressure to 172 mbar. The 
presence initially obstructs flow between the rooms and allows a pressure differential to 
build up. Once the door is opened, significant turbulence is created resulting in higher 
maximum overpressures. 
Surprisingly, in Figure 4-16, it can be seen that it took less time for the left vent (ignition 
enclosure) to fail in test 28 (open doorway) than in test 29. This observation did not 
occur in any other tests undertaken in the series. It would be expected for closed door 
tests, given that more turbulent combustion occurs, that the pressure rise more rapidly, 
causing the vent to fail earlier than it would in a corresponding test with an open 
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doorway. The difference in time taken to reach the pressure peak indicates that in this 
case, combustion was taking place more rapidly in the test with the open doorway. 
Consequently, the possible causes for this surprising observation are that the flame 
distorted through the open doorway, increasing the flame surface area significantly, or 
that there was an error in the recording of the gas concentration of either test. 
4.5.4. The Effects of Ignition Position 
The overpressure-time profiles of a central ignition test and a comparable rear ignition 
test are given in Figure 4-17. In this experimental arrangement, a 10% half layer was 
used, the vent sizes were KA(L) = 2.4 and KA(R) = 4(l), and the doorway was closed by an 
unlatched lightweight door. Observation of the profiles reveals two significant 
differences. The first difference is that the magnitude of the second pressure peak is 
greater with rear ignition. The second difference is that the onset of both major 
pressure peaks begins slightly earlier with central ignition (approximately 30 ms). 
 
Figure 4-17 Comparison of tests with rear and central ignition 
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The proposed sequence of events during central ignition tests is shown schematically 
in Figure 4-18. Early in the explosion, the flame front is expanding from the centre 
ignition position in a spherical (full volume) or hemispherical shape (half layer), which 
causes the pressure to rise in the left enclosure and because the door is closed a 
pressure differential is developed. As the flame continues to expand, the pressure rises 
in the left room and overcomes the inertia of the door, causing it to swing open. The 
flame distorts towards the doorway and because of the pressure differential, unburnt 
gas/air mixture flows into the right enclosure generating turbulence.  
The flame enters the right enclosure much earlier than is the case with rear ignition 
because it has a shorter distance to travel. Consequently, the interval between the door 
opening and the flame front entering the room is short, so the period of turbulence 
generation is also shorter than is the case with rear ignition. The pressure in the left 
enclosure continues to rise, which causes the left enclosure vent to fail, generating the 
PV(L) pressure peak in the left enclosure. Unburnt gas/air mixture are expelled through 
the left vent opening generating a flammable cloud. Combustion is already well 
established in the right enclosure.  
Shortly after the failure of the left vent, the pressure drops in the left enclosure. This 
causes the flow to reverse through the doorway causing the pressure to drop in the 
right enclosure. Meanwhile the flame front in the left enclosure distorts towards the vent 
and when it reaches the opening, it ignites the external cloud causing the external 
explosion. This pressure wave restricts outflow through the vent and creates the 
second, intermediate pressure peak labelled Pext,(1) in the left enclosure (see Figure 
4-17).  
The pressure wave from the external explosion propagates through the vent opening 
into the explosion chamber, which has the effect of ‘pushing’ the flame front farther into 
the right enclosure. The turbulent combustion (along with the external explosion) 
creates the second, and maximum, pressure peak. There is a shorter interval between 
the first and second pressure peaks because the flame front is being driven into the 
right enclosure by the external explosion. The rapid pressure rise causes the right vent 
to fail, expelling unburnt gas/air mixture through the vent. This may be ignited when the 
flame front in the right enclosure reaches the vent opening. However, at this stage in 
the explosion there is a relatively small quantity of unburnt gas/air mixture within the 
enclosure. 
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Figure 4-18 Proposed mechanism for type II tests (central ignition, door closed) 
(adapted from the observational notes of Skippon and Field [404]) 
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4.5.5. The Effects of Vent Size in the Adjoining Enclosure 
The effect of changing the size of the vent in the adjoining (right) enclosure on 
maximum overpressure is given in Figure 4-19. In the diagram, the maximum 
overpressure generated within the enclosure is plotted against KA for both central and 
rear ignition. In all tests KA(L) = 2.4. For completeness, the KA(R) value of 2.4 from test 
type I is included in this plot. In most of the type I tests, the maximum pressure 
corresponded to the external explosion, whereas, in the type II tests, the maximum 
overpressure was generally dominated by turbulent combustion. 
It can be seen that decreasing the right vent size from KA(R) = 2.4 to KA(R) = 4 or 8 
increased the maximum overpressure for both central ignition and rear ignition tests. It 
can also be observed, that whilst decreasing the right vent size from KA(R) = 2.4 to KA(R) 
= 4 had a significant effect on the maximum overpressure, a further decrease in vent 
size did not result in a further increase in overpressure. Work undertaken by MRS [187] 
has shown that if an enclosure has more than one vent, each with different failure 
pressures, the venting process takes place predominately through the vent with the 
lower failure pressure. In these tests, the right enclosure may be considered as a room 
with two vents, the first vent is the KA(R) = 4 or KA(R) = 8, and the second is the 
lightweight door, with a failure pressure of a few mbar. Consequently, the main 
contribution to pressure relief in the right enclosure would have been venting through 
the doorway and out of the left vent opening. Additionally, the area of the doorway was 
greater than that of the smaller KA(R) = 4 and KA(R) = 8 vents.  
Figure 4-20 shows the overpressure-time profiles for tests 26 (KA(R) = 4) and 36 (KA(R) = 
8). It can be seen that the KA(R) = 4 vent fails sooner than the KA(R) = 8 vent. This is 
because the KA(R) = 4 vent is larger, and as both vents are constructed of the same 
material, it has a lower failure pressure. It can also be seen that the PV peak is of 
greater magnitude and that the flame reaches the plane of the left vent opening sooner 
in the KA(R) = 4 test. These observations indicate that there is more turbulence being 
generated in test 26 and provides some explanation of the greater overpressure 
developed. Furthermore, the longer time taken for the failure of the KA(R) = 8 vent 
means that there was more venting through the doorway and out of the left enclosure 
opening in comparison with the KA(R) = 4 test. 
In the experiments where KA(R) = 4, the vent could be fitted at either the left side or the 
right side of the front fascia panel. This was found to have no significant effect on either 
the maximum overpressure or the shape of the overpressure-time profile. 
 
257  Chapter 4 
 
Figure 4-19 Maximum overpressure vs. vent size (type II tests) 
 
Figure 4-20 The effects of adjoining enclosure vent size (type II tests) 
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4.5.6. Summary of Findings of Type II Tests 
The highest overpressure recorded in type II experiments was 414 mbar. Similarly to 
type I tests, the type II experiments were characterised by two dominant pressure 
peaks. The first peak always corresponded to the failure of the left (ignition enclosure) 
vent, which was recorded in both enclosures (right enclosure always recorded the 
event later than the left). The second pressure peak was considerably higher than the 
comparable peak observed in the type I tests. In most cases, this was caused by the 
rapid turbulent combustion of the fuel/air mixture in the right (secondary) enclosure. 
The mixture had become turbulent due to the complex flow interaction between 
enclosures via the connecting doorway and its effect on pressure generation was 
enhanced due to the increased confinement.  
In tests where there was an open doorway, less turbulence was generated, and the 
dominant influence, particularly with fuel rich explosions, was the external explosion. In 
these instances, the maximum overpressure was produced by tests involving a 12% 
natural gas concentration. However, when an interconnecting door was present, 
significant turbulence was generated in the fuel/air mixture in the right enclosure 
leading to high peak overpressures (sufficient to cause structural damage to buildings). 
Not surprisingly, due to the higher burning velocity, the 10% concentration tests 
produced greater overpressures than either the 8% or 12% concentrations. 
With central ignition tests, the flame entered the right enclosure much earlier than was 
the case with rear ignition tests because it had a shorter distance to travel. 
Consequently, the interval between the door opening and the flame front entering the 
room was short, so the period of turbulence generation was also shorter than was the 
case with rear ignition. In addition, due to the position of ignition, after the door opened, 
the turbulent flow through the doorway was of shorter duration meaning that the 
turbulent burning velocity would have been lower than corresponding tests with rear 
ignition. Consequently, the maximum pressure generated within the enclosure was of 
lower magnitude. 
The use of a smaller vent in the right enclosure had a significant effect on the 
maximum overpressure and the mechanism of the explosion development. However, 
altering the size from KA(R) = 4 to KA(R) = 8 had little overall effect. This was largely due 
to the greater generation of turbulence with KA(R) = 4 and the venting process at this 
stage of the explosion which predominantly occurred via the doorway and through the 
left vent opening. 
A summary of the time of flame arrival at the vent opening, the maximum overpressure 
and the dominant pressure generation mechanism is given in Table 4-4. 
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Table 4-4 Summary of type II test conditions and results 
Test 
No. 
Gas in air 








Time of flame 


















23 8 8 Layer Rear Open 2.4 4l 740 740 62 Pt 
24 10 10 Layer Rear Open 2.4 4l - - 90 Pext 
25 8 8 Layer Rear Closed 2.4 4l 560 560 214 Pt 
26 10 10 Layer Rear Closed 2.4 4l 390 - 400 Pt 
27 10 10 Layer Central Closed 2.4 4l 340 - 269 Pt 
28 12 12 Layer Rear Open 2.4 4l 460 - 145 Pext 
29 12 12 Full Rear Closed 2.4 4l 510 530 172 Pt 
30 8 8 Layer Rear Open 2.4 8 - - 131 Pt 
31 8 8 Layer Rear Closed 2.4 8 - - 138 Pt 
32 12 12 Layer Rear Open 2.4 8 620 - 152 Pext 
33 12 12 Layer Rear Closed 2.4 8 510 550 234 Pt 
34 10 10 Layer Central Open 2.4 8 400 470 200 Pt 
35 10 10 Layer Central Closed 2.4 8 400 440 207 Pt 
36 10 10 Layer Rear Closed 2.4 8 420 460 372 Pt 
37 10 10 Layer Central Open 2.4 4r 360 400 76 Pext 
38 10 10 Full Central Open 2.4 4r 350 430 117 Pt 
39 10 10 Layer Central Closed 2.4 4r 340 380 172 Pt 
40 10 10 Full Rear Closed 2.4 4r 430 430 338 Pt 
41 10 10 Layer Rear Closed 2.4 4r 390 430 414 Pt 
42 10 10 Full Rear Closed 2.4 4l - - 317 Pt 
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4.6. Type III Experiments 
The type III tests, undertaken as series E, F, H and J, had a smaller vent in the left 
(ignition) enclosure and a larger, KA(R) = 2.4 vent in the right enclosure. The left 
enclosure was vented as follows: 
• Series E, KA(L) = 4(r) (i.e. the vent was fitted in the right side of the left enclosure 
fascia panel). 
• Series F, KA(L) = 8. 
• Series H, KA(L) = 4(r). 
• Series J, KA(L) = 4(r). 
In all of the tests, the vent material used was 12.5 mm fibreboard. However, in this test 
type, a number of parameters were varied, namely, gas concentration in the enclosures 
such that in some tests (Series J) the gas concentration in adjoining rooms was 
different, the door type, the room into which the door hinged, the door latching 
mechanism and the angle that the door was open. The test arrangements are 
summarised in Table 4-5. In addition, in a small number of tests, the depth of 
flammable layer was varied (Series J). The results of these tests are reported in 
Section (4.6.6). 
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43 8 8 Lightweight  Closed Unlatched 
44 10 10 Lightweight  Closed Unlatched 
45 12 12 Lightweight  Closed Unlatched 
46 10 10 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
47 10 10 Lightweight Open Roller latch 
48 8 8 Lightweight Open Unlatched 
49 12 12 Lightweight Open Unlatched 
50 8 8 Lightweight Open Unlatched 
51 10 10 Lightweight Open Unlatched 
52 12 12 Lightweight Open Unlatched 
53 8 8 Lightweight Closed Unlatched 
54 10 10 Lightweight Closed Unlatched 
55 12 12 Lightweight Closed Unlatched 
56 10 10 Lightweight Closed Unlatched 
60 8 8 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
61 10 10 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
62 12 12 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
63 8 8 Fire door Closed Unlatched 
64 10 10 Fire door Closed Unlatched 
65 12 12 Fire door Closed Unlatched 
66 10 10 Fire door Closed Roller latch 
67 10 10 Lightweight Closed Mortice latch 
68 10 10 Fire door Closed Mortice latch 
71 8 10 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
72 10 8 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
73 8 12 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
73 12 8 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
75 10 12 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
76 12 10 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
77 6 13 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
78 13 6 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
79 6 10 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
80 10 6 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
81 10 10 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
82 10 10 Lightweight Closed Roller latch 
83 10 10 Lightweight Hinged into left room – open at 45° Unlatched 
84 10 10 Lightweight Hinged into left room – open at 45° Unlatched 
85 10 10 Lightweight Hinged into left room – open at 45° Unlatched 
86 10 10 Lightweight Hinged into left room – open at 90° Unlatched 
87 10 0 Lightweight Closed Tubular latch 
a Door hinges into right (adjoining room) unless otherwise stated. 
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4.6.1. Proposed Mechanism for Explosion Development 
Figure 4-21 shows the overpressure-time profile and pressure differential between 
enclosures for test 44, which was a half layer test of 10% concentration, ignited at the 
rear ignition position. A lightweight door was closed and unlatched. The right vent (KA(R) 
= 2.4) was larger than the left vent (KA(L) = 4). Continuing the trend of test types I and II, 
there are two major pressure peaks, with the second being of considerably greater 
magnitude than the first. 
 
Figure 4-21 Overpressure-time profile for type III test 
Additionally, as in test types I and II, the presence of a closed door made a difference 
to the maximum overpressure and the development of the explosion, although it was 
less pronounced than the type II tests in particular. A proposed mechanism for type III 
explosions is given in Figure 4-22. In the very early stages of the explosion, the flame 
propagates in the left (ignition) enclosure, assuming the shape of a quarter-sphere and 
the expanding hot gases generate pressure in the left enclosure (A). As the 
interconnecting door is closed, a pressure differential is developed, which at 
approximately 150 ms is sufficient to start to swing the door open (B). Due to the 
pressure difference, unburnt gas/air mixture flows into the right enclosure, generating 
turbulence and causing the flame front to distort towards the doorway. Approximately 
50 ms later, the pressure in the enclosures equalise, but by this time the flame front 
has reached the interconnected doorway and started to further distort, increasing the 
rate of combustion through an already turbulent mixture (C). The vent in the right 
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enclosure fails, generating the PV pressure peak, which in the case of test 44 (KA(R) = 
2.4) was recorded at 270 ms and measured approximately 40 mbar in the right 
enclosure (D). The PV peak is registered in the left enclosure some 20 ms later 
because it is only able to vent through the doorway, and consequently attains a greater 
magnitude (55 mbar in test 44). Due to the onset of venting, the pressure in both 
enclosures then falls below ambient. The flow through the doorway ‘drives’ the flame 
front towards the right vent opening and this sudden expanding flame front, rapidly 
increases the rate of combustion, generating a fast rise in pressure within the adjoining 
enclosure, which creates a pressure peak (E and F), labelled Pjeff, due to its 
correspondence with the jetting expanding flame front. The Pjeff pressure peak in test 
44 occurred at approximately 370 ms and attained values of 314 mbar in the right 
enclosure and 370 mbar in the left. The left vent (KA(L) = 4) failed during the generation 
of this pressure peak. 
It can be seen that the second major pressure peak is dominated by the rapid increase 
in flame surface area, which has been initiated through the complex flow interaction 
between rooms when a door is initially closed, and the venting process through the 
adjoining room. The external explosion (F) contributes to the magnitude of this second 
peak but is not the dominating influence. A key feature of the type III explosions 
however, is the ‘jetting’ of the flame front into the adjoining enclosure, driven by the 
venting process. This causes a significant increase in the rate of combustion which is 
greater than that seen in type II tests. Consequently, the maximum pressure peaks 
occur earlier and are of greater magnitude. 
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Figure 4-22 Proposed mechanism for type III tests (rear ignition, door closed) 
(adapted from the observational notes of Skippon and Field [404]) 
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4.6.2. The Effects of Gas Concentration 
The effect of gas concentration on the maximum overpressure generated within the 
enclosure is given in Figure 4-23. This diagram highlights the effects of gas 
concentration on half layer tests with the door initially both open and closed. Rather 
differently from the type I and II test, the curves for both an open and closed door, 
follow the variation of burning velocity with gas concentration. This further 
demonstrates that the dominating factor in pressure generation in type III tests was 
turbulent combustion within the enclosure, rather than the external explosion. In the 
case where the external explosion was most influential, the fuel rich concentration 
would produce the greatest overpressure. 
 
Figure 4-23 The effects of gas concentration (type III tests, series F) 
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4.6.3. The Effects of an Interconnecting Door 
The effect of the interconnecting door on maximum overpressure is also highlighted in 
Figure 4-23. It can be seen that the presence of an interconnecting door clearly has a 
positive effect on the pressure attained during the explosion, but in comparison to type 
II tests, the difference is not as marked. The reason for this may be explained by the 
explosion mechanism in these tests, where the venting process occurs predominantly 
through the right enclosure. Consequently, whilst the presence of the door increased 
the generation of turbulence, it had little effect on the jetting expanding flame front 
being driven towards the vent opening. This process produced very rapid combustion 
that was faster than the turbulence enhanced combustion seen in type II tests, 
producing maximum pressures of over 300 mbar in tests with an open doorway. 
4.6.4. The Effects of Vent Size in the Left Enclosure 
The effect of the vent size (in the ignition enclosure) on maximum overpressure is 
shown in Figure 4-24. The data is taken from type III tests involving half layers of 10% 
concentration, ignited at the centre and rear of the enclosure, with a vent size of KA(R) = 
2.4 in the adjoining (right) enclosure, and with a lightweight unlatched door covering the 
interconnecting doorway. For completeness, data points for KA = 2.4 have been taken 
from corresponding the type I tests. However, it should be noted that the maximum 
pressure for the type I tests are caused by the external explosion, whereas the type III 
tests are caused by the turbulent jet driven flame front. 
In the proposed mechanism described in Section 4.6.1, the jetting flame being driven 
towards the vent opening in the adjoining enclosure would occur for any vent size in 
the ignition enclosure, so long as the ignition room vent is strong enough to survive the 
pressure peak caused by the failure of the larger vent in the adjoining enclosure. This 
is because, once the jetting flame mechanism has occurred, the pressure within the 
ignition enclosure is predominantly relieved though the doorway and the larger vent in 
the adjoining enclosure. Therefore, the mechanism suggests that there would be a 
significant increase in the maximum pressure when the vent size in the left enclosure is 
reduced from KA(L) = 2.4 to KA(L) = 4 (or the vent material is stronger such that there is 
an equivalent increase in failure pressure), but a smaller difference if is further 
decreased in size to KA(L) = 8. This is exactly what can be seen in Figure 4-24. 
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Figure 4-24 Maximum overpressure vs. vent size (type III tests) 
4.6.5. The Effects of Ignition Position 
Figure 4-24 also highlights the effect of ignition position on maximum overpressure. It 
can be seen that central ignition tests produce much lower overpressures than 
comparable rear ignition tests. There are a number of reasons for the cause of this 
difference. Firstly, the duration between ignition and the point at which the flame front 
enters the right enclosure is shorter, because of the shorter travel distance, and 
consequently there is less time to generate turbulence. Secondly, the flame surface 
area would be much greater at the time the right vent failed, thus the jetting driven 
flame front would be less significant. Thirdly, in the case of the KA(R) = 2.4 results, 
where the maximum pressure is dependent upon the external explosion, there is less 
unburnt gas/air mixture expelled during the venting process because the flame front is 
closer to the vent opening. 
4.6.6. The Effects of Layer Depth 
A small number of type III tests were conducted in order to examine the behaviour of 
natural gas/air ceiling layers of differing depth. This is representative of real gas 
explosion scenarios, for example, when a cooker hob is switched on and not ignited. 
The experiments were conducted with 10% natural gas/air layers with a nominal depth 
from the ceiling of 0.3 m, 0.6 m and 1.2 m, vent sizes of KA(L) = 4 and KA(R) = 2.4, rear 
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ignition, and a lightweight interconnecting door secured in a closed position with a roller 
latch. The maximum overpressure is plotted as a function of layer depth in Figure 4-25. 
It can be seen that the maximum overpressure increases linearly with layer depth. 
Although, this limited data set shows a strong dependence on the layer depth, this is 
not as strong as that in the work of Butlin and Tonkin [160] in a single enclosure of the 
same explosion chamber, where they identified that the relationship between 
overpressure and layer depth was quadratic. Further work is required in this area. 
 
Figure 4-25 Maximum overpressure vs. layer depth 
4.6.7. Interconnecting Enclosures with Different Gas Concentrations 
In an accidental gas explosion, it is entirely possible that conditions surrounding the 
gas release and subsequent build-up to a flammable mixture, result in different 
concentrations being present in adjoining rooms. Consequently, in order to investigate 
realistic situations where a gas explosion propagates from one room to another, some 
tests were undertaken where the concentrations were different in the two enclosures. 
The experiments were conducted as series J, with a half layer in each enclosure, rear 
ignition, KA(L) = 4 and KA(R) = 2.4 and a lightweight door secured in the closed position 
by a roller latch. The results of the tests are shown in Table 4-6. 
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Table 4-6 Results of tests involving different gas concentrations 
Test No. 
Gas Concentration 
(% v/v) PV (mbar) 
Pmax (mbar) 
Ign (L) Adj (R) Ign (L) Adj (R) 
61 10 10 55 428 372 
71 8 10 39 262 193 
72 10 8 55 400 338 
73 8 12 55 310 248 
74 12 8 50 241 193 
75 10 12 55 276 228 
76 12 10 50 352 283 
77 6 13 50 234 186 
78 13 6 41 290 241 
79 6 10 41 83 69 
80 10 6 52 345 276 
87 10 0 44 234 166 
 
Figure 4-26 shows a comparison of the maximum overpressure as a function of 
concentration in the interconnected enclosures. It is evident, that in all tests the 
maximum overpressures attained occurred in the left (ignition) enclosure. The left 
graph plots the overpressure against the concentration in the left enclosure, for a 
number of tests where the concentration in the right enclosure was fixed at 10%. It can 
be seen that when the ignition enclosure had a lean layer of 6%, the maximum 
overpressure was relatively low, at 83 mbar (left enclosure). However, this increased 
significantly to a maximum of 428 mbar as the concentration in the ignition enclosure 
reached 10%, before decreasing to 352 mbar at 12%. These results demonstrate that 
the maximum overpressure is strongly dependent on the gas concentration in the 
ignition enclosure.  
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Figure 4-26 Maximum overpressure vs. differing concentration in enclosures 
Contrastingly, the right graph plots the overpressure against the concentration in the 
adjoining (right) enclosure, for a number of tests where the concentration in the left 
(ignition) enclosure was fixed at 10%. Similarly, to the left graph, the curves peak at a 
concentration of 10% and fall as the concentration becomes richer, but they fall to 
values lower than that recorded with lean mixtures of 6% and 8%. This was 
unexpected and suggests that some mixing of unburnt gas was taking place in the 
ignition enclosure as the flow was initially reversed. The recorded overpressures for 
lean concentrations in the adjoining enclosure are also interesting. Overpressures of 
234 and 165 mbar were recorded in the left and right enclosures respectively when 
there was no gas present in the right enclosure at the time of ignition. This finding is 
important as the second major pressure peak recorded in the type III tests was derived 
initially from turbulent combustion of mixture in the adjoining enclosure as the flame 
jets into the room from the interconnecting doorway. Due to budgetary constraints, no 
further tests were undertaken where the adjoining enclosure has no gas present. It is 
recommended that further experimental work is undertaken, which should include tests 
where the concentration in the ignition enclosure is varied across the flammable range.  
It is possible that following the opening of the interconnecting door, the flow of unburnt 
mixture from the left enclosure into the right would result in some mixing of the mixture 
already present in the right room. Consequently, the magnitude of the maximum 
pressure peak would be dependent upon the mean concentration of the two 
enclosures, weighted towards that of the adjoining enclosure because not all of the 
flammable mixture in the ignition enclosure would be available for mixing. If however, 
the situation occurred where the flow from the ignition enclosure simply displaced the 
original mixture from the adjoining enclosure, then the maximum pressure developed in 
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the explosion would be independent of the original concentration in the adjoining 
enclosure. 
Figure 4-27 plots the maximum overpressure results against the gas concentration in 
the adjoining room. The black curve represents the tests where the concentration of a 
natural gas layer was fixed at 10% in the (ignition) left enclosure whilst the 
concentration of the layer in the adjoining enclosure was varied. The red curve 
represents the tests where the concentration of a natural gas layer was fixed at 10% in 
the adjoining (right) enclosure whilst the concentration of the layer in the ignition 
enclosure was varied. 
 
Figure 4-27 Maximum overpressure vs. concentration in adjoining enclosure 
The x-axis represents the concentration in the adjoining enclosure (i.e. for the curve of 
10% in the right enclosure, the x-axis represents the concentration in the left enclosure 
and vice versa). This diagram suggests that whilst the magnitude of the maximum 
(second) pressure peak was strongly dependent upon the concentration in the ignition 
enclosure, it was affected by the concentration in the adjoining (right) enclosure. Thus, 
in respect of the behaviour of the mixtures in the adjoining enclosure, with the limited 
data available, it appears that both mixing of the mixture, and displacement of the 
original mixture must be taking place.  
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4.6.8. The Effects of Different Door and Latch Types 
A number of tests were undertaken with different door and latch types. Two door types 
were used; the lightweight, ‘egg-box’ type internal door and an internal fire door. Three 
types of latching mechanism were used; unlatched (i.e. door pushed closed), a roller 
latch and a stronger mortice latch. In these experiments, the vent sizes were KA(L) = 4(r) 
and KA(R) = 2.4, and the ignition was in the rear position. The results of these tests are 
given in Table 4-7.  







type Latch type 
PV 
(mbar) 
Pmax (mbar) Time to 
Pmax,(L) 
(ms) Ign (L) Adj (R) 
43 8 Lightweight Unlatched 41 276 234 500 
44 10 Lightweight Unlatched 55 372 338 375 
45 12 Lightweight Unlatched 41 207 207 470 
59 12 Lightweight Roller latch 62 179 179 625 
60 8 Lightweight Roller latch 50 290 262 580 
61 10 Lightweight Roller latch 55 428 372 375 
62 12 Lightweight Roller latch 50 393 310 430 
63 8 Fire door Unlatched 50 331 283 540 
64 10 Fire door Unlatched 55 400 386 365 
65 12 Fire door Unlatched 48 407 379 485 
66 10 Fire door Roller latch 55 501 455 375 
67 10 Lightweight Mortice latch 66 227 214 425 
68 10 Fire door Mortice latch 72 331 317 400 
69 10 Fire door Roller latch 14 138 152 485 
70 10 Fire door Roller latch 83 331 359 425 
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Figure 4-28 shows the overpressure-time profiles for six tests. Test 44 and 61 show the 
profiles for a lightweight door, unlatched and with a roller latch. Tests 64 and 66 show 
the profiles for a fire door, unlatched and with a roller latch, and tests 67 and 68 show 
the effects of a mortice lock. It is evident from Figure 4-28 that for both door types 
higher maximum overpressures were generated when roller latches were fitted rather 
than being left unlatched. The latch mechanism would have increased the failure 
pressure of the door, thus creating a greater pressure differential between enclosures. 
Consequently, when the door opened a greater level of turbulence would have been 
generated.  
For each latch type, higher maximum overpressures were also observed with fire doors 
than with lightweight ‘egg-box’ doors. In a manner similar to the effect of the roller latch, 
it would have required a greater pressure differential to overcome the inertia of a fire 
door, which results in a higher level of turbulence. Figure 4-28 shows that the test 
involving a fire door combined with a roller latch produced the greatest maximum 
overpressure of the test series (500 mbar).  
Surprisingly, when either door type was fitted with a mortice latch, the strongest of the 
latching mechanisms, lower overpressures were produced than in comparable tests 
with unlatched doors or with a roller latch. It would be expected that the greater 
pressure differential created by this high failure pressure door and latch, would result in 
very high levels of turbulence. 
Figure 4-29 shows the overpressure-time profile for a test undertaken with a lightweight 
door and a mortice latch. Typical of a vented explosion, after ignition the pressure 
began to rise relatively slowly, whilst the pressure in the adjoining enclosure stayed at 
ambient. Accordingly, a pressure differential was developed between the two 
enclosures. However, the strength of the door and latch was not overcome until 
approximately 250 ms after ignition, by which time the pressure differential had 
reached approximately 45 mbar. As soon as the door failed open, there was a sudden 
turbulent flow into the right enclosure, causing the pressure in the left enclosure to 
relieve, such that by 300 ms the pressure was close to ambient. Correspondingly, the 
pressure in the right enclosure had risen to over 40 mbar which was sufficient for the 
vent to fail in the right enclosure. The action of the door failing corresponded to a new 
first pressure peak, which is labelled Pd. 
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Figure 4-28 The effects of door type and latch mechanism 
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Figure 4-29 Overpressure-time profiles for tests involving a mortice latch 
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A key difference in the behaviour of this type of explosion is that the failure of the right 
vent did not cause a ‘jetting’ driven flame toward the right vent opening. This is 
because of the large pressure that remained in the right enclosure. Venting of this 
pressure subsequently occurred through the right vent opening and through a sudden 
flow reversal back through the doorway because of the reversed pressure differential 
between the enclosures. This sudden flow reversal would prevent the jetting 
mechanism from occurring. In test 68, a similar test with a mortice latch, a series of 
damped oscillations occurred shortly after this sudden flow reversal, resulting in the 
flow reversing through the doorway several times. This was not evident in test 67. 
However, in both instances, following this, turbulent flow was established in the right 
enclosure and a Pt peak was generated. This rapid spike in pressure was sufficient to 
cause the left enclosure vent to fail. 
This series of experiments indicate that the failure pressure of the interconnecting door 
is critical to the development of the explosion and the maximum overpressure that will 
be generated. In these instances, the dominant factor is turbulent combustion. A 
proposed mechanism for explosion development in type III explosions with a high 
strength interconnecting door is given in Figure 4-30. 
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Figure 4-30 Proposed mechanism for type III tests (high strength door) 
 
  
The Effects of Interconnected Rooms  278 
4.6.9. Experiments with Door Hinged to Open into the Ignition (Left) 
Enclosure 
Four experiments were undertaken where the door hinged into the ignition (left) 
enclosure. The purpose of these tests was to investigate situations where the door 
closed against the door jamb. This would effectively increase the force required to open 
the door. Furthermore, it was likely that the door would ‘break’, rather than open. 
Figure 4-31 shows the overpressure-time profile for test 83, in which a lightweight door 
was utilised with a roller latch. The door hinged into the left enclosure and was closed 
at time of ignition.  
 
Figure 4-31 Overpressure-time profile for test with door hinged into left room 
Not surprisingly, the overpressure-time profiles are similar to profiles of tests where the 
door was fitted with a mortice latch, with the high failure pressure of the door causing a 
similar explosion development. In this instance, there were a series of damped 
oscillations that occurred just after the Pd and PV(R) pressure peaks that caused flow 
reversals between the interconnecting rooms and restricted the jetted flame process. 
Consequently, the maximum overpressure that was attained (270 mbar), was 
considerably lower than the corresponding test where the door hinged into the right 
enclosure (428 mbar, test 61).  
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A very interesting finding occurred with an identical experimental set-up to test 83, 
except that the door was left partially open, at an angle of 45° into the left enclosure 
(test 84). In this instance, the magnitude of the second pressure peak 703 mbar is over 
twice the pressure generated in test 83, where the door was initially closed. This test 
was repeated in test 85, producing a similar overpressure-time profile, with a maximum 
overpressure of 683 mbar (Figure 4-32). This type of test (test 84) produced the 
highest pressure measurement of the whole experimental programme.  
Figure 4-32 shows the overpressure-time profiles for test 85. As the pressure peak was 
of a high magnitude, three of the plots are shown using a broken scale Y axis, so that 
the first major pressure peak and intermediate peak can be more clearly seen. The 
complete second major pressure peak, for the left room, is shown in isolation as a 
separate image (fourth plot). 
 
Figure 4-32 Overpressure-time profile for test with door open at 45° into left room 
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The door was initially open at an angle of 45° and consequently during the initial stages 
of the explosion the pressure in the two enclosures was equal. As the flame continued 
to propagate the pressure increased in both enclosures until, at 260 ms, the pressure 
in the right enclosure reached 40 mbar and the right vent failed. As soon as the right 
vent failed, the rapid flow towards the doorway (relieving the pressure in the left 
enclosure), pushed the door closed before the flame front was able to enter the right 
enclosure. As a consequence of the door closing, the right enclosure was able to 
continue venting, thus reducing the pressure, but the pressure in the left enclosure 
began to rise again, following an initial drop after the failure of the right vent (PV(R)). 
Evidence from cine film, taken from inside the explosion chamber clearly showed that 
the door had closed before the flame front reached the doorway, and that subsequently 
the door burst (breaking into several fragments) into the right enclosure (Figure 4-33). 
Almost instantaneously, a violent jet of flame was then seen to propagate into the right 
enclosure. This sequence, can be explained from the pressure-time profile. 
 
Figure 4-33 Failure of the door and jetting expanding flame front (test 85) 
When the pressure in the ignition (left) enclosure reached approximately 60 mbar, the 
door burst open, and because of the significant pressure differential created between 
the two rooms, the flame front was driven violently into the adjoining (right) enclosure. 
The relief of the pressure in left room, via the right enclosure, caused the pressure to 
fall, generating a small pressure peak in between the two major pressure peaks (Figure 
4-32). The jetting flame front propagating towards the vent opening, resulted in an 
extremely rapid rise in flame surface area, generating a rapid pressure rise which 
resulted in the dominant pressure peak, which corresponds to both turbulent 
combustion and the jetting expanding flame front. Consequently, the peak has been 
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labelled Pt + Pjeff. Very quickly the flame reaches the plane of the right vent opening 
generating the external explosion, which also contributes to the magnitude of the 
second major pressure peak. The pressure wave produced by the turbulent 
combustion then propagated back through the doorway, greatly increasing the rate of 
combustion in the left enclosure, and the left vent fails.  
This can be seen in Figure 4-34, which is a photo of the external combustion at the 
right vent opening during test 85. The left enclosure vent can be seen failing and being 
pushed clear of the opening at this point. 
 
Figure 4-34 External explosion during test 85 (400 ms after ignition) 
An external video camera was directed towards the right vent in order to try to capture 
the flame propagation after the vent had failed. Once the vent was clear of the opening, 
it was possible to track the flame as it propagated from the doorway to the vent 
opening. Whilst this was not an accurate method of measuring flame speed, it was 
possible, using the time record captured on the video, to estimate the average flame 
speed during this phase of the explosion. The flame was estimated to be travelling at a 
speed of approximately 130 m/s. For comparison, using cine film footage taken inside 
the left enclosure, the flame speed during the initial pressure rise leading to the failure 
of the right vent opening was estimated to be approximately 6 m/s.  
A proposed mechanism for the type III explosions with a door open at 45°, and hinged 
into the left enclosure is given in Figure 4-35.  
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Figure 4-35 Proposed mechanism for type III tests (door open at 45°) 
Test 84 and 85 were repeated in test 86, with the slight difference that the door was left 
open at an angle of 90° into the left enclosure. The maximum overpressure generated 
in this test however was 345 mbar, approximately half of that observed when the door 
was open at a 45° angle. Observations taken from the pressure-time profiles also 
revealed that there was no intermediate pressure peak between the PV and Pt peaks. 
The cine footage taken inside the left enclosure revealed that the door did not close 
following the failure of the right vent and that the flame front passed through the 
interconnecting doorway. It is likely that the position of the door presented a greater 
inertia to overcome than is the case with a 45° angle. The rapid pressure rise following 
turbulent combustion in the right enclosure prevented the door from closing and 
demolished it before it could reach the door frame. Thus, the jetting flame from the left 
enclosure into the right enclosure was not enhanced, as would have happened if the 
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door had been pushed closed, and the magnitude of the Pt peak was reduced 
significantly.  
This series of tests demonstrated the importance of the position of the interconnecting 
door, and the direction the door swings. Moreover, it can be one of the most significant 
factors in the development of the explosion and the generation of overpressure. As a 
limited number of experiments were undertaken, further large-scale experimental work 
is recommended.  
4.6.10. Combustion Driven Oscillations  
In Section 2.4.2, the effects of low frequency oscillations and high frequency acoustic 
oscillations were discussed. It was determined that the role that pressure oscillations 
play in accidental explosions in buildings was insignificant. Consequently, this section 
of the chapter only briefly discusses pressure oscillations observed during the tests. 
In all of the tests, pressure oscillations were observed relatively late in the explosion 
(typically later than 600 ms), with each pressure transducer often recording a different 
magnitude, frequency and duration. However, a number of discrete frequencies, in the 
range of 60 to 480 Hz were observed during the experiments. 
Several previous large-scale studies (see above referenced section) identified that 
acoustic pressure driven oscillations can be significant in vented explosions, often 
corresponding to the maximum overpressure developed. The pressure oscillations 
observed during this experimental programme did not correlate to any significant 
pressure peak. This was as expected for the reasons outlined in Section 2.4.2. 
One important inference from the observation of combustion driven oscillations in the 
type I tests, was described in Section 4.4.1 and shown in Figure 4-1. In this case, the 
pressure oscillations occurred at the same time and had a similar magnitude and 
duration, but were out of phase by 180°. This suggested that the cause of the 
oscillations was bulk movement between the rooms via the doorway.  
4.6.11. Summary of Findings of Type III Tests 
A characteristic of the type III tests, in agreement with the findings of type I and II tests, 
was the exhibition of two major pressure peaks on the overpressure-time profiles. The 
first of these peaks corresponded to the failure of the vent in the right enclosure and 
was always recorded later in the left enclosure. The second major peak was found to 
be considerably greater in magnitude than the comparable peak in types I and slightly 
higher than type II. This pressure peak corresponded to the highly turbulent 
combustion in the right enclosure, caused by the venting driven ‘jetting’ flame, 
propagating into the adjoining enclosure and towards the right vent opening. 
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Analysis of the overpressure-time profiles revealed that whilst the presence of a closed 
door generated considerable turbulence, it has little effect on the maximum 
overpressure because the jetting flame was significantly more prominent. 
Consequently, although the maximum pressures produced in tests with a closed door 
were higher than those with an open doorway, the difference was not as significant as 
comparable tests of type II. However, the failure pressure of the interconnecting door, 
and its inertia, have been observed to be key factors in the generation of turbulence, 
resulting in some of the highest overpressures attained during the experimental 
programme. In addition, the complex nature of the interaction between the flow fields in 
the adjoining enclosures means that the turbulent combustion and jetting mechanisms 
are highly sensitive to the position of the door prior to ignition and the direction in which 
the door hinges. 
As the dominant mechanism for generating pressure was turbulent combustion, the 
greatest overpressures were recorded with tests of 10% natural gas concentration. 
This is because the burning velocity is dependent upon concentration and is at its 
maximum, at concentrations slightly rich of stoichiometric, reducing as the 
concentration diverges towards its flammable limits. 
Significantly higher overpressures were recorded with rear ignition tests. This is 
because the turbulent combustion process was less significant in central ignition tests. 
The size of the left vent had little effect on the magnitude of the maximum overpressure 
as long as it had a greater failure pressure than the right vent. This is because the 
venting process occurred through the doorway and the vent opening in the adjoining 
enclosure. 
In tests involving a concentration in the ignition enclosure that was different to the 
concentration in the adjoining enclosure, it was found that the maximum overpressure 
was strongly dependent upon the original mixture in the ignition enclosure, but had 
some dependence upon the mixture in the adjoining enclosure. 
A summary of the type III test results is given in Table 4-8. 
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(% v/v) Layer 
depth 
Ignition 
Position Door type Latch Door Status 
Vent Size 









43 8 8 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Closed 4r 2.4 276 
44 10 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Closed 4r 2.4 372 
45 12 12 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Closed 4r 2.4 207 
46 10 10 1.2 Central Lightweight Unlatched Closed 4r 2.4 83 
47 10 10 1.2 Central Lightweight Unlatched Open 4r 2.4 186 
48 8 8 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Open 4r 2.4 69 
49 12 12 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Open 4r 2.4 117 
50 8 8 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Open 8 2.4 103 
51 10 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Open 8 2.4 324 
52 12 12 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Open 8 2.4 159 
53 8 8 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Closed 8 2.4 317 
54 10 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Closed 8 2.4 462 
55 12 12 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Closed 8 2.4 214 
56 10 10 1.2 Central Lightweight Unlatched Closed 8 2.4 97 
60 8 8 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 290 
61 10 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 428 
62 12 12 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 393 
63 8 8 1.2 Rear Fire door Unlatched Closed 4r 2.4 331 
64 10 10 1.2 Rear Fire door Unlatched Closed 4r 2.4 400 
65 12 12 1.2 Rear Fire door Unlatched Closed 4r 2.4 407 
66 10 10 1.2 Rear Fire door Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 501 
67 10 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Mortice latch Closed 4r 2.4 227 
68 10 10 1.2 Rear Fire door Mortice latch Closed 4r 2.4 331 
71 8 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 262 
72 10 8 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 400 
73 8 12 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 310 
74 12 8 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 241 
75 10 12 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 276 
76 12 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 352 
77 6 13 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 234 
78 13 6 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 290 
79 6 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 83 
80 10 6 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 345 
81 10 10 0.3 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 103 
82 10 10 0.6 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 221 
83 10 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Hinged into L (closed) 4r 2.4 262 
84 10 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Hinged into L - 45° 4r 2.4 703 
85 10 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Hinged into L - 45° 4r 2.4 683 
86 10 10 1.2 Rear Lightweight Unlatched Hinged into L - 90° 4r 2.4 345 
87 10 0 1.2 Rear Lightweight Roller latch Closed 4r 2.4 234 
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4.7. Type IV Experiments 
The type IV tests, undertaken as series G, had two KA = 4 vents. In the left enclosure 
the vent was fitted to the left side of the fascia panel [KA(L) = 4(l)] and in the right 
enclosure it was fitted to the right side [KA(R) = 4(r)].  
There were only five tests undertaken of this type. All the tests were undertaken with a 
layer, rear ignition and the door closed. However, in these series, different doors, 
latching mechanisms and vent materials were used in a manner similar to test type III. 
The specific set up of the test series is given in Table 4-9. 





(% v/v) Door Type Latching Mechanism Vent Material 
Ign (L) Adj (R) 
57 10 10 Lightweight  Unlatched 12 mm fibreboard 
58 10 10 Lightweight  Unlatched 12 mm fibreboard 
59 12 12 Lightweight  Unlatched 12 mm fibreboard 
69 10 10 Fire door Roller latch 3 mm single pane glass 
70 12 12 Fire door Roller latch 4 mm single pane glass 
 
4.7.1. General 
The maximum overpressures generated during these tests were, in general terms, of a 
range in between that of the type I and type II tests. In some tests (57, 69 and 70) the 
left vent failed first, generating the PV(L) pressure peak and resulting in overpressure-
time profiles similar to the type II tests whereas in the other tests the vents failed 
simultaneously to give PV.  
The KA = 4 vents had a failure pressure of approximately 70 mbar. Because both of the 
enclosures utilised these higher failure pressure vents, the duration of the flow between 
rooms was longer than in the type I tests, generating more turbulence, such that Pt 
dominated the second major pressure peak. In general terms, the type IV tests 
represented an intermediate case between type I and type II tests. 
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4.7.2. Experiments with a Single Pane Glass Vent 
Two experiments, test numbers 69 and 70, were conducted with single paned glass as 
the vent material instead of the 12.5 mm fibreboard. In test 69, the glass was 3 mm 
thick and in test 70, the glass was 4 mm thick. 
During both of these tests, the left vent failed first, producing PV(L), but at that time the 
right vent remained intact. Consequently, these experiments can be likened to the type 
II tests. However, the 3mm glass failed at a much lower pressure than the 12.5 mm 
fibreboard and hence a much lower PV overpressure was produced (see Figure 4-36). 
 
Figure 4-36 Overpressure-time profile for test with 3 mm single pane glass vent 
Figure 4-37 shows the failure of the right window. The window was made of single 
pane glass, 4 mm thick. It can be seen that the left vent had already failed and that 
there is a secondary external explosion at the right vent opening. This secondary 
external explosion has transpired because the gas/air mixture was expelled through the 
right vent opening after the external explosion at the left vent had occurred. 
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Figure 4-37 Failure of the right 4 mm single glass pane vent and secondary 
external explosion (taken from DNV GL archive) 
4.8. Comparison of Experimental Results 
It is apparent that there are four main mechanisms for the development of the 
maximum pressure peak: 
1. The external explosion – this occurs in situations where the failure pressure of 
the vent relief is the same in adjoining rooms. 
2. The sudden turbulent combustion in the adjoining room – this occurs where the 
failure pressure of the vent relief is higher in the adjoining room and where 
there is an interconnecting door that is initially closed.  
3. The sudden increase in flame surface area as a consequence of a jetting flame 
into the adjoining room – this occurs where the failure pressure of the vent relief 
is lower in the adjoining room and where there is an interconnecting door that is 
closed. 
4. A combination of turbulent combustion and a rapid increase on flame surface 
area as a consequence of a jetting flame into the adjoining room – this occurs 
where the failure pressure of the vent relief is lower in the adjoining room and 
where there is an interconnecting door that is partially open. 
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4.8.1. Maximum Overpressure 
In the literature review, it was identified that most of the vented explosion research has 
been undertaken in single empty chambers that are not representative of gas 
explosions in buildings. However, four correlations were identified, that were developed 
from the research conducted after the Ronan Point explosion. For completeness, the 
predicted overpressures from these correlations have been compared to the explosion 
data from this study. The correlation of Astbury et al. was omitted from this comparison 
as one of the input parameters was the maximum pressure developed in the ignition 
room and this was found to be dependent upon the interaction between the enclosures. 
In Figure 4-38 a comparison is made of the experimental results from the work 
described in this thesis and the correlations derived by Rasbash [Equation (2-74)], 
Rasbash et al. [Equation (2-75) and (2-76)], Cubbage and Marshall [Equation (2-78)] 
and Dragosavic [Equation (2-83)]. In respect of the experimental results, the maximum 
overpressures (irrespective of test type) have been plotted and, in addition, the 
maximum overpressures produced for each test type have been averaged and plotted 
against equivalence ratio. The predicted maximum overpressure from Equation [(2-78)] 
has been plotted for the corresponding equivalence ratios by selecting appropriate 
values for the laminar burning velocity. It was not possible to predict the maximum 
overpressure against equivalence ratio using the Dragosavic or Rasbash correlations.  
 
Figure 4-38 Comparison of experimental results 
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It can be seen from Figure 4-38 that the average maximum overpressure for type I test 
increases with concentration, showing that there is a dependence upon gas 
concentration. This demonstrates that the dominating factor in type I tests is the 
external explosion, with fuel rich mixtures more likely to produce a near stoichiometric 
flammable cloud outside the vent opening. The curves for the type II and III 
experiments do not follow this trend due to the dominance of turbulent combustion 
and/or a rapid increase in flame surface area due to the jetting expanding flame front. 
Consequently, the curves for these tests are similar to the burning velocity curve, 
where it peaks at an equivalence ratio of approximately 1.05 and diverges towards the 
flammable limits.  
The Dragosavic correlation underpredicts the average maximum overpressure for all 
the test types. This is perhaps not surprising as the correlation was developed to 
simulate the two pressure peaks that were a feature of the TNO experimental results. 
However, whilst the first pressure peak was identical to that of this experimental 
programme, the second pressure peak was caused by oscillations towards the end of 
the explosion and was most commonly lower in magnitude than the first peak. The 
failure pressure of the vent was therefore a key factor in the magnitude of the 
overpressure.  
The correlation of Rasbash et al. and Cubbage and Marshall overpredict the average 
maximum pressure developed but underpredict the maximum pressure for all 
equivalence ratios. However, the correlations of Rasbash et al. and Cubbage and 
Marshall are interesting as they follow the type II and III profiles remarkably well. This is 
largely due to the fact that the correlation is dependent upon the turbulent burning 
velocity and the type II and III tests are dominated by turbulent combustion. Given, that 
the correlations are also dependent upon a turbulence ‘factor’ it is recommended that 
further work be undertaken to investigate whether this correlation could be refined in 
light of the findings of this study.  
Mannan [405] in reference to the Rasbash et al. and Cubbage and Marshall 
correlations states that the Cubbage and Marshall correlation is limited to methane/air 
mixtures as the dependency on the square of the burning velocity tends to give 
overestimates of the maximum pressure for gases with high burning velocity. The 
results presented in this chapter suggests that this is likely not the case as the 
correlation is underpredicting the maximum pressure for methane/air concentrations 
but overpredicting the average maximum overpressures for all test types. 
In terms of overpressure-time profile, the prediction of Molkov (Figure 2-36) is not in 
agreement with the findings of this work. The time taken to reach both pressure peaks 
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occurs far too quickly and the pressure-time curve bears little resemblance to that seen 
in the during the experiments. Furthermore, the second pressure peak was not caused 
by “mixture burnout”, but rather, was caused by the external explosion, turbulent 
combustion or the jetting flame. 
Structural Damage 
In the literature review it was identified, that overpressures greater than 200 mbar could 
structurally damage a building. One of the objectives of this study was to determine if 
significant pressure damage could be produced by fuel lean and/or fuel rich flammable 
gas/air mixtures. Table 4-10 details the tests where the maximum overpressure 
exceeded this value. It is clear from the results, that damaging overpressures can be 
produced by mixtures across the flammable range, given the right set of 
circumstances. This is an important finding and is not in agreement with the most 
widely used reference sources used in the investigation of gas explosions [12, 15, 16]. 
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Position Door Status Pmax 
II 25 8 Layer Rear Closed 214 
II 26 10 Layer Rear Closed 400 
II 27 10 Layer Rear Closed 269 
II 33 12 Layer Rear Closed 234 
II 34 10 Layer Central Open 200 
II 35 10 Layer Central Closed 207 
II 36 10 Layer Rear Closed 372 
II 40 10 Full Rear Closed 338 
II 41 10 Layer Rear Closed 414 
II 42 10 Full Rear Closed 317 
III 43 8 Layer Rear Closed 276 
III 44 10 Layer Rear Closed 372 
III 45 12 Layer Rear Closed 207 
III 51 10 Layer Rear Open 324 
III 53 8 Layer Rear Closed 317 
III 54 10 Layer Rear Closed 462 
III 55 12 Layer Rear Closed 214 
IV 58 10 Layer Rear Closed 283 
III 60 8 Layer Rear Roller latch 290 
III 61 10 Layer Rear Roller latch 428 
III 62 12 Layer Rear Roller latch 393 
III 63 8 Layer Rear Fire door unlatched 331 
III 64 10 Layer Rear Fire door unlatched 400 
III 65 12 Layer Rear Fire door unlatched 407 
III 66 10 Layer Rear Fire door roller latch 501 
III 67 10 Layer Rear Mortice latch 227 
III 68 10 Layer Rear Fire door mortice latch 331 
IV 70 10 Layer Rear Fire door roller latch 359 
III 71 8 Layer Rear Roller latch 262 
III 72 10 Layer Rear Roller latch 400 
III 73 8 Layer Rear Roller latch 310 
III 74 12 Layer Rear Roller latch 241 
III 75 10 Layer Rear Roller latch 276 
III 76 12 Layer Rear Roller latch 352 
III 77 6 Layer Rear Roller latch 234 
III 78 13 Layer Rear Roller latch 290 
III 80 10 Layer Rear Roller latch 345 
III 81 10 Layer Rear Roller latch 103 
III 82 10 Layer Rear Roller latch 221 
III 83 10 Layer Rear Hinged into left room 269 
III 84 10 Layer Rear Hinged into left room 45° 703 
III 85 10 Layer Rear Hinged into left room 45° 683 
III 86 10 Layer Rear Hinged into left room 90° 345 
III 87 10 Layer Rear Roller latch 234 
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4.8.2. The Influence of Turbulence 
A number of calculations were made to determine the turbulence intensity for the range 
of test types and to relate this information to the explosion development mechanisms 
that have been identified in this study. Some of these results are presented In Table 
4-11, where values are given for the maximum overpressure, turbulence intensity and 
rms velocity of the flow. The key mechanism for the development of the maximum 
pressure is included as it provides a useful appraisal of the calculated turbulence 
values and the proposed mechanisms for pressure development. 















I 14 24.50 16.28 2.84 0.221 0.62 88 Pext 
II 26 53.69 35.68 6.21 0.221 1.38 400 Pt 
III 44 50.93 33.85 5.89 0.221 1.31 372 Pjeff 
III 67 80.53 53.52 9.32 0.221 2.07 227 Pt 
III 85 103.97 69.09 12.03 0.221 2.67 683 Pt + Pjeff 
 
The results in the table are informative and provide additional support to the qualitative 
analysis undertaken as the main body of work in this chapter. It can be seen that the 
type I tests produce some turbulence, but it was not significant, and this is corroborated 
by the qualitative analysis that shows the dominating mechanism, under these 
circumstances, to be the external explosion. The type II tests produced much more 
turbulence and this is substantiated by the high overpressure produced and the 
observations that these type of tests were turbulence dominated. It can also be seen 
that the type III test (test 44), produced a slightly lower level of turbulence than the type 
II test. This is in agreement with the observations that turbulence had less influence on 
this type of explosion and the sharp pressure rise corresponded to the rapidly 
expanding flame front due to the jetting flame. However, significant levels of turbulence 
were produced by some of the type III explosions. Relatively high levels of turbulence 
occurred when the interconnecting door had a high failure pressure (i.e. fire door or 
latched), and most prominently, situations where the door hinged into the room in 
which ignition occurred and was partly open (45°angle).  
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4.9. Conclusions 
The results presented in this chapter represent a substantial amount of new large-scale 
explosion data, which has been interpreted to provide a better understanding of how 
gas explosions develop in buildings and how this information can be applied during the 
subsequent origin and cause investigation.  
A number of mechanisms have been proposed, providing new knowledge and 
understanding of the manner in which gas explosions propagate from one room to 
another. This knowledge provides a valuable new insight into how complex a vented 
explosion in a typical building can be, and how the design and construction of a 
building can affect the magnitude of the explosion (e.g. the selection of windows, the 
use of heavy doors, doors that hinge into rooms with significant ignition sources etc.).  
It is clear from the results of this programme that gas explosions that propagate from 
one room to another have the potential to generate significantly higher overpressures 
than would be the case of an explosion in a single room of the same total volume and 
vent area.  
With the exception of some tests involving fuel lean layers, the overpressure-time 
profiles were characterised by two dominant pressure peaks. The first of these peaks, 
occurred in all tests and corresponded to the failure, of one or both of the vents. The 
second peak corresponded to the external explosion or turbulent combustion as a 
consequence of the interaction between adjoining rooms. For the vast majority of the 
tests, the second major pressure peak produced the maximum overpressures. The 
maximum pressures recorded during the programme ranged from 38 mbar (type I test) 
to 703 mbar (type III test). Several major mechanisms for the development of the high 
overpressures have been identified: 
i. The ignition of a flammable cloud outside the vent opening(s) (i.e. the external 
explosion). 
ii. The sudden increase in mass combustion as the turbulised mixture in the 
secondary compartment is ignited by the propagating flame front emerging 
through the interconnecting doorway. 
iii. The highly turbulent ‘jetting’ flame, driven by the venting process, propagating 
from the interconnecting doorway and towards the vent opening in the 
secondary enclosure. 
The relative influence of the different explosion development mechanisms was strongly 
dependent upon the configuration of the explosion chamber and the ignition position. In 
terms of the configuration of the explosion chamber, the key factors were the failure 
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pressures of the respective vents, and the status (including the direction of hinge), 
failure pressure and inertia of the interconnecting door, prior to ignition. 
Where both enclosures had large, low failure pressure vents, the maximum pressure 
peak was dominated by the external explosion. The external explosion caused a rapid 
pressure rise of short duration (≈ 50 ms), which restricted the outflow from the vent, 
thereby raising the pressure within the enclosure. The pressure wave also propagated 
back into the enclosure and, in type II and III tests, could cause turbulent combustion in 
the adjoining enclosure. The magnitude of the pressure wave was found to be directly 
dependent upon the concentration, increasing over the range 8% to 12%. This was due 
to the dilution of the flammable cloud that had formed outside the explosion chamber. 
Consequently, the maximum overpressure recorded, that was solely due to an external 
explosion, corresponded to a 12% half layer (179 mbar). It should be noted that a test 
involving a 10% gas/air mixture produced a pressure a peak pressure of identical 
magnitude but involved an enclosure that was full of flammable mixture (as opposed to 
a layer). 
In type II tests, where the enclosure in which ignition was initiated had a vent of lower 
failure pressure than the adjoining enclosure, and the interconnecting door failed prior 
to either of the vents, turbulence was created in the adjoining enclosure by flow through 
the doorway. The flow was set-up by the development of a pressure differential due to 
the presence of the door. In addition, the action of the opening of the door into the 
adjoining enclosure caused turbulence. The turbulence had the effect of increasing the 
burning velocity, and hence the mass combustion rate, so large overpressures were 
developed when the flame front propagated from the ignition room into the secondary 
enclosure. In addition, the flame front distorted as it passed through the doorway, 
increasing the flame surface area and hence the mass burning rate. Overpressures 
produced by this mechanism, corresponded to the second major peak and were 
recorded as high as 414 mbar for a 10% layered explosion. 
It was discussed in the report following the Potters Marston experiments [27] that 
‘back-relief’ could limit the maximum overpressure developed in an explosion where 
the flame could propagate from one room to another. However, if you consider the 
open doorway and vent in the neighbouring room as ‘back-relief’, then this 
experimental work has demonstrated that a type II explosion could produce 
overpressures that would cause structural damage to a building. This appears to 
contradict one of the conclusions of the Potters Marston work. However, the 
discrepancy may be explained as both compartments at Potters Marston had very 
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large vent panels of low failure pressure, whereas in these experiments, the adjoining 
enclosure had a small vent with a relatively high failure pressure. 
In type III tests, where the enclosure in which ignition was initiated had a vent of 
greater failure pressure than the adjoining enclosure, flow through the interconnecting 
doorway caused turbulence in the secondary chamber. When the vent in the adjoining 
enclosure failed, pressure in the left enclosure was relieved as unburnt gas/air mixture 
flowed, and the flame front propagated, through the doorway and towards the vent in 
the right enclosure. This rapid venting process caused the flame front to ‘jet’ through 
the secondary enclosure towards the vent. The flame front expanded rapidly and 
combustion was highly turbulent, so high overpressures were attained (462 mbar). 
Higher overpressures still, over 700 mbar, were attained when the door was hinged 
into the left enclosure (ignition) and left open at a 45° angle. 
Due to the complex interaction of flow between the interconnected rooms, it was found 
that in some circumstances unburnt gas/air mixture in the secondary chamber could be 
either mixed with combustion products, or expelled through the vent opening during 
flame jetting. This meant that the maximum overpressure was much more strongly 
dependent on the mixture in the left enclosure than that in the adjoining room. 
As expected, the ignition position had a significant effect on the maximum overpressure 
and the mechanism of explosion development. The magnitude of the external 
explosion is dependent upon its concentration and mass. With rear ignition, a greater 
volume of unburnt gas/air mixture is expelled through the opening. Consequently, 
explosions dominated by the external explosion produced higher pressure peaks with 
rear ignition than with central ignition. In the case of the turbulent combustion and 
jetting flame mechanisms, the ignition location determines the time between ignition 
and flame entry into the adjacent enclosure. Consequently, shorter travel distances, 
such as with central ignition, will result in the flame front reaching the doorway faster 
than with rear ignition, resulting in less turbulent combustion and lower overpressures. 
The most important findings, in terms of the objectives of this study, are that under the 
right conditions, fuel lean and fuel rich explosions can cause overpressures that have 
the potential to structurally damage buildings (> 200 mbar). For example, in test 53, an 
8% natural gas/air layer produced an overpressure of 317 mbar and in test 62, a 12% 
layer caused an overpressure of 393 mbar. These results are of considerable 
importance to gas explosion investigators involved in the interpretation of forensic 
evidence at the scene of a gas explosion in a building, since extensive pressure 
damage is not usually associated with either lean or rich mixtures.  
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CHAPTER 5 
5. THE EFFECTS OF IDEALISED OBSTACLES AND FURNITURE 
5.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 4, it was identified that turbulence and the jetting expanding flame front play 
a key role in gas explosions in buildings, initiated by the complex flow interaction 
through interconnected rooms. However, turbulence can also be generated by the 
interaction of flow with obstacles, such as furniture. 
Typical modern furnished dwellings will have a pathway, for flame propagation, that 
consists of a number of interconnected rooms, each of which may have significant 
congestion. In Chapter 3, it was identified that the average UK home would have room 
congestion of the order of 17% (by volume), with living rooms of the order of 5 – 10%. 
To understand the effects of furniture, in the development of accidental explosions in 
buildings, two large-scale experimental programmes were undertaken at the DNV GL 
Spadeadam Test Site. The results of these confined vented explosion programmes are 
discussed in this chapter. 
5.2. Experimental Programmes 
The experimental programmes (programmes 2 and 4) were designed to investigate a 
wide range of parameters that were likely to influence the development of the explosion 
and the maximum overpressure. Experimental programme 2 was conducted in Rig B 
and consisted of thirty eight natural gas/air vented explosion tests with idealised 
obstacle arrays. Experimental programme 4 was carried out in Rig C and consisted of 
seventeen methane/air tests, of which eleven had furniture within the explosion 
chamber.  
5.3. Experiments Involving Idealised Obstacle Arrays (Rig B) 
The main variables of interest in this study were vent size (i.e. representative of 
differing window sizes in buildings) and the degree of congestion within the explosion 
chamber (investigated in terms of the area and volume blockage). 
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5.3.1. Test conditions and Data (experimental programme 2, Rig B) 
A summary of the experimental test conditions and data gathered from the thirty-eight 
explosion tests is contained in Table 5-1 All the tests were ignited at the centre of the 
rear chamber wall, using full volume, natural gas/air mixtures of 10% concentration 
(v/v). Due to budgetary constraints, and that this explosion chamber had been used for 
a large number of explosions involving pipe arrays where repeatability had been 
demonstrated, only a small number of nominally identical experiments were undertaken 
to check repeatability (tests 12 and 13, and tests 33, 34 and 35). The peak 
overpressure in tests 33, 34 and 35 was found to vary by approximately 5%, which was 
within the 10% limit identified by MRS [403]. However, tests 12 and 13 were found to 
have variability exceeding this limit (15%). Tests 12 and 13 involved the highest degree 
of confinement and consequently it was possible for these tests to exhibit significant 
variability in maximum overpressure for the reasons described in Section 3.17 [402]. 
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1 1 - 0.0 0.00 14 22 69 44 69 35 
2 1 m 12.0 0.57 14 81 155 120 155 88 
3 1 l 12.0 0.75 14 112 135 157 157 86 
4 1 k 20.0 0.94 14 108 145 119 145 83 
5 1 j 20.0 1.26 11 203 246 - 246 89 
6 1 I 28.0 1.31 13 365 380 368 380 145 
7 1 h 12.0 1.51 13 309 336 285 336 152 
8 1 e 28.0 1.76 11 374 393 418 418 149 
9 1 c 20.0 2.51 20 547 713 715 715 192 
10 1 d 40.0 2.51 20 - 903 815 903 210 
11 1 b 28.0 3.52 21 1350 1425 1296 1425 262 
12 1 a 40.0 5.02 18 2793 2992 2272 2992 395 
13 1 a 40.0 5.02 - 3367 3474 2941 3474 - 
14 2 - 0.0 0.00 12 23 92 - 92 143 
15 2 m 12.0 0.57 14 301 477 671 671 86 
16 2 l 12.0 0.75 20 320 677 405 677 102 
17 2 j 20.0 1.26 21 555 1079 790 1079 111 
18 2 h 12.0 1.51 18 - 719 1036 1036 109 
19 2 f 28.0 1.76 20 686 678 1614 1614 125 
20 2 e 28.0 1.76 15 661 780 1281 1281 109 
21 2 g 28.0 1.76 - 691 1073 969 1073 66 
22 2 c 20.0 2.51 17 1162 1259 1937 1937 172 
23 2 d 40.0 2.51 - 1641 1934 1979 1979 176 
24 2 b 28.0 3.52  1801 1986 2273 2273 185 
25 4 - 0.0 0.00 20 96 183 132 183 132 
26 4 l 12.0 0.75 - - - 1058d 1058 103 
27 4 j 20.0 1.26 - - - 1397d 1397 114 
28 4 c 20.0 2.51 - 1293 - 2152d 2152 115 
29 4 b 28.0 3.52 - 2185 2508 2992d 2992 203 
30 9 - 0.0 0.00 26 - - 353d 353 417 
31 9 l 12.0 0.75 - - - 1598d 1598 64 
32 9 k 20.0 0.94 - 1406 - 2006d 2006 72 
33 9 j 20.0 1.26 - - - 2134d 2134 88 
34 9 j 20.0 1.26 - - - 2262d 2262 - 
35 9 j 20.0 1.26 - - - 2162d 2162 - 
36 9 h 12.0 1.51 - - - 2098d 2098 70 
37 9 c 20.0 2.51 - - - 2996d 2996 - 
38 9 b 28.0 3.52 - - - 3700d 3700 - 
a See Figure 3-13 for the specific pipe array layout for each congestion type. 
b Measurement taken from a piezoelectric pressure transducer located 0.4 m from the spark igniter. 
c Flame speed calculated at a distance 7.5 m from the spark igniter. 
d Relatively long duration peak, combination of Pext and Pmfa. 
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5.3.2. General 
In Figure 5-1, a pressure-time profile is shown for an explosion in an empty enclosure 
with a vent size of KA = 1; four distinct pressure peaks are evident. 
 
Figure 5-1 Overpressure-time profile for test number 1 
The first pressure peak, PV, corresponds to the failure of the polythene sheet at a time 
of around 450 ms after ignition. The polythene sheet failed at an overpressure of 
approximately 14 mbar and as this does not represent a significant pressure gradient 
across the vent opening, the rate of unburnt gas/air outflow is relatively low. The 
second pressure peak, Pb, corresponds to the onset of burnt gas venting at a time of 
approximately 775 ms and was recorded as the time that the flame front reached the 
plane of the vent opening. With the onset of burnt gas venting, the volumetric outflow 
rate increases dramatically as the volumetric flow through the vent is inversely 
proportional to the square root of the density of the gas being vented. This significant 
increase in outflow manifests itself as a drop in pressure on the pressure-time profile 
resulting in the pressure peak Pb. The third pressure peak corresponds to the external 
explosion, which occurs when the previously vented unburned gas/air mixture is ignited 
by the flame front when it exits the vent opening.  
In Figure 5-2, a pressure-time profile, recorded on pressure transducers T1 and T6, is 
shown for test number 2. Transducer T1 was located 0.4 m from the rear of the 
explosion chamber and transducer T6 was located 4 m outside the vent opening 
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resulting in a distance of 12 m between the transducers (Table 3-3). The speed of 
sound in the combustion products of a stoichiometric methane/air was calculated to be 
992 m/s meaning that if the pressure wave generated by the external explosion was 
propagating into the explosion chamber, giving rise to a pressure peak, Pext, it would be 
recorded at transducer T1, 12 ms after it was recorded at T6. 
 
Figure 5-2 Pressure-time profile showing the effects of the external explosion 
In Figure 5-2 it can be seen that the external explosion was recorded on T6 at 715 ms, 
generating a pressure peak of 123 mbar. The corresponding pressure peak on T1, 
identical in its profile but of greater magnitude, was recorded at 727 ms and generated 
a pressure peak of 155 mbar. Importantly, in all but two of the experiments (test no’s 3 
and 5, where the pressure peak was of the same magnitude), the magnitude of the 
pressure inside the enclosure was greater than that recorded outside. Consequently, 
the external combustion event cannot be solely attributable to the pressure peak 
generated within the explosion chamber, and whilst it was evident that the pressure 
peak was triggered by the external explosion, its magnitude was caused by a 
combination of the propagation of the external pressure wave into the enclosure, the 
temporary restriction to the outflow of gases caused by the reduced pressure 
differential across the vent opening following the external combustion, and by 
increases in the rate of combustion caused by turbulence and Taylor instabilities. In 
Figure 5-1, the fourth pressure peak corresponds to the time at which the flame surface 
area was at its greatest, giving rise to the pressure peak, Pmfa. This peak was seen on 
a number of tests to be superimposed onto the Pext pressure peak. 
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Taylor instabilities are hydrodynamic instabilities introduced when the less dense 
burned gases are accelerated into the denser unburned gas/air mixture, thereby 
creating a large increase in flame surface area (Section 2.2.5). Taylor instabilities are 
most commonly observed with central ignition and are a contributor to the low 
frequency oscillatory combustion frequently observed with vented explosions. During 
the early stage of burnt gas venting, the flame front was accelerated outside of the 
enclosure creating a ‘pear’ shaped flame front (in the case of central ignition). When 
the flame front was accelerated in this direction, the Taylor effect stabilised the rear of 
the flame front, inside the enclosure, resulting in a reduced mass combustion rate, 
causing a fall in pressure. This fall in pressure triggered an acceleration of the flame 
front in the opposite, Taylor unstable direction, thereby increasing the flame surface 
area and causing a pressure rise in the enclosure. This low frequency oscillatory 
combustion may continue until all the fuel is consumed. A similar effect may be 
observed with rear ignition (although less marked), where, following the external 
explosion, Taylor instabilities are introduced as the burned gases are accelerated into 
the unburned gas/air mixture trapped in the corners of the explosion chamber.  
Although the type of pressure-time profile shown in Figure 5-1 was exhibited on a 
significant number of the explosion tests, there were a number of experiments where 
the maximum pressure peak was of longer duration (caused by a combination of the 
Pb, Pext, and Pmfa pressure peaks) and the PV and Pb pressure peaks were not obvious 
as a consequence of the magnitude of the maximum pressure peak.  
The series of tests produced peak explosion overpressures of between 70 mbar (KA = 
1 and no congestion) to 3.7 bar (KA = 9 and 3.52% VB) with corresponding maximum 
flame speeds in the range 35 - 395 m/s at a distance of 7 m from the ignition point. 
Flame speeds in excess of 600 m/s were consistently recorded close to the vent 
opening during tests with area blockages of 20% or greater combined with a volume 
blockage greater than 1.5%. One test configuration (Type a), was only utilised for tests 
with a vent opening of KA = 1, as the overpressures predicted for tests involving a vent 
opening of KA = 2, 4 or 9, based on earlier experiments, exceeded the design strength 
of the explosion chamber. 
It is clear from the results of these experiments that the presence of congestion can 
significantly increase the overpressures generated, often by more than an order of 
magnitude. High and damaging overpressures can be generated even from relatively 
benign confined explosions in empty (no internal congestion) chambers with large vent 
areas. The significance of these results is that they confirm that the size of the vent 
opening and the degree of congestion within a building are key factors in whether or 
not a building will sustain structural damage following a gas explosion.  
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The tests demonstrated that is was possible to generate overpressures capable of 
causing structural damage in empty chambers if the vent openings do not allow 
sufficient outflow (i.e. KA = 9). Furthermore, with volume blockages of as little as 0.57%, 
overpressures greater than 200 mbar were generated in all tests where KA > 1. 
It is recognised that the effect of area blockage and obstacle array separation distance 
may play a more important role in the development of fast flames than volume 
blockage. However, unlike chemical, process and storage facilities, where congested 
region layouts or designs will be readily available, populated buildings will have 
congested and confined areas that are not predictable, and, as a consequence, it is 
easier to use volume blockage as a criteria. Consequently, for the purpose of this 
study, the volume blockage was the main variable when designing the congestion 
configuration. However, further large-scale experimental tests, investigating the effects 
of area blockage and separation distance are recommended.  
5.3.3. Effect of Vent Size 
Effect on Overpressure 
In Figure 5-3, the effect of vent size (i.e. confinement) on overpressure is shown for 
explosions with no congestion. It can be seen that the overpressure and the duration of 
the maximum pressure peak increases as the vent size is reduced. Furthermore, the 
maximum pressure peak on the KA = 9 pressure-time profile is significantly longer in 
duration, has a shallower gradient than tests with larger vent openings and also 
exhibits a number of oscillatory peaks. These observations are attributed to the 
influence of turbulence and Taylor instabilities caused by the significant amount of 
unburnt gas that gets ‘trapped’ in the corners of the explosion chamber.  
It was also noted that as the vent size was increased, the magnitude of Pb decreased 
because unburnt gas venting was not significantly restricted by the vent opening and 
the external explosion, Pext, was dominant. However, as the size of the vent was 
reduced, the outflow through the vent was restricted, which increased the magnitude of 
Pb, and the external explosion became less significant, and in some instances, typically 
with KA = 9, resulted in its pressure peak, Pext merging with the pressure peak Pb, to 
produce a single broad peak (sometimes also merging with Pmfa). It was also evident 
that it triggered Taylor instabilities. 
The effect of vent size on empty enclosures with regard to maximum overpressures 
was also very interesting. The magnitude of the KA = 9 maximum overpressure was 
found to be twice that of the corresponding value for KA = 4, four times that of KA = 2 
and five times that of KA = 1.  
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Figure 5-3 The effect of vent size on overpressure (no congestion) 
In Figure 5-4, the effect of vent size on overpressure is shown for tests where 
congestion was present in the enclosure. It can be seen that as the vent size was 
decreased, the magnitude of the maximum pressure peak increased. In a similar 
manner to tests without congestion, the influence of the external explosion, on the 
pressure generated within the enclosure, reduced with decreasing vent size and 
increasing congestion, with the pressure peak Pext, merging with the pressure peaks Pb 
and Pmfa to produce a single broad peak. Furthermore, the average rate of pressure 
rise, (dP/dt)avg, from the onset of the maximum pressure peak, ranged from 2.8 bar/s 
for KA = 1, to 17.4 bar/s for KA = 9 indicating that there is a direct correlation between 
both the rate of pressure rise and maximum overpressure with reducing vent size.  
It was observed that in tests conducted with a larger vent size (i.e. KA = 1), the flame 
typically emerged from the vent as a narrow jet and a few metres from the plane of the 
vent opening, the jetting flame front ignited the unburnt gas/air mixture and flame 
propagated rapidly in a ‘mushroom’ shape, giving rise to the peak external 
overpressure. As the vent size was decreased, the pressure at which flame venting 
occurred increased and as a consequence the emerging jet velocity increased and the 
unburnt gas/air mixture was distributed farther from the vent opening. These increased 
jet velocities cause higher shear and would be expected to promote better mixing with 
external air, resulting in a leaner external cloud. 
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Figure 5-4 The effect of vent size on overpressure (type (j) congestion) 
In addition, the time taken for flame venting increased as the vent area was decreased, 
allowing more time for the vented gases to travel farther from the vent opening. In 
these instances, the external flame propagation did not appear mushroom shaped, but 
rather, was elongated, with the centre of the external explosion typically being several 
metres from the plane of the vent opening. For this reason, and because the smaller 
vent opening limits the size of the pressure wave that can propagate back into the 
enclosure, the influence of the external explosion was observed to be greater with 
larger vent openings. However, due to the reasons described above, it is possible that 
very rich mixtures inside a chamber with a small vent could result in a strong external 
explosion. This should be the subject of further research. 
The effect of vent size on the pressure generated outside the explosion chamber is 
shown in Figure 5-5. This diagram shows the maximum overpressure recorded, as a 
consequence of the external explosion, by the transducers located outside the 
explosion chamber. The results show that decreasing the size of the vent gives rise to 
an increase in external overpressures. This increase in pressure is a result of the small 
vent area causing flammable unburnt gas/air mixture ahead of the flame front to be 
vented at far higher velocities than is the case for larger vent areas. This high efflux 
velocity causes greater turbulence within the external flammable gas cloud, which 
causes faster burning velocities (and hence flame speeds) and higher external 
overpressures, though of shorter duration. The plot also highlights the effect of 
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decreasing vent size discussed above, with the KA = 9 tests with congestion registering 
a greater overpressure at the T7 location than at T6 (see Table 3-3 for location data).  
 
Figure 5-5 The effect of vent size on external pressure 
Effect on Flame Speed 
In Figure 5-6, the effect of vent size on flame speed is shown for explosions with no 
congestion. As the flame speed is a combination of the rate of combustion and the 
induced flow velocity, a change in either alters its magnitude. However, the two 
properties are not independent, as combustion generates pressure, and pressure 
generates flow (Schelkin Mechanism). The ‘induced’ flow, in terms of turbulent vented 
explosions, is typically of the order of 80 – 85% of the flame speed [103], and 
consequently, any change in outflow velocity will significantly affect the flame speed. 
As seen in Figure 5-6 , reducing the vent size resulted in increased flame speeds as 
the flame approaches the vent, suggesting that for explosions without congestion, there 
is an indirect correlation between flame speed and vent size. It should be noted that the 
flame speeds are measured along the centreline and that reducing the vent size 
increases the internal pressure giving rise to greater flow velocities. This has the effect 
of producing greater distortion of the flame, particularly along the centreline. 
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Figure 5-6 The effect of vent size on flame speed (no congestion) 
The effect of varying the vent size where congestion is present in the enclosure is 
shown in Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-8. Figure 5-7 shows the calculated flame speed for 
tests with 0.75% volume blockage and Figure 5-8 plots the calculated flame speeds for 
tests with 1.26% volume blockage. It can be seen in Figure 5-7 that in the early stages 
of the explosions (flame travel ≤ 5 m), the flame speeds are significantly faster than 
those tests where no congestion was present, and that, unlike the results shown in 
Figure 5-6, reducing the vent size resulted in reduced flame speeds. However, as the 
flame approached the vent opening, the flame speeds increased rapidly long the 
centreline of the vent opening. The effect of vent size on reduced flame speed was 
most significant when the volume blockage was greater than 2%, with the fastest flame 
speeds being generated in the KA = 1 tests (Figure 5-8). Reducing the vent opening 
(i.e. increasing confinement) tended to reduce the speeds of the flowing mixture inside 
the chamber, except in regions close to the opening, which reduces the flame speed. In 
certain instances, choked flow conditions occurred. Choked flow occurs in vented 
explosions when the unburnt gas/air mixture and/or burnt gases passing through the 
vent opening are initially subsonic (upstream of the vent opening), and the principles of 
the conservation of mass require the fluid to increase in velocity as it flows through the 
reduced cross-sectional area of the vent opening. This increase in velocity will continue 
until the limiting conditions of choked flow are reached. This limiting condition occurs 
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when the fluid approaches the local speed of sound (i.e. Mach number 1) and 
consequently the velocity cannot be increased by increasing the upstream pressure or 
reducing the downstream pressure. However, the mass flow rate may be increased by 
increasing the upstream pressure, which will increase the density of the fluid across the 
vent opening, but will not increase its velocity. The onset of choked flow may be 
estimated in vented natural gas/air explosions as the condition occurs when the critical 
pressure ratio, that is the ratio of the absolute pressure immediately upstream of the 
vent opening to the absolute pressure immediately downstream of the vent opening is 
approximately 1.89 for the unburnt gas/air mixture and 1.80 for the burnt gases under 
stoichiometric conditions. Consequently, choked flow conditions cannot occur at 
overpressures, within the enclosure, less than 900 mbar.  
It may be concluded therefore, that reducing the vent size, for a given level of 
congestion, results in increased flame speeds up until the point where the fluid velocity 
through the vent opening reaches the local speed of sound. After this point, reducing 
the vent opening results in the flame speed being reduced, except in the region of the 
vent opening. In addition, the reduction in flow velocity will result in comparatively lower 
levels of turbulence in the wake of obstacles and this will result in less enhancement of 
combustion rates and hence comparatively low flame speeds. 
 
Figure 5-7 The effect of vent size on flame speed (type (l) congestion) 
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Figure 5-8 The effect of vent size on flame speed (type (j) congestion) 
5.3.4. Effect of Congestion 
Congestion increases the flame speed, and consequently, the overpressure as a result 
of three mechanisms. Firstly, the flame surface area increases due to the distortion of 
the flame as it flows around the obstacles that form the congested region. This leads to 
an increase in the overall mass burning rate, thereby increasing the flame speed. 
Secondly, the unburnt mixture being pushed ahead of the flame will create turbulence 
in the wake of the obstruction. Thirdly, when the flame front reaches this turbulent 
region there is an increase in the rate of heat and mass transfer within the reaction 
zone, the burning velocity is therefore enhanced and this also increases the flame 
speed, setting up the positive feedback process. This results in the faster production of 
combustion products, which further enhances the flow and initiates a change from 
laminar to turbulent conditions. The first mechanism was found to be more significant in 
the early stages of the explosion process when the flame front is moving relatively 
slowly and few turbulence generating obstacles have been encountered. By contrast, 
the second mechanism will be more significant when the flame speed is already high 
as the higher flow speeds cause increased levels of turbulence to be created in the 
wake of obstacles. Therefore turbulence will be more significant later in the explosion 
process when the flame will have progressed farther along the enclosure. 
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Effect of Volume Blockage 
A pressure-time profile for an explosion involving a type (j) obstacle configuration with a 
vent size of KA = 1 is shown in Figure 5-9. This configuration consisted of four arrays, 
each containing five pipes. The first array was located 1 m from the rear of the 
enclosure and the pitch between arrays was set at 2 m. The times at which the flame 
front arrived at the obstacle arrays have been plotted on the graph so that the effects of 
obstacles on overpressure may be observed; three distinct pressure peaks are evident.  
The first pressure peak occurs approximately 360 ms after ignition and corresponds to 
the flame passing through the 1st obstacle array but also may be associated with the 
failure of the polythene sheet. This peak occurs at an overpressure of approximately 14 
mbar, and as this does not represent a significant pressure gradient across the vent 
opening, the rate of unburnt gas/air outflow is relatively low and the pressure peak is 
not significant. The second pressure peak occurs at approximately 560 ms and 
corresponds to the flame arrival at the second pipe array (located at 3 m). At this point 
the flame speed was in the order of 50 m/s but with the downstream obstacle array 2m 
away, the enhanced combustion in the wake of the second array did not extend the full 
gap between the arrays and the flame speed started to decrease, resulting in the 
pressure falling, giving the second pressure peak. 
 
Figure 5-9 Overpressure-time profile for type (j) explosion, KA = 1 
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The influence of the 5 m and 7 m obstacle arrays are evident as changes in the 
gradient of the pressure-time curve, indicating that the flame speed is increasing. The 
third pressure peak, Pb, corresponds to the onset of burnt gas venting at a time of 
approximately 680 ms. The fourth pressure peak corresponds to the external 
explosion, which occurs when the previously vented unburned gas/air mixture is ignited 
by the flame front when it exits the vent opening.  
An overpressure-time profile for an explosion involving a type (a) obstacle configuration 
with a vent size of KA = 1 is shown in Figure 5-10. This configuration consisted of eight 
arrays, each containing ten pipes and was the most congested set-up that was used in 
the experimental programme. It was only used on the largest vent size in order to 
prevent damage to the explosion chamber. The first array was located 1 m from the 
rear of the enclosure and the pitch between arrays was set at 1 m. The time at which 
the flame front arrived at the first seven of the eight obstacle arrays is plotted on the 
graph so the effects of congestion on overpressure can be observed. It was not 
possible to plot the flame arrival at the final array as the ionisation probe triggered 
early, possibly due to the high flow speeds. The flame speed in the region of the vent 
opening however, was in excess of 600 m/s. The effect of the 1st obstacle array is not 
immediately obvious on the pressure time profile but it is important as it has 
established flow within the chamber. 
 
Figure 5-10 Overpressure-time profile for type (a) explosion, KA = 1 
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The PV pressure peak has a magnitude of 18 mbar and occurred at approximately 355 
ms, a similar time to that of the type (j) test shown in Figure 5-9. However, the pressure 
peak is not obvious on the pressure-time graph due to the magnitude of the maximum 
pressure peak. It can be seen in Figure 5-10 that the influence of the onset of burnt gas 
venting is significantly less than that of a type (j) explosion, which has less congestion. 
This observation was consistent throughout the experimental programme. The flame 
arrival at the second and then subsequent arrays is seen as an increase in gradient on 
the pressure-time curve indicating that the flame front is accelerating and interacting 
with obstacles immediately downstream to cause further turbulence, thereby setting up 
a positive feedback mechanism. 
An overpressure-time profile for an explosion involving a type (c) obstacle configuration 
with a vent size of KA = 4 is shown in Figure 5-11. This configuration consisted of eight 
arrays, each containing five pipes. The first array was located 1 m from the rear of the 
enclosure and the pitch between arrays was set at 1 m. However, the arrays were 
offset (see Figure 3-13) such that the horizontal distance between each individual pipe 
was 2 m. The maximum overpressure generated in this explosion was 2.15 bar, 
considerably more than that generated in explosions with more congestion but with 
larger vent openings. It appears that the horizontal spacing between consecutive 
obstacles has affected the development of the explosion. Clearly, the generation of 
pressure is a combination of flame acceleration due to congestion and the degree of 
confinement, and it may be concluded that both congestion and confinement (i.e. less 
inadvertent venting) will tend to increase the observed overpressures in accidental 
explosions in buildings. Interestingly, with this type of configuration and vent size, the 
external explosion is of less influence, for the reasons described in Section 5.3.3. 
There is a noticeable pressure differential from the rear of the chamber to the vent 
opening in tests involving the larger vent sizes, which is not apparent with tests of vent 
size K = 9.  
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Figure 5-11 Overpressure-time profile for type (c) explosion, KA = 4 
The effect of volume blockage on internal explosion overpressures is shown in Figure 
5-12 and Figure 5-13. It can be seen that, in general terms, with the vent size 
remaining constant, the observed maximum overpressures increased as the volume 
blockage was increased and the maximum pressure peak occurred earlier in the 
explosion. This is to be expected as explosion overpressures increase with flame 
speed and an increasing level of congestion resulted in a higher flame speed for a 
given vent size (see Figure 5-14 ). In addition, the effect of decreasing the vent size 
(higher vent coefficient) is to increase the overpressure because it reduces the venting 
rate.  
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Figure 5-12 The effect of volume blockage on overpressure, KA = 1 
 
Figure 5-13 The effect of volume blockage on maximum overpressure 
For any given congestion level, reducing the vent size always resulted in an increased 
pressure. Whilst a larger vent resulted in increased flow and turbulence, it did not 
overcome the effects of reducing the confinement. The noticeable reduction in 
overpressure observable in Figure 5-13 occurs with the type (i) and type (h) congestion 
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configurations. The type (i) configuration has three arrays and a 3.0 m pitch and the 
type (h) configuration has a reduced area blockage. It is therefore apparent that the 
area blockage and pitch play an important role in the development of fast flames and 
overpressure.  
Interestingly, increasing the level of congestion affects the influence of the vent size on 
overpressure. In Section 5.3.3, it was observed that reducing the vent size, for 
experiments with no congestion, gave rise to overpressures for KA = 9 that were twice 
that of the corresponding value for KA = 4, four times that of KA = 2 and five times that 
of KA = 1. Table 5-2 shows the comparison with experiments involving congestion. 
Table 5-2 Effects of congestion and vent size on overpressure 
Test 
Type 
Max Pressure (bar) Maximum Pressure Ratio 




















1 2 4 9 
0% VB 0.07 0.09 0.18 0.35 1.9 3.9 5.0 2.0 2.6 1.3 
m 0.16 0.67   - - - - - 4.2 
l 0.16 0.68 1.37 1.6 1.2 2.4 10.0 2.0 8.6 4.3 
k 0.15   2.01 - - 13.4 - - - 
j 0.25 1.08 1.4 2.26 1.6 2.1 9.0 1.3 5.6 4.3 
h 0.34 1.04  2.1 - 2.0 6.2 - - 3.1 
e 0.42 1.28   - - - - - 3.0 
c 0.72 1.94 2.15 3 1.4 1.5 4.2 1.1 3.0 2.7 
d 0.9 1.98 2.92  - - - 1.5 3.2 2.2 
b 1.43 2.27  3.7 - 1.6 2.6 - - 1.6 
 
It can be seen that for all tests, excluding KA = 1, the addition of congestion reduces the 
relative influence of the vent size when compared to experiments without congestion. 
However, when comparing tests involving KA = 1, the opposite is found to occur for the 
lower levels of congestion; with the magnitude of overpressure for a type (k) test with a 
vent size of KA = 9, over thirteen times greater than the comparative test with KA = 1, 
indicating that the level of congestion (generating turbulence) is insufficient to 
overcome the effects of the reduction in confinement (larger vent). This is not surprising 
as the pressure developed within an enclosure during a vented explosion is a balance 
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between the rate at which expanding combustion products are produced and the rate 
of outflow through the vent opening. Consequently, any restriction in outflow through a 
reduction in vent size will result in higher overpressures within the enclosure; the effect 
of which will be enhanced if the congestion is increased. This effect is further 
highlighted in Figure 5-14, where the effect of vent size on maximum overpressure is 
plotted. In Figure 5-13 and Figure 5-14, a line is plotted to indicate the overpressure 
threshold for structural damage. It can be seen that tests without congestion (KA > 4), 
and tests involving congestion below the levels typically found in residential buildings, 
developed overpressures greater than that for structural damage for a typical building. 
This may suggest that most buildings involved in gas explosions would suffer 
significant damage. However in practice, this is not the case, as the flammable gas/air 
mixture is often ignited at non-stoichiometric conditions (e.g. a permanent source of 
ignition ignited the mixture as soon as it became flammable) such that lower flame 
speeds are developed, thereby allowing more time for venting and consequently 
constraining the overpressure developed.  
 
Figure 5-14 The effect of vent size on maximum overpressure 
The effect of volume blockage on flame speed is shown in Figure 5-15 for explosion 
tests where the pitch was set at 2.0 m. It can be seen that the flame speed rises as the 
volume blockage within the enclosure is increased, irrespective of vent size.  
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Figure 5-15 Flame speed vs. blockage ratio 
Effect of Area Blockage and Pitch 
The effects of the obstacle array separation distance (pitch) has received little 
systematic study in the literature [406]. In turbulent explosions, the maximum burning 
rate, and therefore the highest rate of pressure generation for a given vent size, will 
occur at the position of maximum turbulence intensity. It has been shown [406, 407], 
that the turbulence intensity increases downstream of an obstacle array until it reaches 
a maximum value some distance after it, and it then begins to decay at an 
approximately steady rate over a relatively long distance. Consequently, if a flame front 
is propagating towards a series of obstacle arrays, the maximum flame speed, and 
hence overpressure, might be generated if the arrays were separated by the ‘critical’ 
distance. That is, each successive array is located just downstream of the position of 
maximum turbulence intensity, so that it receives the flame front at its peak speed, and 
thereby, it generates the maximum possible turbulence intensity downstream, so that 
the peak flame speed is received by the next obstacle, and so on. If the pitch of a 
series of arrays is too large or too small, then the downstream array would not be 
affected by the peak turbulence generated from the upstream array, resulting in an 
explosion of lesser severity.  
During this experimental programme, a number of experiments were undertaken where 
the pitch and/or the area blockage were altered. However, no experiments were 
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undertaken where the volume blockage and area blockage were constant and the pitch 
was altered. However, as some of the results were interesting, a brief description is 
detailed in this section.  
A few experiments were undertaken where the area blockage and vent size were 
constant and the volume blockage was altered by varying the separation distance 
between arrays. In Figure 5-16, the effect of pitch on overpressure is shown for tests 
where the area blockage was 20%, the vent size was KA = 1 and the pitch was varied 
between 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 m by altering the volume blockage. It can be seen that the 
greatest overpressures, and fastest flame speeds are being generated by the arrays 
with a pitch of 1.0 m, and the lowest overpressure is being generated where the pitch 
of the arrays is 3.0 m. This may simply be because the rig represents that with the 
largest volume blockage and largest number of repeat arrays but further large-scale 
study is recommended. 
 
Figure 5-16 The effect of pitch on overpressure 
A small number of experiments were undertaken where the volume blockage and vent 
size were constant and the area blockage and the separation distance between arrays 
was altered. The effect of area blockage and pitch on overpressure is shown in Figure 
5-17 for tests where the volume blockage was 2.51%, the vent size was KA = 1 and the 
pitch was varied between 1.0 and 2.0 m. It can be seen that the greatest overpressures 
and fastest flame speeds were generated when the area blockage was greatest. 
Further large-scale studies into the effect of area blockage are recommended. 
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Figure 5-17 The effect of area blockage and pitch on overpressure 
5.3.5. Summary of Findings from the Idealised Obstacle Tests 
The series of tests produced peak explosion overpressures of between 70 mbar (KA = 
1 and no congestion) to 3.7 bar (KA = 9 and 3.52% VB) with corresponding maximum 
flame speeds in the range 35 - 395 m/s at a distance of 7 m from the ignition point. 
Flame speeds in excess of 600 m/s were consistently recorded close to the vent 
opening during tests with area blockages of 20% or greater combined with a volume 
blockage greater than 1.5%. One test configuration [Type (a)], was only utilised for 
tests with a vent opening of KA = 1, as the overpressures predicted for tests involving a 
vent opening of KA = 2, 4 or 9, based on earlier experiments, exceeded the design 
strength of the explosion chamber. 
A number of important observations were made in terms of the vent size. For any given 
congestion level, reducing the vent size always resulted in an increased pressure. The 
vent size was also found to significantly affect the external explosion, with larger vents 
tending to produce higher overpressures within the chamber. 
The results of these large-scale experiments show that high and damaging 
overpressures can be generated even from explosions in empty (no internal 
congestion) enclosures if the vent opening is such that it prevents sufficient outflow (KA 
> 4). The presence of congestion was found to significantly increase the overpressures 
generated, often by more than an order of magnitude. With volume blockages of as 
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little as 0.57%, overpressures greater than 200 mbar were generated in all tests where 
KA > 1. The significance of these results is that they confirm that the size and failure 
pressure of potential vent openings, and the degree of congestion within a building, are 
key factors in whether or not a building will sustain structural damage following a gas 
explosion. Given that the average volume blockage in a room in a UK dwelling is in the 
order of 17% (living rooms are less, circa 5 – 10%), it is clear that without the use of 
large windows of low failure pressure, residential buildings will continue to be 
susceptible to significant structural damage during an accidental gas explosion. 
5.4. Experiments Involving Furniture (experimental programme 4, 
Rig C) 
There were two main objectives of this part of the experimental work. The first objective 
was to understand the effect of furniture on overpressure, for a volume blockage that 
was typical of the average UK room. The second objective was to build upon the 
idealised work reported in Section 5.3 and to investigate whether there was any 
correspondence between the results of experiments with idealised obstacle arrays and 
those involving non-uniform obstacles in the form of furniture. 
5.4.1. Test Conditions and Data 
The experimental programme was undertaken in Rig C with a fixed vent size of KA = 
2.7. Seventeen methane/air tests were undertaken in this programme, of which ten 
involved furniture. The main variables of interest in this study were different furniture 
configurations, of which there were four, and the gas concentration. All but one of the 
tests were undertaken with rear ignition, the remaining test was ignited centrally. 
A number of ‘baseline’ tests were undertaken to check for repeatability, prior to 
undertaking the tests with furniture. As the majority of tests with furniture were 
undertaken with 10% methane/air mixtures, four of the seven baseline tests were 
undertaken at this concentration. The results were in agreement with the 10% criteria 
described in Section 3.17. 
A summary of the experimental variables and data gathered from the seventeen vented 
explosion tests is contained in Table 5-3. 
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(% v/v) Ignition Furniture VB (%) 
Pmax  
(mbar) 
1 10 Rear No 0 209 
2 10 Rear No 0 196 
3 10 Rear No 0 186 
4 10 Rear No 0 172 
5 6 Rear No 0 - 
6 7.5 Rear No 0 112a 
7 12.5 Rear No 0 310 
8 10 Rear Yes 5 509 
9 10 Rear Yes 5 497 
10 7.5 Rear Yes 5 164 
11 9.5 Rear Yes 5 463 
12 10 Rear Yes 3 236 
13 9.5 Rear Yes 8 501 
14 10 Rear Yes 7 293 
15 12.5 Rear Yes 7 929 
16 11.5 Rear Yes 7 821 
17 10 Central Yes 7 247 
a Vent did not fail, gases vented around vent panel, pressure-time profile incorrect. 
5.4.2. Baseline Tests in an Empty Chamber 
Rows 1 – 7 of Table 5-3 provide the maximum overpressures recorded in the empty 
enclosure tests. Test 5, which was a lean (6%) methane/air mixture, proved difficult to 
ignite, with the vent failing to open following ignition. No overpressure data was 
generated but analysis of the internal video footage revealed an unusual combustion 
process (for explosions). A thin blue flame appeared to propagate along the axially 
located suspension wire, which secured the ionisation probes and thermocouples 
(Figure 5-18). This unusual manner of flame propagation during an explosion may be 
attributed to the suspension wire, around which aluminium foil had been wrapped in 
order to provide additional heat protection to the ionisation cables. Whilst the ignition 
energy was not sufficient to sustain a propagating flame, it appears that aluminium and 
iron oxide from the suspension wire and its metallic wrapping may be catalysing the 
oxidation of methane [408, 409].  
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Figure 5-18 Aluminium and iron oxide from the suspension wire catalysing the 
oxidation of methane (6% methane/air test) 
Figure 5-19 shows the overpressure-time profile for a 10% natural gas/air explosion 
carried out as a baseline test. It is immediately apparent that there are two major 
pressure peaks in this explosion. By comparison, Figure 5-20 shows the profile with 
that of test 1 in Rig B, which displays four pressure peaks. In both cases the explosion 
chambers were empty but the volumes of the explosion chamber, the vent area and 
vent failure pressure were different. In the case of Rig B, the failure pressure of the 
vent was low, whereas Rig C had a smaller vent of significantly higher failure pressure. 
The timing wire broke at 504 ms indicating that the 12.5 mm fibreboard vent had failed; 
this is marked on the plot (Figure 5-19). Shortly after the vent failed, and due to the 
onset of venting, the pressure within the chamber dropped, causing the PV pressure 
peak. This was measured at 209 mbar and was the maximum overpressure attained in 
the explosion. Analysis of the video records show that the flame reached the plane of 
the vent opening at 600 ± 10 ms. Immediately after this point, a small peak may be 
observed on the plot indicating the onset of burnt gas venting, but this was 
instantaneously followed by a rapid pressure rise due to the external explosion 
(coinciding with maximum flame surface area).  
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Figure 5-19 Overpressure-time profile for empty chamber 
The reason there are only two apparent pressure peaks in test 1 conducted in Rig C, 
was due to the relatively high failure pressure of the vent. This means that the flame 
was already well developed by the time the vent failed, and consequently, there was 
less gas/air mixture left in the chamber. This is also demonstrated by the relatively low 
pressure peak from the external explosion. The flame front arrived at the vent opening 
shortly after the vent failed, which would have resulted in less gas/air mixture being 
expelled through the opening and subsequently being available for combustion. The 
pressure rise was also not as rapid as other examples of the external explosion. In this 
instance, the pressure rise was largely driven by the reduction in pressure difference 
across the vent opening, thereby reducing the rate of outflow during the burnt gas 
venting phase. 
The flame speeds, along the centre-line, for a 10% methane/air explosion in an empty 
chamber are shown in Figure 5-21. These were determined from the flame arrival times 
recorded by the ionisation probes and thermocouples (Table 3-4 and Figure 3-43).  
The maximum flame speed attained in this experiment in an empty chamber of volume 
70 m3 and L/D ≈ 3:1 was calculated as 65 m/s. In comparison with Figure 5-6, which is 
an equivalent explosion in Rig B (182 m3 volume, L/D 2:1), the results are broadly 
similar, with the slightly lower flame speeds in test 3 being explained by the difference 
in chamber size and vent failure pressures.  
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Figure 5-20 Comparison of overpressure-time profiles for tests in empty chamber 
chambers (Rigs B & C) 
 
Figure 5-21 Flame speed for a 10% methane/air explosion in an empty chamber 
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The External Explosion 
A photo sequence taken during test 4 (Figure 5-22) illustrates the later stages of a 10% 
methane/air explosion in an empty chamber, from vent failure through to the external 
explosion. The photo sequence has been taken from video footage at 30 frames per 
second (fps). Consequently, each frame represents approximately 33 ms. Frame 1 is 
taken just before the vent starts to fail; and in frame 2, the vent can be seen ‘bowing’ 
outwards. In frame 3, the vent has failed but is still largely in place, restricting outflow. 
In frames 4 and 5 the vent has been removed and is being pushed clear of the vent, 
such that in frame 6, the vent is clear of the opening, allowing full outflow of unburnt 
gas/air mixture. In frames 7 and 8, the vent can be seen breaking into pieces and being 
pushed farther away from the vent opening. In frame 9, the flame has just reached the 
plane of the vent opening and in frame 10, a jet of flame can be seen exiting the vent. 
In frame 11, the jetting flame can be seen igniting the unburnt gas/air mixture, which 
had accumulated approximately 6 – 8 m from the vent opening.  
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Figure 5-22 Photo sequence showing the later stages of a 10% methane/air 
explosion in an empty chamber 
Figure 5-23 shows a photo sequence for a 12% methane/air explosion in an empty 
chamber (test 7). The maximum pressure generated in this explosion, measured at 310 
mbar, was greater than that of the 10% explosion (test 1, Figure 5-19). This maximum 
pressure peak (Pext) was caused by the external explosion. The pressure peak was 
considerably greater than the PV peak which was approximately 200 mbar. The 
difference in the external explosion of a stoichiometric concentration compared to a fuel 
rich mixture may be visualised by comparing Figure 5-22 and Figure 5-23. The external 
explosion of the fuel rich mixture appears more visible, with the jetting flame being 
more luminous (relatively, the apparent luminosity may be due to background light). 
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Figure 5-23 Photo sequence showing the later stages of a 12.5% methane/air 
explosion in an empty chamber 
In an identical manner to that of Figure 5-22, the photo sequence in Figure 5-23 has 
been taken from video footage at 30 fps. Frame 1 is taken just before the vent starts to 
fail, and in frame 2, the vent can be seen ‘bowing’ outwards. In frame 3, the vent has 
failed, but is still partially in place, restricting outflow. In frame 4, the vent is clear of the 
opening, thus allowing the full outflow of unburnt gas/air mixture. In frames 5, 6 and 7 
the vent can be seen breaking into pieces and being pushed farther away from the vent 
opening, whilst the unburnt gas/air mixture is diluting and forming a flammable cloud 
that is likely close to stoichiometric concentration. In frame 8, the flame front reaches 
the plane of the vent opening and exits as a jet in frame 9. In frame 10, the jetting flame 
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ignites the flammable cloud that has accumulated some 6 – 8 m from the vent opening. 
The external explosion is clearly visible throughout the rest of the frames. 
The jetting external explosion was a key factor in the development of the explosion 
during this programme. Due to confinement, there is a build-up of pressure which, if it 
was sufficiently high enough, could cause unburnt gas/air mixture to be vented at high 
velocity through the vent opening. This turbulent transient jet has a characteristic 
‘mushroom’ shape appearance with a high velocity stalk (see Figure 2-32). At some 
point, after the venting stage of the explosion, the expanding flame front will reach the 
jet, and as the centre of the jet is intensely turbulent (see Section 5.3.3), the flame front 
is accelerated due to the combined influence of turbulence and flame stretch. If the 
concentration of the external jet has not been reduced below the lower flammable limit 
and the time-scale of the turbulence does not cause flame quenching, the jetting flame 
front will ignite the ‘mushroom’ shaped jet head and give rise to an external explosion. 
This can be clearly seen in Figure 5-23. Jetted external explosions can correspond to 
the dominant pressure peak in some vented explosions (Chapter 4), restricting venting 
within the chamber and causing a pressure wave to propagate back towards and into 
the chamber itself. The effectiveness of this process is governed by the magnitude of 
the pressure developed during the external explosion (dependent upon concentration 
of the external cloud) and the distance of the external explosion to the vent opening. If 
combustion within the chamber is still ongoing at the time of the external explosion, the 
pressure can rise by a factor of two or more than would have occurred if there was not 
an external explosion. 
5.4.3. Tests with Furniture 
A number of pieces of furniture had been sourced from a local house clearance 
business. These pieces of furniture were used to create realistic ‘mock ups’ of a typical 
UK living room. A drawing showing the layout of the first mock up is given in Figure 
5-24 and a photograph taken before test 8 is shown in Figure 5-25. 
Tests 8 – 11 (5% VB) 
The items used during the experimental programme, and their calculated volume, are 
given in Appendix B. The furniture layout used in tests 8 to 11 had a volume blockage 
of 5%. 
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Figure 5-24 Layout of furniture for tests 8 to 11 
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Figure 5-25 Furniture layout for tests 8 to 11 
Figure 5-26 shows the overpressure-time profile for test 8, which was a 10% 
methane/air explosion. It can be seen that there are two main pressure peaks, but 
unlike the corresponding test in the empty chamber, the second peak was dominant. 
The timing wire on the vent broke at 450 ms, indicating that the vent had failed. 
Analysis of the video records showed that the flame reached the vent opening at 525 
ms. In Figure 5-26, at 525 ms there is a slight dip in the overpressure-time curve, which 
corresponds to the onset of burnt gas venting. However, approximately 30 ms later, 
there was a rapid pressure rise due to the external explosion. Consequently the Pb 
pressure peak is barely noticeable. The external explosion was measured as 509 mbar 
which is over double that recorded in the corresponding test in an empty chamber. 
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Figure 5-26 Overpressure-time profile for test 8 
Figure 5-27 shows the overpressure-time profiles for tests 8 and 10. It compares the 
pressure development between stoichiometric and fuel lean mixtures. There are 
several noticeable differences on the pressure traces. Firstly, the stoichiometric 
explosion has two main pressure peaks, whilst the fuel lean has three. Secondly, the 
duration of the explosion is considerably longer for the fuel lean explosion, which 
corresponds to the lower burning velocity. Thirdly, the stoichiometric explosion is 
dominated by the external explosion, whilst the fuel lean explosion is dominated by the 
PV peak, and also generated a peak corresponding to the maximum flame area.  
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Figure 5-27 Overpressure-time profiles for tests 8 and 10 
Interestingly, in a similar manner to some of the experiments with interconnected 
rooms, the fuel lean explosion generated a peak shortly after the rarefaction wave, 
which followed the PV peak as a consequence of overventing. No external explosion 
occurred during the fuel lean explosion, which correlates with the lack of a Pext peak on 
the overpressure-time profile. It is perhaps better demonstrated by the photo sequence 
shown in Figure 5-28. The sequence starts 30 ms before vent failure, no external flame 
is observed. 
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Figure 5-28 Photo sequence showing the later stages of a 7.5% methane/air 
explosion with 5% VB from furniture 
An additional observation of note is that the vents fail at different pressures, even 
though the size, material of the vent panel, and its fixing were identical. As discussed in 
Section 1.6 pressure damage is dependent upon the magnitude of the pressure 
generated and the relationship between the duration of the imposed pressure load and 
the natural period of vibration of the structure. In this case, whilst the pressure was 
lower, in the case of the fuel lean explosion, the duration was significantly longer. 
Due to budgetary constraints, only two experiments were conducted with methane/air 
concentrations of 7.5%. Neither of these tests produced an overpressure of magnitude 
sufficient to cause structural damage to a building. However, the addition of furniture in 
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the second test did cause the maximum pressure to increase. It is therefore clear, that 
an explosion of a fuel lean mixture, in a building with interconnected rooms that were 
furnished, would be capable of causing structural damage. Further work is 
recommended with fuel lean explosions, where the explosion chamber has both 
interconnected rooms and furniture. 
Tests 12 (3% VB) 
For test 12, the armchairs and the coffee table were removed (see Figure 5-24), 
reducing the volume blockage to 3%. In addition, the sofa was moved towards the vent 
such that it was 2.65 m from the rear of the explosion chamber. The test was 
undertaken with a 10% methane/air mixture and generated a maximum overpressure 
of 236 mbar. The cause of the relatively low overpressure was attributed to the low 
level of congestion and greater distance between the ignition source and largest 
turbulence generating obstacle. 
Test 13 (8% VB) 
For test 13, a number of items were added along the edges of the side walls and the 
armchairs were repositioned (see Figure 5-29). This was carried out to increase the 
volume blockage in the enclosure, in a manner that was representative of realistic 
furnishing of rooms (i.e. furniture is typically positioned against the walls of a room). 
Following the changes to the room layout, the volume blockage was calculated to be 
8%; this was the maximum blockage used during this experimental programme. 
Figure 5-30 shows the overpressure-time profile for test 13 (9.5% methane/air) and 
compares it to that of test 8 (10% v/v and 5% VB). Whilst the profiles look very similar, 
perhaps surprisingly (even though there was a slightly higher laminar burning velocity 
due to concentration), the test with the lower blockage ratio attained a slightly higher 
maximum overpressure and a considerably higher pressure peak corresponding to the 
vent opening. In addition, it reached the 1st peak sooner. These findings are easily 
explained, and in some way, set the scene for the effects of furniture. Whilst the 
volume blockage was increased, the additional furniture was placed against the walls 
of the chamber and not in the direct path of the propagating flame front. Consequently, 
turbulent flow due to these additional obstacles was limited. Furthermore, they had the 
effect of reducing the potential maximum flame surface area, also acting to cool the 
flame slightly earlier. In terms of the time taken to reach the first peak, the sofa was 
moved farther from the source of ignition, which meant its influence occurred later in 
the explosion. Consequently, in test 8, flame acceleration due to turbulence generated 
by the sofa, occurred earlier, and the pitch of the downstream obstacles was such that 
it did not further affect pressure development. 
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Figure 5-29 Layout of furniture for test 13 
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Figure 5-30 The effect of volume blockage 
Pressure Damage 
Figure 5-31 and Figure 5-32 show the damage to the furniture layout following 10% 
methane/air explosions. Test 12 had a volume blockage of 3% and generated a 
maximum pressure of 236 mbar. It can be seen that some of the furniture had been 
‘overturned’ and some moved during the explosion. It is relatively common during the 
investigation of gas explosions in buildings to see an apparent lack of damage to 
furniture and household items. The propagating flame front and flow ahead of the flame 
will flow around the obstacle wherever possible. Items may also ‘bounce’ as the 
pressure rise within enclosures causes flexible suspended floors (e.g. floorboards etc.) 
to momentarily bow before returning to their original shape (although in some instances 
the flooring may be permanently deformed). However, items such as storage units, 
appliances etc. which present a confined space where gas can accumulate, may suffer 
significant damage. Furthermore, in general terms, there will be large scale damage in 
situations where the building walls and floors collapse.  
 
The Effects of Idealised Obstacles and Furniture  338 
 
Figure 5-31 Damage following test 12 
 
Figure 5-32 Damage following test 13 
Test 13 had a volume blockage of 8% and generated a maximum pressure of 501 
mbar. It can be seen that there are more items of furniture that have been overturned. 
This degree of pressure generation in a building would have caused significant 
structural damage and the distribution of furniture would have been far more 
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widespread. It can also be seen in Figure 5-32 that the sofa has suffered extensive fire 
damage. This was a cumulative effect as a result of several explosions. 
Tests 14 to 17 (7% VB) 
As a consequence of the damage to the sofa, the furniture was changed prior to test 
14. In addition, the volume blockage was altered to 7%. The layout for tests 14 to 17 is 
given in Figure 5-33 and Figure 5-34. 
 
Figure 5-33 Photo of furniture layout for tests 14 to 17 
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Figure 5-34 Layout of furniture for tests 14 to 17 
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Figure 5-35 shows the calculated flame speed for test 15, which for comparative 
purposes is shown against plots for test numbers 3 and 13. For clarity, some of the 
more significant pieces of furniture, directly in the path of the propagating flame front, 
are plotted on the diagram. 
 
Figure 5-35 Comparison of centreline flame speeds (tests 3, 13 and 15) 
As discussed in Section 5.3.4, congestion increases the flame speed, and 
consequently, the overpressure. In these experiments, where the experimental set-up 
is attempting to represent realistic conditions in which an accidental gas explosion may 
occur; the acceleration of the flame front is a consequence of a complex interaction 
between the propagating flame front, the local obstruction and its position, and the size 
and geometry of the enclosure. This can be clearly seen in Figure 5-35, where the 
increase in flame speed is approximately linear for the test with no congestion; whilst 
with congestion it is clear that additional mechanisms are affecting the flame speed. 
However, the comparisons between the tests carried out with furniture are somewhat 
surprising. The fuel rich mixture (test 15, φ = 1.3, VB = 7%) produced higher flame 
speeds than that of the stoichiometric concentration (test 13, φ = 1.0, VB = 8%). It also 
generated a significantly higher maximum overpressure; which was largely attributable 
to the external explosion. Nevertheless, the inconsistency still remains that higher 
flame speeds were attained by a concentration with a lower laminar burning velocity, 
and in an enclosure with a lower volume blockage. The volume blockage discrepancy 
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may be explained with the same reasoning as discussed earlier in this chapter. To 
develop turbulence, the obstacle must be in the path of the propagating flame front and 
the separation distance between downstream obstacles is also critical. If the obstacles 
are spaced either too close, or too far apart, the turbulence intensity will be reduced 
and the explosion will be less severe. In this instance, the additional furniture was 
positioned at the edge of the enclosure and the sofa was positioned farther from the 
ignition source. It seems plausible that this could, to some degree, explain the 
discrepancy.  
Scrutiny has been given to the reliability of the ionisation probe and thermocouple 
measurements as the explosion process is extremely turbulent and in some instances 
the flame front was recorded at an instrument downstream before it was recorded at 
the adjacent, upstream position. However, test 14 (also 10% methane/air) was 
undertaken with the same furniture layout as tests 15 and 16 (11.5% methane/air), and 
again it produced a lower maximum overpressure and lower flame speeds (see Figure 
5-36). Furthermore, the argument regarding the accuracy of the flame arrival 
measurements is invalid as the overpressure-time profiles clearly demonstrate that the 
pressure peaks were being generated faster with the fuel rich mixture; and the time at 
which the pressure peaks are generated is a function of flame speed. 
Clearly, erroneous gas concentration measurements have to be considered. However, 
the gas filling process was robust with the gas analyser being calibrated against a test 
gas of known composition prior to each test. A single sampling point was used in Rig 
C, but this was considered adequate as the gas was recirculated during this 
experimental programme. To check the accuracy of this system, a small number of 
additional tests were undertaken using four sample points (not included in this thesis). 
The gas concentration measurements taken using a single sample point compared 
favourable to those taken from the four point system. Furthermore, the difference in 
mixture concentration is clearly visible from inspection of internal and external video 
records (see Figure 5-22, Figure 5-23 and Figure 5-28), where the fuel rich flames are 
more luminous than those of stoichiometric concentration. There is also a distinct 
difference between stoichiometric and fuel lean images. 
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Figure 5-36 Overpressure vs. gas concentration (tests 14 and 15) 
Accepting that the gas concentrations are valid, what plausible explanation could there 
be for the discrepancy in flame speed? The answer lies in the internal video records. 
Figure 5-37 shows the flame development of tests 14 and 15 taken at 470 ms after 
ignition. Test 14 is in the left frame. The flame can be seen to be developing in a 
hemispherical shape and appears to be laminar. Contrastingly, test 15, in the right 
frame is clearly cellular and wrinkled in its nature, with an increased surface area. The 
flame stretch and curvature would have resulted in a Markstein number, Ma < 0, with a 
consequent increased mass burning rate. Hence the flame front arrives at the 1st 
obstacle (table and chairs), early in the explosion, generating flow and creating 
turbulence. This turbulence enhances the burning rate, which creates more flow, and 
so on. It therefore appears that the cause of the flame speed discrepancy is due to the 
fuels rich mixtures early development of a cellular flame structure. The author is not 
aware of this finding being reported elsewhere in the literature and consequently it 
necessitates further work. 
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Figure 5-37 Flame development (tests 14 and 15) 
Accepting the difference in flame structure with the fuel rich mixture, in general terms, 
the development of the flame front witnessed in the experiments was similar to that 
observed in small-scale experiments of Masri et al. [44]. The explosion develops in two 
distinct ways. Firstly, the initially laminar flame distorts as it impinges upon the 
obstacle, increasing the flame surface area, thereby increasing the mass combustion 
rate and the flame speed (Figure 5-38, 340 – 440 ms).  
   
 
Figure 5-38 Explosion development showing increase in flame surface area as 
advancing flame front propagates around table 
Secondly, the explosion is significantly influenced by the changes in the flow field 
induced by the obstacle. The unburnt mixture pushed ahead of the flame creates 
turbulence in the wake of the obstruction. The flame interacts with the modified flow 
field, with the geometry and size of the obstacle determining the turbulence levels and 
length scales. This can further enhance the mass combustion rate, thereby increasing 
the flame speed and setting up a positive feedback process (Figure 5-38, 540 ms).  
The location of obstacles, their shape and separation distance was found to be 
important. These factors govern the manner of the flow around the obstruction, the 
intensity of the re-circulation zone which was formed, and whether any unburnt gas 
was trapped in the wake of the obstruction. Flat type obstacles (sofa etc.), which 
345  Chapter 5 
typically present the larger blockage area in the flame path, tended to give rise to the 
most rapid increase in combustion rate. Conversely, flows were seen to pass smoothly 
around cylindrical type obstacles. In certain circumstances, obstacles can result in 
pockets of gas being formed downstream. The flame front will follow the easiest path 
around these obstacles and will burn in these pockets, which if they are confined may 
generate pressure pulses. 
The large obstacles and their position sets up a complex interaction between the 
propagating reaction front and the flow fields around the obstructions. In some 
instances, particularly where the obstacle was positioned against the wall of the 
chamber, the velocities were reduced and little turbulence was generated. 
Furthermore, the flame area was also reduced as it has reached the edge of the 
flammable mixture. These factors result in lower overpressures. In other instances, if 
the separation distance was in an ‘optimum’ region, local flame acceleration in the form 
of jetting occurred. The motion of gas movement around the obstacles creates both 
turbulence by vortex shedding and local wake/recirculation which can cause the flame 
to ‘fold’ on itself, to form a vortex shape flame. This folding, increases the flame surface 
area available for combustion but may produce localised flame quenching. A colour 
image of a folded flame front is given in Figure 5-39. This image of a vortex shaped 
flame was captured at the point at which the flame front propagated around the thermal 
marker board, which represented a flat type obstacle. In this example, the flame was 
still in the early stages of development and was laminar prior to reaching the obstacle. 
 
Figure 5-39 Folded flame front producing a vortex shaped flame 
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The External Explosion 
In the tests involving furniture, the maximum overpressure typically corresponded to 
the external explosion. The exception to this was the test carried out with a 7.5% 
methane/air mixture. The magnitude of the external explosion, in agreement with the 
findings of Chapter 4 and Section 5.3, was dependent upon the gas concentration; with 
fuel rich mixtures generating the largest overpressures within the explosion chamber. 
Figure 5-40 shows the overpressure-time profile for test 15. The key stages of the 
external explosion are plotted on the diagram. The breaking of the timing wire and 
analysis of the video records (see Figure 5-41) show that the vent failed 515 ms after 
ignition and some 20 ms later was clear of the vent opening. It can be seen in the video 
record that the expanding flame front had just passed over the 1st obstacle (kitchen 
table and chairs) when the vent failed. At 594 ms, the flame front was observed to have 
arrived at the plane of the vent opening, immediately igniting the high velocity unburnt 
gas/air mixture expelled from the chamber to form a jetting flame (see Figure 5-42). 
 
Figure 5-40 Overpressure-time profile for fuel rich mixture (test 15) 
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Figure 5-41 Video record from a high speed camera showing the explosion 
development and time of vent failure (test 15) 
These observations indicate that unburnt gas/air mixture was being expelled, at high 
velocity, for 81 ms. At 607 ms, the jetting flame reached the ‘mushroom’ shaped tip of 
the jetting outflow and ignited it, generating the external explosion. The magnitude of 
the external explosion caused the pressure to peak within the chamber at 929 mbar. At 
644 ms the external explosion stopped and the jetting flame ceased at 706 ms.  
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Figure 5-42 Development of the external explosion for fuel rich mixture (test 15) 
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Figure 5-43 shows a plot of the calculated methane/air mixture outflow through the vent 
opening during the venting stage of the explosion. It has been calculated using the 
equation for the flow through an orifice [Equation (2-43)], taking the pressure 
differential across the vent from the overpressure-time profiles. It has been assumed 
that the flow is incompressible and that the temperature of the mixture is constant. 
Clearly these assumptions are not strictly correct, but they are deemed as adequate for 
providing an estimate of the volume of gas expelled from the vent opening to form a 
flammable cloud. The total volume of gas expelled is of the order of 48 m3. 
 
Figure 5-43 Calculated outflow of methane/air mixture through the vent opening 
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Central Ignition 
A single test (test 17) was undertaken with central ignition. The test was undertaken 
with a 10% methane/air mixture and a volume blockage of 7%. Figure 5-44 shows the 
overpressure-time profile. In agreement with the typical pressure-time profile of a rear 
ignition test, there are two pressure peaks. The first pressure peak corresponds to the 
vent failure and the second peak corresponds to the external explosion and maximum 
flame area. This explosion also exhibited pressure oscillations during the latter stages 
of the explosion. This mechanism is initiated because central ignition causes the flame 
to propagate from the centre of the chamber outwards in an approximately spherical 
shape. Consequently, unburnt gas/air mixture becomes trapped at the rear of the 
chamber and is burnt towards the end of the explosion. 
 
Figure 5-44 Overpressure-time profile for central ignition test (No. 17) 
The external explosion also behaves in a different manner to rear ignition tests. Figure 
5-45 shows three images taken from the high speed camera. In the first frame, the 
spherical flame can be seen developing. In the second frame, the vent is just beginning 
to fail, but the flame front is already close to the vent opening. In the third frame, the 
flame can be seen distorting towards the vent opening as it ignites the jetting outflow of 
unburnt gas/air mixture.  
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Figure 5-45 Explosion development – central ignition (test No. 17) 
A photo sequence of the external explosion is given in Figure 5-46. There are some 
interesting differences between the external explosion from a centrally ignited 
explosion and that of rear ignition. Firstly, the initiation of the jetting flame is almost 
immediately followed by the external explosion. Secondly, the external explosion 
occurs closer to the vent opening because there is a shorter distance for the flame front 
to travel to the vent opening, and consequently, the flame front reaches the vent 
opening very quickly after the vent fails. Thirdly, there is a reduced volume of gas 
expelled through the vent opening, again, due to the position of the flame front. Lastly, 
the jetting flame continues after the external explosion for a significant time. This is 
because, with central ignition, there is more unburnt gas/air mixture left within the 
chamber.  
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Figure 5-46 Photo sequence of external explosion – central ignition (test No. 17) 
 
5.4.4. Comparison of Results 
Comparison with Experiments Involving Idealised Obstacle Arrays 
For comparative purposes, Figure 5-47 shows the overpressure-time profile of an 
experiment involving furniture and two experiments with idealised obstacles. The test 
involving furniture consisted of a layout that provided an area blockage of 22% and a 
volume blockage of 5%, whilst the idealised obstacle tests had area blockages of 20% 
and 12%, and volume blockages of 1.26% and 0.75% respectively.  
Care should be taken when comparing these results as the explosion chambers are of 
different volume, the vent openings are of different size and the vent material has a 
different failure pressure. However, some interesting observations can be made. The 
second pressure peak on the overpressure-time profiles are similar in shape, with the 
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difference in shape of the first pressure peak caused by the difference in vent failure 
pressure and effects of inertia. It can also be seen that the both tests involving 
idealised obstacles produced higher maximum overpressures than the experiment 
involving furniture; with the idealised obstacle configuration that provided a similar area 
blockage (20%), producing a considerably greater maximum overpressure (1079 
mbar). The idealised obstacle set-ups had uniform separation distances between 
obstacle arrays, whilst the furniture layout consisted of several obstacles that were not 
directly in the path of the propagating flame front and consequently would not have 
generated significant turbulence. 
 
Figure 5-47 Comparison of overpressure-time profiles for tests involving 
furniture and idealised obstacles 
Figure 5-48 shows the effects of volume blockage on the maximum overpressure. It 
compares the results of some of the experiments involving idealised obstacle arrays 
with those using furniture. There are three plots on the graph and a dotted line to 
indicate the threshold for structural damage. The first plot represents the results of the 
tests with idealised obstacle arrays, the second represents the tests involving furniture 
and the third represents the volume blockage of furniture directly in the path of the 
propagating flame front (all furniture positioned against the walls of the chamber has 
been discounted from the volume blockage calculation). 
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Figure 5-48 Maximum overpressure vs. volume blockage 
It can be seen that consistently higher maximum overpressures were recorded during 
the idealised obstacle array tests. This is not surprising as the importance of separation 
distance between obstacles in the development of pressure has already been 
discussed in this chapter. The idealised obstacle arrays had more obstacles in the path 
of the flame and the separation distance between obstacles was uniform. 
The plot that represents the furniture that was positioned in the path of the flame front, 
and therefore considers the volume of furniture that is effective in generating 
turbulence, shows that the maximum pressure increased with increasing volume 
blockage. However, the difference in the magnitude of the maximum overpressures 
between the idealised obstacles and furniture demonstrates that volume blockage is 
just one parameter that needs to be considered. It is clear from the two experimental 
programmes that area blockage is a more effective measure for turbulence generation 
and that obstacle separation distance is critical. Notwithstanding this, gas explosion 
investigators would realistically only be able to measure congestion in terms of volume 
blockage, so the relationship between this simple parameter and overpressure is 
important. In terms of explosion investigation, the most important finding from Figure 
5-48 is that tests with all tests (except the empty chamber, Rig B) generated pressures 
greater than that required to cause structural damage to a building. The volume 
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blockage can be seen to play a significant role in generating pressure in all cases 
except for volume blockages of 3% and 7% involving furniture.  
The encouraging finding of the work is that the overpressures with furniture and 
realistic obstacles produce significantly lower overpressures than idealised obstacle 
arrays with similar volume blockage. Given that the results for tests involving idealised 
obstacles and those of furniture produced such different results, it is important that 
further large-scale experimental work involving furniture be conducted. Furthermore, 
given the findings with fuel rich tests, it is of significant importance that this work be 
conducted with a wide range of concentrations. An experimental programme to conduct 
some 300 explosion tests, in a purpose built two-storey building that will contain 
furnished interconnected rooms, has been developed. The experimental programme, 
which has been estimated to cost £2.5m and take two years to complete, is in the final 
stages of negotiation with OFGEM regarding its suitability for funding through the 
Network Innovation Allowance (NIA) and/or Network Innovation Competition (NIC) 
research schemes. It is hoped that these essential programmes will commence in 
2015.  
Comparison with Other Large-Scale Experiments 
Bimson et al. [48] observed a transition from normal self-wrinkling behaviour to flame 
distortion as the flame front interacted with the obstacle, leading to rapid flame 
acceleration. This process ‘drove’ unburnt gas/air mixture ahead of the flame and out 
through the vent opening in a ‘mushroom’ shaped vortex. The authors hypothesised 
that the prolonged outflow after the main and external explosion was due, inter alia, to 
the combustion of unburned gas/air held up in the front corners of the enclosure.  
The results of this work are in agreement with the work of Bimson et al. [48], where 
similar effects of air entrainment on the external explosion were noted. It was observed 
that there was a rich mixture at which entrained air produced an external cloud of 
optimum concentration, generating peak overpressures within the enclosure. Initial 
unburnt gas/air richer or leaner than this concentration, produced external flammable 
clouds above or below this optimum mixture respectively (φ ≈ 1.05), resulting in 
reduced external and internal overpressures. Their results, for particular vent 
coefficients, were in the region of 5 – 10% dilution of the concentration prior to ignition. 
Similar effects were observed in this work, where initial equivalence values of φ = 1.3 
produced greater overpressures than those of φ = 1.05. 
The observations related to external explosions in this work were also similar to that 
observed by Harrison and Eyre [133] with an emerging jet igniting a ‘mushroom’ 
shaped cloud. The external explosion also influenced pressure generation within the 
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enclosure in the same manner. Firstly, through the reduction, or reversal, of the 
pressure gradient across the vent opening, thereby reducing the outflow through the 
vent and increasing the quasi-static internal pressure. Secondly, the acoustic pressure 
wave generated by the external explosion was also observed to propagate through the 
vent opening and into the explosion chamber, thereby increasing the internal 
overpressure. This wave was also reflected at the rear of the enclosure, with the 
coincidence of the incident and reflected waves resulting in pressure peaks that were 
larger and narrower than those recorded elsewhere in the enclosure. Thirdly, in some 
instances, the external explosion triggered instabilities that resulted in low frequency 
oscillatory pressure generation. 
Comparison with Identified Correlations 
In the literature review, two correlations were identified that accounted for turbulence 
(via a turbulence factor) and also allowed the maximum overpressure to be plotted 
against gas concentration. In Figure 5-49, a comparison is made of the experimental 
results from this work and the correlations derived by Rasbash et al. [Equation (2-75) 
and (2-76)] and Cubbage and Marshall [Equation (2-78)]. In respect of the experimental 
results, the maximum overpressures produced for each test with furniture have been 
averaged and plotted against equivalence ratio. The predicted maximum overpressures 
from Equation (2-75) and Equation (2-78) have been plotted for the corresponding 
equivalence ratios by selecting appropriate values for the laminar burning velocity.  
It can be seen from Figure 5-49 that the maximum overpressure in the experiments 
increases with concentration. This suggests that the dominating factor is the external 
explosion, with fuel rich mixtures more likely to produce a near stoichiometric 
flammable cloud outside the vent opening. However, the surprising finding that fuel rich 
flames, due to the early development of a cellular structure, were propagating at faster 
speeds than that of stoichiometric mixtures, is also contributing to the overpressures in 
these instances.  
The predictions of both correlations follow a typical burning velocity curve which does 
not follow the trend of the experimental results, whilst also overpredicting the lean and 
stoichiometric overpressures and underpredicting those of fuel rich concentrations. 
This reason for the underprediction of fuel rich overpressures is because the 
correlations do not account for the effects of the external explosion.  
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Figure 5-49 Comparison of experimental results with the correlations of Rasbash 
et al. [Equation (2-75)] and Cubbage and Marshall [Equation (2-78)] 
5.4.5. Summary of Findings from the Furniture Tests 
The series of tests produced peak overpressures between 164 mbar (7.5% 
methane/air) and 929 mbar (12.5% methane/air).  
With the exception of a fuel lean test, experiments involving furniture generated two 
pressure peaks, with the dominant peak corresponding to the external explosion. The 
first pressure peak was always associated with the failure of the vent. The external 
explosions involving furniture produced pressure peaks that were over double that of 
corresponding tests in an empty chamber. 
The jetting external explosion was a key factor in the development of the explosion 
during this programme. Confinement and turbulence caused a pressure build-up which 
caused unburnt gas/air mixture to be expelled through the vent opening at high 
velocity. This was subsequently ignited by the flame front as it exited the vent opening, 
producing a jetting flame which then ignited the ‘mushroom’ shaped cloud to initiate the 
external explosion. The maximum overpressures produced in the programme 
corresponded to the external explosion of an initially fuel rich methane/air mixture 
(12.5%). 
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Two fuel lean tests were undertaken in this programme (7.5% methane/air), neither 
produced pressures capable of causing structural damage. All other tests involving 
furniture produced explosions capable of causing structural damage to a building. 
It was found that there was not a satisfactory correlation relating the actual volume 
blockage of a room to the maximum overpressure. Most importantly, it was the 
blockage in the path of the flame front that was important. Furthermore, the separation 
distance between turbulence generating obstacles was also significant.  
In general terms, the expanding flame front was observed to develop in two distinct 
ways. Firstly, the flame distorted as it impinged upon an obstacle, increasing the flame 
surface area. Secondly, the unburnt mixture pushed ahead of the flame created 
turbulence in the wake of the obstruction. The flame then interacts with the modified 
flow field, which can further enhance the mass combustion rate, thereby increasing the 
flame speed and setting up a positive feedback process. 
Fuel rich mixtures were found to develop cellular flame structures very early in the 
explosion giving rise to increased mass burning rates and generating flow which 
created turbulence downstream of obstacles. Surprisingly, these burning rates were 
faster than that of corresponding near stoichiometric mixtures. Further work is 
recommended to investigate this observation. 
A central ignited test produced a different overpressure-time profile, with a different 
characteristic external explosion. In this case, the flame reached the flame front soon 
after the vent had failed and consequently, the external explosion occurred close to the 
vent opening.  
The results of these large-scale experiments show that high and damaging 
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5.5. Conclusions 
Similarly to Chapter 4, the results presented in this chapter represent a substantial 
amount of new large-scale explosion data, which can be readily interpreted and applied 
to the development and subsequent investigation of gas explosions in buildings.  
It was shown that it was possible to generate overpressures capable of causing 
structural damage in empty (no internal congestion) enclosures if the vent openings do 
not allow sufficient outflow. The presence of congestion was found to significantly 
increase the overpressures generated, often by more than an order of magnitude. 
Furthermore, with volume blockages of as little as 0.57%, overpressures greater than 
200 mbar were generated in all tests where KA > 1. However, the obstacle geometry, 
and its location to other obstacles and the enclosure, are critical in the development, or 
otherwise, of damaging overpressures. Consequently, volume blockage, as a 
parameter for determining the maximum overpressure, has to be interpreted carefully.  
A number of findings were presented, providing new knowledge and understanding of 
the manner in which gas explosions develop in the presence of furniture. This 
knowledge provides further insight into how complex a vented explosion in a typical 
building can be, and how the degree of congestion in the form of furniture, and its 
layout within a room, can affect the magnitude of the explosion.  
All of the pressure peaks identified in the literature review were observed during this 
experimental programme. The PV peak was always the first pressure peak and 
corresponded to the failure of the vent. In some tests, however, where there was a vent 
of low failure pressure, and considerable congestion, the peak was not immediately 
evident. The Pb pressure peak associated with the onset of burnt gas venting was seen 
in some of the results but more often was masked by the rapid pressure increase due 
to the external explosion. The Pext peak, corresponding to the external explosion was 
the dominant factor in most of the tests reported in this chapter.  
It was determined, that for any given congestion level, reducing the vent size always 
resulted in an increased pressure. Whilst a larger vent resulted in increased flow and 
turbulence, it did not overcome the effects of reducing the confinement. 
The size of the vent was also found to significantly affect the external explosion. In 
tests with larger vents, a jetting flame emerged and ignited the external flammable 
cloud, forming a mushroom shaped flame and giving rise to the peak external 
overpressure. As the vent size was decreased, the emerging jet velocity increased and 
the unburnt gas/air mixture was distributed farther from the vent opening. In these 
instances, the external flame propagation did not appear mushroom shaped, but rather, 
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was elongated, with the centre of the external explosion typically being several metres 
from the plane of the vent opening. Consequently, the influence of the external 
explosion was observed to be greater with larger vent openings.  
In terms of flame speed it was found that reducing the vent size, for a given level of 
congestion, resulted in increased flame speeds up until the point where the fluid 
velocity through the vent opening reached the local speed of sound. After this point, 
reducing the vent opening resulted in the flame speed being reduced, except in the 
region of the vent opening. In addition, this reduction in flow velocity reduced the levels 
of turbulence in the wake of obstacles, thereby lessening the enhancement of 
combustion rates and producing relatively low flame speeds.  
Similarly to the behaviour observed with idealised obstacles, two important processes 
were observed in the development of an explosion involving furniture. Firstly, an initially 
laminar flame distorts as it impinges upon the obstacle, increasing the flame surface 
area. Secondly, the explosion is significantly influenced by the changes in the flow field 
induced by the obstacle. When the flame arrives at the obstacle, it interacts with the 
modified flow field, with the geometry and size of the obstacle determining the 
turbulence levels and length scales. Consequently, the separation distance between 
obstacles and their location was found to be important. When the volume blockage in 
the path of a propagating flame front increases, the gaps between the obstructions and 
the enclosure will decrease resulting in increased gas velocities around the obstacle, 
which may increase the reaction rate. 
The effect that the shape of the obstruction and its location within the enclosure 
appeared to be significant. It governed the manner of the flow around the obstruction, 
the intensity of the re-circulation zone which was formed, and whether any unburnt gas 
was trapped in the wake of the obstruction. The introduction of large obstacles and 
their position sets up a complex interaction between the propagating reaction front and 
the flow fields around the obstructions. In some instances, particularly where the 
obstacle was positioned against the walls of the chamber, flow velocities were reduced 
and little turbulence was generated. In other instances, if the separation distance was 
in an ‘optimum’ region, local flame acceleration in the form of jetting occurred. The 
motion of gas movement around the obstacles creates both turbulence by vortex 
shedding and local wake/recirculation which can cause the flame to ‘fold’ on itself, to 
form a vortex shaped flame, resulting in increased combustion rates.  
It is recognised that the effect of area blockage and obstacle array separation distance 
may play a more important role in the development of fast flames than volume 
blockage. However, unlike chemical, process and storage facilities, where congested 
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region layouts or designs will be readily available, populated buildings will have 
congested and confined areas that are not predictable, and, as a consequence, it is 
appropriate to use volume blockage as a criteria. Consequently, for the purpose of this 
study, the volume blockage was the main variable when designing the congestion 
configuration. However, further large-scale experimental tests, investigating the effects 
of area blockage and separation distance are recommended. This should be linked to a 
programme that investigates the complex interaction caused when flames propagate 
from one furnished room to another. In addition, due to the surprising findings in some 
of the fuel rich tests, further work should also be carried out to investigate the 
development of cellular flames which were found to increase mass burning rates and 
generate turbulence downstream of obstacles.  
It is clear from the results of this experimental programme, and those reported in 
Chapter 4, that gas explosions that propagate from one furnished room to another have 
the potential to generate overpressures capable of inflicting significant structural 
damage on buildings. The significance of the results presented in this chapter, is that 
they confirm that the size and failure pressure of potential vent openings, and the 
degree of congestion within a building, are key factors in whether or not a building will 
sustain structural damage following a gas explosion. Given that the average volume 
blockage in a room in a UK dwelling is in the order of 17%, it is clear that without the 
use of large windows of low failure pressure, residential buildings will continue to be 
susceptible to significant structural damage during an accidental gas explosion. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6. THE INTERPRETATION OF THERMAL DAMAGE 
6.1. Introduction 
When a flammable gas is released within, or migrates into, a building and mixes with 
air to form a flammable gas/air mixture which is ignited; a flame front will propagate 
through the mixture, wherever possible in an approximate spherical geometry, 
releasing energy in the form of heat, light and pressure.  
In Chapter 1 it was discussed that the damage sustained by a building, and its decor, 
during an explosion can provide forensic evidence that is important in the accurate 
determination of the origin and cause of the incident. The severity and extent of thermal 
damage to surfaces such as door frames, window-sills, wallpaper etc. may be used to 
provide an indication of the relative density of the fuel gas, its concentration in the 
explosive mixture prior to ignition, its distribution throughout the building and the depth 
of any flammable layer. This information may then be used to determine any credible 
sources of gas by calculating or measuring the release rate and estimating whether an 
escape of this magnitude is capable of mixing with air to form a flammable layer, or 
completely full mixture, which is in agreement with the scorching patterns. 
There are numerous materials, typically found at the scene of explosion incidents that 
are susceptible to thermal damage and hence may be used as ‘markers’ by explosion 
investigators. These materials include paints, polyethylene sheeting, wallpaper, paper, 
wool, cotton, plywood, varnished wood, PVC coated electrical cable etc.  
In Chapter 2 it was determined that whilst there was a plethora of literature relating to 
the response of people and materials exposed to heat, the majority of this work 
focused on the intensity of hydrocarbon fires and the behaviour of materials exposed to 
compartment fires. little work was found in the literature relating to the heat flux of a 
vented explosion.  
Of the few studies in the literature concerning thermal damage from an explosion, the 
most relevant work saw a variety of fibres exposed to an electric heating plate set to 
350°C (to ensure the fabric melting point was exceeded) and a gas burner (Section 
2.7.3). The fibres were exposed to the heat sources for a duration of 30 s except for 
acrylic, polyester, silk and wool materials, where the duration was shortened to 15 s 
due to the very rapid melting/charring of the fibre samples. The samples were 
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subsequently analysed through an optical microscope and SEM. The initial change in 
the fibre, that occurred with either heat source, and which was particularly prevalent in 
cellulosic materials, was a discolouration from yellowish initially through to brown. The 
fibre ends of nylon, polyester, acrylic and wool were found to have melted and fused 
together to form ‘bulb-like’ ends. Cotton fibres, after contact with the flame were found 
to lose their normal appearance and take on a lacelike, delicate charred consistency. 
Whilst these results are of relevance to this study, they need to be treated with caution 
as the experiments are not fully representative of the conditions of an explosion, 
particularly in terms of duration and flame temperature. 
The objectives of this aspect of the research were to determine the effect of an 
explosion within a building on specific markers that were most likely to be found at the 
scene of an explosion and to determine to what extent these thermal damage markers 
could be used as forensic evidence in the investigation to determine the origin of the 
explosion and the most likely source of gas release. In particular, the intention was to 
identify if the materials and surfaces exposed to a propagating flame could provide 
reliable evidence that could be used to: 
i. determine the relative density of the fuel gas (and hence likely fuel type); 
ii. estimate the distribution of flammable mixture throughout the building; 
iii. determine the depth of any flammable layer; and 
iv. estimate the concentration of fuel gas in the explosive mixture prior to ignition. 
6.2. The Experimental Programmes 
The experimental work was undertaken in four separate programmes. The 1st set of 
tests were conducted in conjunction with the interconnected room tests undertaken at 
the FRS facility. The 2nd and 3rd set of tests were undertaken at DNV GL Spadeadam 
and the final set of tests was undertaken at the University of Leeds. The first two sets 
of tests were analysed by visual comparison and the third and fourth set using various 
laboratory techniques. These techniques are discussed later in this chapter. A number 
of tests were undertaken under nominally identical conditions to check repeatability. 
Whilst assessment of thermal damage is subjective, the results were considered to be 
satisfactory. 
6.2.1. The FRS Experimental Programme 
Test numbers 1 – 19 and 23 – 44 of the interconnected room tests were, in addition to 
being used to determine the effects of interconnecting rooms, also used to analyse the 
thermal damage that occurs to typical materials found in dwellings, as a consequence 
of exposure to a transient flame front and the movement of hot combustion products.  
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The marker boards were positioned adjacent to the walls of the chambers (see Figure 
3-46, Figure 3-47 and Table 3-7). This location was chosen for two reasons; firstly, 
because it represented the position that the materials were most likely to be found in a 
building, and secondly, because the location would not significantly affect the 
development of the explosion (e.g. by creating turbulence). 
As the flame and hot gases propagated during the explosion the thermal strips were 
subjected to heat (from the hot gases) and short duration flame impingement. 
Assessment of the vertical distribution and severity of thermal damage was undertaken 
by measurement and visual comparison. The lowest vertical position on each strip, at 
which scorching was observed, was measured from floor level and recorded. This 
information was used to compare the observed damage with the initial depth of the 
gas/air mixture. The severity of thermal damage was assessed by visually comparing 
the degree of scorching of each test strip with other strips of the same material and to a 
reference non-exposed strip. Each strip was graded on a ‘relative damage number’ 
scale of 0 – 5, where 0 represented no evidence of scorching and 5 represented the 
worst case of damage to that particular type of material. Differences in the sensitivity of 
the various materials to thermal damage were taken into account by using a separate 
damage number scale for each type of material. Table 6-1 shows the criteria used for 
assessing the severity of thermal damage and the assignment of a damage number. 
Table 6-1 The criteria for assessing thermal damage (FRS) 
Damage Number Severity of Damage 
0 No evidence of thermal damage 
1 Material showed signs of discolouration 
2 Material exhibited significant discolouration 
3 Material showed evidence of charring 
4 Material presented significant charring 
5 Material exhibited blistering, blackening or burning 
 
A summary of the experimental test conditions and data gathered from the 45 
explosion tests conducted is contained in Table 6-2. A range of experimental 
parameters were used during the tests and their effects on the severity and extent of 
thermal damage to the test materials are discussed in this chapter. The main variables 
studied during these experimental tests, in terms of thermal damage, were the gas 
concentration, initial depth of the natural gas/air ceiling layer and ignition position. 
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(m) L R 
1 8 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 1.1 1.1 
2 8 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 1.2 1.2 
3 10 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.4 
4 10 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 1.8 1.4 
5 10 Full Rear Open 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.2 
6 12 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 2.6 1.8 
7 12 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 2.4 2.6 1.8 
8 10 Full Rear Open 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.1 
9 10 1.2 Central Open 2.4 2.4 2.6 1.6 
10 10 1.2 Central Open 2.4 2.4 3.2 1.7 
11 8 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 1.3 1.4 
12 10 Full Central Open 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.2 
13 8 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 1.3 1.4 
14 10 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 1.6 1.7 
15 12 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.3 
16 10 1.2 Central Closed 2.4 2.4 3.1 1.5 
17 10 Full Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 
18 10 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 1.6 1.2 
19 12 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 2.4 2.0 1.4 
23 8 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 4l 1.3 1.6 
24 10 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 4l 2.5 1.3 
25 8 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 4l 1.0 1.5 
26 10 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 4l 2.7 1.6 
27 10 1.2 Central Closed 2.4 4l 2.7 1.3 
28 12 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 4l 4.0 1.4 
29 12 Full Rear Closed 2.4 4l 2.3 2.2 
30 8 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 8 2.0 1.6 
31 8 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 8 1.0 1.4 
32 12 1.2 Rear Open 2.4 8 3.0 1.4 
33 12 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 8 2.3 1.5 
34 10 1.2 Central Open 2.4 8 2.0 1.3 
35 10 1.2 Central Closed 2.4 8 2.7 1.7 
36 10 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 8 2.7 1.2 
37 10 1.2 Central Open 2.4 4r 3.0 1.6 
38 10 Full Central Open 2.4 4r 1.3 2.1 
39 10 1.2 Central Closed 2.4 4r 2.7 1.6 
40 10 Full Rear Closed 2.4 4r 2.0 2.2 
41 10 1.2 Rear Closed 2.4 4r 2.7 1.8 
42 10 Full Rear Closed 2.4 4r 3.3 2.2 
43 8 1.2 Rear Closed 4r 2.4 1.8 1.4 
44 10 1.2 Rear Closed 4r 2.4 2.1 1.6 
45 12 1.2 Rear Closed 4r 2.4 2.3 1.5 
46 10 1.2 Central Closed 4r 2.4 2.7 1.6 
81 10 0.3 Rear (0.3)d Closed 4r 2.4 2.3 0.6 
82 10 0.6 Rear (0.6)d Closed 4r 2.4 2.2 0.8 
a Measured from the ceiling. 
b Weighted average of all the materials used in the test. 
c To an accuracy of ± 20 cm. 
d Height of spark ignitor from ceiling. 
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6.2.2. The Spadeadam Experimental Programmes 
Two experimental programmes were carried out in Rig C at Spadeadam. The 
measurement of thermal damage was carried out by placing thermal marker boards at 
various locations in the explosion chamber(s) (for programme three, see Figure 3-48). 
During experimental programme four, two purpose made marker stands were used, 
each of which held 2 x softwood panels in place during the explosion. One panel was 
placed such that the softwood panels were ‘face-on’ to the propagating flame and one 
was positioned close to the vessel chamber walls and perpendicular to the propagating 
flame (Figure 3-51). A summary of the test conditions and data is given in Table 6-3. 
In programme three, similarly to the FRS experiments, the severity of thermal damage 
was assessed by visually comparing the degree of scorching of each test strip with 
other strips of the same material. However, in this case, each strip was graded on a 
‘relative damage number’ scale of 0 - 10 where 0 represented no evidence of scorching 
and 10 represented the worst case of damage to that particular type of material. 
Differences in the materials sensitivity to thermal damage were taken into account by 
using a separate damage number scale for each type of material (see Table 6-4).  
The purpose of the homogenous natural gas explosions was to simulate the ignition of 
a uniform flammable mixture in a room, which had built-up over a significant time 
following the onset of a low momentum gas release, and to determine the subsequent 
thermal damage. A number of natural gas layered explosions were also undertaken to 
simulate relatively common accidental natural gas explosions in dwellings. 
The purpose of the propane release experiments was to simulate an accidental 
explosion following a high momentum vertical propane release into a room, which was 
subsequently ignited shortly after the release commenced. This would represent a 
common cause of propane explosions in dwellings, that where a single-stage propane 
regulator fails and allows gas to escape, at high momentum, through appliance 
controls. In addition, a single propane layer test was undertaken [3(8)]. 
In the propane tests, the fuel/air mixtures were found to be inhomogeneous. In tests 
(3)5 to (3)7, the central region of the inner-chamber was relatively fuel rich compared to 
the outer portion of the chamber. This was confirmed by comparing the gas 
concentration measured at 2.3 m high with gas build-up calculations (taken from Harris 
[16]), assuming uniform mixing of the total gas entering the vessel through the entire 
volume of the inner-chamber. The discrepancy between the calculated and measured 
value was found to be greatest in experiment (3)7, most likely because the mixing 
efficiency was reduced due to the low efflux velocity of the propane entering the 
chamber. A summary of results is given in Table 6-5. 
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Gas Conc. (% v/v) 




- - - - Centrec  - 7.7 - 
(3)2 - - - - Centrec  - 11.8 - 
(3)3 - - - - Centrec  - 9.7 - 
(3)4 - - - - Centrec - 8.9 - 
(3)5 
Propane 
0.3 Up 17 240 Centrec  - 3.8 - 
(3)6 0.3 Up 16 480 Centrec  - 7.4 3.3 
(3)7 0.3 Up 6 240 Centrec  - 5.7 1.9 




1 Horizontal - - Centrec  0.4 7.3 8.1 
(3)10 1 Horizontal - - Centrec  0.1 8.7 9.4 
(3)11 1 Horizontal - - Centrec  0.2 4.7 6.1 
(3)12 1 Horizontal - - Centrec 0.5 10.2 12.4 
(3)13 2 Horizontal - - Centrec  0.1 0.1 9.0 
(3)14 2 Horizontal - - Centrec  0.1 0.1 7.4 




- - - - Rear - 10 - 
(4)2 - - - - Rear - 10 - 
(4)3 - - - - Rear - 10 - 
(4)4 - - - - Rear - 10 - 
(4)5 - - - - Rear - 6 - 
(4)6 - - - - Rear - 7.5 - 
(4)7 - - - - Rear - 12.5 - 
(4)8 - - - - Rear - 10 - 
(4)10 - - - - Rear - 7.5 - 
(4)11 - - - - Rear  9.5 - 
a The experimental programme number is given in parentheses. 
b Measured from floor level. 
c Centre of the rear chamber. 
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Table 6-5 Average damage number results (tests (3)1 to (3)15) 
Test 










0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.5 0 0 
(3)2 0.3 1.8 0.8 0.5 1 0.5 1.7 0.8 1.0 1 4 3.5 
(3)3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 1.0 2.0 1.2 0 0 0 
(3)4 0.5 1.3 1.5 0 0 0 1.0 1.8 0.8 0 2 3 
(3)5 
Propane 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
(3)6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.4 1.0 
(3)7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 




0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 
(3)10 1.0 2.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 0.0 
(3)11 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3)12 1.0 1.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.5 
(3)13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3)14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3)15 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Test 
No. Test Type 
Gloss Painta Polyethylenea  Cotton Stripa Wallpapera 




0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.0 6.7 6.3 0 0.5 0 
(3)2 0.5 1.3 0.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.7 7.7 7.7 2.5 4 3 
(3)3 0.5 1.0 0.5 9.7 10.0 10.0 7.3 7.3 7.0 0 0.5 0 
(3)4 0.0 1.0 0.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.7 8.0 7.7 0 1.5 0.5 
(3)5 
Propane 
2.2 2.8 2.8 8.8 9.0 8.2 5.4 3.2 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3)6 0.2 1.6 2.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 4.0 7.8 6.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 
(3)7 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 8.8 9.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 




2.2 2.4 1.3 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.2 6.6 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3)10 1.8 1.4 0.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.4 7.8 3.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 
(3)11 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 7.2 2.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3)12 2.0 1.8 0.7 10.0 10.0 10.0 4.4 5.4 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3)13 2.0 1.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 4.0 1.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 
(3)14 1.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 6.0 2.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(3)15 1.0 1.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 7.2 4.6 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Test 
No. Test Type 
Newspapera 
Heavy Duty 
Wallpapera PVC Tapea Woola 




7.0 7.0 7.0 1.3 2.7 1.0 0.5 1.7 0.5 4.0 5.7 4.3 
(3)2 9.7 9.7 10.0 2.0 4.3 3.0 2.3 4.7 3.3 4.5 6.0 5.5 
(3)3 10.0 7.3 7.3 2.0 2.7 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.3 4.0 2.7 
(3)4 10.0 10.0 9.7 2.3 3.7 3.7 2.0 2.3 1.3 3.7 7.3 7.3 
(3)5 
Propane 
5.8 5.0 5.0 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 6.6 4.8 3.6 
(3)6 9.0 10.0 10.0 1.2 2.4 3.4 1.4 3.0 3.8 8.0 9.2 9.8 
(3)7 0.4 2.0 2.8 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 




9.8 10.0 7.2 2.6 3.2 1.5 3.0 4.2 2.0 9.6 9.6 4.6 
(3)10 10.0 10.0 9.0 3.0 3.8 1.8 3.4 4.8 1.6 10.0 9.8 3.8 
(3)11 2.6 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 3.4 1.3 0.0 
(3)12 10.0 10.0 8.8 2.2 3.8 1.4 3.2 4.4 1.8 9.6 10.0 7.4 
(3)13 9.4 5.0 0.5 1.8 1.0 0.0 1.8 1.3 0.0 5.4 2.4 0.0 
(3)14 8.4 3.3 0.0 1.5 1.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.8 0.0 
(3)15 9.2 7.5 0.5 1.6 2.4 0.5 1.4 2.0 0.0 9.2 3.6 0.7 
a Average thermal damage number. 
371 Chapter 6 
6.2.3. The University of Leeds Experimental Programme 
Seventeen explosion tests were undertaken in the 1m3 explosion chamber. The 
purpose of these tests was to undertake a comparison with the large-scale tests, under 
the more controlled conditions possible at small-scale. It was also useful to carry out 
some experiments under completely confined conditions in a near spherical explosion 
chamber. This would make it possible to determine if venting affected the pattern of 
thermal damage. 
Explosions were undertaken using methane, propane and ethylene at varying 
concentration. The material samples were placed on the door of the explosion vessel 
and secured using double sided tape. Similarly to the Spadeadam experiments, the 
severity of thermal damage was assessed by visually comparing the degree of 
scorching of each test strip with other strips of the same material and graded using the 
same ‘relative damage number’ scale (see Table 6-6). In addition, samples from this 
set of experiments were also assessed for thermal damage by SEM. A summary of the 
experimental test conditions and data is given in Table 6-7. 
Table 6-6 The criteria for assessing thermal damage by visual examination 









Gloss Paint Varnish Wallpaper 
0 No damage No damage No damage No damage No damage 
1           





3   Some blistering Some blistering     
4 Browned     Browned Larger or more dense blotches 
5           
6 Well browned Heavy blistering 
Heavy 
blistering Well browned 
Covered in 
blotches 
7           
8 Dark brown     Dark brown Heavily browned 
9           
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Paintc Varnish Wallpaper 
TDM1 
Methane 
7 0.72 Centre 4.84 6 4.5 0.8 6 6 
TDM2 8 0.83 Centre 6.40 7 7 1 7 8 
TDM3 10 1.06 Centre 7.37 8 8 2 8 9 
TDM4 12 1.30 Centre 6.12 7 6.5 0.6 7 7 
TDM5 13 1.42 Centre 4.58 5.5 6 0.8 5 6.5 
TDM6 8 0.83 Centre 6.37 7 6.5 1 6.5 7.5 
TDM7 10 1.06 Centre 7.35 8 8 2 8 8.5 
TDM8 8 0.83 Centre 6.28 7 6.5 1.5 8 7 
TDM9 10 1.06 Centre 7.92 8 8 1 7 8.5 
TDM10 12 1.30 Centre 6.17 6.5 6 1 7 6.5 
TDP1 
Propane 
3 0.74 Centre 5.94 6.5 7 2 6 6 
TDP2 4.5 1.13 Centre 8.14 9 9 3 9 9 
TDP3 7 1.81 Centre - 4 4 1 7 7 
TDP4 7 1.81 Centre 4.92 4.5 4.5 1.5 7 8 
TDE1 
Ethylene 
6.5 1.00 Centre 8.94 8 8.5 2 6 9 
TDE2 4 0.60 Centre 5.37 5 4 1 4 5 
TDE3 6.5 1.00 Centre 8.88 9 9 2 9 9 
TDE4 8.6 1.35 Centre 8.47 8 8 1 7 8 
a The numbering scheme is derived as follows: TD stands for thermal damage. The third letter denotes the 
fuel type (M = methane, P = propane and E = ethylene). 
b Oil based paint. 
c Water based paint. 
 
6.3. Sensitivity to Thermal Damage (all Rigs) 
Thermal damage to the material samples was typically exhibited in a mottled pattern 
(Figure 6-1). 
With homogeneous (full volume) explosions, the thermal damage sustained during the 
explosion was distributed fairly uniformly along the length of the samples, although in 
the large-scale tests (Rigs A and C) a slight increase in damage was noticeable in the 
middle section, approximately corresponding to the elevation of the ignition position. 
This information may prove useful in the determination of the ignition source. 
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Figure 6-1 Typical mottled pattern of thermal damage (Rig C) 
The large-scale layered natural gas explosion tests (Rigs A and C) produced thermal 
damage that was distributed relatively uniformly to the middle and upper sections of the 
samples (approximately corresponding to the layer depth), whilst the propane layer 
experiment produced damage that was distributed to the bottom section of the sample 
(again corresponding to the approximate layer depth). This suggests that the density of 
the fuel, and hence likely fuel type, may be determined in layered explosions. It also 
suggests that the approximate height of the gas release may be determined. 
In the twin compartment tests in Rig C, marker boards in the outer enclosure displayed 
a greater degree of damage than a comparable board in the inner enclosure. Analysis 
of the video records demonstrated that this was because some of the boards in the 
outer enclosure were in the path of the venting flame front and hot combustion gases.  
Figure 6-2 shows a comparison of the average damage number (taken from the 
material samples of the Spadeadam tests in Rig C) against critical heat flux values 
taken from Babrauskas [410]. It should be noted that the critical heat flux values taken 
for the gloss paint, varnish, and polyethylene samples have been taken from 
experiments where the material was fixed to a wood backboard (substrate) and this is 
not an accurate representation of the Spadeadam experimental conditions. The results 
show that there does not appear to be a correlation between the critical heat flux and 
the observed thermal damage sustained by materials during a gas explosion.  
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Figure 6-2 Comparison of damage number vs. critical heat flux 
(Rig C, critical heat flux data taken from Babrauskas table 19 [410]) 
The reason for this disagreement is due to the fact that thermal damage from 
explosions is often exhibited in the coating or covering of a wood surface. Work 
undertaken by Burrell and Hare [343] on behalf of the HSE and by Staggs et al. [354] 
identified that non-specialised coatings (i.e. paints, varnishings etc.) tend to burn off at 
low heat fluxes but do not produce volatiles of sufficient concentration to initiate flaming 
combustion. Consequently, once the coating is removed, the ignition properties of the 
substrate remain unchanged. As energy is required to ‘drive off’ volatiles from the 
coating, the critical heat flux of the coated wood sample increases [343, 354]. 
Therefore, if critical heat flux is to be used as a measure for the susceptibility of 
coatings to thermal damage, further experimental work is required to derive critical heat 
flux values for the materials themselves (i.e. without the substrate). 
6.3.1. Wallcoverings (all Rigs) 
The damage sustained by wallcoverings during the explosion tests was generally 
exhibited as scorching, a discolouration of the materials surface due to the transient 
flames radiative and contact heat transfer, with the severity of the discolouration 
depending on the flame temperature and the duration of its exposure/contact with the 
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surface. Little or no scorching was evident on the emulsion painted plasterboard test 
strips. 
In the FRS and Spadeadam tests, several alternative types of ordinary and vinyl 
wallpapers were used in certain tests. Each exhibited its own scorching and damage 
characteristics, and consequently, the different types of wallpaper were not generally 
comparable. Insufficient samples of each of these types were used to enable 
consistent damage number scales to be established and so the data should be used 
carefully. An example of typical damage sustained by vinyl wallpaper during the FRS 
tests is shown in Figure 6-3.  
In certain tests, some of the wallpapers (particularly vinyl types) also exhibited 
blistering on their surfaces (as can be seen in the right sided test strip in Figure 6-3). 
The presence of scorched blisters, was found to be prevalent where the quality of the 
papering was poor and air bubbles were trapped behind the paper. The extent of 
blistering, therefore, was not initially considered to be as reliable a damage indicator as 
the degree of scorching. 
 
Figure 6-3 Typical thermal damage sustained by vinyl wallpaper (FRS) 
Damage to Anaglypta type wallpaper tended to pick out the raised pattern on the paper 
(Figure 6-4 FRS, and Figure 6-5 University of Leeds), most probably because these 
areas were less able to lose heat through conduction to the backing, and so scorched 
much more readily than the surrounding depressions.  
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Figure 6-4 Thermal damage to raised areas of anaglypta type wallpaper (FRS) 
 
 
Figure 6-5 Thermal damage to wallpaper (confined explosion – Leeds) 
 
6.3.2. Wood Surfaces (all Rigs) 
The typical thermal damage that was sustained by gloss painted and varnished wood 
surfaces during the explosion tests is illustrated in Figure 6-6 (University of Leeds) and 
Figure 6-7 (FRS) respectively. The scorching showed the typical mottled blistering but 
also tended to pick out the grain in the wood in a manner similar to that displayed by 
Anaglypta type wallpaper. It was evident that painted or varnished woods were more 
susceptible to scorching than untreated softwood. Varnished and white-gloss painted 
softwood provided the greatest repeatability of any of the surfaces tested. 
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Figure 6-6 Typical thermal damage to white gloss painted wood (Leeds) 
 
Figure 6-7 Typical thermal damage to varnished softwood (FRS) 
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Figure 6-8 (University of Leeds) shows some examples of wood painted with quick 
drying gloss. Unlike wooden surfaces painted with oil based gloss, those painted with 
quick drying gloss or emulsion (both water based) displayed very little damage to the 
naked eye. For comparison Figure 6-9 (Spadeadam) shows the thermal marker board 
in Rig C, with painted wood samples, before and after a stoichiometric explosion. The 
sample on the left is painted with water based (quick drying) gloss and the sample on 
the right is painted with oil based gloss. The results are startling, the sample painted 
with the water based gloss suffered very little thermal damage, yet the oil based 
sample had significant scorching. 
 
Figure 6-8 Wood samples painted with quick drying gloss (Leeds) 
This finding is very interesting; if an accidental explosion occurred in a modern building, 
which has been decorated using quick drying paints, and the investigator is following 
guidance given in the standard reference texts (Sections 1.2 and 1.6), the evidence 
would be suggesting that a fuel lean mixture had caused the explosion. Although this 
evidence may be contrary to the pressure damage the building has sustained, it is 
plausible that the evidence would be misinterpreted, possibly resulting in an incorrect 
interpretation of the origin and cause of the explosion. 
An observation that occurred consistently in all painted samples, was that evidence of 
thermal damage was more evident in sections of the wood where a knot was present 
(Figure 6-10, Spadeadam, Rig C). The thermal damage would present itself in the form 
of scorching or discoloration in the exact shape of the knot. Even if the knot was not 
visible through the painted surface, but a small area of scorching was present, 
examination of the rear side of the sample consistently demonstrated that the damage 
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corresponded to the area of wood where a knot was present. Knots are imperfections 
in the wood (where branches used to grow) that allow the sap (resin) within the wood to 
‘bleed’ out. This resin is an oil based substance that is prone to scorching. This finding 
gives investigators a useful tip, because in all cases where a transient flame passed 
over a knot in a sample of wood, either scorching or discolouration was evident.  
In order to see if there was a more robust method for detecting thermal damage in the 
form of discoloration, UV lighting was used to examine the samples. It was found that 
this was useful in looking at areas where little scorching was visible to the naked eye 
(see Section 6.10.1).  
 
Figure 6-9 Thermal damage to painted wood samples (Spadeadam, Rig C) 
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Figure 6-10 Thermal damage to knots in wood (Spadeadam, Rig C) 
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6.3.3. Newspaper (Spadeadam, Rig C) 
Newspaper exhibited significant scorching in all of the tests and often was completely 
destroyed. This is not surprising given it is a very thermally thin cellulosic material. An 
example of a sample taken following a homogenous natural gas explosion 
(Spadeadam, Rig C) is given in Figure 6-11. Where the newspaper was not completely 
destroyed, it displayed a characteristic blackening around the edges. It was typically 
graded between 7 and 10 on the damage scale. Note that the damage appears most 
pronounced at approximately the height of the ignition source. 
 
Figure 6-11 Thermal damage to newspaper (Spadeadam, Rig C) 
6.3.4. Polythene sheet (Spadeadam, Rig C) 
The polythene sheet samples represented a number of materials found in households 
(e.g. bin bags, carrier bags etc.). When subjected to the passage of a transient flame, 
the polythene sheet melted and shrank. This was consistently seen throughout the 
programme (see Figure 6-12, Spadeadam, Rig C). It was typically graded between 8 
and 10 on the damage scale. 
The Interpretation of Thermal Damage  382 
 
Figure 6-12 Thermal damage to polythene sheet (Spadeadam, Rig C) 
6.3.5. Electrical Cable and Insulating Tape (Spadeadam, Rig C) 
The PVC covered electrical cable and the PVC tape displayed similar characteristics. 
The PVC covering or tape often blistered and then burnt (see Figure 6-13, Spadeadam, 
Rig C). The tape often exhibited a mottled effect throughout its length.  
 
Figure 6-13 Thermal damage to electrical cable (Spadeadam, Rig C) 
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6.3.6. Cotton Wool (Spadeadam, Rig C) 
Figure 6-14 shows an example of thermal damage to cotton wool, where fibre ends 
have melted and fused together to form blackened  ‘bulb-like’ ends, in a manner similar 
to that observed by Wąs-Gubala and Krauß (see Section 2.7.3). The cotton wool 
samples consistently showed significant thermal damage with uneven amounts of 
blackening throughout its length; which in some instances, and in accordance with 
other evidence, was most pronounced at the height of the ignition source. In a number 
of tests, the cotton was nearly completely destroyed and was typically graded as 9 on 
the damage scale.  
 
Figure 6-14 Thermal damage to cotton wool (Spadeadam, Rig C)  
6.4. The Effect of Initial Mixture Composition (all Rigs) 
Figure 6-15 shows the effect of equivalence ratio on the intensity of thermal damage. A 
series of plots of average thermal damage number against equivalence ratio are shown 
for a series of homogenous natural gas tests undertaken at Spadeadam in Rig C 
during experimental programme three. It can be seen, in general terms, the average 
damage number increases with increasing equivalence ratio and hence gas 
concentration. The result of the tests from the University of Leeds are shown in a 
different diagram (Figure 6-17). The damage numbers from the Leeds results are not 
directly comparable to the damage number results from the Spadeadam tests as some 
of the materials used were different (e.g. varnish used in the Spadeadam tests was 
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water based polyurethane whilst the Leeds tests used oil based polyurethane varnish) 
and the materials were mounted on different substrates (e.g. wood backboard). For this 
reason, the order of susceptibility of materials to thermal damage is different in the two 
experimental programmes.  
 
Figure 6-15 The effects of gas concentration on various materials 
(Spadeadam, Rig C) 
Figure 6-16 provides an example of the degree of thermal damage corresponding to 
vented explosions of concentrations of 8, 10 and 12% natural gas in air (taken from 
Spadeadam tests, Rig C). 
Examination of the test results demonstrated that there was a direct correlation 
between the degree of thermal damage and the concentration of the flammable gas/air 
mixture prior to ignition, with the severity of thermal damage increasing with gas 
concentration over this range (8% – 12%). This is also shown in Figure 6-3, Figure 6-4, 
and Figure 6-7, which are also representative examples of thermal damage sustained 
in vented explosions. However, a few additional vented explosion tests (not included in 
the summary data) were conducted Spadeadam at concentrations of 6% and 13% 
natural gas in air. No scorching was evident on most of the test samples at 6%, and the 
damage at 13% natural gas was slightly less than that observed at 12%.  
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Figure 6-16 The effects of gas concentration on unfinished softwood 
(Spadeadam, Rig C) 
The findings of the tests undertaken at the University of Leeds in the confined 
explosion rig were interesting. Consistently, and unlike the experiments undertaken in 
large-scale vented explosion chambers, the thermal damage was most intense at 
around stoichiometric concentration and became less intense as the concentration 
diverged towards the flammable limits (see Figure 6-17 and Figure 6-18). This 
suggests there is a direct correlation between flame temperature and the intensity of 
thermal damage. The question is then raised, why are the results different in a vented 
explosion. The answer to this question may be found in information gathered during the 
literature review. 
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Figure 6-17 The effects of gas concentration on various materials 
(confined explosions – University of Leeds) 
 
 
Figure 6-18 The effects of gas concentration on varnished wood 
(confined explosion – University of Leeds) 
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In Section 2.2.4, it was determined that stoichiometric hydrocarbon/air flames have an 
adiabatic flame temperature, at conditions of constant pressure, of approximately 2150 
– 2250 K, but the flame temperature decreases as the gas/air concentration diverges 
towards its flammable limits. During confined explosions, the pressure increases, 
resulting in an increased flame temperature because the unburnt gas/air mixture is 
heated by compression. 
In Section 2.2.5, it was shown that the burning velocity of a particular flammable gas is 
also strongly dependent upon the concentration of the gas/air mixture, with the 
maximum laminar burning velocity value for any fuel gas being typically found just on 
the ‘rich’ side of the stoichiometric concentration and reducing in value as the 
concentration diverges towards its flammable limits. It was also shown that the burning 
velocity value decreases as the pressure increases. However, although there is a 
decrease in the rate of combustion in volumetric terms, the mass burning rate is 
increased due to the increased density of the gas.  
Additionally, in Section 2.2.5, it was established that the flame thickness increases as 
the gas concentration diverges towards the flammable limits and is at its maximum 
under fuel rich conditions. However, the flame thickness decreases with increasing 
pressure and temperature; the dependency on pressure being larger than that of 
temperature. 
If it is accepted that the degree of thermal damage is a function of flame temperature 
and contact duration. Then, in a confined explosion, where the peak flame temperature 
occurs just rich of stoichiometric and increases, the mass combustion rate increases, 
and the flame thickness decreases; the flame contact duration will be less than that in a 
vented explosion and the flame temperature will be the dominant factor. 
In vented explosions, whilst the maximum flame temperature still occurs at just rich of 
stoichiometric, at fuel rich concentrations, the flame thickness is greater and the 
burning velocity is lower. This means that the flame contact duration is greater than at 
stoichiometric conditions and consequently scorching can be more marked. These 
effects are what have been observed during the experiments. 
The effect of radiation on thermal damage should also be contemplated and was 
considered as a reason for the discrepancy in results between vented and confined 
explosions (fuel rich mixtures being more radiative). Whilst radiation clearly plays some 
part in producing thermal damage, the duration of an explosion is so short that its 
effects are limited and consequently flame contact is dominant. This is corroborated by 
the lack of thermal damage during layered explosions to areas of material outside the 
nominal layer depth (see Section 6.5).  If radiation was playing a significant role in 
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producing thermal damage, some visible damage would be apparent on all surfaces 
visible to the flame front.  The minor effect of radiation in terms of thermal damage 
during vented explosions is not surprising as the time period of maximum flame 
intensity is in the order of a few hundred milliseconds and consequently radiation would 
be expected to play a less important role (Section 2.7.3). 
As a consequence of these findings, it is presented by the author, that an explosion 
investigator, by observing the severity of the thermal damage, may be able to estimate 
the natural gas concentration prior to ignition, to the nearest 2%, over the concentration 
range 6% to 12%. However, at a natural gas concentration of 13% the severity of 
thermal damage is difficult to distinguish from that at 12%. Thermal damage to wooden 
surfaces resulting from fuel lean explosions may be difficult to observe at the scene of 
an explosion. In such circumstances, the observation of superficial melting or fusing of 
plastic materials and fibres provides evidence of exposure to a transient flame front. 
6.5. The Effect of layer Depth (FRS, Rig A and Spadeadam, Rig C) 
During experimental programme 3 (Spadeadam, Rig C), a number of layered explosion 
tests were undertaken. Photographs of layered natural gas tests during this programme 
clearly showed buoyant flames propagating through the high level flammable layer. 
Figure 6-19 provides an example of a flame propagating through a natural gas layer of 
depth 1.8 m (measured from the ceiling). As a consequence of natural gas layered 
explosions, thermal damage was observed on the material samples above the nominal 
layer boundary, indicating exposure to a transient flame front.  
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Figure 6-19 Flame propagation during a layered natural gas explosion (Rig C) 
During experimental programme 1 (FRS, Rig A), the average height, above floor level, 
of the lowest scorch marks was measured in each test and compared with the initial 
depth of the buoyant gas/air mixture layer prior to ignition.  
Figure 6-20 (taken from tests conducted at FRS, Rig A) shows the average values for 
all materials, for each explosion test, plotted against the nominal layer depth from the 
ceiling. Where a flammable natural gas layer was present initially, thermal damage was 
observed above the nominal layer boundary, with the material strips showing a well-
defined transition region, typically 30 cm in height, between the scorched and 
unscorched area of the strip. The discolouration generally extended down to the height 
at which the concentration had been 8% ± 1% and followed an approximate trend of 
extending 15 cm for each percentage gas concentration above eight. Thus there was 
little scorching below the nominal layer depth for 8% layered explosions but for 10% 
layers, scorching could be found 30 cm below the nominal layer boundary and for 12% 
layers, scorching could be found up to 60 cm below the nominal layer boundary.  
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Figure 6-20 Presence of scorching with the depth of flammable layer (FRS) 
In contrast to the location of thermal damage in a natural gas explosion, explosions 
involving layers of heavier than air gases, such as LPG, exhibit thermal damage at low 
level, from the point of leakage down to floor level. In these situations, more burning 
should be evident at low level, such as scorching to carpets, furniture etc., than at 
ceiling level.  
Figure 6-21 is a photograph of thermal damage to the upper section of an internal door. 
It was taken during the investigation of a gas explosion in an occupied building and 
provides an indication of exposure to a transient flame front propagating through a 
lighter than air flammable layer. In this particular incident, the fuel involved was natural 
gas. 
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Figure 6-21 Evidence of scorching on the upper section of an internal door 
(taken from DNV GL archive) 
6.6. The Effect of Fuel Type (University of Leeds, Rig D) 
As the thermal damage is a function of flame temperature and contact duration, 
hydrocarbon fuels other than natural gas/methane should present similar results. Whilst 
the flame temperature, burning velocities and flame thicknesses are different for 
different fuels, as discussed in Chapter 2, they have similar flame temperature, burning 
velocity and flame thickness characteristics. Consequently, it was expected that the 
degree of thermal damage for both propane and ethylene would follow the same trend, 
but most probably with slightly more damage. To demonstrate this, a number of tests 
were undertaken with propane and ethylene at the University of Leeds. Figure 6-22 
shows some of the results of the experiments. The results for propane and ethylene 
are in broad agreement with those of methane, and the reasoning given above. 
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Figure 6-22 The effects of fuel type on varnished wood (Leeds) 
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6.7. The Effect of Ignition Position (FRS, Rig A) 
The effect of ignition position was considered for tests undertaken at FRS during 
experimental programme 1. The thermal damage sustained during central ignition tests 
was found to be more spatially uniform than in rear ignition tests. All marker boards in 
the left room were located approximately equidistant from the central point of ignition, 
and exhibited a similar severity of thermal damage, meaning that it was possible to 
quite accurately determine the initial flammable mixture concentration (as thermal 
damage was consistent). However, with rear ignition, marker boards at positions A, B, 
and C, at the front of the left room, tended to suffer relatively light damage, whilst 
others exhibited more significant thermal damage. Examination of the video records 
showed that once venting was established, rapid flow through the vent impeded the 
flame front from reaching the two front corners of the room. A consequence of this was 
that it was more difficult to accurately estimate the initial mixture concentration, or in 
other terms, the lack of thermal damage could lead investigators to underestimate the 
gas concentration prior to ignition. This finding also provides further evidence that it is 
flame contact that causes the majority of thermal damage.  
6.8. The Effect of Flame Speed (Spadeadam, Rig C) 
As the degree of thermal damage is dependent upon contact duration, it follows that if 
the temperature remains constant but the flame speed increases, less thermal damage 
should be evident. A small number of tests were undertaken to investigate this during 
experimental programme 4. Figure 6-23 shows the results of two tests. The first test 
result (shown on the left) was a test undertaken with a gas concentration of 10% with 
furniture giving a 5% volume blockage (test number 8). For comparison, the results of 
test number 1 are shown alongside (10% concentration, no furniture). For consistency 
both photographs have been taken with a Canon EOS 7D DSLR under laboratory 
conditions with optimum lighting. It is clear, that the test without furniture has 
considerably more thermal damage . This result was consistent with the limited number 
of other comparable tests undertaken with and without furniture. The results suggest 
that faster flames result in a reduced contact duration and consequently materials 
exposed to the transient flame suffer less thermal damage. This finding is significant 
and could be a further reason for the conflicting evidence gathered during explosion 
investigations. Further work in this area is recommended. 
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Figure 6-23 The effect of flame speed on thermal damage 
6.9. The Effect of Door Position (FRS, Rig A) 
In the explosion tests (experimental programme 1) where the interconnecting door was 
initially closed, it acted as a very low failure pressure explosion relief, venting from the 
ignition room to the secondary room. This process led to the generation of turbulence 
or the jetting of the flame front, both of which resulted in larger flame areas. In some 
cases, more extensive scorching damage was noticeable, particularly on wood 
surfaces. This additional damage was caused by the flame extending below the original 
boundary layer resulting in more extensive scorching damage as the flame was able to 
come into contact with parts of the marker board which were below the original layer 
boundary. Further large-scale experimental work is recommended in this area. 
6.10. The Interpretation of Thermal Damage 
The interpretation of thermal damage discussed so far in this chapter has largely been 
through subjective evaluation. This is consistent with the reality of how the majority of 
gas explosions are currently investigated. The determination of origin and cause, in 
terms of thermal damage, is typically based on photographic evidence taken on site 
and the knowledge and experience of the investigator (see Figure 6-24). Consequently, 
a number of additional methodologies were used to determine if there was a more 
scientific method for classifying thermal damage.  
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Figure 6-24 Evidence of thermal damage to crisp packets 
For clarity, this aspect of the study was not intended to be exhaustive. Its purpose was 
to determine if other readily available and cost effective methodologies for evaluating 
the intensity of thermal damage were effective and practicable. The results of 
experimental programme number four (Spadeadam, Rig C), were therefore subjected 
to three additional methodologies: 
i. UV lighting. 
ii. Stereo microscopy. 
iii. Digital imaging microscopy software. 
6.10.1. UV lighting (Spadeadam Rig C) 
All of the test samples from experimental programme four were transferred to the DNV 
GL laboratory at Loughborough for further analysis. Samples were placed under a UV 
bench light and photographed. This technique was not particularly successful in 
distinguishing the degree of thermal damage between samples subjected to explosions 
of different concentration or flame speed. An example of a sample (test 10) subjected 
to UV light is given in Figure 6-25. Whilst thermal damage is clearly visible on the 
surface of the painted wood sample, there are areas of thermal damage that are more 
evident under UV light. The use of UV light may therefore be of some value during the 
on-site investigation or in a laboratory, where UV light may aid the investigator in 
identifying samples that have suffered thermal damage which otherwise may not have 
been visible to the naked eye (i.e. thermal damage from fuel lean explosions). 
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Figure 6-25 Painted wood sample subjected to examination by UV light 
6.10.2. Stereo Microscopy (Spadeadam Rig C) 
It was initially believed that the best determination of the degree of thermal damage 
would be gained through the use of a stereo microscope. However, this was dismissed 
as it became apparent that in order to make a credible determination of the gas 
concentration before ignition and the depth of any flammable layer, from the thermal 
damage a surface had suffered, an assessment of a relatively large area of the sample 
was required. The majority of the samples examined had at least one small area of 
more significant damage and thus erroneous evaluations were possible. An example of 
the image of thermal damage through a stereo microscope is given in Figure 6-26. 
 
Figure 6-26 Stero microscope image of a sample of painted wood 
(Spadeadam Rig C, test 2) 
6.10.3. Digital Imaging Measurement (Spadeadam Rig C) 
Following the findings outlined in Section 6.10.2, it was decided to seek a methodology 
using digital imaging. It was believed that digital photographic imaging and analysis 
may present an accurate and efficient method of analysing thermal damage. 
The samples were sorted into batches according to their coating (e.g. oil based paint 
etc.), their location in the explosion chamber, orientation and gas concentration. Each 
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sample was then photographed (in three sections of identical length) using a Canon 
EOS 7D camera under studio conditions to ensure the colour, white balance etc. was 
consistent. The digital images were then analysed using Axiovision image 
measurement and analysis software. The software package allows manual, semi-
automated and fully automated analysis. The experiment samples were analysed for 
total area damaged and percentage area damaged using the fully automatic function. 
An example of the damage captured by Axiovision software is given in Figure 6-27. 
 
Figure 6-27 Fully automated damage capture from Axiovision 
(Spadeadam Rig C, test 5) 
It can be seen from Figure 6-27 that this type of imaging software has the potential to 
offer objective determinations of the degree of thermal damage a material has suffered. 
However, the number of experiments that were carried out with this methodology was 
limited. Consequently, further work is recommended.  
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With this analysis, the results were measured in terms of percentage surface area that 
was damaged, per unit length of sample. The average area subjected to thermal 
damage for 10% tests was 28.9% for tests with furniture and 45.8% for tests without 
furniture, demonstrating the effect of flame speed. Interestingly, a comparison of 
marker boards directly in the path of the propagating flame front (40.1% thermal 
damage) and those side-on to the flame (52.0% thermal damage) showed that objects 
side-on to the flame may be subjected to the flame front for a longer duration.  
6.10.4. Scanning Electron Microscopy 
The results of the small-scale experiments undertaken at the University of Leeds were 
also analysed using a Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM). With an identical 
argument to that given in Section 6.10.2, the methodology was dismissed due to the 
constraints surrounding the sample size. However, for completeness some of the 
results are presented in this section. 
SEM analysis was undertaken for various samples with magnification ranging from x 50 
to x 1000. An example is shown in Figure 6-28 for a 10% methane/air explosion, where 
analysis of a vanished wood sample before and after the explosion is shown. The 
magnification levels in this example are x 50. It can be seen that the work is really 
useful, not surprisingly, for understanding the effects of the explosion on the material at 
the microscopic level.  
Analysis of the various images of painted and varnished samples showed small blisters 
where pyrolysed volatiles had become trapped or broken through the surface of the 
coating. 
The wallpaper samples prior to the explosion revealed imperfections (bubbles) under 
the surface caused by the quality of the wallpaper pasting. After the explosion, there 
was evidence of cellulosic fibre damage and bubbles and blisters caused through 
pyrolysis. 
It was difficult to distinguish the thermal damage on the bare wood samples with the 
SEM. 
Overall, the results of the SEM analysis were not particularly useful in terms of 
identifying the degree of damage and relating that to the depth of flammable layer or 
gas concentration. 
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Figure 6-28 SEM analysis for varnished wood 
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6.11. Summary of Findings 
The experiments demonstrated that materials commonly found in residential buildings 
exhibit characteristic thermal damage patterns that enables the path of a transient 
flame front, and consequently, the distribution of flammable gas within a building, to be 
determined. Most commonly, the samples displayed blistering or mottled scorching 
patterns. 
Thermal damage in all cases was most intense at approximately the same height as 
the ignition source. This may aid investigators in determining the source of ignition.  
Varnished or painted wooden surfaces (with oil based paint) produced the greatest 
repeatability during the tests and consequently appear to be the most reliable material 
for assessing thermal damage in explosion investigations. Wooden surfaces painted 
with quick drying paints (water based) displayed very little thermal damage to the 
naked eye. Knots in wood always displayed thermal damage if exposed to a transient 
flame front. 
Polythene sheeting shrank and melted, displaying a characteristic thermal damage 
pattern. PVC covered materials tended to blister and burn, often displaying a mottled 
effect. 
There was a direct correlation, in vented explosions, between gas concentration and 
the degree of thermal damage (in the natural gas range of 8 to 12%), with the most 
significant damage occurring under fuel rich conditions. This pattern was not seen in 
confined explosion tests where the degree of thermal damage followed the flame 
temperature curve. These thermal damage characteristics were also observed during 
propane and ethylene tests. 
Where a flammable natural gas layer was present initially, thermal damage was 
observed above the nominal layer boundary, with the material strips showing a well-
defined transition region, typically 30 cm in height, between the scorched and 
unscorched area of the strip. This information means that investigators would be able 
to estimate the depth of flammable gas layer to within typically 30 cm. 
Tests undertaken with furniture produced less thermal damage than comparable tests 
without furniture. This suggests that there is an indirect correlation between flame 
speed and thermal damage. 
It was possible to gain objective thermal damage assessments using digital imaging 
software. 
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6.12. Conclusions 
The results presented in this chapter represent a substantial amount of new data; 
which can be readily interpreted during the investigation of gas explosions in buildings. 
A number of findings were presented, providing new knowledge and understanding of 
the thermal damage exhibited by various materials when subjected to a propagating 
flame front. This knowledge provides insight into why some explosions exhibit 
significant thermal damage and others, of very similar nature, display very little.  
During a gas explosion investigation, there are often a number of potential sources of 
gas that could have caused the explosion. Some of these sources may have been 
present before the explosion (i.e. potential causes) and others may be present as a 
consequence of the explosion. The need to determine the concentration of the gas/air 
mixture is of critical importance to an explosion investigator as this information is used 
to eliminate or identify the source of the gas release [i.e. can potential release sources 
lead to a build-up of gas of the required concentration within the enclosure(s)]. The 
experiments conducted in these programmes have demonstrated that it is possible to 
use the severity and extent of thermal damage to wooden surfaces (e.g. window-
frames, windowsills, doorframes etc.), wall coverings and furniture, sustained during a 
gas explosion, to provide useful information on the gas concentration, its distribution 
throughout the building prior to ignition and the depth of any flammable layer.  
The presence of blistering was observed on all types of surfaces, with the severity of 
blistering increasing with natural gas concentration (up to 12%). However, blistering 
also depends on factors other than flame temperature and contact duration (e.g. the 
material age and quality of wallpaper hanging etc.). Consequently, the overall 
discolouration of a surface perhaps represents a more reliable thermal damage 
indicator. Other fuel types displayed similar characteristics. 
Whilst wallpaper surfaces exhibited a distinct scorching pattern, the wide variety 
available, and their wide variation in thermal properties, makes them much less useful 
as forensic indicators, and probably only useful in indicating the distribution of gas and 
the passage of a transient flame front. The most suitable materials, in terms of forensic 
indicators, appear to be softwood covered with either gloss varnish or white oil based 
gloss paint. Such surfaces are common in buildings as door frames, window frames, 
etc. 
Under controlled experimental conditions it was possible to assess the severity of the 
thermal damage to various materials and estimate the natural gas concentration (over 
the range 8% to 12%) prior to the explosion to the nearest 2%. However, when 
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investigating an actual gas explosion incident, this degree of accuracy is unlikely 
because of the large number of other factors involved. Though it should be possible in 
most cases to distinguish between lean, (5% to 8%), close to stoichiometric conditions 
(9% to 11%) and rich (12% to 15%) natural gas/air mixtures.  
It is currently common practice for buildings to be decorated using water based quick 
drying paints. These paints are less susceptible to thermal damage and may cause the 
misinterpretation of evidence, which could lead to an incorrect diagnosis of the origin 
and cause of an explosion. The work presented in this chapter will assist explosion 
investigators in understanding the behaviour of various materials when subjected to a 
propagating flame front, and provide guidance on the analysis of the events that led up 
to the explosion. A UV light may be a simple aid on-site that would enable thermal 
damage to wood surfaces painted with water based paint to be more readily identified, 
even if it may not be possible to determine the gas concentration from that particular 
piece of evidence. 
Where a flammable gas/air layer was present, thermal damage was observed above 
the nominal layer boundary (for natural gas), down to the lowest level where the 
concentration was originally above 8% ± 1%. It was possible to estimate the layer 
depth from the damage to an accuracy of approximately 30 cm. In practical situations 
this accuracy would probably be decreased because of the effects of obstacles such as 
furniture causing large scale turbulence during the explosion, breaking up the layer. 
Whilst mixtures containing a lighter than air fuel gas are known to form ceiling layers of 
the type witnessed with the natural gas experiments, those containing heavier than air 
fuel gases will form low level layers. These two cases should be distinguishable from 
the vertical distribution of thermal damage, so that observation of such damage should 
assist in the identification of the fuel gas involved in an explosion. 
Some of the explosion experiments in the twin enclosure, caused significant thermal 
damage in the adjoining chamber. Analysis of video records confirmed that this was 
caused by the distorted (sometimes jetting) flame front during the venting and external 
explosion stages.  
The results of the experimental programmes presented in this chapter, provide 
evidence that the guidance used by explosion investigators worldwide is incomplete at 
best and incorrect in certain areas. The knowledge that little evidence of thermal 
scorching is not necessarily indicative of a fuel lean mixture, is a key finding that will 
change the manner in which explosions are investigated, and is of considerable 
importance to gas explosion investigators involved in the interpretation of forensic 
evidence at the scene of a gas explosion in a building. 
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This research is related to the investigation of accidental gas explosions in dwellings. In 
particular it considers how forensic evidence, in terms of pressure and thermal 
damage, found at the scene of an explosion may be used to determine the likely 
composition and distribution of the fuel/air mixture, prior to its ignition.  
An understanding of the magnitude of pressure generated during the explosion, and an 
assessment of the thermal damage sustained by the building and its décor, will assist 
an experienced investigator in determining the fuel type, its reactivity, the distribution of 
the mixture throughout the building and the depth of any flammable layer. This 
information is required in order to establish the most credible source of gas release and 
to correctly determine the origin and cause of the explosion. 
Studies have shown that an overpressure generated by a gas explosion, in the region 
of 200 mbar, has the potential to cause significant structural damage to a properly 
designed and constructed building (Section 1.6). Current guidance (Sections 1.2 and 
1.6) suggests that extensive pressure damage is caused by near stoichiometric 
concentrations and is not usually associated with either lean or rich mixtures. The 
same guidance also states that extensive thermal damage to decor, furnishings etc. is 
associated with fuel/air mixtures of stoichiometric or greater concentrations, whilst an 
explosion involving a fuel lean concentration will exhibit little signs of thermal damage. 
However, there have been gas explosions where the building has suffered significant 
structural damage but there has been very little, and in some cases, no evidence of 
thermal damage (Section 1.6). Three key questions arise from these observations: 
1. Can fuel lean or fuel rich explosions cause significant structural damage? 
2. Is it possible to determine the gas concentration prior to ignition from the 
severity of the thermal damage? 
3. Do materials exposed to a transient flame front always exhibit thermal damage? 
Following the tragic gas explosion at Ronan Point in 1968, a significant body of 
research into the causes, mechanisms and effects of gas explosions in buildings was 
undertaken. It was believed that the cause of the widespread damage to the tower 
block was largely produced by the propagation of a flame from one room to another, 
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generating higher overpressures than would have been expected if the explosion had 
been confined to a single room. Whilst the research (Section 2.6) demonstrated that 
higher pressures could be generated in these so called ‘cascade’ explosions, the 
mechanism for producing these overpressures was not fully understood.  
The insightful work of Stretch [239] and Rasbash [229, 236] (Section 2.6.1) was found 
to be especially important to this study as it recognised the role that both 
interconnected rooms and furniture play in the development of an accidental gas 
explosion and the necessity for research into their effects. They concluded that large-
scale experimental work was required to determine pressure-time curves for single sets 
of rooms containing furniture. They noted that whilst full-scale experiments were 
difficult to carry out with a high degree of reliability and were expensive, when the 
investment and risks involved were considered, further experimental work was quite 
clearly demanded. To date, some forty-five years after this recommendation, no work 
of this nature had been published 
The majority of the literature related to thermal damage was found to have been 
conducted in terms of fire investigation and was concerned with the ignition, pyrolysis, 
burning and charring behaviour of wood and textiles. Consequently, there was little 
directly relevant material regarding the scorching of fabrics and materials following an 
explosion and no information to relate the degree of thermal damage to the gas 
concentration prior to ignition or to the depth of any flammable layer. 
In Chapter 4, a considerable amount of large-scale data was presented on the 
propagation of a natural gas explosion from one enclosure to another. It provides new 
knowledge and understanding relating to the development of gas explosions in 
buildings where there has been a build-up of flammable gas/air mixture in more than 
one room.  
A number of mechanisms have been proposed, detailing the manner in which gas 
explosions propagate from one room to another. This knowledge provides a valuable 
new insight into how complex a vented explosion in a typical building can be, and how 
the design and construction of a building can affect the magnitude of the explosion. It is 
clear from the results of this study that gas explosions that propagate from one room to 
another have the potential to generate significantly higher overpressures than would be 
the case of an explosion in a single room of the same total volume and vent area.  
Several causes of the development of high overpressures have been identified: 
i. The ignition of a flammable cloud outside the vent opening(s) (i.e. the external 
explosion). 
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ii. The sudden increase in mass combustion as the turbulised mixture in the 
secondary compartment is ignited by the propagating flame front emerging 
through the interconnecting doorway. 
iii. The highly turbulent ‘jetting’ flame, driven by the venting process, propagating 
from the interconnecting doorway and towards the vent opening in the 
secondary enclosure. 
The relative influence of the different explosion development mechanisms was found to 
be strongly dependent upon the configuration of the building and the ignition position. 
The key factors being the failure pressures of the respective vents, the failure pressure 
and inertia of the interconnecting door and the position of the door (including the 
direction of hinge) prior to ignition. 
The most important findings presented in Chapter 4, in terms of the objectives of this 
study, are that under the right conditions, fuel lean and fuel rich explosions can cause 
overpressures that have the potential to structurally damage buildings (> 200 mbar). 
These results are of considerable importance to gas explosion investigators involved in 
the interpretation of forensic evidence at the scene of a gas explosion in a building, 
since extensive pressure damage has not typically been associated with either lean or 
rich mixtures.  
The most effective interconnected enclosure design, in terms of mitigating the effects of 
a gas explosion, would consist of adjoining rooms that have windows that are large, of 
low failure pressure and equal size, with a lightweight interconnecting door that hinges 
away from the room that presents the most likely ignition source. Of course, this design 
would not be ideal in terms of fire protection, so careful consideration would be 
required. 
In Chapter 5, a substantial amount of new large-scale explosion data was presented on 
the effects of congestion in the form of idealised obstacle arrays and furniture. A 
number of findings were presented, providing new knowledge and understanding of the 
manner in which gas explosions develop in the presence of furniture. This knowledge 
provides further insight into how complex a vented explosion in a typical building can 
be, and how the degree of furniture, and its layout within a room, can affect the 
magnitude of the explosion.  
It was shown that it was possible to generate overpressures capable of causing 
structural damage in empty (no internal congestion) enclosures if the vent openings do 
not allow sufficient outflow (i.e. KA > 4). The presence of congestion was found to 
significantly increase the overpressures generated, often by more than an order of 
magnitude. Furthermore, with volume blockages of as little as 0.57%, overpressures 
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greater than 200 mbar were generated in all tests where KA > 1. However, the obstacle 
geometry, and its location to other obstacles and the enclosure, were found to be 
critical in the development, or otherwise, of damaging overpressures. 
It was determined, that for any given congestion level, reducing the vent size would 
always result in an increased pressure. There was therefore no point in this study 
where the increased flow and turbulence caused by a larger vent actually overcome the 
effects of reducing the confinement. This represents an important piece of information 
for the designers of buildings in that increasing the size of the windows will always 
reduce the maximum overpressure that could be developed in the event of an 
explosion, and consequently, it reduces the likelihood of the building being structurally 
damaged. 
The size of the vent was also found to significantly affect the external explosion. As the 
vent size was decreased, the emerging jet velocity increased and the unburnt gas/air 
mixture was distributed farther from the vent opening. Consequently, the influence of 
the external explosion was observed to be greater with larger vent openings.  
Two important processes were observed in the development of an explosion involving 
furniture. Firstly, an initially laminar flame was distorted as it impinged upon the 
obstacle, increasing the flame surface area. Secondly, the explosion was significantly 
influenced by the changes in the flow field induced by the obstacle. When the flame 
arrived at the obstacle, it interacted with the modified flow field, with the geometry and 
size of the obstacle determining the turbulence levels and length scales. Consequently, 
the separation distance between obstacles and their location was found to be 
important.  
The effect that the shape of the obstruction and its location within the enclosure 
appeared to be significant. The introduction of large obstacles and their position sets 
up a complex interaction between the propagating reaction front and the flow fields 
around the obstructions. In some instances, particularly where the obstacle was 
positioned against the wall of the chamber, the velocities were reduced and little 
turbulence was generated. Furthermore, the flame area was also reduced as it has 
reached the edge of the flammable mixture. In other instances, if the separation 
distance was in an ‘optimum’ region, local flame acceleration in the form of jetting 
occurred.  
In Chapter 6, a substantial amount of new data was presented, which can be readily 
interpreted in the investigation of gas explosions in buildings. These findings provide 
new knowledge and understanding of the thermal damage exhibited by various 
materials when subjected to a propagating flame front. This knowledge provides insight 
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into why some explosions exhibit significant thermal damage and others, of very similar 
nature, display very little.  
The thermal damage sustained by a building, and its decor, during an explosion has 
been shown to provide useful forensic evidence in the investigation of a gas explosion. 
The experiments have demonstrated that it is possible to use the severity and extent of 
thermal damage to wall coverings and wood surfaces, sustained during a gas 
explosion, to provide useful information on the gas concentration, its distribution 
throughout the building prior to ignition and the depth of any flammable layer.  
It was demonstrated that it was possible to assess the severity of the thermal damage 
to various materials in order to estimate the natural gas concentration (over the range 
8% to 12%) prior to the explosion to the nearest 2%.  
The presence of blistering was observed on all types of surfaces, with the severity of 
blistering increasing with natural gas concentration (up to 12%). However, as blistering 
also depends on factors other than flame temperature and contact duration, the overall 
discolouration of a surface was found to represent a more reliable thermal damage 
indicator.  
Whilst wallpaper surfaces exhibited a distinct scorching pattern, the wide variety 
available, and their wide variation in thermal properties, makes them much less useful 
as forensic indicators, and probably only useful in indicating the distribution of gas and 
the passage of a transient flame front. The most suitable materials, in terms of forensic 
indicators, appear to be softwood covered with either gloss varnish or white oil based 
gloss paint. Such surfaces are common in buildings as door frames, window frames, 
etc. 
It is currently common practice for buildings to be decorated using water based quick 
drying paints. These paints have been found to be less susceptible to thermal damage 
and may cause the misinterpretation of evidence which could lead to an incorrect 
diagnosis of the origin and cause of an explosion. The knowledge that little evidence of 
thermal scorching is not necessarily indicative of a fuel lean mixture is a key finding 
that will change the manner in which explosions are investigated, and is of 
considerable importance to gas explosion investigators involved in the interpretation of 
forensic evidence at the scene of a gas explosion in a building. Consequently, during 
explosion investigations where little evidence of scorching to painted surfaces is 
exhibited, the investigator should undertake a more detailed examination of other 
materials susceptible to thermal damage (e.g. wallcoverings, furnishings, carpets etc.) 
before concluding that the explosion is attributed to the ignition of a fuel lean mixture.  
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Where a flammable gas/air layer was present, thermal damage was observed above 
the nominal layer boundary (for natural gas), down to the lowest level where the 
concentration was originally above 8% ± 1%. It was possible to estimate the layer 
depth from the damage to an accuracy of approximately 30 cm.  
Whilst mixtures containing a lighter than air fuel gas are known to form ceiling layers of 
the type witnessed with the natural gas experiments, those containing heavier than air 
fuel gases will form low level layers. These two cases should be distinguishable from 
the vertical distribution of thermal damage, so that observation of such damage should 
assist in the identification of the fuel gas involved in an explosion. 
Overall, it has been clearly demonstrated that under the right conditions, fuel lean and 
fuel rich explosions can cause overpressures that have the potential to structurally 
damage buildings (> 200 mbar), contrary to the current guidance and investigation 
practice. It was shown that it is possible to determine the gas concentration from the 
severity of explosion damage to the nearest 2%. It was also demonstrated that certain 
coatings can significantly affect the degree of thermal damage that a material exhibits. 
Careful interpretation of the evidence is critical. It is hoped that this study will 
significantly assist in this matter. 
7.2. Limitations of the Study 
It was recognised that the effect of area blockage and obstacle separation distance 
may play a more important role in the development of fast flames than volume 
blockage. However, unlike chemical, process and storage facilities, where congested 
region layouts or designs will be readily available, populated buildings will have 
congested and confined areas that are not predictable, and, as a consequence, it is 
easier to use volume blockage as a criterion. Consequently, for the purpose of this 
study, the volume blockage was the main variable when designing the congestion 
configuration. However, further large-scale experimental tests, investigating the effects 
of area blockage and separation distance are recommended. This should be linked to a 
programme that investigates the complex interaction caused when flames propagate 
from one furnished room to another. 
Whilst the experiments conducted into the effects of thermal damage were substantial, 
the range of materials used in the study, in comparison to the materials that may be 
encountered during an explosion investigation, was limited. Consequently, further 
research is recommended. 
It was demonstrated in this study, that under controlled conditions, that it was possible 
to assess the severity of the thermal damage to various materials in order to estimate 
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the natural gas concentration prior to the explosion to the nearest 2% (over the range 
8% to 12%). However, when investigating an actual gas explosion incident, this degree 
of accuracy is unlikely because of the large number of other factors involved. Though it 
should be possible in most cases to distinguish between lean, (5% to 8%), close to 
stoichiometric conditions (9% to 11%) and rich (12% to 15%) natural gas/air mixtures. 
It was also demonstrated that it was possible to estimate the depth of a flammable 
layer from the damage to an accuracy of approximately 30 cm. In practical situations 
this accuracy would probably be decreased because of the effects of obstacles such as 
furniture causing large scale turbulence during the explosion, breaking up the layer. 
7.3. Recommendations for Future Work 
During the course of this study, a number of findings were identified that necessitate 
more investigation. Consequently, the following are suggestions for future large-scale 
experimental work: 
1. Further tests should be carried out with furnished rooms. These tests should be 
conducted across a wide range of fuel/air concentration. 
2. Experiments should be carried out in a two-storey explosion chamber with 
interconnected rooms to further investigate the turbulence intensity generated 
during the complex flow interaction between interconnected rooms. 
3. Experimental work should be carried out to investigate the combined effect of 
interconnected rooms and furniture for fuel lean mixtures. Fuel lean explosions 
are capable of producing damaging overpressures if the flame front propagates 
from room to room. However, in the limited fuel lean tests carried out with 
furniture, damaging overpressures were not produced.  
4. Experimental work should be undertaken to further investigate the situation 
where the ignition room has a flammable mixture but the adjoining room has no 
gas present. The programme should include tests where the concentration in 
the ignition enclosure is varied across the flammable range and where the 
adjoining enclosure has either no gas present, or a concentration up to the 
lower flammable limit. 
5. Tests should be undertaken to investigate the effect of reducing the vent size in 
an adjoining enclosure. This is to determine the size of vent at which any further 
reduction in vent size does not result in an increased overpressure. 
6. Tests should be undertaken to investigate the effects of area blockage and 
separation distance. This work should be conducted with multiple arrays, of 
differing shape, and where the area blockage and volume blockage are 
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constant. Ideally, this work should be linked to a programme that investigates 
the complex interaction caused when flames propagate from one furnished 
room to another. 
7. Tests should be carried out to measure the transient concentration of the 
outflow of unburnt gas/air mixture that forms an external flammable cloud. This 
will help researchers better understand the role that the external explosion 
plays and the mechanism that generates overpressure within the explosion 
chamber. It would also help validate the concentrations predicted by CFD type 
models. 
8. Experiments should be carried out to investigate the cause of possible separate 
external explosions where the explosion chamber has more than one vent. This 
should include the determination of whether two separate distinct flammable 
clouds are formed outside each vent. 
9. Experiments should be carried out to investigate the effect of decreasing vent 
size with fuel rich explosions. These tests should be conducted to determine if 
strong external explosions can be produced as a consequence of high jet 
velocities and shear mixing outside the vent opening. 
10. The effect of layer depth on maximum overpressure should be further 
investigated. Tests should be carried out with lighter and heavier than air fuels. 
11. Further thermal damage experiments should be undertaken in interconnecting 
rooms to better establish the effect of turbulence and jetting flames on the 
ability to accurately determine the layer depth and gas concentration prior to 
ignition. 
12. The compilation of a comprehensive photographic library of examples of 
thermal damage, for comparative purposes, would be of significant value to 
explosion investigators, enabling them to confidently predict the gas 
concentration prior to ignition. 
13. Further examination of a wide variety of materials exposed to a transient flame 
front should be undertaken using digital imaging software to develop a robust 
methodology for the objective assessment of thermal damage. 
14. Experimental work should be undertaken to determine critical heat flux values 
for materials commonly used as forensic evidence during explosion 
investigations (e.g. paints, varnishes etc.). This will help determine if the 
susceptibility of materials to thermal damage can be categorised by critical heat 
flux. 
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7.4. Final Remarks 
This study started as a quest to answer questions related to the interpretation of 
evidence at the scene of an accidental gas explosion. At that time, it was believed by 
the author and other members of the DNV GL incident investigation team and the wider 
scientific community, that there was potential for the origin and cause of gas explosions 
to be incorrectly determined due to a lack of meaningful, or worse still, incorrect, 
guidance in the literature. 
This research has resulted in a clearer understanding of how gas explosions develop in 
furnished buildings and has certainly answered those early questions. It is hoped that 
this knowledge may be used to better interpret evidence such that the likelihood of 
incorrect origin and cause determination is greatly reduced. 
Mark Twain said, during his ‘Disappearance of Literature’ speech in New York on 20th 
November 1900, “it’s a ‘classic’, something that everybody wants to have read and 
nobody wants to read”. Whilst I can be confident that this thesis will not become a 
‘classic’, I sincerely hope that students, scholars and industry recognise and appreciate 
its contribution to knowledge and understanding of gas explosions in dwellings, and 
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1 Ensure that operating personnel are aware of their duties and location during 
the test. 
2 Place marker boards as required  
3 Secure vent covers. 
4 Ensure that the air supply for pneumatic systems is turned on. 
5 Ensure that the natural gas supply is connected correctly and that the manually 
operated gas flow valve and pneumatic isolation valve on the gas supply line to 
the rig are closed. 
6 Check operation of instrumentation. 
7 On satisfactory completion of the above items, ensure that personnel in the 
area around the test enclosure are aware that testing of the main enclosure 
functions is about to commence. 
8 The operation of the fan shall be checked. 
9 Operation of the pneumatically operated rig gas isolation, purge and gas inlet 
valves shall be checked. 
10 Check operation of the gas sampling system. 
11 After ensuring the area around them is clear, the operation of the explosion 
chamber purge valves shall be checked for satisfactory opening and closing. 
12 Check the operation of the ignition spark. 
13 Calibrate gas analyser and check computer timing. 
14 Conduct a visual check of the surrounding area outside the main test zone. 
15 Ensure that all personnel are evacuated from the exclusion zone and that all 
barriers leading to the exclusion zone are closed. Carry out a further visual 
check on the area outside the main test zone. 
16 Ensure that all personnel associated with the test are aware of their required 
location for the filling and firing sequences of the test. 
17 Ensure that all test rig valves are closed. 
18 Check that the explosion chamber purge valves are closed.  
19 Open the manual isolation valves on the high pressure natural gas supply.  
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20 The needle valve on the gas supply (located immediately downstream of the 
gas supply shall be opened by a maximum ¼ turn to ensure the gas enters the 
system at a relatively slow rate. 
21 When the Engineer in charge is satisfied that all preparations are complete, 
contact Test Control and request clearance to proceed further. 
22 When clearance to proceed has been granted, contact the test control room 
and ask for the pneumatically operated rig gas isolation valve to be opened. 
23 Open the pneumatically operated gas and air inlet valves. 
24 Turn on the fan and gas supply to the mixing system and adjust flow using flow 
valves and rotameters. 
25 During filling, monitor the site and ensure that personnel remain at their 
designated positions. 
26 As filling proceeds; the Engineer-in-charge shall, as appropriate, notify Test 
Control that the test is ready to proceed at 10 minutes prior to the test. Three 
long klaxon blasts will sound and a spoken warning will be issued over the radio 
system. 
27 When the gas/air mixture is at its desired concentration the Engineer-in-charge 
shall notify Test Control. 
28 Shut-off the gas supply to the rig by closing the pneumatic gas inlet and gas 
isolation valves. 
29 Shut off the fan and close pneumatic valves on air supply. 
30 Open the gas purge valve to depressurise the gas supply line and then close 
the gas purge valve. 
31 Raise the gas sampling system. 
32 Gain clearance from Test Control to proceed with the test. Two long klaxon 
blasts will sound 1 minute before the test and a spoken warning will be given. 
Five short klaxon blasts will sound 30 s before the test followed by a countdown 
from 10 to ignition. 
33 If the test fails to ignite. The Engineer-in-charge shall ensure that all 
personnel remain at their designated locations unless instructed to the contrary, 
whilst an assessment of the cause of failure is conducted. The enclosure shall 
be made safe by the following method: 
Open the explosion chamber purge valves and allow the gas/air mixture 
to vent to atmosphere. The Engineer-in-charge shall ensure that the gas 
concentration is less than 20% of the lower explosion limit prior to 
approaching the explosion chamber. Any repairs that can be safely 
Appendix A 436 
carried out may be undertaken and the filling sequence may then be re-
initiated. 
34 Following firing or aborting the test, the Engineer-in-charge shall inform Test 
Control that the test is complete or aborted as appropriate. 
35 One long klaxon blast will be given and the “all clear” will be given over the 
radio system. 
36 The Engineer-in-charge shall approach the area; ensure that any fires are 
extinguished and that the rig enclosure is safe. All other test personnel shall 
remain at their designated positions until the area has been declared safe. 
37 The manual valves on the gas supply line shall be closed. The gas filling line to 
the enclosure shall be vented. 
38 The Engineer-in-charge shall notify Test Control that the area is safe and open 
the gates to the exclusion zone. 
39 If, as a result of the explosion, the rig is in a damaged condition and may be 
considered dangerous to personnel, warning signs should be issued advising 
as such and action taken to make the rig safe. 
40 Check data results. 
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Rigs B and C (premixed purge and recirculation filling) 
1 Ensure that operating personnel are aware of their duties and location during 
the test. 
2 Fit polythene tube over gas recirculation ductwork. 
3 Place congestion (furniture/obstacles) as required  
4 Secure vent cover. 
5 Ensure that the nitrogen bottles for pneumatic systems are turned on. 
6 Check operation of instrumentation. 
7 Calibrate gas analyser using test gas. 
8 Ensure that the methane/ propane supply is connected correctly and that the 
manually operated gas flow valve and pneumatic isolation valve on the gas 
supply line to the rig are closed. 
9 On satisfactory completion of the above items, ensure that personnel in the 
area around the test enclosure are aware that testing of the main enclosure 
functions is about to commence. 
10 After ensuring the area around them is clear, the operation of the explosion 
chamber flap valves and gas recirculation/purge system blast gate dampers 
shall be checked for satisfactory opening and closing. 
11 The operation of the fan shall be checked. 
12 Operation of the pneumatically operated rig gas isolation, purge and gas inlet 
valves shall be checked. 
13 Check the operation of the ignition spark. 
14 Calibrate gas analyser and check computer timing. 
15 Conduct a visual check of the surrounding area outside the Spadeadam Site 
Boundary (CCTV cameras) and inform the RAF and Forestry Commission of 
the test. 
16 Ensure that all personnel are evacuated from the exclusion zone and that all 
barriers leading to the exclusion zone are closed. Carry out a further visual 
check on the area outside the Spadeadam Site Boundary. 
17 Ensure that all personnel associated with the test are aware of their required 
location for the filling and firing sequences of the test. 
18 Ensure that all test rig valves are closed. 
19 Open the explosion chamber flap valves.  
20 Turn the fan on and check that it is operating. 
21 Open the manual isolation valves on the high pressure methane or propane gas 
supply.  
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22 The needle valve on the gas supply (located immediately downstream of the 
gas supply shall be opened by a maximum ¼ turn to ensure the gas enters the 
gas recirculation system at a relatively slow rate. 
23 When the Engineer in charge is satisfied that all preparations are complete, 
contact Test Control and request clearance to proceed further. 
24 Test Control shall obtain clearance to test from RAF Range Controller and 
confirm this to the Engineer-in-charge. 
25 When clearance to proceed has been granted, contact the test control room 
and ask for the pneumatically operated rig gas isolation valve to be opened. 
26 Open the pneumatically operated gas inlet valve. 
27 During filling, monitor the site and ensure that personnel remain at their 
designated positions. 
28 The required gas concentration will be achieved by regulating the gas flow 
valve and/or opening and closing the pneumatic gas valve. The air flow may be 
regulated by controlling the fan speed. 
29 As filling proceeds; the Engineer-in-charge shall, as appropriate, notify Test 
Control that the test is ready to proceed at 15 minutes and 5 minute prior to the 
test. These will be broadcast over the Spadeadam site radio system and 
acknowledged by Test Control. 
30 When the gas/air mixture is at its desired concentration and weather conditions 
are correct for the test, the Engineer-in-charge shall allow the attendees to 
approach the viewing area. 
31 Ensure that all personnel at the viewing area fit hearing protection before 
commencing further, a two minute warning of firing shall be given over the 
Spadeadam Site radio and Test Control will sound the alarm 3 times. 
32 Shut-off the gas supply to the rig by closing the pneumatic gas inlet and gas 
isolation valves. 
33 Close the explosion chamber flap valves and turn off the fan. 
34 Open the gas purge valve to depressurise the gas supply line and then close 
the gas purge valve. 
35 Open the recirculation system blast gate dampers and turn on the fan for 15 
seconds. Turn off the fan. 
36 Gain clearance from Test Control to proceed with the test. 
37 A five second countdown shall be given over the Spadeadam Site radio and 
upon ‘fire’ ignition will initiated. 
38 If the test fails to ignite. The Engineer-in-charge shall ensure that all 
personnel remain at their designated locations unless instructed to the contrary, 
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whilst an assessment of the cause of failure is conducted. The enclosure shall 
be made safe by the following method: 
With the fan on, the recirculation system purge valves and the explosion 
chamber flap valves shall be opened to allow purging of the enclosure 
with air. The Engineer-in-charge shall ensure that the gas concentration 
is less than 20% of the lower explosion limit prior to approaching the 
explosion chamber. Any repairs that can be safely carried out may be 
undertaken and the filling sequence may then be re-initiated. 
39 Following firing or aborting the test, the Engineer-in-charge shall inform Test 
Control that the test is complete or aborted as appropriate. 
40 The Engineer-in-charge shall approach the area; ensure that any fires are 
extinguished and that the rig enclosure is safe. All other test personnel shall 
remain at their designated positions until the area has been declared safe. 
41 The manual valves on the gas supply line shall be closed. The gas filling line to 
the enclosure shall be vented. 
42 The Engineer-in-charge shall notify Test Control that the area is safe and open 
the gates to the exclusion zone. 
43 If, as a result of the explosion, the rig is in a damaged condition and may be 
considered dangerous to personnel, warning signs should be issued advising 
as such and action taken to make the rig safe. 
44 The Engineer-in-charge shall ensure that any buildings or cabins within the 
exclusion zone damaged during tests are inspected and any necessary actions 
undertaken such that they do not present a hazard to personnel. 
45 The attendees can leave the exclusion zone. 
46 Check data results. 
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Rigs B and C (purge filling) 
1 Ensure that operating personnel are aware of their duties and location during 
the test. 
2 Place marker boards as required.  
3 Secure vent cover. 
4 Ensure that the nitrogen bottles for pneumatic systems are turned on. 
5 Ensure that the methane/ propane supply is connected correctly and that the 
manually operated gas flow valve and pneumatic isolation valve on the gas 
supply line to the rig are closed. 
6 Check operation of instrumentation. 
7 On satisfactory completion of the above items, ensure that personnel in the 
area around the test enclosure are aware that testing of the main enclosure 
functions is about to commence. 
8 Operation of the pneumatically operated rig gas isolation, purge and gas inlet 
valves shall be checked. 
9 After ensuring the area around them is clear, the operation of the explosion 
chamber flap valves shall be checked for satisfactory opening and closing. 
10 Check the operation of the ignition spark. 
11 Calibrate gas analyser and check computer timing. 
12 Conduct a visual check of the surrounding area outside the Spadeadam Site 
Boundary (CCTV cameras) and inform the RAF and Forestry Commission of 
the test. 
13 Ensure that all personnel are evacuated from the exclusion zone and that all 
barriers leading to the exclusion zone are closed. Carry out a further visual 
check on the area outside the Spadeadam Site Boundary. 
14 Ensure that all personnel associated with the test are aware of their required 
location for the filling and firing sequences of the test. 
15 Ensure that all test rig valves are closed. 
47 Check that the explosion chamber flap valves are closed.  
16 Open the manual isolation valves on the high pressure methane or propane gas 
supply.  
17 The needle valve on the gas supply (located immediately downstream of the 
gas supply shall be opened by a maximum ¼ turn to ensure the gas enters the 
system at a relatively slow rate. 
18 When the Engineer in charge is satisfied that all preparations are complete, 
contact Test Control and request clearance to proceed further. 
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19 Test Control shall obtain clearance to test from RAF Range Controller and 
confirm this to the Engineer-in-charge. 
20 When clearance to proceed has been granted, contact the test control room 
and ask for the pneumatically operated rig gas isolation valve to be opened. 
21 Open the pneumatically operated gas inlet valve. 
48 The required gas concentration will be achieved by regulating the gas flow 
valve and/or opening and closing the pneumatic gas valve. 
22 During filling, monitor the site and ensure that personnel remain at their 
designated positions. 
23 As filling proceeds; the Engineer-in-charge shall, as appropriate, notify Test 
Control that the test is ready to proceed at 15 minutes and 5 minute prior to the 
test. These will be broadcast over the Spadeadam site radio system and 
acknowledged by Test Control. 
24 When the gas/air mixture is at its desired concentration and weather conditions 
are correct for the test, the Engineer-in-charge shall allow the attendees to 
approach the viewing area. 
25 Ensure that all personnel at the viewing area fit hearing protection before 
commencing further, a two minute warning of firing shall be given over the 
Spadeadam Site radio and Test Control will sound the alarm 3 times. 
26 Shut-off the gas supply to the rig by closing the pneumatic gas inlet and gas 
isolation valves. 
27 Open the gas purge valve to depressurise the gas supply line and then close 
the gas purge valve. 
28 Gain clearance from Test Control to proceed with the test. 
29 A five second countdown shall be given over the Spadeadam Site radio and 
upon ‘fire’ ignition will initiated. 
30 If the test fails to ignite. The Engineer-in-charge shall ensure that all 
personnel remain at their designated locations unless instructed to the contrary, 
whilst an assessment of the cause of failure is conducted. The enclosure shall 
be made safe by the following method: 
Open the explosion flap valves and allow the gas/air mixture to vent to 
atmosphere. The Engineer-in-charge shall ensure that the gas 
concentration is less than 20% of the lower explosion limit prior to 
approaching the explosion chamber. Any repairs that can be safely 
carried out may be undertaken and the filling sequence may then be re-
initiated. 
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31 Following firing or aborting the test, the Engineer-in-charge shall inform Test 
Control that the test is complete or aborted as appropriate. 
32 The Engineer-in-charge shall approach the area; ensure that any fires are 
extinguished and that the rig enclosure is safe. All other test personnel shall 
remain at their designated positions until the area has been declared safe. 
33 The manual valves on the gas supply line shall be closed. The gas filling line to 
the enclosure shall be vented. 
34 The Engineer-in-charge shall notify Test Control that the area is safe and open 
the gates to the exclusion zone. 
35 If, as a result of the explosion, the rig is in a damaged condition and may be 
considered dangerous to personnel, warning signs should be issued advising 
such and action taken to make the rig safe. 
36 The Engineer-in-charge shall ensure that any buildings or cabins within the 
exclusion zone damaged during tests are inspected and any necessary actions 
undertaken such that they do not present a hazard to personnel. 
37 The attendees can leave the exclusion zone. 
38 Check data results. 
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Rig D 
1 Undertake safety checks, power on the data logging system and the gas mixing 
system, load the Wavecap software. 
2 Check all instrumentation is functioning correctly. 
3 Record the ambient temperature, pressure and humidity. 
4 Close the explosion vessel door (using a non-asbestos gasket), and tighten all 
bolts (sequence of opposites) using the 4R Torque Wrench set to 500 lbf.ft.  
5 Check all valves in the vessel are closed. 
6 Connect barocel pressure line to the vessel, open one of the ambient valves in 
the vessel (located in the front door) and record ambient pressure, temperature 
and humidity. 
7 Close the ambient valve and evacuate the vessel to 200 mbar. Allow pressure 
to settle. If pressure does not settle a special procedure is required to check for 
leak sources and the test should be abandoned if the leak is not found. 
8 Fill the vessel with the required test gas to reach the required concentration 
using the partial pressure method. 
9 Fill the vessel with air such that the gas/air mixture reaches atmospheric 
conditions (typically 1013.3 mbar). 
10 Disconnect barocel pressure line. 
11 Connect ignition lead and power spark box. 
12 Check the test room is clear of people and leave test room. 
13 Set time delay sequence in sequence generator 
14 RUN and ARM data logger 
15 Activate sequence in sequence generator (pressing START) 
16 Reset sequence generator and save data.  
17 Enter test room and disconnect ignition lead and power to spark box. 
18 Perform oxygen gas analysis. 
19 Purge the system: 
a. Turn on vacuum pump; 
b. Open evacuating valve; 
c. After two minutes open ambient valve in the vessel for combustion gas 
and clean air mixing under vacuum (no combustion gases can be 
discharged into the test room); 
d. After 10-15 minutes, stop vacuum pump. 
20 Open the explosion vessel door. 
21 Check data results. 
22 Inspect explosion vessel and equipment. 
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APPENDIX B 
Calculations of the Furniture Volume 
Table B-1 Furniture layout 1 (tests 8 – 11) 
Item 








1 Tall Lamp      
 Lamp shade Total cone 0.010497   
  Small cone 0.001416   
  Vol frustum 0.009081   
  Vol stand 0.000100   
  Total volume  ( ign base) 0.009181 1 0.009181 
2 Kitchen table chair Seat 0.004725   
  Back rest 0.003150   
  Legs 0.001350   
  Back rest supports 0.000675   
  Total volume 0.009900 4 0.039600 
3 Kitchen table Table top 0.022500   
  Legs 0.008250   
  Total volume 0.030750 1 0.030750 
4 Glasses (tumblers 35cl) Total volume 0.000350 5 0.001750 
5 Vase & flowers Cylinder 0.014451 1 0.014451 
6 Sofa Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.475200   
  Sides 0.234000   
  Back 0.540000   
  Total volume 1.249200 1 1.249200 
7 Small table Table top 0.004230   
  Legs 0.001500   
  Total volume 0.005730 1 0.005730 
8 Picture frame Total volume 0.000375 1 0.000375 
9 Small lamp Total cone 0.004562   
  Small cone 0.000003   
  Vol frustum 0.004558   
  Vol stand 0.001810   
  Total Volume  0.006368 1 0.006368 
10 Armchair Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.224400   
  Sides 0.234000   
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Item 








  Back 0.255000   
  Total volume 0.713400 1 0.713400 
11 Small table Table top 0.007600   
  Legs 0.000860   
  Total volume 0.008460 1 0.008460 
12 Stereo Stereo 0.033300   
  Speakers 0.014040   
  Total volume 0.047340 1 0.047340 
13 Flower table Table top 0.010925   
  Legs 0.000700   
  Total volume 0.011625 1 0.011625 
14 Glasses (15cl) Total volume 0.000150 3 0.000450 
15 Vase Cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
16 Fire surround Rectangle 0.163200 1 0.163200 
17 small lamp Total cone 0.007548   
  Small cone 0.000825   
  Vol frustum 0.006723   
  Vol stand 0.000126   
  Total Volume( ign base) 0.006849 1 0.006849 
18 Small clock Rectangle 0.001105 1 0.001105 
19 Vase Cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
20 stereo cabinet Rectangle 0.048298   
 drawers Rectangle 0.031668   
  Total volume 0.079966 1 0.079966 
21 Armchair Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.224400   
  Sides 0.234000   
  Back 0.255000   
  Total volume 0.713400 1 0.713400 
22 TV Rectangle 0.196365 1 0.196365 
      
 Room Total volume   3.3 m3 
  Chamber volume   68 m3 
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Table B-2 Furniture layout 2 (test 12) 
Item 








1 Tall Lamp      
 Lamp shade Total cone 0.010497   
  Small cone 0.001416   
  Vol frustum 0.009081   
  Vol stand 0.000100   
  Total volume  ( ign base) 0.009181 1 0.009181 
2 Kitchen table chair Seat 0.004725   
  Back rest 0.003150   
  Legs 0.001350   
  Back rest supports 0.000675   
  Total volume 0.009900 4 0.039600 
3 Kitchen table Table top 0.022500   
  Legs 0.008250   
  Total volume 0.030750 1 0.030750 
4 Glasses (tumblers 35cl) Total volume 0.000350 5 0.001750 
5 Vase & flowers Cylinder 0.014451 1 0.014451 
6 Sofa Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.475200   
  Sides 0.234000   
  Back 0.540000   
  Total volume 1.249200 1 1.249200 
8 Picture frame Total volume 0.000375 1 0.000375 
9 Small lamp Total cone 0.004562   
  Small cone 0.000003   
  Vol frustum 0.004558   
  Vol stand 0.001810   
  Total Volume  0.006368 1 0.006368 
12 Stereo Stereo 0.033300   
  Speakers 0.014040   
  Total volume 0.047340 1 0.047340 
13 Flower table Table top 0.010925   
  Legs 0.000700   
  Total volume 0.011625 1 0.011625 
14 Glasses (15cl) Total volume 0.000150 3 0.000450 
15 Vase Cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
16 Fire surround Rectangle 0.163200 1 0.163200 
17 small lamp Total cone 0.007548   
  Small cone 0.000825   
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Item 








  Vol frustum 0.006723   
  Vol stand 0.000126   
  Total Volume ( ign base) 0.006849 1 0.006849 
18 Small clock Rectangle 0.001105 1 0.001105 
19 Vase Cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
20 stereo cabinet Rectangle 0.048298   
 drawers Rectangle 0.031668   
  Total volume 0.079966 1 0.079966 
22 TV Rectangle 0.196365 1 0.196365 
      
 Room Total volume   1.9 m3 
  Chamber volume   68 m3 
  Volume blockage   3% 
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Table B-3 Furniture layout 3 (test 13) 
Item 








1 Tall Lamp      
 Lamp shade Total cone 0.010497   
  Small cone 0.001416   
  Vol frustum 0.009081   
  Vol stand 0.000100   
  Total volume  ( ign base) 0.009181 1 0.009181 
2 Kitchen table chair Seat 0.004725   
  Back rest 0.003150   
  Legs 0.001350   
  Back rest supports 0.000675   
  Total volume 0.009900 4 0.039600 
3 Kitchen table Table top 0.022500   
  Legs 0.008250   
  Total volume 0.030750 1 0.030750 
4 Glasses (tumblers 35cl) Total volume 0.000350 5 0.001750 
5 Vase & flowers Cylinder 0.014451 1 0.014451 
6 Sofa Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.475200   
  Sides 0.234000   
  Back 0.540000   
  Total volume 1.249200 1 1.249200 
8 Picture frame Total volume 0.000375 1 0.000375 
9 Small lamp Total cone 0.004562   
  Small cone 0.000003   
  Vol frustum 0.004558   
  Vol stand 0.001810   
10 Armchair Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.135000   
  Sides 0.432000   
  Back 0.216000   
  Total volume 0.783000 2 1.566000 
11 Small table Table top 0.007600   
  Legs 0.000860   
  Total volume 0.008460 1 0.008460 
12 Stereo Stereo 0.033300   
  Speakers 0.014040   
  Total volume 0.047340 1 0.047340 
13 Flower table Table top 0.010925   
  Legs 0.000700   
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Item 








  Total volume 0.011625 1 0.011625 
14 Glasses (15cl) Total volume 0.000150 3 0.000450 
15 Vase Cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
16 Fire surround Rectangle 0.163200 1 0.163200 
17 small lamp Total cone 0.007548   
  Small cone 0.000825   
  Vol frustum 0.006723   
  Vol stand 0.000126   
  Total Volume  ( ign base) 0.006849 1 0.006849 
18 Small clock Rectangle 0.001105 1 0.001105 
19 Vase Cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
20 stereo cabinet Rectangle 0.048298   
 drawers Rectangle 0.031668   
  Total volume 0.079966 1 0.079966 
22 TV Rectangle 0.196365 1 0.196365 
22 Sideboard model as rectangle 0.356250 1 0.356250 
23 Book case model as rectangle 0.197400 1 0.197400 
24 Tall glass unit model as two rectangles 0.900852 1 0.900852 
25 Single wooden unit model as rectangle 0.162000 1 0.162000 
26 Single glass unit model as rectangle 0.119070 1 0.119070 
27 Single floor unit model as rectangle 0.069540 1 0.069540 
      
 Room Total volume   5.2 m3 
  Chamber volume   68 m3 
  Volume blockage   8% 
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Table B-4 Furniture layout 4 (test 14 - 17) 
Item 








1 Tall Lamp      
 Lamp shade Total cone 0.010497   
  Small cone 0.001416   
  Vol frustum 0.009081   
  Vol stand 0.000100   
  Total volume  ( ign base) 0.009181 1 0.009181 
2 Kitchen table chair Seat 0.004725   
  Back rest 0.003150   
  Legs 0.001350   
  Back rest supports 0.000675   
  Total volume 0.009900 4 0.039600 
3 Kitchen table Table top 0.022500   
  Legs 0.008250   
  Total volume 0.030750 1 0.030750 
4 Glasses (tumblers 35cl) Total volume 0.000350 5 0.001750 
5 Vase & flowers Cylinder 0.014451 1 0.014451 
6 Sofa Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.515625   
  Sides 0.450000   
  Back 0.375000   
  Total volume 1.340625 1 1.340625 
8 Picture frame Total volume 0.000375 1 0.000375 
9 Small lamp Total cone 0.004562   
  Small cone 0.000003   
  Vol frustum 0.004558   
  Vol stand 0.001810   
  Total Volume ( ign base) 0.006849 1 0.006849 
10 Armchair Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.135000   
  Sides 0.432000   
  Back 0.216000   
  Total volume 0.783000 2 1.566000 
11 Small table Table top 0.007600   
  Legs 0.000860   
  Total volume 0.008460 1 0.008460 
12 Stereo Stereo 0.033300   
  Speakers 0.014040   
  Total volume 0.047340 1 0.047340 
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Item 








14 Glasses (15cl) Total volume 0.000150 3 0.000450 
15 Vase Cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
16 Fire surround Rectangle 0.163200 1 0.163200 
17 small lamp Total cone 0.007548   
  Small cone 0.000825   
  Vol frustum 0.006723   
  Vol stand 0.000126   
  Total Volume  ( ign base) 0.006849 1 0.006849 
18 Small clock Rectangle 0.001105 1 0.001105 
19 Vase Cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
20 stereo cabinet Rectangle 0.048298   
 drawers Rectangle 0.031668   
  Total volume 0.079966 1 0.079966 
22 TV Rectangle 0.196365 1 0.196365 
22 Sideboard model as rectangle 0.356250 1 0.356250 
24 Tall glass unit model as rectangle 0.391140 1 0.391140 
25 Single wooden unit model as rectangle 0.162000 1 0.162000 
26 Single glass unit model as rectangle 0.119070 1 0.119070 
27 Single floor unit model as rectangle 0.069540 1 0.069540 
      
 Room Total volume   5 m3 
  Chamber volume   68 m3 
  Volume blockage   7% 
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Table B-5 Effective Furniture layout 1 (tests 8 – 11) 
Item 








2 Kitchen table chair seat 0.004725   
  back rest 0.003150   
  legs 0.001350   
  back rest supports 0.000675   
  Total Volume 0.009900 4 0.039600 
6 Kitchen table tabletop 0.022500   
  legs 0.008250   
  Total volume 0.030750 1 0.030750 
7 Glasses (tumblers 35cl) Total volume 0.000350 5 0.001750 
8 Vase & flowers model as cylinder 0.014451 1 0.014451 
9 Sofa Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.475200   
  Sides 0.234000   
  Back 0.540000   
  Total volume 1.249200 1 1.249200 
13 Armchair Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.224400   
  Sides 0.234000   
  Back 0.255000   
  Total volume 0.713400 1 0.713400 
16 Flower table tabletop 0.010925   
  legs 0.000700   
  Total volume 0.011625 1 0.011625 
17 Glasses (15cl) Total volume 0.000150 3 0.000450 
18 Vase model as cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
24 Armchair Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.224400   
  Sides 0.234000   
  Back 0.255000   
  Total volume 0.713400 1 0.713400 
25 TV model as rectangle 0.196365 1 0.196365 
      
 Room Total volume   3.0 m3 
  Vessel volume   68 m3 
  Effective volume blockage   4% 
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Table B-6 Effective Furniture layout 2 (test 12) 
Item 








2 Kitchen table chair seat 0.004725   
  back rest 0.003150   
  legs 0.001350   
  back rest supports 0.000675   
  Total Volume 0.009900 4 0.039600 
6 Kitchen table tabletop 0.022500   
  legs 0.008250   
  Total volume 0.030750 1 0.030750 
7 Glasses (tumblers 35cl) Total volume 0.000350 5 0.001750 
8 Vase & flowers model as cylinder 0.014451 1 0.014451 
9 Sofa Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.475200   
  Sides 0.234000   
  Back 0.540000   
  Total volume 1.249200 1 1.249200 
16 Flower table tabletop 0.010925   
  legs 0.000700   
  Total volume 0.011625 1 0.011625 
17 Glasses (15cl) Total volume 0.000150 3 0.000450 
18 Vase model as cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
25 TV model as rectangle 0.196365 1 0.196365 
      
 Room Total volume   1.5 m3 
  Vessel volume   68 m3 
  Effective volume blockage   2% 
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Table B-7 Effective Furniture layout 3 (test 13) 
Item 








2 Kitchen table chair seat 0.004725   
  back rest 0.003150   
  legs 0.001350   
  back rest supports 0.000675   
  Total Volume 0.009900 4 0.039600 
6 Kitchen table tabletop 0.022500   
  legs 0.008250   
  Total volume 0.030750 1 0.030750 
7 Glasses (tumblers 35cl) Total volume 0.000350 5 0.001750 
8 Vase & flowers model as cylinder 0.014451 1 0.014451 
9 Sofa Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.475200   
  Sides 0.234000   
  Back 0.540000   
  Total volume 1.249200 1 1.249200 
13 Armchair Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.135000   
  Sides 0.432000   
  Back 0.216000   
  Total volume 0.783000 2 1.566000 
16 Flower table tabletop 0.010925   
  legs 0.000700   
  Total volume 0.011625 1 0.011625 
17 Glasses (15cl) Total volume 0.000150 3 0.000450 
18 Vase model as cylinder 0.004712 1 0.004712 
25 TV model as rectangle 0.196365 1 0.196365 
      
 Room Total volume   3.1 m3 
  Vessel volume   68 m3 
  Effective volume blockage   5%
 
 
455 Appendix B 
Table B-8 Effective Furniture layout 4 (tests 14 - 17) 
Item 








2 Kitchen table chair seat 0.004725   
  back rest 0.003150   
  legs 0.001350   
  back rest supports 0.000675   
  Total Volume 0.009900 4 0.039600 
6 Kitchen table tabletop 0.022500   
  legs 0.008250   
  Total volume 0.030750 1 0.030750 
7 Glasses (tumblers 35cl) Total volume 0.000350 5 0.001750 
8 Vase & flowers model as cylinder 0.014451 1 0.014451 
13 Armchair Rectangle 1 (seat) 0.135000   
  Sides 0.432000   
  Back 0.216000   
  Total volume 0.783000 2 1.566000 
25 TV model as rectangle 0.196365 1 0.196365 
      
  Total volume   2 m3 
  Vessel volume   68 m3 
  Volume blockage   3% 
 
